Innovating Like China: a Theory of Stage-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights*

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January 2012

Abstract

Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese economy to simulate the optimal path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of the patent system in China. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence based on a dynamic panel regression to support the key mechanism in our theoretical model.

JEL classification: O31, O34, O40

Keywords: economic growth, stage-dependent intellectual property rights

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*We are grateful to Elias Dinopoulos, Rachel Griffith, Oleksandr Talavera, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and seminar participants at the University of Durham, the University of Hull, and the University of Mainz for very helpful comments and suggestions.
"China and others are entering the tricky middle-income stage of development in which the big advances from absorbing rich-world technology start to run out."

The Economist (2011)\(^1\)

1 Introduction

In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the implementation of a modern intellectual property rights (IPR) system in China was subject to intense debates.\(^2\) Proponents including Deng Xiaopeng, the paramount leader of China at that time, saw the creation of a modern IPR system in China as a necessary means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to provide incentives for domestic innovation. In 1982, the first intellectual property law under the leadership of Deng was drafted in China. Then, through a series of policy reforms, the strength of patent rights in China increased over time. For example, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China gradually increased from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005.\(^3\) In 1992, the statutory term of patent in China was lengthened from 15 years to 20 years.\(^4\) Then, in compliance with the TRIPS agreement,\(^5\) China reformed its patent system again in 2000.\(^6\) Recently, the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was approved in December 2008 and came into effect in October 2009 with the objective of building China into an innovative country with well-protected IPR by 2020.\(^7\) In addition to strengthening patent rights, China also improved the protection for trade secrets by developing a comprehensive set of laws and regulations over the last two decades.\(^8\) In a recent report issued by NERA Economic Consulting, Sepetys and Cox (2009, p. 3) nicely summarize the evolution of IPR in China.

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\(^1\) The Economist, "The world economy: Catching up is very hard to do". September 24th - 30th, 2011.

\(^2\) See for example Allison and Lin (1999) and La Croix and Konan (2002) for a discussion on the historical development of IPR in China.

\(^3\) The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights. See Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed description of this patent index.

\(^4\) As for the term of patent for utility model and design patents, it was lengthened from 5 years to 10 years. Also, this patent reform expanded patentable subject matter in China.

\(^5\) The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In summary, TRIPS establishes a minimum level of IPR protection that must be provided by all member countries.

\(^6\) The policy changes include (a) providing patentholders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction against the infringing party before filing a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages, (c) affirming that state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent application process, examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. See for example Hu and Jefferson (2009) for an empirical analysis on this patent reform in China.

\(^7\) See for example Yang and Yen (2010) for a review of the policy changes in this third amendment. In summary, the changes aim at (a) promoting patent applications, (b) encouraging exploitation of jointly owned patents, (c) heightening patentability requirement, (d) increasing statutory damages and administrative fines, (e) clarifying the granting of compulsory licenses, and (f) establishing protection for genetic resources.

\(^8\) See for example Zuber (2008) for a discussion on the protection of trade secrets in China and the US.
as follows.

In the early stages of development, with limited resources and limited capacity for research and development, there may be little or no IPR protection. Domestic industry will be characterized by imitation rather than innovation. Imitation allows for low-cost production, low prices for goods and services, and the stimulation of consumption and employment. A weak IPR regime may support technological growth and development through imitation in early stages of development. At subsequent stages of development, however, a weak IPR regime discourages domestic innovation. Innovation and technological development are drivers of economic growth. Economies that succeed in shifting into knowledge-based production are characterized by domestic innovation, typically supported with well-designed and adequately enforced IPR laws.

In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic model to formalize this insight on the evolution of IPR in developing countries using China as a timely example. For example, one objective of China’s twelfth five-year plan (2011-2015) is to shift its reliance on foreign technology to domestic innovation. A recent study by Li (2010) provides an interesting case-study analysis on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to demonstrate that China is in the process of transforming from an imitation-oriented economy to an innovation-oriented economy and that strengthening patent rights can play an important role in facilitating this transformation process. This finding is consistent with the implication of our theoretical analysis.

To analyze stage-dependent IPR for a developing country at different stages of development, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through FDI. We show that the model features an inverted-U effect of patent strength on domestic innovation under a certain parameter space. The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, increasing patent strength has a direct positive effect on domestic innovation by reducing imitation. On the other hand, the reduction in imitation leads to an increase in FDI that strengthens the displacement effect of foreign technologies on domestic innovation. As for the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strengths of IPR protection, we show that they are stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation of foreign technologies. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Finally, we also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese economy to simulate the optimal path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country
evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this result is consistent with the actual evolution of the patent system in China.

This study relates to the literature on IPR and economic growth. This literature focuses on an important issue that is optimal IPR protection. An early study by Nordhaus (1969) finds that the optimal patent length should balance between static distortionary effects of markup pricing and dynamic gains from enhanced innovation. In a dynamic general-equilibrium model, Judd (1985) finds that the optimal patent length is infinite while Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) find that the optimal patent length can be finite in a version of the Romer model. Kwan and Lai (2003) show that extending the effective lifetime of patent would lead to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare whereas Li (2001) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the effects of patent breadth on R&D and economic growth. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2011) analyze the effects of rent protection activities on innovation. Chu (2009) analyzes the effects of blocking patents on R&D and welfare. Recently, Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011) consider optimal state-dependent patent protection based on the endogenous technological gap between the leader and followers in an industry. However, this literature rarely considers optimal IPR protection in developing countries in which economic growth is driven by imitation and transfer of foreign technologies in addition to domestic innovation. We fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the optimal strength of IPR protection in a developing country at different stages of economic development.

Our study also relates to the literature on IPR and North-South product cycles. A key question in this literature is whether strengthening Southern IPR protection would stimulate or stifle Northern innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) develop a North-South product-cycle model and find that strengthening Southern IPR protection either has no effect or a surprisingly negative effect on Northern innovation. Lai (1998) shows that whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative effect on Northern innovation depends on the mode of technology transfer (i.e., imitation versus FDI) while Glass and Wu (2007) argue that the effect also depends on the type of technological innovation (i.e., quality improvement versus variety expansion). Instead of analyzing the effects of Southern IPR protection on Northern innovation, the present study considers a much less explored issue that is optimal IPR protection in the South as a function of its technology distance from the North.

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10 Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases (increases) Southern imitation, which is similar to the effects of IPR protection.
An influential study by Grossman and Lai (2004) considers globally optimal IPR protection in an open-economy model featuring both developed and developing countries that have asymmetric innovative capability and market size. The present study differs from Grossman and Lai (2004) by considering a model in which (a) economic growth in the developing country is driven by both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer and (b) the relative importance of innovation and technology transfer changes endogenously as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier. These two features together imply that optimal IPR protection should be stage-dependent, which is an important property that is absent in all the abovementioned studies.

