Healing, Psychotherapy and the *Philokalia*

Chapter 15 in:

*The Philokalia: Exploring the Classic Text of Orthodox Spirituality*, Oxford University Press

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16 March 2010
The *Philokalia* identifies the passions as a fundamental concern of the spiritual life, a concern which must be properly understood if the barrier that they present to progress towards the goal of human existence is to be effectively addressed. The exact nature and properties of the passions and the proper means of addressing and overcoming them are presented, as one would expect from forty or so authors writing over a span of more than a thousand years, in many and diverse ways. On a canvas of more or less consistent philosophical and theological assumptions about Christian anthropology, a rich variety of images, symbols, metaphors and allegories is used to paint a passionate picture of the human predicament and its solution. Amidst this plethora of images, is that of the compassionate physician treating the ailing human creature whose very life is drained by the multiplicity of wounds and diseases that comprise the passions. Although it might be stretching things too far to claim that this image is universal and consistent throughout the texts of the *Philokalia*, it would certainly seem to be an important image, amongst other images, and it is found in both the earliest and latest texts and in texts by all of the major contributors.

What, then, is the nature of the pathology that the *Philokalia* diagnoses? Fundamentally, the passions are themselves, collectively and individually, understood as being a kind of disease, or sickness, of the soul.

Thus:

- In *On the Eight Vices*, John Cassian refers to unchastity, avarice, anger, dejection, and listlessness as sicknesses.\(^1\)
- Neilos, in his *Ascetic Discourse*, refers to sin as being like a protracted illness, and to the passions as causing a disease of the soul.\(^2\)
- John of Karpathos, in *For the Encouragement of the Monks in India who had Written to Him: One Hundred Texts*, refers to the sicknesses of unbelief and despair, and of rebellion against God.\(^3\)
- In *On the Character of Men and on the Virtuous Life*, attributed in the *Philokalia* to Antony the Great, the greatest sickness of the soul is said to be not knowing God, and Godlessness and love of praise are said to be “the worst and most incurable disease of the soul”.\(^4\)
- Thalassios the Libyan, in *On Love, Self-Control, and Life in Accordance with the Intellect*, asserts that “The soul’s disease is an evil disposition”.\(^5\)
- Abba Philimon is quoted as saying that “Thoughts about vain things are sicknesses of an idle and sluggish soul”.\(^6\)
- In *On the Practice of the Virtues, Contemplation and the Priesthood*, a text attributed in the *Philokalia* to Theognostos, reference is made to “the sickness of the passions”.\(^7\)
- Ilias the Presbyter, in Part I of *A Gnomic Anthology*, contrasts the “hidden sickness”, “in the depths of consciousness” with the possibly healthy outward appearance of a soul.\(^8\)
- Symeon Metaphrastis, in the *Paraphrase of the Homilies of St Makarios of Egypt*, refers to “the sickness of evil and ignorance”.\(^9\)
- Nikitas Stithatos, in *On the Inner Nature of Things and on the Purification of the Intellect*, refers to sickness of the soul (or “psychic illness”) in a general sense and to lack of faith specifically as a disease of the soul.\(^x\)
• Gregory Palamus, in *To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia*, distinguishes between passions which belong to human beings “by nature”, and therefore are good, and the misuse of these passions which provides evidence of sickness of the soul.\(^{\text{xii}}\)

These Philokalic references to sickness and disease show great diversity. However, they also show a more or less consistent understanding of the human condition as giving evidence of a kind of pathology of the soul. This evidence is closely associated with, if not actually identified with, the presence and activity of the passions. In fact, even if these explicit metaphors were not used, the account of the passions provided by the *Philokalia* would arguably invite the use of medical metaphors such as disease, sickness and illness. The passions are portrayed as causing pain and dysfunction in the spiritual life,\(^{\text{xii}}\) as being contrary to nature,\(^{\text{xiii}}\) and as leading to death\(^{\text{xiv}}\) if left untreated.

