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Chapter 11
Communal Feeding in War Time:
British Restaurants, 1940–1947
Peter J. Atkins

Introduction

When asked to comment on the London County Council’s (LCC) plans for a history of wartime efforts to feed the capital’s blitzed population, one insider commented that ‘the story is worth telling .. we are recording an epic in history’.¹ Although this history was unfortunately never published, for subsequent generations food has always played an important part in imagining the experience of the nation at war.² Much of the literature has focused upon the supply chain (‘dig for victory’, ‘the national farm’, import shortages) or rationing and its impact upon diet and nutrition. This leaves a gap for the present paper in the area of communal feeding. I will look at the curious and somewhat misunderstood institution of the British Restaurant (BR), which operated from 1941 to 1947 and arguably achieved notoriety far beyond its numerical significance. In 1942 one commentator perceptively observed that BRs ‘may be said to have started as an improvisation and to continue as a compromise’.³ The implication of this statement is of a lack of strategic foresight, yet there were some positive outcomes that are worth looking at, and also some unintended consequences.

This chapter is divided into four parts. First, the origins and development of BRs are analysed, particularly with regard to the rhetoric and hidden purposes of the Ministry of Food (MF) and of political interests generally. Second, I will briefly introduce a regional perspective, which, as far as I am aware, has not been attempted before. Third, I will show that pulling together for the war effort was not a feature of the catering sector, where vitriolic criticism was made of the government’s communal feeding policies. Fourth, there is consideration of the food served in BRs.

The historiography of BRs is interesting in its own right. R.J. Hammond in his official three volume history of wartime food control devotes a whole chapter to

¹ London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), LCC/RC/GEN/1/1: E.A. Hartill, 13 January 1944.
² Although the LCC history remained in draft, the official war history did provide three volumes on food, authored by R.J. Hammond.
³ Anon. 1942: 675.
the restaurants and this remains the most detailed account. Hammond’s approach shows a welcome irreverence towards the decision-making process of government and reveals tensions and rivalries within and between ministries. There is a degree of what one might call ‘creative chaos under fire’ in his narrative, especially in the early years when air raids threatened to cause widespread dislocation. Writing in the 1950s, Hammond presumably had access to the relevant civil servants and their ‘inside stories’, and certainly some of his interpretations go well beyond the evidence that has survived in the papers of the MF. Since Hammond there has been little of a critical nature written about BRs, although we have a contextualized commentary by Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska and, more recently, a book by James Vernon that touches on communal feeding.

Origins and Development

According to the official war history, early plans for emergency feeding were inchoate. The idea of reviving the National Kitchens that had figured in the First World War was soon dropped. There appears to have been some bickering between ministries about who should take on the responsibility of feeding in the event of enemy attacks. In the spring of 1940 the advent of Lord Woolton as Minister of Food, and then Churchill as Prime Minister, was something of a turning point. By July an experiment was being conducted by the MF on a working-class housing estate in North Kensington. Over 2,000 hot meals per week were cooked on simple ranges, as well as electric and gas cookers; potato peeling machines; electric washing machines; refrigerators and insulated containers; sinks, scales, saucepans and furniture, as well as electric and gas cookers; potato peeling machines; electric washing machines; refrigerators and insulated containers; sinks, scales, saucepans and furniture. The pricing formula was ‘cost of food + 25 per cent + ½d for fuel’, working out at an affordable 9d or 10d for a two-course meal.

In November 1940 provincial local authorities were circulated, asking them to consider setting up what were now to be called Community Kitchens. By the end of the year these had been established in major cities such as Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle upon Tyne. Progress was slow at first but the spread of air raids concentrated the minds of councils, as did the minister’s offer of financial assistance.

Churchill disliked terminology such as ‘Communal Feeding Centre’ and ‘Community Kitchen’ as redolent of Communism and the workhouse’. In March 1941 he suggested the name ‘British Restaurant’ because the word ‘restaurant’ is associated positively in people’s minds with ‘a good meal’. One modern branding professional sees this in retrospect as the masterstroke of someone who instinctively understood the difference between product and brand.