Finally, this study relates to the literature on distance to frontier and convergence; see for example Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Gersbach et al. (2011). Our study relates to this literature by considering IPR as a specific economic institution and shows that IPR policy can be an important policy variable that affects the convergence of developing countries. Finally, our study relates to a recent study by Wu (2010), who also considers the effects of IPR protection on the convergence of developing countries using a Schumpeterian model of distance to frontier. While Wu (2010) focuses on the existence of non-convergence traps, our study differs from his interesting analysis by characterizing the optimal path of IPR protection in developing countries and considering multiple channels of foreign technology transfer through FDI and imitation.

The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 analyzes stage-dependent IPR protection. Section 5 considers two extensions of the baseline model. The final section concludes with a discussion.

2 Stylized facts

In this section, we document some stylized facts about the effects of IPR protection on economic growth. In the empirical literature, it is well known that the growth effects of IPR protection differ across developed and developing countries; see for example Park (2008b) for a survey. In the following empirical framework, instead of treating developed and developing countries as separate groups, we use a distance-to-frontier variable to capture the degree of economic development as a continuous variable and find that it indeed has an interactive effect with IPR on economic growth.

Specifically, we consider an unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2005 for 92 countries. We include all countries with available data for each variable in at least some years during this period.
obtain data on labor productivity relative to the US (i.e., US relative productivity is normalized to one) from the Penn World Table, and this variable, relative labor productivity (RLP), inversely measures the distance to frontier. To capture the strength of IPR, we consider the standard Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, which is available with one observation every 5 years for each country. We consider the following empirical specification.

\[ \text{growth}_{i,t+1} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 IPR_{i,t} + \delta_2 RLP_{i,t} + \delta_3 RLP_{i,t} + \Gamma \chi_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \]

where \( \text{growth}_{i,t+1} \) is the growth rate of per capita GDP in country \( i \), that is \( \ln GDP_{i,t+1} - \ln GDP_{i,t} \). Vector \( \chi_{i,t} \) denotes standard control variables including (a) education measured by the average years of schooling from the Barro-Lee data set, (b) the degree of openness measured by the sum of export and import over GDP from the Penn World Table, (c) an index of economic freedom from the annual report of Economic Freedom of the World, (d) country fixed effects and (e) period fixed effects. Differentiating growth with respect to IPR, we have

\[ \frac{\partial \text{growth}_{i,t+1}}{\partial IPR_{i,t}} = \delta_1 + \delta_2 RLP_{i,t}. \]

Our main finding is that \( \delta_1 < 0 \) and \( \delta_2 > 0 \). In other words, for a country that is far away from the world technology frontier (i.e., a small \( RLP_{i,t} \)), the effect of IPR on growth is negative. For a country that is close to the world technology frontier (i.e., a large \( RLP_{i,t} \)), the effect of IPR on growth becomes positive. In the theoretical analysis, our main result of stage-dependent optimal IPR policy is based on this important property that the positive growth effect of IPR strengthens relative to the negative growth effect as a country evolves towards the technology frontier, for which we provide empirical evidence here.

We have considered a number of estimation techniques. The results are summarized in Table 1, in which the dependent variable is \( \text{growth}_{i,t+1} \).
The first column of Table 1 reports the coefficients of the country fixed effects estimation, whereas the second column also includes period effects, which may reflect technical progress and business cycle components common to all countries, in addition to the persistent country-specific aspects such as geography, institutions, and initial efficiencies. Both country and period fixed effects are jointly significant with p-value lower than 1%. Similarly, country dummies are significant given period dummies, and period dummies are significant given country dummies. We have also performed Hausman tests based on the difference between fixed effects and random effects, which reject the random effects specification at less than 1% significance. To partially correct for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, we have also reported in the third column the 2-stage least square coefficients for which the...
instruments are the lagged independent variables. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of the coefficients change much.

We have also undertaken dynamic panel estimations, in which the dependent variable is \( \ln GDP_{i,t} \), while \( \ln GDP_{i,t-1} \) is one of the regressors, along with \( IPR_{i,t-1} \), \( RLP_{i,t-1} \), \( IPR_{i,t-1} \ast RLP_{i,t-1} \), and other controls. In this formulation, the growth rate is implicitly obtained as \( \ln GDP_{i,t} - \ln GDP_{i,t-1} \). As well known since Caselli et al. (1996), in this kind of dynamic panel growth regressions there are serious omitted variable and endogeneity problems. Most notably, the current value of \( \ln GDP_{i,t} \) is explained by its lagged value, \( \ln GDP_{i,t-1} \), which is necessarily correlated with the fully persistent country fixed effects\(^{12}\). Moreover, most of the other explanatory variables are typically endogenous or predetermined (see Caselli et al. 1996). Both problems lead to biased and inconsistent OLS estimators, and this issue is commonly addressed by estimating first-differenced equations and instrumenting the first differences of the endogenous right hand side variables with the levels of the variables lagged two periods and more, and using GMM. We have undertaken regressions using different versions of the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) first-differenced GMM estimators which in general confirm our main results. However, this estimator, may not perform well if variables are persistent, as remarked by Bond et al. (2001), because the lagged levels are weak instruments for future first-differences\(^{13}\). In this case, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM estimator\(^{14}\) is a more appropriate estimator\(^{15}\). Since all our variables are very persistent\(^{16}\), we have undertaken Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM estimations in order to check for robustness. As the reader can see\(^{17}\), despite the dynamic panel specification, the coefficients of the main explanatory variables, which are reported in the fourth column of Table 1, are roughly in line with those of the static panel regressions of the first three columns. The diagnostic tests are as expected, with overidentification restrictions accepted

\(^{12}\)This is a case of the general dynamic panel bias highlighted by Nickell (1981).

\(^{13}\)In our attempts with Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM regressions, once eliminating instrument proliferation using STATA’s collapse command and all possible lag restrictions, we have always obtained lagged per capita GDP coefficients that are lower than those of the corresponding Within Groups estimators, which is known to be biased downward. This is a powerful tool to detect bias in first-differenced GMM, as recommended in the growth literature by Bond et al. (2001).

\(^{14}\)This estimator complements Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM by instrumenting the level equations using the lagged first-differences of the series, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995).

\(^{15}\)A relevant point has been made by Bobba and Coviiello (2007) regarding the positive effect of education on democracy, visible in the system GMM analysis rather than in the difference GMM analysis (in Acemoglu et al., 2005).

\(^{16}\)The unit root is accepted for all variables in almost all the panel unit root tests we have undertaken.

\(^{17}\)We have used STATA command xtabond2 for the dynamic panel regressions. STATA outputs are available upon request. We have used the two-step robust options adjusted for small samples, and with orthogonal deviations (recommended for unbalanced panels). The reported estimates used lag(2 3) collapse to avoid instrument proliferation, but they are remarkably stable to alternative lag restrictions over all the available range.
by Sargan test and Hansen test - as are accepted the (not reported) Difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of the instruments - and with Arellano-Bond tests rejecting the null of no first-order serial correlation and accepting the null of no-second-order serial correlation. Finally, the residuals of all our regressions have been tested for unit roots, which are always excluded at less than 1% significance.