The *Philokalia* also employs medical metaphors in respect of the treatment of the passions. Thus, medicines effective in treatment of the diseased soul include:

- Anger (when properly used against evil thoughts)\(^{\text{xv}}\)
- Fear of God\(^{\text{xvi}}\)
- Salvation\(^{\text{xvii}}\)
- Guarding the intellect (by remembrance of sins, mindfulness of death, meditation on the passion of Christ, and remembrance of blessings)\(^{\text{xviii}}\)
- Ascetic discipline\(^{\text{xix}}\)
- Tears\(^{\text{xx}}\)

More generally, healing of the soul is explicitly described as being brought about through meditation and prayer,\(^{\text{xix}}\) the compassion of God,\(^{\text{xii}}\) pain and suffering,\(^{\text{xiii}}\) the passion of Christ,\(^{\text{xiv}}\) wisdom,\(^{\text{xv}}\) and reproof.\(^{\text{xvi}}\) Specific remedies for specific passions include almsgiving for the healing of the soul’s incensive power,\(^{\text{xvii}}\) spiritual knowledge for the healing of mental dejection,\(^{\text{xviii}}\) humility for envy and self-conceit,\(^{\text{xix}}\) solitude for conceit and vanity.\(^{\text{xx}}\) But again the whole tenor of the *Philokalia* is one of the healing of the human condition, and even where this is implicit rather than explicit, or where other kinds of metaphors are used, it would still seem appropriate to understand the *Philokalia* as offering a kind of therapeutic repertoire, or pharmacopeia, for the treatment of the soul afflicted by the passions. Thus, ascetic discipline, prayer (including the Jesus prayer), psalmody, and guarding of the heart might all be understood as therapies for the soul.

The aim of therapy, the healing of the soul, might at one level be understood as achieving dispassion. In this sense, the aim of Philokalic therapy can in many places appear very similar to that of Stoic philosophy, the elimination of the passions. But the *Philokalia* does not stop here, for its authors only understand dispassion as a means to a theological end, the goal of pure prayer, or union with God. Whilst the doctrine of deification was only definitively formulated by Gregory Palamus in the 14th Century, and is treated explicitly by relatively few authors of the *Philokalia*,\(^{\text{xxi}}\) nonetheless it is the case throughout the *Philokalia* that well-being is understood theologically, whether in terms of hesychia, illumination of the intellect, blessedness, pure prayer or openness to God, rather than purely psychologically or philosophically in terms of thoughts or ideas.
In the second century of *Two Hundred Texts on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation of the Son of God*, Maximus the Confessor provides a more detailed account of the healing process:

If you are healed of the breach caused by the fall, you are severed first from the passions and then from impassioned thoughts. Next you are severed from nature and the inner principles of nature, then from conceptual images and the knowledge relating to them. Lastly, when you have passed through the manifold principles relating to divine providence, you attain through unknowing the very principle of divine unity. Then the intellect contemplates only its own immutability, and rejoices with an unspeakable joy because it has received the peace of God which transcends all intellect and which ceaselessly keeps him who has been granted it from falling (cf. Phil. 4:7).

This account of healing appears to reverse or undo the pathology of the passions that Maximus describes elsewhere. Maximos seems to understand a process by which thoughts or images become impassioned by a kind of cathexis or attachment of a passion to a thought/image. In the healing process, this attachment is broken. But the healing process is more radical than this, for having uncoupled thought processes from the passions it goes on to engage them in a contemplation of the “manifold principles relating to divine providence” and then, through a process of “unknowing”, to the divine unity itself. Here, there is a transcending of the intellect, a transcending of the multiplicity of thoughts, in the unity of God.

If the *Philokalia* presents a school of therapy for the soul, designed to bring about its healing, it might well be argued that the *Philokalia* is a kind of manual for psychotherapy. However, once this word, “psychotherapy”, is coined, with all its more modern connotations of Freudian and post-Freudian therapies designed to explore the unconscious, and of the cognitive-behavioural therapies based on cognitive and behavioural scientific psychology, we realise at once how the *Philokalia* is both similar to and radically different to what we now call, in the western world, psychotherapy.

