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Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth.

Cozzi, Guido and Galli, Silvia (2012) 'Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth.', Working Paper. Durham University, Durham.


The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We focus on two issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We argue that in a common law system an explictly dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. We also provide a simple "rule of thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Keywords:Endogenous growth, Basic and applied R&D, Endogenous technological change, Common law. JEL classifcation: O31 O33 O34.
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Status:Not peer-reviewed
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Record Created:07 Dec 2012 10:36
Last Modified:16 Oct 2013 13:22

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