CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVES AND
THE TOTALITARIAN CHALLENGE 1933-1940*

An address broadcast by the BBC on 14 July 1940 contained the following passage:

And now it has come to us to stand alone in the breach, and face the worst that the tyrant's might and enmity can do. Bearing ourselves humbly before God, but conscious that we serve an unfolding purpose, we are ready to defend our native land against the invasion by which it is threatened. We are fighting by ourselves alone; but we are not fighting for ourselves alone. Here in this strong City of Refuge which enshrines the title-deeds of human progress and is of deep consequence to Christian civilisation ... here ... we await undismayed the impending assault.¹

The grandiose, defiant, tones were characteristic of the speaker - but the imagery was not.

Before 1940 Churchill rarely presented resistance to the totalitarian regimes in Christian terms. He had declared during the House of Commons debate on the Munich agreement in October 1938 that 'there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power, that power which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onward course by a barbarous paganism'.² But his opposition to German ambitions from 1933 onwards had been expressed overwhelmingly in terms of relative military strengths, British safety and independence, and the continental balance of power.³ Only gradually from 1935 did he add a further range of appeals, and only during 1938 did he begin to do so with some regularity. Against Nazi and Communist ideologies he contrasted the British 'ideology' of 'freedom, ... a liberal constitution, ... democratic and Parliamentary Government, ... Magna Carta and the Petition of Right'.⁴ As the need for labour co-operation in rearmament became manifest and later as he himself sought Labour party sympathy, he spoke of preserving the opportunities created by modern science for improved, easier and more equal conditions for the 'broad, toiling masses'.⁵ On those occasions when he did appeal to 'moral and spiritual ideas' or to a 'cause' greater than that of the British nation alone - even, on the outbreak of war in September 1939, to 'all that is
most sacred to man' - he meant the essentially secular values of the League of Nations
Covenant, the 'standards of Law, of Justice and of Freedom', and the rights of the individual.  

Churchill was not a Christian, even though he conformed to the Church of England. He
had some sense of 'God' and 'Providence', but if this amounted to any faith beyond
'evolutionary materialism' it was 'Gibbonian deism' - or perhaps more precisely belief in a
'Churchillian Deity', which through the agencies of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough in
the 1700s, Randolph Churchill in the 1880s and himself in 1940, reached out to embrace the
destiny of Britain and its Empire.  

When he repeatedly invoked Christian faith during 1940, he did so not from personal conviction but as a rhetorician. He drew upon the most powerful
language available to sharpen and solemnize the confrontation with Germany, to inspire the
British nation and the self-governing Dominions to renewed determination, and to strengthen a
moral appeal for assistance from the United States. He was also responding to deep
movements in public feeling. Britain was still a broadly Christian society, even if for most this
took the form of strongly-held 'marginal Christianity' rather than active church membership.

Faith in God's power of intervention and mediation in human affairs remained part of official
belief. The imminence of war during the Czechoslovak crisis had brought unusually large
numbers of people into churches and chapels for prayers of penitence and intercession. Under
the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury and with the King's public approval all British
churches, Established, Free Church and Roman Catholic, had observed a Day of National
Prayer (18 September 1938) and after the Munich settlement - interpreted as an answer to
those prayers - a Day of Thanksgiving (2 October). Over the next two years successive
international crises were marked by similarly large church attendances led by national and civic
leaders on further national Days of Prayer, declared by the King-in-Council - an act of state -
after the outbreak of war (1 October 1939), or less formally at the King's 'desire' during the
campaign in France (26 May 1940) and to mark the first year of war (8 September). During
the desperate summer months of 1940 religious language acquired a vigorous public currency,
and not just among believers. Reinforced by the August 1939 pact between the atheistic
dictatorships of Communist Russia and Nazi Germany, the war was commonly presented not
just as a fight for British independence or human freedom but as a defence of Christian
civilisation. For many, the fall of France, leaving Britain 'standing alone', seemed to confirm that the British nation had been charged by God with a special mission in the world.12

If Churchill's choice of rhetoric in 1940 confirms that Christian faith remained a central element in British public values, were there other leading Conservative politicians and government ministers, undoubted Christians, who had earlier offered Christian responses to totalitarianism? If so, did these have significant effects upon events? Such questions have hardly ever been asked, yet once raised they begin to reveal new dimensions to familiar political episodes.