On the one hand, the *Philokalia* shares with contemporary psychotherapies a concern with “inwardness” and with self-reflective awareness, a suspicion about the motives that lay behind apparently innocent or well intentioned actions, and a keen attention to the content and processes of cognition. Even some of the methods look very similar – especially those that betray a Stoic model of the passions (or in the case of contemporary psychology the emotions) as fundamentally based upon thoughts (or cognition). For example, the identification of thoughts/judgements that lead to fear might be a concern of both the cognitive therapist and the disciple of the *Philokalia*, remembrance of death is also effectively a cognitive strategy for changing patterns of thought, and ascetic discipline might be considered a kind of behavioural therapy orientated towards changing patterns of thought as well as lifestyle. Even the Philokalic injunctions to obedience and submission to an elder or spiritual guide find their parallels in the therapeutic relationship with a therapist who is seen as having greater wisdom, knowledge and experience in matters of the inner life.

On the other hand, contemporary psychotherapies are based on very different theoretical frameworks and aim at very different ends. Whilst differences in theory might be surprisingly more superficial than they first appear, there are undoubtedly important differences. The Freudian tripartite model of the psyche as comprising id, ego and superego, for example, is not so very different to the Platonic model of appetitive, incensive and rational parts of the soul, a model which
influenced both Freud and the authors of the Philokalia. Or again, both the cognitive therapist and the authors of the Philokalia emphasise the importance of a self-reflective awareness of thought processes which will lead to greater understanding of how to identify aberrant patterns of thought and develop healthy ones. The scientific rationalism of the cognitive therapist is not necessarily so very far removed from the philosophical and contemplative reasoning of the Philokalic practitioner when consideration is limited only to matters of cognitive analysis. But when consideration is broadened to include ultimate concerns, the atheistic assumptions of Freud and the cognitive-behaviourists contrast strongly with the Philokalic world of personal spiritual forces which draw the human creature inevitably towards, or away from, a telos which is firmly located in the Divine. Moreover, the end of human beings in relationship with God involves the authors of the Philokalia in a contemplative “unknowing” which ultimately transcends human rational thought. This transcendence is completely lacking, at least from Freud and the more scientific cognitive-behavioural schools of therapy, if not from all of the schools of therapy which have emerged since the work of pioneers such as Freud, Skinner and Ellis.

Differences are perhaps nowhere more apparent, however, than in the accounts that are given in the secular psychotherapies and in the Philokalia of the relationship of suffering to therapy and the healing process. In order to give this comparison more careful consideration, it will be necessary first to say a little more about what the goals of the secular psychotherapies are.

Jerome Frank has suggested that:

The goal of all forms of psychotherapy is to enable a person to satisfy his legitimate needs for affection, recognition, and sense of mastery through helping him to correct the maladaptive attitudes, emotions, and behaviour that impede the attainment of such satisfactions. In so doing, psychotherapy seeks to improve his social interactions and reduce his distress, while at the same time helping him to accept the suffering that is an inevitable aspect of life and, when possible, to utilize it in the service of personal growth.\textsuperscript{xxv}

Whilst psychotherapy seeks to reduce distress, it also recognises that suffering is an inevitable aspect of life and that acceptance of suffering that cannot be relieved will be an important goal of therapy, alongside reduction where it can. Where possible, however, a higher goal is hinted at, the goal of “personal growth”, a goal towards which the acceptance of inevitable suffering may take the patient closer. The exact form that this personal growth might take is not specified, although it would appear to have something to do with the enabling of satisfaction of personal needs and the achieving of a “sense of mastery”. Exactly how these goals might be achieved will vary from one form of therapy to another.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

Although there is not space here to survey exactly how personal growth is understood in all the different kinds of psychotherapy, Carl Rogers has provided an account which might be considered typical of many, albeit not all:

... the individual becomes more integrated, more effective. He shows fewer of the characteristics which are usually termed neurotic or psychotic, and more of the characteristics of the healthy, well-functioning person. He changes his perception of himself,
becoming more realistic in his views of self. He becomes more like the person he wishes to be. He values himself more highly. He is more self-confident and self-directing. He has a better understanding of himself, becomes more open to his experience, denies or represses less of his experience. He becomes more accepting in his attitudes toward others, seeing others as more similar to himself.