Therefore we can conclude by saying that the available cross-country evidence seems to robustly suggest that the beneficial growth effect of IPR strengthens as the country gets closer to the world technological frontier. This provides empirical motivation for the IPR and growth mechanics highlighted in the theoretical model presented in the next section.

3 A simple model of distance to frontier

We consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier. The discrete-time model has four components (a) individuals, (b) final goods, (c) intermediate goods, and (d) R&D. In each period, there is a unit continuum of risk-neutral individuals indexed by $j$. Each individual $j$ lives for one period, supplies one unit of labor and consumes final goods to maximize expected utility. To facilitate tractable aggregation of social welfare, we follow a common specification in the literature to consider linear utility given by $u_j = E[c_j]$, where $c_j$ denotes consumption by individual $j$. Labor supply is used as an input for final goods, which can be consumed by individuals, devoted to various types of R&D activities or used as an input for intermediate goods. To model the effects of IPR, we consider a specific IPR parameter $\Theta$, that captures the effects of patent protection on imitation, which in turn affects FDI and innovation. This setup captures the main concerns of policymakers in China.

A key difference between our model and the models in Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006) and Wu (2010) is in our formulation of the interaction between imitation of foreign technologies and domestic innovation in the developing country. In previous studies, imitation and innovation in an industry are assumed to be performed by the same firm implying that the interaction between imitation and innovation lies in the resource allocation across the two types of activities within a firm. In contrast, in our model, imitation and innovation in an industry are performed by two different firms capturing the realistic scenario in which domestic innovation in the developing country can be displaced by the importation of more advanced foreign technologies. In other words, our framework captures both the positive spillover effect and the negative market-stealing effect of foreign technologies on domestic

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18 Our model borrows many elements from other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, such as Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
Another key difference is that we take into consideration two channels of foreign technology transfer (a) FDI and (b) imitation. Within this framework, a stronger patent system makes imitation of foreign technologies more difficult. Consequently, the lower intensity of imitation improves the incentives for technology transfer via FDI, and this theoretical finding is consistent with empirical evidence. As for the effects of stronger patent protection on domestic innovation, there are a direct positive effect from the decrease in imitation and an indirect negative effect from the increase in FDI (i.e., the displacement effect of foreign technologies on domestic innovation). Therefore, our model features an inverted-U effect of patent strength on domestic innovation that has been documented in recent empirical studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007).

In the model, we consider a specific sequence of actions by domestic innovators, foreign firms and domestic imitators. In particular, we assume that domestic innovation is followed by FDI and then imitation. This specific sequence of actions gives rise to the two important and realistic implications discussed above. First, domestic innovation may be displaced by foreign technologies. Second, a strengthening of patent protection that reduces imitation may encourage both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer supporting the abovementioned rationales for implementing a modern IPR system in China.

Finally, as in previous studies, we assume that there is no trade in factors of production and the developing country takes the world technology frontier as given. A slight modification from previous studies is that we allow for trade in final goods, so that foreign firms that perform FDI can retrieve their monopolistic profits out of the developing country.

### 3.1 Final goods

This sector is perfectly competitive, and firms take the output and input prices as given. Final goods $Y_t$ (chosen as the numeraire) are produced by combining labor input with a unit continuum of differentiated intermediate goods $X_t(i)$ indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. We consider a

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19 See for example Aitken and Harrison (1999).
20 An early study by Lee and Mansfield (1996) finds a positive effect of IPR on FDI. Although subsequent studies produce mixed results, recent empirical studies tend to find a positive effect. For example, Javorcik (2004) finds that IPR has a positive effect on FDI in technology-intensive sectors of transition economies. Considering a more comprehensive set of countries, Branstetter et al. (2006) also find that strengthening IPR has a positive effect on technology transfer.
22 See Section 6 for a discussion on this assumption.
standard production function.

\[ Y_t = L_t^{1-\alpha} \int_0^1 A_t^{-\alpha}(i) X_t^\alpha(i) di, \]  
\[ \text{(1)} \]

where \( A_t(i) \) is the level of technology associated with \( X_t(i) \). The supply of labor \( L_t \) is normalized to unity for all \( t \). The conditional demand function for \( X_t(i) \) is

\[ X_t(i) = A_t(i) \left[ \alpha / P_t(i) \right]^{1/(1-\alpha)}, \]
\[ \text{(2)} \]

where \( P_t(i) \) is the price of \( X_t(i) \) for \( i \in [0, 1] \).

### 3.2 Intermediate goods and domestic innovation

There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by \( i \in [0, 1] \), and each industry \( i \) is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader. In each industry, an individual is randomly chosen as the entrepreneur, who is given the opportunity to innovate at the beginning of the period and potentially dominate the industry for the remaining period. In the next period, all relevant patents expire and the monopolistic position will be randomly assigned to another entrepreneur who performs the next innovation. This simple setup, which is in line with other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, simplifies the model by equating the return to R&D to the monopolistic profit in the current period, and this simplification allows us to focus on the dynamic aspects of distance to frontier. For each monopolist, producing one unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of final goods. The familiar profit-maximizing price is \( P_t(i) = 1/\alpha \). Therefore, using (2), we can derive the amount of monopolistic profit as

\[ \pi_t(i) = P_t(i) X_t(i) - X_t(i) = \pi A_t(i), \]
\[ \text{(3)} \]

where \( \pi \equiv (1-\alpha)\alpha^{(1+\alpha)/(1-\alpha)} \) is a composite parameter.

At the beginning of time \( t \), the level of productivity in industry \( i \) is \( A_{t-1}(i) \). An entrepreneur is given the opportunity to increase the level of productivity to \( \tilde{A}_t(i) = (1 + \gamma_t) A_{t-1}(i) \), where \( \gamma_t \) is the step size of innovation that is a choice variable.\(^{23}\) The expected return to innovation in industry \( i \) is

\[ (1 - p_t) \pi [\tilde{A}_t(i) - A_{t-1}(i)] = (1 - p_t) \pi \gamma_t A_{t-1}(i), \]
where \( p_t \in [0, 1] \)

\(^{23}\)It is useful to note that although a domestically invented technology may not be as advanced as foreign technologies, it was nevertheless patentable in China before its third amendment to patent laws when the novelty requirement for a patentable invention required only local novelty within China. After the recent passage of this third amendment, patentability in China is now based on global novelty. Nevertheless, domestic innovators may invent locally adapted inventions that are "sufficiently" different from foreign inventions and patentable in China.
is the endogenous probability (to be derived below) that the monopolistic position will be taken away either by a foreign firm or by a domestic imitator before production in this period begins. When this probability $p_t$ is high, the entrepreneur only has a small chance of capturing the monopolistic profit and has less incentives to do R&D. This setup relates to the idea of intellectual appropriability discussed in Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2006). Under this interpretation, $p_t$ can be viewed as the probability that the monopolistic position is stolen by another entrepreneur before the innovator manages to start production.