It is well understood that the threat of war, onset of rearmament and the Nazi and Soviet religious persecutions caused great moral perplexity and spiritual anxiety among many British Christians, most obviously the clergy and religious pacifists. It is also known that during the Czechoslovak crisis the churches' desire for peace was so strong that almost all their leaders fervently supported Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and the Munich agreement.13 Yet as it affected British politicians, the international crisis of the 1930s is normally considered only as a matter of diplomatic, military and economic assessments, as practical and material expediencies rather than anything felt and articulated in ideological and moral, let alone religious, terms.14 True, a few leading politicians were such prominent lay churchmen that the fact has to be noted, but if this goes beyond simple use of the epithet 'Christian' their religion is generally treated as somehow separate from, or an encumbrance upon, their politics. Insofar as religion is recognised as a political element in the 1930s it is associated chiefly with criticism of the government, whether from within the Labour and Liberal parties or from members of the League of Nations Union and the Peace Pledge Union. But did not Conservative members of the government offer Christian answers to such Christian critics?

There is also a wider issue: the nature of the interwar Conservative party's popular appeal and electoral success. This has usually been interpreted in socio-economic or class terms, or more successfully as ideological manipulation of such interests, with a 'gendered' appeal - success among the new female electorate - as a more recent addition.15 But Conservatism had always existed in several forms, and these further Conservative arguments require investigation if the party's interwar dominance and the nation's wider political culture are to be
properly understood. Alongside the constitutional and historical, the loyalties to family, locality, nation and Empire, conceptions of ‘national character’ and the ethic of ‘service’, there were also appeals to spiritual values.\textsuperscript{16}

This article proceeds by identifying prominent Christians in the Conservative party and the National government, but also the dilemmas which inhibited most of them from expressing extended religious and moral criticism of nazism and fascism. It then considers two leading Conservative who did confront these dilemmas and publicly articulated forms of ‘Christian Conservative’ resistance to totalitarianism, if at first carefully defined and delimited. It examines the remarkable interest of these and numerous other public figures in a controversial Christian revivalist movement. Finally, it assesses whether recognition of a Christian Conservative rhetoric and spiritual concern can help explain certain crucial aspects of British politics and policy in the 1930s.

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The upper reaches of the Conservative party and National government contained more than the one or two individuals commonly noted as ‘Christian’; it included others who exceeded conventional conformism in their manifest devotion, lay churchmanship, or readiness to introduce religious dimensions into public discussion. Among the anti-appeasers after Munich were members of the Cecil family - Lords Cecil, Cranborne, Wolmer and, behind the scenes, Salisbury - and also Lord Lloyd and Ronald Cartland, all in some senses ‘Christian idealists’.\textsuperscript{17} Chamberlain’s Cabinet contained equally committed Christians.\textsuperscript{18} These included Inskip, not just Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, but also a lay leader of evangelical Anglicanism, president of the National Church League, Church Pastoral Aid Society, Crusaders’ Union, YMCA, and Lord’s Day Observance Society, who in 1936 declared Sunday observance to be ‘one of the many blessings which had made Great Britain a power in the world’.\textsuperscript{19} Hoare had first risen to prominence as an Anglo-Catholic campaigner for ecclesiastical causes, notably in resistance to disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales but also for assistance to the Greek Orthodox Church and on committees for the Eastern Churches and Redemption of St.
Sophia. Lord Zetland, a former Indian governor, had developed an interest in comparative religious studies. Earlier the Cabinet had included two other prominent Anglican laymen: Ormsby-Gore (another member of the extended Cecil family) and Percy, a contributor to the 1924 Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship. There were also three active Free Churchmen: the Conservative Kingsley Wood and the Liberal National Runciman served on national committees of Methodism, while another Liberal National, Ernest Brown, was a Baptist lay preacher and treasurer of the Free Church Federal Council.

Several of these clearly were exercised by the moral and religious challenge from the totalitarian states, as well as the military threat. A view that these regimes manifested pagan 'forces of darkness' and that Hitler in particular was 'anti-Christ incarnate', was fundamental to the reservations or repugnance which all Cecils felt towards government foreign policy at various times. Lord Cecil's dedication to the League of Nations and the League of Nations Union was rooted in a sense of religious duty, of having 'been "called" to preach the League spirit in public affairs'. Cartland's ardent sense of 'the battle ... between Totalitarianism and Christianity' led him to such bitter criticism of the government that in August 1939 Chamberlain encouraged moves to have him de-selected as a parliamentary candidate.