In his behaviour he shows similar changes. He is less frustrated by stress, and recovers from stress more quickly. He becomes more mature in his everyday behaviour as this is observed by friends. He is less defensive, more adaptive, more able to meet situations creatively. xxxvii

For Rogers, this growth takes place when a troubled, conflicted person is provided with a certain type of relationship, one which is characterised by genuineness, acceptance and empathy. xxxviii However, in other forms of psychotherapy it might be facilitated by resolution of inner conflicts, symptom reduction, or modification of patterns of thought. What would seem to be the common thread is that psychotherapy aims to reduce distress and suffering where possible, to enable acceptance of and adaptation to stresses that cannot be changed, and to achieve a greater sense of self confidence and self mastery which is concerned with the satisfaction of personal needs, including the need for harmonious and mutually fulfilling interactions with others.

We may again note that there is much common ground here with the model of therapy that is presented in the Philokalia. The Philokalia is also concerned with the correction of maladaptive attitudes, emotions (or passions), and behaviours. The Philokalia is concerned with acceptance of suffering, improved social interactions, and personal growth. It is concerned with self awareness and realism about self and experience of the world. At least insofar as ascetic discipline is a form of self-control, it is also concerned with self mastery. However, alongside these parallel concerns, we must also note that the Philokalia is an anthology of texts concerned with the life of prayer and that its ultimate goal is one of deification, or union with God. This central theological preoccupation, and its recognition of the need for the grace of God in order to achieve it, renders its school of therapy radically different to secular psychotherapy. If the psychotherapies are, by and large, “talking cures”, the Philokalia offers a “praying cure”. If the former aim to increase self confidence, the latter aim to increase confidence in God:

Humility consists in constant prayer combined with tears and suffering. For this ceaseless calling upon God for help prevents us from foolishly growing confident in our own strength and wisdom, and from putting ourselves above others. These are dangerous diseases of the passion of pride. xxxix

This difference is brought out when we consider how suffering is dealt with differently in psychotherapy and in the Philokalia. Whilst suffering might constitute the reason for seeking psychotherapy, and its reduction and management might constitute the therapeutic objectives of psychotherapy, in the Philokalia we find that it is fundamentally a part of therapy. This becomes especially clear in the works of Maximos the Confessor, the second largest single contributor to the Philokalia, although it is by no means confined to these texts.
For Maximos, the healing process is facilitated primarily by the suffering of Christ in his passion, but necessarily also by the willing participation of human beings in this suffering. Thus, for example, in the fourth century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, he writes:

> The aim of divine providence is to unite by means of true faith and spiritual love those separated in various ways by vice. Indeed, the Saviour endured His sufferings so that ‘He should gather together into one the scattered children of God’ (John 11:52). Thus, he who does not resolutely bear trouble, endure affliction, and patiently sustain hardship, has strayed from the path of divine love and from the purpose of providence.

Elsewhere, in the first century of *Two hundred texts on theology and the incarnate dispensation of the Son of God, Written for Thalassios*, Maximos associates a process of suffering which “purifies those practicing the virtues”, and which then leads on to contemplation, dispassion and deification, with a Christological model of the appearance of Christ in human and then transfigured forms.

Human suffering thus presents both a healing opportunity to share in the human suffering of Christ, and also a healing path by which to progress to contemplative prayer, dispassion and ultimately deification.

Maximos clearly does not see suffering as the only prescription administered by the Divine Physician of Souls. The efficacy of the treatment is also dependent upon human compliance. Neither is specific suffering deliberately brought about by God with the purpose of imposing treatment. Maximos refers to suffering as caused by human sin, misfortune, the devil, and the passions. It is the fool who regards either God or other human beings as responsible, says Maximos. However, in the fourth century of *Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice*, Maximos differentiates between two kinds of suffering. The one kind is a part of a “pleasure-pain syndrome”, where pain in the soul results from pleasure in the senses. This pain, associated with indulgence of the passions, was introduced by Adam, through the fall. The other kind of suffering, which brings about healing of this syndrome, is a pain in the senses which is associated with pleasure in the soul. This is the suffering which is associated with pursuit of virtue, and which was introduced into the world through the incarnation of Christ. Thus, Maximos writes:

> For through His passion He conferred dispassion, through suffering repose, and through death eternal life. By His privations in the flesh He re-established and renewed the human state, and by His own incarnation He bestowed on human nature the supranatural grace of deification.