To increase the level of technology by a step size of $\gamma_t$ in industry $i$, the entrepreneur has to devote $R_t(i)$ units of final goods to R&D. We consider a simple convex cost function given by

$$R_t(i) = \frac{(\gamma_t)\sigma}{\sigma \gamma} A_{t-1}(i), \quad (4)$$

where $\gamma$ is a productivity parameter and $\sigma > 2$. In (4), the scaling by $A_{t-1}(i)$ is common in the literature to capture increasing difficulty in innovation and to ensure a stationary $\gamma_t$ on the balanced-growth path. The expected profit of R&D is $(1 - p_t)\bar{\gamma} \gamma_t A_{t-1}(i) - R_t(i)$. Simple differentiation yields the equilibrium step size of innovation given by

$$\gamma_t = [(1 - p_t)\bar{\gamma}]^{1/(\sigma - 1)}$$

for $i \in [0, 1]$. Equation (5) shows that an increase in $p_t$ reduces the incentives for innovation and decreases $\gamma_t$.

**Proposition 1** Weaker intellectual appropriability (i.e., a larger $p_t$) decreases the equilibrium step size of domestic innovation.

### 3.3 Foreign direct investment

After the domestic entrepreneurs complete their R&D projects and before they sell their products, foreign firms may transfer recent technological developments from the world technology frontier to the developing country. This transfer of foreign technologies via FDI is a random process. If the process is successful in industry $i$, then the foreign firm takes away the monopolistic position from the domestic entrepreneur in that industry. Before this process of technology transfer begins, the level of productivity in industry $i$ at time $t$ is

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24This parameter assumption $\sigma > 2$ ensures that the equilibrium growth rate is concave in $p_t$, so that the growth-maximizing level of patent protection is an interior solution.
\( \tilde{A}_t(i) = (1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1}(i) \). If the technology transfer succeeds, then productivity in industry \( i \) further increases to

\[
\tilde{A}_t(i) = \tilde{A}_t(i) + g^* A^*_{t-1}. \tag{6}
\]

\( A^*_{t-1} \) is the level of technology at the world technology frontier at time \( t - 1 \) and evolves according to

\[
A^*_t = (1 + g^*) A^*_{t-1}, \tag{7}
\]

where \( g^* \) is the exogenous growth rate of the world technology frontier. In other words, (6) considers the case in which the domestic economy imports newly developed frontier technologies from abroad.\textsuperscript{25} Although newly developed technologies represent an important source of technology transfer to developing countries, it is conceivable that previously developed technologies that have not been adopted by developing countries also represent another important source of technology transfer. Therefore, we will explore this extension in Section 5.

The expected value of a successful transfer of foreign technologies via FDI in industry \( i \) is \( (1 - t_s)\pi \tilde{A}_t(i) \), where \( t_t \in [0, 1] \) is the probability that the transferred technologies will be imitated by a domestic firm in which case the foreign firm has to give away a share \( s \in [0, 1] \) of the market to the domestic imitator (to be discussed further below). To achieve a successful FDI project with probability \( f_t \) in industry \( i \), the foreign firm has to devote \( F_t(i) \) units of final goods. For analytical simplicity, we consider a quadratic cost function given by

\[
F_t(i) = \frac{(f_t)^2}{2f} \tilde{A}_t(i), \tag{8}
\]

where \( f \) is a productivity parameter. The expected profit of FDI is \( f_t(1 - t_t s)\pi \tilde{A}_t(i) - F_t(i) \).

Simple differentiation yields the equilibrium intensity of FDI given by

\[
f_t = (1 - t_t s)\pi \tilde{f} \in [0, 1] \tag{9}
\]

for \( i \in [0, 1] \).\textsuperscript{26} Equation (9) shows that either a larger probability of imitation \( t_t \) or a larger share \( s \) of the market to be given away to the imitator reduces the incentives for technology transfer via FDI.

\textsuperscript{25} An example is telecommunications. Although mobile phones represent a more advanced technology than fixed-line phones, mobile phones have become widespread in China before fixed-line phones ever had a chance to do so. In China, the number of mobile-phone subscribers is now more than double the number of fixed-line subscribers. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China has about 300 million fixed-line subscribers and 800 million mobile-phone subscribers in 2010.

\textsuperscript{26} A parameter condition (P1) to be stated below will ensure that \( f_t < 1 \).
Proposition 2 A higher rate of imitation (i.e., a larger $\iota_t$) reduces the intensity of FDI.

3.4 Imitation and intellectual property rights

After the foreign firms complete their process of technology transfer, the domestic economy consists of two types of industries that are occupied by either (a) domestic innovators or (b) foreign firms. In the case of (a), another domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to adapt the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries. We refer to this type of imitation as efficient imitation $e_t$. In the case of (b), a domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to imitate existing foreign technologies in the industry. We refer to this type of imitation as inefficient imitation $\iota_t$. Both types of imitation are random. If the imitation process is successful, then the imitator takes away (a) the monopolistic position from the domestic innovator in the case of efficient imitation $e_t$ or (b) some market share $s \in [0, 1]$ from the foreign firm in the case of inefficient imitation $\iota_t$. For $s = 0$, the imitator is unable to take away any market share from the foreign firm. For $s = 1$, the imitator takes away the entire market share from the foreign firm. The general case of $s \in (0, 1)$ captures the scenario, in which the foreign firm and the domestic imitator collude and share the monopolistic profit as in Segerstrom (1991). Under this general case, the domestic imitator is able to take away some market share from the foreign firm because domestic firms often have a competitive advantage over foreign firms through local knowledge and local network in developing countries. For example, Branstetter et al. (2006) note that when a foreign firm "...transfers this knowledge to local employees, there is a risk that these employees will defect to a local manufacturer, taking sensitive technology with them. These employees are able to combine the patented and unpatented elements of the firms’ technology, effectively competing with it in the local market."

The return to efficient imitation is $\pi \hat{A}_t(i)$. To achieve an efficient imitation with probability $e_t$ in industry $i$, the imitator has to devote $E_t(i)$ units of final goods to imitative R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by

$$E_t(i) = \Theta_t \frac{(e_t)^2}{2\sigma} \hat{A}_t(i),\quad (10)$$

27We call this efficient imitation because it raises the level of technology in the industry.
28We call this inefficient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industry’s level of technology.
29Similarly, we can also introduce another profit-sharing parameter between domestic innovators and domestic imitators without changing our main results. However, we think it is more natural for the domestic imitators, who have imitated the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries, to force out the domestic innovators who possess less advanced technologies.
where $\bar{e}$ is a productivity parameter for efficient imitation and $\Theta_t \in (0, \infty)$ is a policy variable determining the level of patent protection at time $t$. This formulation captures the idea that a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger $\Theta_t$) makes imitation more difficult and potentially improves intellectual appropriability by domestic innovators. The expected profit from efficient imitation is $e_t \pi \hat{A}_t(i) - E_t(i)$. Simple differentiation yields the probability of a successful efficient imitation in industry $i$ given by

$$e_t = \min\{\bar{e} \pi / \Theta_t, 1\}$$

for $i \in [0, 1]$.