The process of setting up BRs was fairly bureaucratic. At first the ministry insisted on approving all applications from the centre and the paperwork often took months, involving the allocation of equipment, requisition of buildings and recruitment of staff. To short-cut this process, some local authorities decided to open their own communal restaurants, as did voluntary organizations such as

8 Titmuss 1950: 346.
9 LMA, LCC/RC/GEN/1/1, ‘LCC, Meals Services, Origin of the Service, [1944]’.
10 TNA, MAF 83/382, MAF 99/1796.
12 Memo to Minister of Food, 21 March 1941, Churchill 1950: 663.
14 Some sample documents have been preserved for Barrow-in-Furness and other places, see TNA, MAF 99/1684–6.
15 Equipment was scheduled under 150 different headings, including solid fuel ranges, as well as electric and gas cookers; potato peeling machines; electric washing machines; refrigerators and insulated containers; sinks, scales, saucepans and furniture, TNA, MAF 74/49.
16 From May, 1941, Divisional Food Officers were given this power.
the National Council of Social Service and the Women’s Voluntary Services. The advantage of being inside the official system was that all capital costs were reimbursed. The disadvantage was that ministry officials continued to micro-manage, such as suggesting menus, monitoring food quality and insisting on each outlet being financially self-supporting.18

Most BRs were run on the cafeteria principle.19 The diners bought tickets and then queued up and chose food from a series of hot plates. From May 1941 onwards a number of cooking depots were set up around the country in order to supply food in bulk to the BRs and schools in that locality. My estimate is that about 10 per cent of BR meals were supplied in this way and, surprisingly perhaps, the quality was said to have been indistinguishable from the meals prepared on site.20

BRs received allowances for rationed foods on the same scale as commercial catering establishments, although the quantities were higher where at least 60 per cent of the clientele were industrial workers, especially for those in Category B – heavy manual labour (Table 11.1).21 BRs were just one element of a broad government wartime food policy, which can be divided into the systematic (rationing, welfare foods, milk in schools) and the practical. The latter included provisions for day-to-day feeding (BRs, school canteens, factory and pithead canteens, and a rural pie scheme) and emergency feeding (cooking depots, emergency meals centres, rest centres, air raid shelter canteens, Queen’s Messenger Convoys, and other mobile canteens).22 This system was administered by three ministries, namely Food, Education and Labour.

As a result of this complexity, the term ‘British Restaurant’ was confusingly vague. We have already mentioned the dining rooms set up under the MF’s scheme. These were supplemented by the LCC’s LMS, by other local authority schemes and by restaurants set up by voluntary organizations. All of these counted in official statistics as BRs but they often had no direct connexion with the government. In addition, evacuee feeding centres were sometimes rebranded as BRs, as were school canteens that served meals on a daily basis to the general public.23

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17 For instance Bournemouth, Eastbourne, Hastings, Hull, Newcastle, Oxford and Wolverhampton.
18 Food quality was a sensitive issue. Woolton was anxious for his staff to remember ‘the Ministry’s prestige was very closely associated with the efficiency of British Restaurants [and] he was anxious that the quality of the service and other meals served should be maintained at a higher level’, TNA, MAF 99/1716, memo by Mr Harwood, 27 October 1941.
19 TNA, MAF 74/49.
20 TNA, MAF 99/1734, City of Birmingham, Reconstruction Committee, ‘British Restaurant Enquiry, September 11 to October 6, 1944’.
21 Pyke 1944b: 231, TNA, MAF 74/49.
23 These were the result of deals done with the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education, TNA, MAF 74/49.
24 The Ministry began pressurizing local authorities in 1940 but this ceased in 1943, TNA, MAF 99/1759.
price. Such people include those whose incomes have fallen, old age pensioners, and others with small fixed incomes, women engaged in war work, men whose wives and families have evacuated, and evacuated persons who have difficulties owing to limited domestic accommodation. School children are also catered for in a number of restaurants and this service is likely to expand very considerably.25

A possible reading of this statement is that BRs were a form of infilling where factory canteens were not provided, for instance in industrial districts dominated by workshops, and where local education authorities were not supplying school dinners.

Related to this was an economy of scale argument. Resources of various kinds were of course in short supply in wartime and BRs were said to economise on fuel to cook meals and labour to prepare and serve them.26 Hidden beneath was the point that, where communal facilities were available within easy walking distance, it became difficult for housewives to resist the call to work on the grounds that their domestic labour was irreplaceable. Nutrition was also frequently cited as a justification for government-sanctioned feeding schemes. Dieticians were used in formulating menus and the ministry deployed scientific expertise to analyse the content of meals. BRs were therefore a small cog in the larger engine of food policy that strove to improve health and working efficiency.