According to Maximos, then, the suffering associated with the human condition is intimately tied up with the pleasure associated with the passions. If the passions are pleasurable, they are also noxious, or hostile. The healing of this suffering is brought about through a Christological therapy which is both concerned with the sharing of Christ in human suffering, freely chosen, and also with human sharing in the suffering of Christ, also freely chosen for love of him.

As noted above, the repertoire of therapies offered in the *Philokalia* is much broader than this Maximian perspective on participation in Christ’s suffering alone might imply. It includes, for example, obedience and spiritual discipline, remembrance of death, psalmody, watchfulness and
prayer. However, in every therapeutic modality the Philokalia has its points of radical difference from contemporary secular psychotherapy. These differences are most obviously and pervasively theological, finding their justification in scripture, doctrine and Christian tradition rather than in any anthropocentric outcomes, understanding a dependence upon the grace of God rather than the activities of human beings as essential for the process of healing, and finding a Divine telos as the only ultimately important goal of healing.

In the example just examined, of the Maximian understanding of the therapeutic role of suffering, the difference from secular psychotherapies is not only theological but is also strikingly Christological. A Christological element to the therapy of the Philokalia may be identified more widely, as for example in the use of the Jesus prayer, or the significance of the transfiguration of Christ for understanding the illumination of the intellect. Even where it is not explicit, there is arguably always an implicit Christology lurking in the background, as for example in the case of the temptation of Christ in the wilderness as a model for ascetic discipline.

The Philokalia is also personal in a way that the contemporary psychotherapies are not. It is true that the Philokalic importance of the personal relationship of the Christian disciple with a spiritual father finds its parallel in the significance accorded to the therapeutic relationship between patient and therapist in virtually all psychotherapies. Similarly, relationships with other human beings are important for the growth of Christian virtue in the Philokalia, and for understanding and healing dysfunctional relationships in psychotherapy. However, the world of the Philokalia is rich with other personal and spiritual beings with whom the disciple is also in relationship, including both angels and demons as well as, most importantly, God himself. An instructive example here might be found in the growing popularity of the practice of mindfulness in secular psychotherapy.

Mindfulness, in this context, has its origins in the traditions of Buddhism. It is not easily defined, and is susceptible of varying definitions, but it is “to pay attention in a particular way”. The attention is generally understood to be focussed on present experience, and often also implies a degree of acceptance of this experience, however difficult that may be. It is sometimes also associated with a degree of ineffability. It is now seen as having an evidence based role in a variety of forms of psychotherapy from dynamic to cognitive-behavioural, and finds a place in stress management as well as in the treatment of anxiety and mood disorders, addiction and even psychosis. The common features of mindfulness and hesychia, or stillness, as understood in the Philokalia are immediately apparent. For example, both are associated with bodily discipline and avoidance of distractions, and both are associated with a degree of ineffability. However, as the authors of the English translation of the Philokalia make clear in their glossary, hesychia is fundamentally a state of relationship with God – of listening or being open to God. Where the English word “mindfulness” appears in the translation of the Philokalia, it usually refers explicitly to mindfulness of God.

Whilst mindfulness as employed in secular psychotherapy has some important commonalities with hesychia and mindfulness in the Philokalia, they may be distinguished both by the theological context and, importantly, also the greater personal and interpersonal nature of Christian hesychia as contrasted with the more impersonal and intrapersonal nature of Buddhist/secular mindfulness. In hesychia, the Christian is drawn towards a relationship with God in Christ. In mindfulness, the
Buddhist is in a more or less impersonal state of attentive awareness. These differences reflect the theological contrast between the Christian understanding of the contingency of creation upon a personal creator, and the Buddhist understandings of impermanence of all things and in particular of “non self”, or absence of any enduring entity such as self or soul.