The return to inefficient imitation is $s \pi \hat{A}_t(i)$. To achieve an inefficient imitation with probability $\iota_t$ in industry $i$, the imitator has to devote $I_t(i)$ units of final goods to imitative R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by

$$I_t(i) = \Theta_t \left(\iota_t\right)^2 \hat{A}_t(i),$$

where $\bar{\iota}$ is a productivity parameter for inefficient imitation. This formulation captures the idea that a stronger system of patent protection makes the imitation of foreign technologies more difficult and improves intellectual appropriability by foreign firms. The expected profit is $\iota_t s \pi \hat{A}_t(i) - I_t(i)$. Simple differentiation yields the probability of a successful inefficient imitation in industry $i$ given by

$$\iota_t = \min\{\bar{\iota} s \pi / \Theta_t, 1\}$$

for $i \in [0, 1]$.

**Proposition 3** A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger $\Theta_t$) reduces both types of imitation.

Proposition 3 shows that stronger patent protection reduces both efficient and inefficient imitations. The reduction in inefficient imitation increases foreign technology transfer via FDI from Proposition 2. As for domestic innovation, stronger patent protection has a direct positive effect by reducing efficient imitation and an indirect negative effect by increasing FDI. In (5), the probability $p_t$ is given by $f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t$. In other words, at the time of innovation, a domestic innovator may be subsequently displaced by a foreign firm with probability $f_t$ or by a domestic imitator with probability $(1 - f_t)e_t$. Differentiating $p_t =$

15
\( f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t \) with respect to \( \Theta_t \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial p_t}{\partial \Theta_t} = (1 - e_t) \frac{\partial f_t}{\partial \Theta_t} + (1 - f_t) \frac{\partial e_t}{\partial \Theta_t},
\]

(14)

Equation (14) shows that a larger \( \Theta_t \) increases \( p_t \) through \( f_t \) (i.e., the displacement effect of foreign technologies) and decreases \( p_t \) through \( e_t \) (i.e., the direct effect of reducing domestic imitation). Applying (9), (11) and (13), we find that

\[
\frac{\partial p_t}{\partial \Theta_t} < 0 \iff t > \frac{1}{2s} \left( \frac{s^2}{\bar{e}} - \frac{1 - \pi \bar{f}}{\pi \bar{f}} \right).
\]

(15)

Recall that domestic innovation \( \gamma_t \) is decreasing in \( p_t \) from Proposition 1. Therefore, if and only if (15) holds, then patent strength \( \Theta_t \) would have a monotonically positive effect on domestic innovation \( \gamma_t \). In other words, for a sufficiently small \( t \) (or equivalently, a sufficiently large \( \Theta_t \)), it is possible for \( \partial \gamma_t / \partial \Theta_t \) to become negative (i.e., \( \partial p_t / \partial \Theta_t > 0 \)) implying an inverted-U effect of \( \Theta_t \) on domestic innovation \( \gamma_t \). The negative effect of patent protection on domestic innovation arises from the displacement effect of foreign technology transfer via FDI.

For a developing country, it is unlikely that the level of patent protection has reached this level.\(^{30}\) Therefore, we impose the following sufficient condition to ensure that \( \partial \gamma_t / \partial \Theta_t > 0 \) for \( \Theta_t \in (0, \infty) \). This parameter condition is given by

\[
\bar{f} < \frac{1}{\pi(1 + s^2/\bar{e})},
\]

(P1)

which in turn implies \( \bar{f} < 1/\pi \).\(^{31}\) For the rest of the analysis, we assume that (P1) holds, so that the effect of patent protection on domestic innovation is monotonically positive. However, due to its negative effect on technology transfer through imitation, we will show that the overall effect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U shape that is consistent with recent empirical evidence as discussed before.

**Proposition 4** Given (P1), a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger \( \Theta_t \)) has a positive effect on domestic innovation in the developing country.

\(^{30}\)See for example Park (2008b) for a survey of empirical studies on patent strength and innovation. Upon surveying the empirical literature, Park (2008b) concludes that although an inverted-U effect of patent strength on innovation is theoretically plausible, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the level of patent protection in most countries is still on the upward-sloping side of the curve.

\(^{31}\)This condition is sufficient for \( f_t < 1 \) in (9).
3.5 Aggregation

At the beginning of time $t$, the level of technology is industry $i$ is $A_{t-1}(i)$. Then, the domestic innovator increases the level of technology to $\tilde{A}_t(i)$. After that, if either a foreign firm or a domestic imitator succeeds in transferring foreign technologies into industry $i$, then the level of technology would further increase to $\hat{A}_t(i)$. The transfer of foreign technologies succeeds with probability $f_t$ while the efficient imitation of foreign technologies succeeds with probability $e_t$. Using the law of large numbers, we derive the following law of motion for aggregate technology $A_t \equiv \int A_t(i)di$ in the developing country.

$$A_t = [f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t]g^*A^*_{t-1} + (1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1}. \quad (16)$$

Intuitively, (16) states that the industries experience an average productivity improvement by $\gamma_tA_{t-1}$ through domestic innovation and a fraction $f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t$ of the industries experiences an additional productivity improvement by $g^*A^*_{t-1}$ through either FDI or efficient imitation.

The aggregate production function can be obtained by substituting $P_t(i) = 1/\alpha$ and (2) into (1) to derive

$$Y_t = \zeta A_t, \quad (17)$$

where $\zeta \equiv \alpha^{2\alpha/(1-\alpha)}$ is a composite parameter. The resource constraint for final goods is

$$Y_t = C_t + X_t + R_t + E_t + I_t + F_t + NX_t, \quad (18)$$

where (a) $C_t$ is aggregate consumption, (b) $X_t$ is the total amount of final goods used in the production of intermediate goods, (c) $R_t$ is aggregate innovative R&D, (d) $E_t$ is aggregate expenditure on efficient imitation, (e) $I_t$ is aggregate expenditure on inefficient imitation, (f) $F_t$ is aggregate expenditure on FDI, and (g) $NX_t$ is net export. Using $P_t(i) = 1/\alpha$ and (2), we obtain

$$X_t = \alpha^{2/(1-\alpha)}A_t. \quad (19)$$

From (4), aggregate innovative R&D is

$$R_t = \frac{(\gamma_t)^\sigma}{\sigma \gamma}A_{t-1}. \quad (20)$$

From (10), aggregate expenditure on efficient imitation is

$$E_t = (1 - f_t)\Theta_t \frac{(e_t)^2}{2\epsilon}[(1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1} + g^*A^*_{t-1}]. \quad (21)$$
From (12), aggregate expenditure on inefficient imitation is

\[ I_t = f_t \Theta_t \frac{(\ell_t)^2}{2\ell} [(1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1} + g^*A_{t-1}^*]. \tag{22} \]

From (8), aggregate expenditure on FDI is

\[ F_t = \frac{(f_t)^2}{2f} [(1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1} + g^*A_{t-1}^*]. \tag{23} \]

As for the net export of final goods, it is given by

\[ NX_t = \left( f_t(1 - \nu_t)s\pi - \frac{(f_t)^2}{2f} \right) [(1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1} + g^*A_{t-1}^*]. \tag{24} \]