Second, the political case for BRs was partly ideological and partly tied to wartime strategy. The first element was the subject of an unseen struggle in the wartime coalition government between Conservatives, such as Woolton, and those on the left. The latter constantly stressed that 'the restaurants are used mainly by the working classes and the lower paid professional and clerical classes'.27 Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, frequently demanded an expansion of industrial canteens,28 whereas Woolton maintained that 'there is ... no restriction in admittance to British restaurants; they are open to all members of the public'.29 Woolton's justification for this was that BRs were intended for those involved in war work, and that this was not restricted to fighting or making munitions. They should therefore equally be open to shop assistants, office workers and housewives. Others, from the right, saw communal feeding as 'entirely abhorrent to the British way of life' and this divide was later to be a live political issue when the war ended but BRs continued.30

A decision was made early on in the war not to close down commercial restaurants or to charge the food they served against people's rations.31 Following on from this there was the oft heard accusation of waste and 'luxury feeding' in expensive restaurants. In a sense, BRs were a balancing measure, giving equivalent access, off the ration, to people who would otherwise have been unable to afford to eat out. There was a deliberate policy to make eating in a BR an uplifting experience. The décor was lightened and even details such as the font of the lettering on notices were discussed. A few restaurants had live music and many had art, either newly painted murals or specially chosen prints. In short, here was a vehicle for raising morale. BR customers, according to a survey in Birmingham, seem to have appreciated the food, the service, and the 'homely' atmosphere.32

London and the Regions

In 1942 most local authorities with populations over 50,000 (mostly County and Municipal Boroughs) had adopted the BR idea. In the band 10,000 to 50,000 it was about a half, and a quarter for those authorities under 10,000.33 Twelve local authorities had ten or more restaurants open each, and London dominated with a quarter to a third of BRs nationally.34 Table 11.2 shows regional variations at the scale of the Food Office District. For the sake of comparison, some data is included on commercial catering premises from a census by the MF in 1940.

Although it was anticipated that the enemy would bomb vital installations and maybe civilian targets, plans to deal with the consequences were slow to recognize the need to feed displaced populations. Communal feeding in various guises was encouraged but the MF throughout the war avoided centralized compulsion. Instead they relied upon persuading local authorities to take responsibility for the particular circumstances of their area. This amounted to a redefinition of the role of the local state.

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25 TNA, MAF 99/1589, Ministry of Food, 'Memorandum on British Restaurants', [1941].
26 TNA, MAF 74/49, Ministry of Food, Public Relations Division, Information Branch, 'British Restaurants', 3 September 1943.
27 TNA, MAF 99/1590-94, monthly reports on British Restaurants to the War Cabinet.
28 Hammond 1956: 390.
29 TNA, MAF 99/1589, Ministry of Food, 'Memorandum on British Restaurants', [1941].
30 Ernest Burdett in Morgan et al. 1946: 515.
31 Woolton 1959: 220. This was different from the decision made in Germany to deduct café meals from ration quotas, Anderson 1943: 27.
32 TNA, MAF 99/1734, A 1944 survey of the British Restaurants in Birmingham found that the vast majority of the 1530 people questioned were favourably disposed.
33 TNA, MAF 152/55.
34 TNA, MAF 74/49.
Table 11.2 The Regional Pattern of British Restaurants and Civic Restaurants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population per catering establishment, 1940</th>
<th>Population per British Restaurant, 1941</th>
<th>Numbers of British Restaurants, 1941</th>
<th>Civic Restaurants, 1948</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern I</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>14,659</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern II</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>16,061</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>13,736</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>79,329</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>16,927</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>16,432</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>23,335</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>57,832</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>19,708</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>8,794</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>16,429</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>22,932</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>231,425</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>34,615</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>20,910</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: TNA, MAF 74/49; MAF 83/382; MAF 99/519; MAF 99/1589.

Initially there was some irritation in the Ministry at the attitude of some local authorities. Despite the inducements offered in the form of capital grants, guarantees against operating losses and professional advice on practical details, 'the vast majority' of councils by early 1941 had not welcomed the idea. The reaction was said to have 'varied from true passive resistance to lukewarm acquiescence... The general retort to any approach ... has been that a demand ... does not exist in that particular town.' Town clerks apparently 'seized on any pretext for delay' and were especially exercised by the lack of a clear legal framework for action, for instance in the requisitioning of premises. This excuse disappeared on 28 January 1941 with the making of the Local Authorities (Community Kitchens) Order under Regulation 54B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. Nevertheless the government's non-aggressive policy was restated in a circular letter the following month:

The Minister of Food does not wish to cause local authorities to set up Community Kitchens when the need does not exist, the intention of the Order is solely to give adequate authority for the establishment of Community Kitchens where there is need for them.