The differences between the Philokalia and secular psychotherapies, about which much more could doubtless be said than space allows for here, might be summarised as being the difference between what is essentially a “talking cure” and that which is essentially a “praying cure”. The former is anthropocentric. The latter is pervasively theocentric and specifically Christocentric.

What, then, are the implications of the Philokalia for the Christian understanding of healing, and for the practice of psychotherapy?

1. Christian healing is a fundamentally theocentric and Christological process which does not necessarily imply freedom from suffering, or even reduction of suffering, in human terms. However, it does understand a therapeutic process whereby suffering itself becomes a part of the healing process. As Maximos would have it, the passion of Christ becomes a means of the healing of human passions.

2. The passions are “hostile pleasures”. They reflect a distraction from Divine purpose, a drawing into relationships with things and people which are superficially rewarding but ultimately a cause of human suffering. To try to find a balm for human suffering amidst the pleasures of wealth, sexual indulgence or self-satisfaction is therefore somewhat like trying to put out a fire with petrol!

3. Psychotherapy is concerned with psychological processes, with thoughts, emotions and passions, whether viewed from a secular perspective or through the lens of the Philokalia. However, secular psychotherapies are concerned primarily with the improvement of psychological wellbeing, whereas the Philokalia is concerned primarily with spiritual wellbeing understood in a personal and Christocentric way. The Philokalia keeps a positive perspective about the ultimate goals around which most secular psychotherapies either prefer to remain silent or else are nihilistic.

4. Although the therapy offered by the Philokalia is not primarily concerned with reducing psychological suffering, this does not imply that the reduction of psychological suffering might not be achieved by application of the therapy that the Philokalia prescribes. Similarly, at least in certain circumstances or on some occasions, secular therapies might usefully and legitimately be appropriated by Christians to this end. Indeed one might imagine that Christian love will always be concerned to bring such relief where possible. The warning that the Philokalia offers is that this relief should not be the final end of therapy, or one that is pursued to the ultimate harm of the person concerned.

5. If secular psychotherapy is a “talking cure”, then the Philokalia offers a “praying cure”. Prayer, understood as relationship with the Divine, leading eventually to union with God, is both the means and end of the therapy that the Philokalia prescribes.

It is interesting that counselling and psychotherapy are increasingly open to consideration of a spiritual dimension of human well-being, and yet that the possibility of prayer within the context of a therapeutic relationship seems to be increasingly controversial. Whilst the concept of spirituality is
elastic enough to accommodate widely varying ideas of what the spiritual goals of therapy should be, prayer is an inescapably theistic and personal encounter. The *Philokalia* was published at a time when the European enlightenment was challenging not only ideas of whether and how God might be known, but even the extent to which anything at all can confidently be known by the human subject. Whilst it arises from an eastern context within which such concerns were hardly voiced at all, or even completely unknown, yet its self-reflective approach to the need to question and interpret human thoughts, and ultimately to find transcendence beyond them, works remarkably well as a means of seeking healing in our present age.

The present secular age, within which we live, is inward looking and radically reflexive if also at times surprisingly naïve about the goodness that it expects to find within the human self. To this context, the *Philokalia* brings a means of being self reflective which is both critical and realistic, aware of immanence and transcendence, psychologically sophisticated and yet spiritually directed.

### Bibliography


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i *Philokalia* 1: 73-94

ii *Philokalia* 1: 231 & 234 respectively. See also p247 where Neilos refers to possessions as a “source of disease”, because they “give rise to all the passions”.

iii Paras 46 & 75 respectively (*Philokalia* 1: 308 & 316 respectively). Later, he also refers to garrulity as a disease (Para 90 – see p320).

iv Paras 97 & 158 respectively (*Philokalia* 1: 344 & 353 respectively).

v Para 89 (*Philokalia* 2: 318), cf Para 44 (p328)

vi A Discourse on Abba Philimon, author unknown (*Philokalia* 2: 349)

vii Para 68 (*Philokalia* 2: 375)

viii Para 32 (*Philokalia* 3: 37)

ix Para 72 (*Philokalia* 3: 317)

x Paras 22, 11 & 55 respectively (*Philokalia* 4: 113, 110 & 122 respectively).