In other words, the domestic economy exports goods to pay for the monopolistic profits (net of FDI expenditure) earned by foreign firms. Finally, aggregate consumption is

\[ C_t = \zeta (1 - \alpha^2)A_t - (R_t + E_t + I_t + F_t + NX_t). \tag{25} \]

### 3.6 Convergence

If we define \( a_t \equiv A_t/A_t^* \) as an inverse measure of the developing country’s distance to the world technology frontier, then the law of motion for \( a_t \) is

\[ a_t = [f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t] \left( \frac{g^*}{1 + g^*} \right) + \left( \frac{1 + \gamma_t}{1 + g^*} \right) a_{t-1} \equiv H(a_{t-1}). \tag{26} \]

Equation (26) is plotted in Figure 1 for a constant value of \( \Theta \).
In this case, $a_t$ converges to a unique steady-state value given by

$$a^* = \frac{f + (1-f)e}{1 - \gamma/g^*}. \quad (27)$$

To ensure that $a^* \in (0,1)$, we naturally assume

$$g^* > \frac{\gamma}{1 - p} = \frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{(1-p)^{(\sigma-2)/(\sigma-1)}}, \quad (P2)$$

where $p = f + (1-f)e$. At the steady state, the developing country grows at the same rate as the world technology frontier despite the fact that the step size of domestic innovation $\gamma$ is smaller than $g^*$. However, if the developing country fails to obtain foreign technologies (i.e., $f = e = 0$), then it would diverge from the rest of the world because domestic innovation alone is insufficient for the country to catch up with the world technology frontier. Furthermore, (27) shows that stronger patent protection has opposing effects on the steady-state level of distance to frontier. On the one hand, a larger $\Theta$ stimulates domestic innovation $\gamma$ and FDI $f$ implying a positive effect on $a^*$. On the other hand, it discourages efficient imitation $e$ implying a negative effect on $a^*$.
4 Stage-dependent IPR protection

The growth rate of technology in the developing country at time $t$ is

$$g_t \equiv \frac{A_t}{A_{t-1}} - 1 = p_t \frac{g^*}{a_{t-1}} + \gamma_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)

where $p_t = f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t$. This equation shows that for a backward country (i.e., a small $a_{t-1}$), obtaining foreign technologies through $p_t$ (i.e., FDI and efficient imitation) is relatively important for achieving a higher growth rate. In contrast, for an advanced country (i.e., a large $a_{t-1}$), domestic innovation $\gamma_t$ becomes relatively important. Differentiating (28) with respect to $p_t$ yields

$$\frac{\partial g_t}{\partial p_t} = \frac{g^*}{a_{t-1}} - \frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}}{(\sigma - 1)(1 - p_t)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

$$\frac{\partial^2 g_t}{\partial p_t^2} = -\frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}(\sigma - 2)}{(\sigma - 1)^2(1 - p_t)^{1+2/(\sigma - 1)} < 0.}$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

The second-order condition implies that the growth rate $g_t$ in the developing country is globally concave in $p_t$, whereas the first-order condition implies a growth-maximizing $p_t^g$ given by

$$p_t^g = 1 - \left(\frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)} a_{t-1}}{\left(\sigma - 1\right) g^*}\right)^{(\sigma - 1)/(\sigma - 2)} \in (0, 1),$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

which is decreasing in $a_{t-1}$ and increasing in $g^*$. To see that $p_t^g > 0$ for any $a_{t-1} < 1$,

$$g^* > \frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}}{(1 - p_t)^{1/(\sigma - 2)}} > \frac{\left(\pi \gamma\right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}}{(\sigma - 1)} a_{t-1},$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

where the first inequality follows from (P2), and the second inequality follows from $1 - p < (\sigma - 1)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}$, where $\sigma > 2$.

Because $p_t = f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t \in [\pi \underline{f}, 1]$, the following parameter condition ensures that there exists a value of $\Theta_t \in (0, \infty)$ that equates $p_t = p_t^g$.

$$\bar{f} < \frac{p_t^g}{\pi}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (P3)

In other words, the growth-maximizing $p_t^g$ can be mapped into a unique level of growth-maximizing patent strength $\Theta_t^g$ that is increasing in $a_{t-1}$ because $p_t$ is monotonically decreasing in $\Theta_t$ given (P1). Intuitively, the growth-maximizing level of patent protection increases as the developing country evolves toward the world technology frontier. This finding of a stage-dependent growth-maximizing patent protection is driven by the property that the relative importance between foreign technologies and domestic innovation on the develop-
oping country’s growth rate changes endogenously as it evolves towards the world technology frontier. Also, it is interesting to note that in the case of an increase in \( g^* \), \( p_t \) increases and \( \Theta_t^d \) decreases for a given \( a_{t-1} \). Intuitively, when the technology frontier grows at a faster rate, it is more efficient for the developing country to imitate foreign technologies than to invest in domestic innovation by implementing a weaker patent system.

**Proposition 5** As a developing country evolves towards the world technology frontier, the growth-maximizing patent strength increases over time. In addition, for a given stage of development, the growth-maximizing patent strength is decreasing in the growth rate of frontier technology.

### 4.1 Quantitative analysis

As for the welfare-maximizing patent strength, we consider a government that chooses \( \Theta_t \) as a function of \( a_{t-1} \) to maximize aggregate welfare of current and future individuals given by \( \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} U_t \), where \( U_t \equiv \int u_t^d \, dj \). The assumption of risk neutrality implies that aggregate welfare of individuals at time \( t \) is simply given by aggregate consumption at time \( t \) (i.e., \( U_t = C_t \)). Substituting (20) - (24) into (25) yields

\[
C_t = [\zeta(1 - \alpha^2)p_t - \Phi_t] g^* A_{t-1}^* + \left( \zeta(1 - \alpha^2) - \frac{(\gamma_t)^\sigma}{\sigma \overline{\gamma}(1 + \gamma_t)} - \Phi_t \right) (1 + \gamma_t) a_{t-1},
\]  

where \( \Phi_t \equiv (1 - f_t)\Theta_t(e_t)^2/(2\overline{\tau}) + f_t\Theta_t(\tau_t)^2/(2\overline{\tau}) + f_t(1 - \tau_t s)\overline{\pi} \). The government’s objective is

\[
\max_{\Theta_t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} C_t = A_0^* \max_{\Theta_t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} [\beta(1 + g^*)]^{t-1} c_t,
\]

where \( c_t \equiv C_t/A_{t-1}^* \). Using (33), we can rearrange terms to obtain

\[
c_t = [\zeta(1 - \alpha^2)p_t - \Phi_t] g^* + \left( \zeta(1 - \alpha^2) - \frac{(\gamma_t)^\sigma}{\sigma \overline{\gamma}(1 + \gamma_t)} - \Phi_t \right) (1 + \gamma_t) a_{t-1}.
\]

Given (34) and (35), we can solve for the socially optimal policy as a time-invariant dynamic programming, using the following Bellman equation.

\[
v(a_{t-1}) = \max_{\Theta_t} c_t + \beta(1 + g^*) v(a_t),
\]
where the law of motion for $a_t$ is given by (26). Substituting (26) and (35) into (36), we derive an expression only in $a_{t-1}$, parameters, and policy variable $\Theta_t$. Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical approach (described in Appendix A) to simulate the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength $\Theta_t^w$.