In view of the resistance and apathy in some areas, it is not at all surprising that there was a great deal of geographical variation in implementation. Local politics in Manchester, for instance, were said never to have been favourable to BR. When pressed the city authorities preferred to open outlets in the suburbs rather than in the city centre. By contrast, Liverpool, Birmingham and Bristol bought into the concept at an early date and made substantial local provision. Even London had...

35 Biddle 1942: 83.
36 French 1943, Q.2855, made it clear that the Ministry considered the route of direct control: 'after all, we are a very large trading organization'.
38 TNA, MAF 99/1609.
39 Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1944.
40 TNA, MAF 99/1759, Memorandum, 'Establishment of British Restaurants', [1942].
great diversity. The boroughs varied in their initiative and enthusiasm to the extent that Chelsea and Poplar had one restaurant per 8,000 people, whereas Stepney had one per 70,000.41 Ellen Leopold attributes this at least partly to civil defence planning which encouraged the oversupply of facilities in west London for the benefit of evacuees who would have gone there from the south coast in the event of an invasion.42 Towns responded differently to the BR idea. Many were happy with a pared down version that meant trestle tables and benches, while for others the presentation of what they saw as a ‘social service’ was at the core of their civic pride. An example is the degree to which the price of meals (mostly lunch) were subsidized. In 1944, for instance, the vast majority were charged at 8d or 9d, but a quarter of authorities opted for less and some insisted on as much as 1s.43

Commercial Resistance to Civic Entrepreneurship

One explanation for geographical variations was the power of chambers of commerce in many localities. On behalf of the catering trade, the chambers opposed central interference in the free market under the cover of war measures. Private caterers objected that they could not produce a meal equivalent to that in BRs at a comparable price. A confidential estimate by the MF in 1946 was that a standard cafeteria meal costing 1s 3d in a BR was at least 1s 10d in a Lyons outlet.44

The official war history reveals the advantages enjoyed by BRs.45 They benefited in effect from interest-free loans and the guaranteed write-off of any operating losses that were not too excessive. Their equipment was purchased centrally. They received professional advice on sites, equipment and food standards from ministry officials. To some extent this was balanced by the fact that many were in unsuitable premises, serving restricted menus, and with costs inflated by the payment of wages approved by the Joint Industrial Council that were above the catering industry norm. Direct comparisons with the private sector are therefore difficult. On 12 January 1942 Woolton met with a deputation from the catering trade. He promised to look at representations about proposals for any new restaurants that were said to be unnecessary in view of existing commercial provision. This was repeated in an answer to a parliamentary question two weeks later.46

Profitability was variable. In the financial year 1942–3, after allowing for the amortization of capital, 698 local authorities running BRs achieved a net profit and this was repeated in 1943–4.47 After the war, Gilbert Sugden found that civic restaurants were still mostly profitable in 1947–8, although some care is needed with his conclusions because authorities running loss-making portfolios of restaurants were forced to close them down.48 This happened most famously to the LCC, whose costs soared, particularly due to rising rents in the city centre.

Opinions about alternatives were explored in the wartime social survey. In February 1943 a stratified sample of 4490 industrial workers found that 42 per cent had lunch at home, 22 used a canteen, 19 per cent ate sandwiches, and 11 per cent frequented cafés.49 A 1944 survey of BR customers in Birmingham found that 62.6 per cent of respondents saw going home as their main option, and 11.2 per cent would have eaten sandwiches. Only 3.8 per cent considered a private restaurant or café.50 Convenience seems to have been a major factor since over half of customers travelled five minutes or less for their meal and 91 per cent for 15 minutes or less. Clearly this would not have been possible in cities with fewer outlets than Birmingham.51 One argument in favour of BRs was that they had played their part in the enormous increase during the war of eating out. On balance it was therefore likely that they had helped to increase trade for catering generally rather than competing with the private sector.52

The Food in British Restaurants

The MF from the outset thought carefully about the nutritional standard of meals served at BRs. In March, 1941, ministry dieticians prepared sets of menus, taking into account regional preferences, such as in Scotland.53 The same year a booklet entitled Canteen Catering was issued. It listed standard and special recipes, with suggestions for alternatives where supplies were short or variable.