xi Para 41 (*Philokalia* 4: 309)

xii It is, of course, also the case that the passions are associated with pleasure. However, this is understood as inevitably being associated with pain. For example, Maximos argues this in *Various Texts on Theology*, the
Divine Economy and Virtue and Vice (eg Philokalia 2: 175), where he also refers to a “Pleasure-pain syndrome” (2: 246).

xiii See, for example, the account by Theodorus, Philokalia 2: 15. The notion of the passions as “contrary to nature” is widely encountered in the texts of the Philokalia.

xiv Eg Philokalia 2: 197

xv Evagrius, in Texts on Discrimination in Respect of Passions and Thoughts, para 15 (Philokalia 1: 47)

xvi Diadochus of Photiki, in On Spiritual Knowledge and Discrimination, para 17 (Philokalia 1: 258)

xvii John of Karpathos, in Ascetic Discourse Sent at the Request of the Same Monks in India (Philokalia 1: 325)

xviii Philotheos of Sinai, in Forty Texts on Watchfulness, para 14 (Philokalia 3: 20)

xix Ilias the Presbyter, in Part I of A Gnomic Anthology, para 32 (Philokalia 3: 37)

xx Nikitas Stithatos, in On the Practice of the Virtues, para 75 (Philokalia 4: 99)

xxi Mark the Ascetic, in his Letter to Nicolas the Solitary (Philokalia 1: 157); Evagrius, in Texts on Discrimination in Respect of Passions and Thoughts, para 13 (Philokalia 1: 46); John of Karpathos, in For the Encouragement of the Monks in India who had Written to Him, para 37 (Philokalia 1: 320); Philotheos of Sinai, in Forty Texts on Watchfulness, para 2 (Philokalia 3: 16); Gregory Palamus, in To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia, para 42 (Philokalia 4: 310)

xxii John Cassian, in On the Holy Fathers of Sketis and on Discrimination (Philokalia 1: 105), John of Karpathos, in For the Encouragement of the Monks in India who had Written to Him, para 37 (Philokalia 1: 306), Symeon Metaphrastis, in his Paraphrase of the Homilies of St Makarios of Egypt, para 72 (Philokalia 3: 317)

xxiii Maximos the Confessor, in the third century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, para 82 (Philokalia 2: 96), Gregory Palamus, in To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia, para 42 (Philokalia 4: 310)

xxiv John of Karpathos, in Ascetic Discourse sent at the Request of the Same Monks in India (Philokalia 1: 325), Maximos the Confessor, in the first century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice, para 14 (Philokalia 2: 168), Peter of Damaskos, in Book I of A Treasury of Divine Knowledge (Philokalia 3: 95)

xxv Maximos the Confessor, in the third century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice, para 36 (Philokalia 2: 218)

xxvi Ilias the Presbyter, in Part I of A Gnomic Anthology, para 30 (Philokalia 3: 37)

xxvii Maximos the Confessor, in the first century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, para 79 (Philokalia 2: 61)

xxviii Maximos the Confessor, in the second century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice, para 23 (Philokalia 2: 192)

xxix Gregory of Sinai, in On Commandments and Doctrines, Warnings and Promises; On Thoughts, Passions and Virtues, and also on Stillness and Prayer, para 132 (Philokalia 4: 250)

xxx Gregory Palamus, in To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia, para 36 (Philokalia 4: 307)

xxxi Specifically: The author(s) of the text attributed to Antony the Great, Theodorus the Great Ascetic, Maximos the Confessor, Thalassios the Libyan, Theognostos, Ilias the Presbyter, Nikitas Stithatos, Theoliptos, Gregory of Sinai, and Gregory Palamus.

xxi Philokalia 2: 139, para 8

xxvi In the first century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, para 84, and in the first century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice, para 60 (Philokalia 2: 62-63 & 177 respectively)

xxvii See, for example, the way in which Neilos, in his Ascetic Discourse, uses the example of fear of disaster at sea as a way of changing cognitive patterns in relation to fear of God and attitudes towards the spiritual life (Philokalia 1: 242-243)


xxix Ibid., 62-63. Frank suggests a classification according to the primary target of therapy (individual v family/group), temporal orientation (past v present), and what they seek to modify (thoughts, emotions, behaviours, etc).