To facilitate the simulation, we calibrate the parameters using empirical moments, such as labor share, output growth, consumption and FDI of the Chinese economy. The model features the following parameters $\{g^*, \beta, \alpha, s, \bar{\ell}, \bar{\pi}, \bar{f}, \sigma\}$ and variables $\{a_{t-1}, \Theta_t\}$. We consider 20 years in a generation. For the (inverse) distance-to-frontier variable, we set $a_{t-1} = 0.11$ to capture the relative labor productivity between China and the US in 2005. For the growth rate of frontier technologies, we set $g^* = (1 + 1.5\%)^{20} - 1$ to capture the long-run average annual TFP growth rate in the US. For the discount factor, we set $\beta$ to match an annual discount rate of 10% to ensure that utility is bounded despite the high growth rate in China. For the labor share $1 - \alpha$, we set $\alpha$ to 0.6 to match the 40% labor share of GDP in China. For the profit-sharing parameter between foreign firms and domestic imitative firms, we set $s = 0.5$ as a benchmark and also consider $s \in \{0, 1\}$ for robustness check. For the innovation parameter, we set $\bar{\pi} = 1$ as a benchmark and also consider other values $\bar{\pi} \in \{0.5, 2\}$ for robustness check. For the imitation parameters, we set $\bar{\ell} = 1$ and consider the symmetric case of $\bar{\ell} = \bar{\ell}$ as a benchmark, but we also consider $\bar{\ell} \in \{0.5\bar{\ell}, 2\bar{\ell}\}$ for robustness check. For the FDI parameter, we set $\bar{f} = 9$. Finally, for the curvature parameter in the innovation cost function, we set $\sigma = 5$. Given these parameter values, the optimal value of $\Theta_t^w$ evaluated at $a_{t-1} = 0.11$ is 0.053. With this complete set of parameter values, we can then compute the following moments from the model and compare them to the data of the Chinese economy. We find that from the model, the annual growth rate of output is 7.5%, consumption as a share of GDP is 0.49, and FDI as a share of GDP is 0.032. These calibrated moments are in line with the data on China from the Penn World Table and the World Development Indicators.

Using the above parameter values, we simulate the optimal path of IPR policy $\Theta_t^w$ and find that it is increasing in $a_{t-1}$. This finding is also robust to other parameter values. Hence, these numerical simulations indicate that our theoretical prediction on the growth-maximizing policy also applies to the welfare-maximizing policy. In Figure 2, we show our benchmark simulation outcome.

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32See for example Luo and Zhang (2010) for data on labor share in China.
5 Extensions

In this section, we consider two extensions of the baseline model. In the first extension, we consider the case in which the domestic economy imports both frontier and previously developed technologies from abroad. In the second extension, we consider the case in which the domestic innovators may strategically choose a more drastic innovation to deter the entry of foreign firms. In summary, our main result of stage-dependent patent protection remains robust to each of these extensions.
5.1 Transfer of foreign technologies

In this subsection, we consider the case in which frontier technologies and also previously developed technologies that have not been adopted by the domestic economy are both important sources of technology transfer. In this case, we modify (6) to

\[ \widetilde{A}_t(i) = \widetilde{A}_t(i) + g^* A_{t-1}^* + \phi(A_{t-1}^* - A_{t-1}), \]  

(37)

where \( A_{t-1}^* - A_{t-1} \) is the distance between frontier and domestic levels of technology, and \( \phi > 0 \) is a parameter determining the importance of this channel of technology transfer. Under this specification, (16) becomes

\[ A_t = p_t[g^* A_{t-1}^* + \phi(A_{t-1}^* - A_{t-1})] + (1 + \gamma_t)A_{t-1}, \]  

(38)

where \( p_t = [f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t] \). In other words, in addition to the average productivity improvement by \( \gamma_t A_{t-1} \) in all industries, a fraction \( p_t \) of the industries experiences an additional productivity gain by \( g^* A_{t-1}^* + \phi(A_{t-1}^* - A_{t-1}) \) through either FDI or efficient imitation. Rearranging terms, we derive from (38) the growth rate of the domestic economy given by

\[ g_t \equiv \frac{A_t}{A_{t-1}} - 1 = \frac{p_t(g^* + \phi)}{a_{t-1}} + \gamma_t - p_t \phi. \]  

(39)

Differentiating \( g_t \) with respect to \( p_t \) yields

\[ \frac{\partial g_t}{\partial p_t} = \frac{g^* + \phi}{a_{t-1}} - \frac{(\pi \gamma)^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{(\sigma - 1)(1 - p_t)^{(\sigma-2)/(\sigma-1)}} - \phi. \]  

(40)

Therefore, \( \partial^2 g_t / \partial (p_t)^2 < 0 \) continues to be given by (30) as before. Setting \( \partial g_t / \partial p_t = 0 \) in (40) yields the growth-maximizing \( p_t^g \) given by

\[ p_t^g = 1 - \left[ \frac{(\pi \gamma)^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{(\sigma - 1)} \frac{a_{t-1}}{g^* + \phi(1 - a_{t-1})} \right]^{(\sigma-1)/(\sigma-2)}, \]  

(41)

which continues to be decreasing in \( a_{t-1} \) and increasing in \( g^* \). Given that \( p_t = [f_t + (1 - f_t)e_t] \) remains the same as in Section 3 and is strictly decreasing in \( \Theta_t \), there exists a unique level of growth-maximizing patent strength \( \Theta_t^g \) that is increasing in \( a_{t-1} \) and decreasing in \( g^* \) as before.
5.2 Strategic domestic innovation

In this subsection, we consider an extension in which domestic innovators may strategically choose a more drastic innovation to deter foreign entry. Specifically, we modify (8) as follows.

\[ F_t(i) = \left( \frac{f_t}{2f_t/\gamma_t} \right)^2 \tilde{A}_t(i), \]  
(42)

where we divide \( f \) by \( \gamma \) to capture in a simple way the mechanism that a more drastic domestic innovation makes foreign entry more difficult. Taking \( \gamma_t \) as given, the foreign firm chooses \( f_t \) to maximize the expected profit of FDI. Simple differentiation yields

\[ f_t = \frac{(1 - \nu_t s) \pi_t f}{\gamma_t}. \]  
(43)

As before, the expected return to R&D is \( (1 - p_t) \pi_t A_{t-1}(i) - R_t(i) \), where \( p_t = f_t + (1 - f_t) e_t \). Taking the foreign firm’s best response in (43) as given, the domestic innovator in industry \( i \) maximizes the expected return to R&D by choosing \( \gamma_t \). Simple differentiation yields

\[ \gamma_t = [(1 - e_t) \pi_t \gamma]^{1/(\sigma-1)}, \]  
(44)

where \( e_t \) is given by (11). Given that \( e_t \) is decreasing in patent strength \( \Theta_t \), \( \gamma_t \) is increasing in \( \Theta_t \). Intuitively, stronger patent rights lead to a lower intensity of imitation, which in turn stimulates domestic innovation. Substituting (44) into (43) yields

\[ f_t = \frac{(1 - \nu_t s) \pi_t f}{[(1 - e_t) \pi_t \gamma]^{1/(\sigma-1)}}, \]  
(45)

where \( \nu_t \) is given by (13). Given that both \( e_t \) and \( \nu_t \) are decreasing in \( \Theta_t \), patent rights have two opposing effects on FDI \( f_t \). On the one hand, stronger patent rights reduce imitation and increase FDI. On the other hand, stronger patent rights increase domestic innovation and decrease FDI. Therefore, the overall effect of \( \Theta_t \) on \( f_t \) is ambiguous.