Among ministers, Zetland reflected privately on the challenge to the mind of Christendom from the 'pagan philosophy' and 'misapplied Darwinism' of Germany. Others showed concern for Christian solidarity. Ormsby-Gore, like other Cecilians once a fierce adversary of Liberal nonconformists, revealed an important shift in the character of Conservative politics when arguing in 1935 for Brown's promotion to the Cabinet: 'he and his wife are the salt of the earth as the best type of bible loving nonconformists .... I know that in the ultimate crisis we may all have to face some day, he'll have no use for the neo-paganism of Germany & what its triumph may mean in the world'. As the Czechoslovak crisis developed, Inskip and two Cabinet colleagues, the Conservative W.S. Morrison and National Liberal Burgin, joined the Conservative anti- appeaser Amery, the Labour pacifist Lansbury and 173 other MPs of all parties protesting against a congress of the World Union of Freethinkers in London, signing a 'Manifesto of Witness' which proclaimed that 'in these momentous days when conflict and anxiety prevail on every side', the 'hope of the world' lay in the freedom and the practice of
truth and justice brought by recognition of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Hoare declared in November 1937 that 'the forces of brutality and materialism will ... gain if we fail to make use of the one invincible weapon of religion that we possess against them'. Percy revealed a little more. 'To Toryism', he wrote in 1935, 'more than to any other school of political thought, "totalitarianism" is, in principle, fundamentally repugnant'. This, he argued, was because 'Toryism' derived ultimately from 'the first commandment of the Mosaic Law', which was 'the original charter of free thought' and because it understood that the motive force for human progress lay 'not in the compulsory authority of the State, but in the individual's conscience and sense of duty'.

Much of this, however, consisted of private comments, sporadic surfacings of personal faith or occasional quasi-academic statements. Those by Cabinet ministers help confirm, if further confirmation is needed, that appeasement of Germany was not based upon sympathy with nazism. But none amounted to public creation of a Christian Conservative perspective. Why did these politicians not express their abhorrence of totalitarianism more explicitly? The answers lie in the familiar perplexities of British responses to the continental dictatorships, probably felt more acutely by Christian Conservatives than by less religiously-minded ministerial and party colleagues. Like many church leaders, some Christian Conservatives thought there were religious as well as socio-economic reasons for regarding nazism and fascism, however unpleasant, as less horrible than communism, because less directly anti-Christian in propaganda and policies. There was a belief that they had emerged largely as reactions to communism: without communism, there might have been no nazism or fascism. In 1935 Inskip endorsed a lurid popular religious tract which located the source of international anti-religious influences squarely in Moscow. While Cecil considered communism a lesser threat than fascism (given the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations in 1934) and thought actions by the Franco forces showed that 'not only democracy but Christianity is on trial', the views of Cabinet members on the Spanish civil war were close to those of backbench Conservative members of the 'United Christian Front': that here at least, fascism in resisting communism acted as a defence for Christianity. Inskip was sensitive to the German government's interference with the Lutheran church, but was as confused by the
complicated nature of the German church struggle and as deflected by Nazi reassurances as were most British church leaders - and like other Conservative politicians much less inclined to make it into a public or diplomatic issue. In early 1938 he declined to join a church protest against the arrest of Niemöller because he 'recognised that he was having a trial according to ... German law and I felt it would be out of place for me to protest'. Like Archbishop Lang he warned Ribbentrop that Niemöller's imprisonment in a concentration camp, despite his legal acquittal, was a 'great shock' to British opinion, but neither turned their distaste for German religious persecution - including persecution of Jews - into grounds for criticising Chamberlain's foreign policy.

The larger answer is that until 1939 all Christian Conservative judgements on totalitarianism remained subordinate to what they regarded as a still more serious plight: the risk of war. None was a pacifist; from early 1934 they accepted the need for rearmament. Nevertheless for them as for almost all British churchmen, the enormous losses of the Great War - moral and spiritual as well as human and material - had deepened a belief that general war, except in the most extreme circumstances, offended against God's will. Consequently the policy of appeasement easily seemed to express the Christian injunctions, as was shown by the British churches' earnest support and thanksgiving for Chamberlain's efforts during the Czechoslovak crisis - even though an obvious outcome of the Munich agreement was to expose many more people in central Europe to 'paganism' and persecution. The priority given to peace, and consequently to avoiding inflammation of diplomatic relations, also explains why many Christian Conservatives were as cautious about presenting a religious-based criticism of totalitarianism as other Conservatives were to introduce ideological criticisms. Churchill was as concerned as Cabinet ministers to deny that Britain intended any interference with the internal government of other countries: there was 'no question of resisting Dictators because they are Dictators, ... but only if they attack other people'. Indeed the totalitarian challenge raised such delicate moral and spiritual problems, especially in relation to rearmament and amidst strong church and chapel opinion, that few Conservative politicians could feel confident in addressing them directly in public. It may also be that
some Christian Cabinet ministers felt the task was being adequately performed by more senior colleagues.