xxxvii Ibid., 31-38.

xxxviii Maximos the Confessor, in the third century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, para 87 (Philokalia 2: 97)

xxxix Para 17 (Philokalia 2: p102)

xl Paras 97-98 (Philokalia 2: pp134-135)

xlii cf In the first century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice, paras 24-25 (Philokalia 2: p170)

xliii See the second century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, paras 44 & 91 (Philokalia 2: 73 & 81 respectively)
See the third century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, para 82 (*Philokalia* 2: 96)

xv See the second century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, para 46 (*Philokalia* 2: 73) and the first century of *Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice*, para 90 (p185)

xvi See the third century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, para 82 (*Philokalia* 2: 96)

xviii See the first century of *Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice*, paras 83 & 86-88 (*Philokalia* 2: 183 & 184)

xix See the first century of *Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice*, para 53 (*Philokalia* 2: 175). In the third century of *Various Texts*, in para 87, Maximos appears to actually identify pain as a passion (p232).

xx See the third century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, para 82 (*Philokalia* 2: 96)

xxi In the second century of *Four Hundred Texts on Love*, para 46 (*Philokalia* 2: p73)

1 I am referring here to texts which are attributed to Maximos, and in particular paras 7, 8, 10, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42-44. Some texts in this work, as it appears in the *Philokalia*, are known not to be by Maximos (see G. E. H. Palmer, P. Sherrard, and K. Ware, *The Philokalia: The Complete Text Compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth*, vol. 2 (London: Faber & Faber, 1984), 49-50, 391-95.)

xxii Para 43 (*Philokalia* 2: 246)


xxiv See Nikitas Stithatos in *On Spiritual Knowledge, Love and the Perfection of Living*, para 52 (*Philokalia* 4: 155)

xxv Explicit applications of this Christological model are of course also be found, as for example where Evagrius finds in it a basis for the rejection of thoughts (*Texts on Discrimination in Respect of Passions and Thoughts*, para 1, *Philokalia* 1:38), or where Hesychios the Priest finds in it a model for “humility, fasting, prayer and watchfulness” (*On Watchfulness and Holiness*, para 12, *Philokalia* 1:164), or where John of Damaskos finds an illustration in it for his description of the process of “provocation” (*On the Virtues and the Vices, Philokalia* 2:338).

xxvi See Chris Mace, *Mindfulness and Mental Health* (London: Routledge, 2008). The following account is largely based upon this work.

xxvii Ibid., 4.

xxviii See, for example, Peter of Damaskos in *The Seven Forms of Bodily Discipline*, in Book I of his *Treasure of Divine Knowledge* (*Philokalia* 3: 89)

xxix See the entry on “stillness” in any of the four published volumes.

xxi Mark the Ascetic, in his *Letter to Nikolas the Solitary* (*Philokalia* 1: 159-160); Diadochus of Photiki in *On Spiritual Knowledge and Discrimination*, para 96 (*Philokalia* 1: 293); Theodorus the Great Ascetic, in *A Century of Spiritual Texts*, para 13 (*Philokalia* 2: 16); Ilias the Presbyter, in Part III of *A Gnomic Anthology*, para 11 (*Philokalia* 3: 48); Nikitas Stithatos in *On the Inner Nature of Things and on the Purification of the Intellect*, para 74 (*Philokalia* 4: 128); Theoliptos in *On Inner Work in Christ and the Monastic Profession* (*Philokalia* 4: 178-189); Nikiphoros the Monk in *On Watchfulness and the Guarding of the Heart* (*Philokalia* 4: 203-204); Gregory of Sinai in *On Commandments and Doctrines, Warnings and Promises; On Thoughts, Passions and Virtues, and also On Stillness and Prayer*, paras 17, 61 (*Philokalia* 4: 215, 223) as well as in various other works; Gregory Palamas in *Topics of Natural and Theological Science and on the Moral and Ascetic Life*, para 46 (*Philokalia* 4: 367)