As before, the growth rate in the domestic economy is

\[ g_t = \left[ f_t + (1 - f_t) e_t \right] \frac{g_t}{a_{t-1}} + \gamma_t, \]  
(46)
where \( f_t \) is given by (45) and \( \gamma_t \) is given by (43). Differentiating \( g_t \) with respect to \( \Theta_t \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial g_t}{\partial \Theta_t} = \left( (1 - e_t) \frac{\partial f_t}{\partial \Theta_t} + (1 - f_t) \frac{\partial e_t}{\partial \Theta_t} \right) a_{t-1} + \frac{\partial \gamma_t}{\partial \Theta_t},
\]

(47)

where \( \partial e_t / \partial \Theta_t < 0 \) and \( \partial \gamma_t / \partial \Theta_t > 0 \). \( \partial \gamma_t / \partial \Theta_t \) captures the positive effect of patent protection on domestic innovation. \( \partial p_t / \partial \Theta_t \) captures the following effects of patent protection on foreign technology transfer. First, \( \Theta_t \) has a negative effect on technology transfer through imitation \( e_t \). Second, \( \Theta_t \) has the ambiguous effects on technology transfer through FDI \( f_t \) as discussed above. If the overall effect of \( \Theta_t \) on foreign technology transfer is positive, then the effect of \( \Theta_t \) on economic growth would be always positive. However, if the overall effect of \( \Theta_t \) on foreign technology transfer is negative, then there exists two opposing effects of \( \Theta_t \) on economic growth. This situation occurs if and only if the following condition holds under which \( \partial p_t / \partial \Theta_t < 0 \).

\[
\tilde{f} < \frac{\pi \gamma (1 - e_t)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}}{\sigma - 2} \left[ (1 - e_t) \frac{r^2 \tau}{e} + (1 - \tau) \frac{\alpha - 1}{\sigma - 1} \right]^{-1}.
\]

(48)

Given (48), the relative importance of the two opposing effects of \( \Theta_t \) on \( g_t \) is determined by \( a_{t-1} \) (i.e., the inverse distance to frontier). When a country is far away from (close to) the technology frontier, the negative effect of patent rights on foreign technology transfer dominates (is dominated by) the positive effect on domestic innovation. This implication is consistent with our baseline model as well as the stylized facts documented in Section 2. Finally, we have conducted a large number of numerical simulations and find that the growth-maximizing \( \Theta_t \) is increasing in \( a_{t-1} \).

6 Discussion

In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier to analyze the evolution of IPR protection in developing countries. Although our model is stylized, we believe that it captures the essence of the key issue that is the interrelation between economic development and optimal IPR protection. Specifically, an appropriate IPR system contributes to the economic development of a country, which in turn determines the optimal level of IPR protection in the country at a given development stage. In summary, we find that the optimal strength of IPR protection increases as a developing country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this theoretical finding of stage-dependent IPR
protection is consistent with the actual evolution of the IPR system in China.

In terms of policy implications, our finding suggests that it is optimal for a developing country to gradually strengthen its IPR protection. In other words, requiring a developing country, such as China, to immediately raise its level of patent protection on par with developed countries would hurt its social welfare. In a National Academy of Sciences report, Merrill et al. (2004, p. 13) state that "patents exist in most countries, and the degree to which countries at different stages of economic development should adhere to the same standards of patentability, conform to the same rules, and follow the same administrative procedures is an enormously complex although extremely important set of issues. [...] readers should not infer that what we recommend for the United States we believe less-developed countries should adopt." Our finding of stage-dependant optimal IPR policy reiterates their concern and provides a justification for the WTO's procedure that when the TRIPS Agreement were implemented in developed countries in 1996, developing countries and least developed countries were given an extension of 4 years and 11 years respectively to apply the agreement's provisions.

Finally, in the theoretical model, we consider a developing country that takes the world technology frontier as given. Although it is arguable that technological progress in developed countries may be affected by the level of IPR protection in developing countries, it is still an open debate among existing studies (cited in the introduction) as to whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative effect on Northern innovation. Therefore, we leave this important but controversial issue to future research.

References


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Recall that the government’s objective is
\[
\max_{\theta_t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} C_t = A_0^* \max_{\theta_t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} [\beta(1 + g^*)]^{t-1} c_t,
\]
where \( c_t \) is given by (35). Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical approach to solve for the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength. In our numerical analysis, we simulate numerically the value function, \( v(a_{t-1}) \), and the policy function \( G(a_{t-1}) = \Theta_t \), adopting a standard value-function iteration method, according to which \(^{33}\):

1. We select a grid of points \(^{34}\) for \([0, 1]\), i.e. the state space of \( a_i \), where now \( i \in 1, ..., N \) indexes the \( i \)-th point in the grid (not time);
2. We start from an initial guess \(^{35}\) of \( v_0(a) \);
3. We obtain numerical solutions for
\[
v_{1i} = \max_{\Theta_i} c_i + \beta(1 + g^*) v_0(a_i)
\]
for all \( i \in 1, ..., N; \)
4. We obtain a (cubic) polynomial spline approximation of \( v_1(a) \) such that \( v_1(a_i) = v_{1i} \);
5. We iterate this procedure, this time starting from the new function \( v_1(a_i) \), obtaining
\[
v_{2i} = \max_{\Theta_i} c_i + \beta(1 + g^*) v_1(a_i)
\]
for all \( i \in 1, ..., N; \)
6. Obtain a polynomial spline approximation of \( v_2(a) \) such that \( v_2(a_i) = v_{2i} \); this is necessary for the maximization to take place in the continuous space \([0, 1]\), thereby admitting solutions for \( \Theta_i \) corresponding to values of \( a \) not necessarily in the chosen grid \(^{36}\);
7. We keep repeating the maximization and approximation, until the change in \( v_{ni} \) and in the policy variables does not exceed a tolerance value \(^{37}\).

\(^{33}\) All computations have been performed using Matlab. The .m files used are available upon request.
\(^{34}\) This number is \( N = 40 \) in our simulations.
\(^{35}\) Identically equal to zero.
\(^{36}\) Otherwise \( v_1(a_i) \) would not be defined.
\(^{37}\) of \( 10^{-4} \), and the number of iterations do not exceed a maximum number of loops, set equal to 80 in our simulations.