Generally speaking, the food in BRs was said to be of good quality and filling.54 There were some attempts to introduce meals in the Oslo style, with the intention of providing in one sitting all of the day’s needs for animal protein, vitamins and minerals.55 But this met with resistance from customers who wanted their

41 LMA, LCC/RC/GEN/1/26.
43 TNA, MAF 99/1797.
46 Hansard 377, 28 January 1942, c. 717.
47 TNA, MAF 99/1609.
48 Sugden 1949.
49 Box and Thomas 1944: 162.
50 These data are at odds with a London survey in 1943, where the percentages were 24, 27, and 18 respectively. No doubt the longer commuting distances in the big city will have been a factor. London Council of Social Service 1943: 17.
51 TNA, MAF 99/1734, City of Birmingham, Reconstruction Committee, ‘British Restaurant Enquiry, September 11 to October 6, 1944’.
53 TNA, MAF 74/49.
54 They were said to be superior to those served in the restaurants of the Sorbonne, in Paris, The Times, 22 February 1947, 6.
55 Pyke 1944a: 92.
traditional meat and two vegetables. In Birmingham all 56 BRs had a choice of five meat dishes, five vegetables and five desserts, and those in the city centre had more. In other cities with less on offer, menus had to be removed from the entrances because customers would ‘wander from one to another and the restaurant serving roast attracted the customer’.

A meeting was held in June 1942 to request the collaboration of universities and research institutes around the country. In the chair, Dr Magnus Pyke, of the MF’s Scientific Adviser’s Division, suggested a start with work on the vitamin C content of canteen meals. This was because restrictions on fruit intake transferred the onus of delivering vitamin C on to vegetables, and especially cabbage. There was concern that mass catering, particularly the use of hot cupboards, was destructive of this vitamin, so the research results were eagerly anticipated. It had initially been planned that a main meal in a BR would provide one third of the day’s energy needs. In practice, the survey found (Table 11.3) about 22 per cent of recommended calories in an average BR lunch. This was partly because the use of potatoes as a substitute for bread gave meals a bulky and unappetizing appearance. Vitamin C was low in winter.

### Table 11.3 The Nutritional Content of British Restaurant Meals in February 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>1000 k cals</td>
<td>626 k cals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein</td>
<td>24 g.</td>
<td>22 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcium</td>
<td>270 mg.</td>
<td>186 mg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>8 mg.</td>
<td>4-9 mg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin A</td>
<td>200 i.u.</td>
<td>1000 i.u.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin B₂</td>
<td>200 i.u.</td>
<td>136 i.u.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin C</td>
<td>50 mg.</td>
<td>28-49 mg. (seasonal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riboflavin</td>
<td>0.9 mg.</td>
<td>0.3-0.9 mg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicotinic acid</td>
<td>12 mg.</td>
<td>7 mg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, MAF 256/197.

Conclusion

An occasional trope in the confidential papers of the MF was of sympathy for the plight of women and the promotion of BRs and other forms of communal feeding as means of easing the burden of domesticity. But feminist research, while acknowledging women’s vital role in wartime industry, rejects institutions such as communal feeding as of any long-term significance. Their facilitating role was minimal since the expectation upon working women was now of a double burden that included a return to all of the pre-war commitment to cooking and child care.

What then of the other achievements of the MF’s BR policy? The functional arguments that I referred to above were modest in their outcome. The best we can say is that at the height of the war about half a million people a day (including children) received a cheap but nutritious meal that supplemented their rations. This filled a small niche in industrial feeding, particularly in the workshop cities such as Birmingham, but maybe less so in factory cities such as Manchester, where works canteens bore the burden.

Three methods of quantifying this impact were used at the time. The first, as used by the MF, was to look at the allocation of rationed foodstuffs such as meat, as a surrogate measure. On this basis it was calculated that, in August 1941, BRs received 3.7 per cent of the catering total. Second, various estimates were made of the number of meals served. Again in 1941, BRs were calculated to have managed only 0.9 per cent of total, with commercial restaurants at 38.3 per cent, and industrial canteens at 14.5 per cent. A 1942 version of the latter, given in a parliamentary answer, revealed somewhat different figures at 1.8, 57.1, and 41.0 per cent respectively. And a retrospective enquiry at the end of the war found that BRs were providing 3.5 per cent of main meals in January 1942, rising to 7.5 per cent by March 1944. The third approach was to ask the consumers where they ate. The wartime social survey in February 1943 found that only 2 per cent ate in BRs. This is probably the most reliable figure. The instability in the data above is due to the definition of a ‘meal’, which on some occasions included tea or snacks, but on others was restricted to cooked main meals. Overall, we can say with confidence that BRs contributed only marginally to wartime feeding.

The more intangible political considerations are a little more positive. Most importantly perhaps, BRs contributed to a debate about communal feeding that continued after the war, but which ultimately ran into the sand at the mid-1950s.
political hinge point with the abolition of rationing in 1954 and entrenchment of Conservative ideals at the 1955 general election.

References