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The most prominent lay churchman in Chamberlain's Cabinet, the one invariably identified by historians as Christian, was Lord Halifax. He was not, however, the first to offer a substantial Christian Conservative response to totalitarianism. This came from Chamberlain's predecessor as prime minister, Stanley Baldwin.

Since 1922 Baldwin had established an unusual political personality. In party and ministerial speeches which commonly reached beyond the policies and tactics of the moment, and by many ostensibly non-political addresses to non-political audiences, he expressed a preoccupation with public values which drew, among other sources, upon a deeply-felt broad church Anglicanism. By the quality, simplicity and power of his language and messages he had become a highly successful public moralist, so masterly that he could fuse non-partisan values with Conservative party interests without much of his audience noticing, and thereby command wide cross-party admiration. By 1933 he had seen off the challenges of the General Strike, Lloyd George's Liberal party, the 'press lords', and the Labour party. But during his holiday ruminations in Aix-les-Bains that summer he identified a new threat: 'walking alone among these hills I have come to the conclusion the world is stark mad .... I think we are the sanest but the disease is catching'. This madness was not just the resumption of foreign rearmament and international aggression. Earlier than most other British politicians, he grasped the shared features of Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia and Mussolini's Italy and identified a single monstrosity - what he usually called 'dictatorship', but which he learned by 1935 to describe also as 'totalitarianism'. In them he perceived extreme forms not simply of a political challenge but of a moral affliction created within all societies by the accelerated changes brought by the Great War: acceptance that the best opinions were popular opinions, however uninformed, crude and brutish these might be; belief that all problems could be solved by the state; obsession with material advance, and unquestioning
faith in the power of science. From these flowed the perversion of education and the new
electrical media into instruments for creating a servile 'mass mind'; the erection of an
'idolatrous conception of the state', and an acceptance that governments were justified in
manipulating societies and human nature as if they were machines, moulded by regimentation
or force for some supposed collective good. Seen in these ways, the military and ideological
threats from the fascist and communist powers were manifestations of a deeper spiritual crisis.
As he said in December 1934, 'the great danger that faces humanity to-day is the danger of the
loss of freedom'. Soon 'from the Rhine to the Pacific there will be a people running into
millions who have been trained to be either Bolshevik robots or Nazi robots'.

For so experienced and successful a political leader as Baldwin, such perceptions were
inseparable from considerations of public thinking and government strategy. He declared the
threat to be not just external, but potentially internal to Britain. In the modern world, with
faster communications and with unsophisticated and impatient electorates, ideas passed with
'lightning rapidity' between nations: 'there are no ideas ... that may not spread through this
country as through others. No country is immune'. Britain had to establish a moral and
ideological resistance to totalitarianism. There were obvious partisan applications. From
1933 to mid 1935 he used anti-totalitarianism as a means to justify perpetuation of the
National government, and to attack not only the political 'extremes' of Mosley's British Union
of Fascists and Cripps's Socialist League but also a Labour opposition which since 1931 had
turned sharply towards the left. But there were also larger, 'national', potentialities. After the
collapse of the Disarmament Conference in late 1933, Baldwin knew that Britain had to create
an armed deterrence. His presentation of rearmament was as indicative of his ideological and
moral concerns as it was of his sensitivity towards the strength of peace and disarmament
opinion among the electorate. When Tom Jones the official suggested that he should 'impress
the country with the gravity of the situation and make them realise that we seem to be shaping
for another war', Baldwin the politician replied: 'I would not put it that way. I would say that
we are the only defenders left of liberty in a world of Fascists'. Given the widespread belief
that balance-of-power thinking, alliance systems and an arms race had 'caused' the Great War
and that another war against Germany might begin with a 'knock-out blow' - aerial explosive
and gas bombardment of British cities - Baldwin, unlike Churchill, did not think that popular acceptance of rear-arrangement could be achieved by using the language of power politics, nor by elaborating upon the still uncertain character of the German military threat. These might well be counter-productive, scaring a volatile electorate 'into fits' and strengthening the anti-rear-arrangement opposition groups. Instead he spoke of repairing 'deficiencies in defence', and enveloped rear-arrangement in a positive ideological teaching. As the international situation continued to deteriorate and a need for greater rear-arrangement, requiring co-operation from the trade unions and Labour party, became obvious, from May 1935 he shifted his anti-totalitarianism towards appeals for recognition of shared national interests and values. Now the Labour movement was celebrated as 'a bulwark of popular liberty' against communism and fascism.

From mid 1933 Baldwin's speeches therefore presented a sustained defence of democracy against dictatorship. During even routine party speeches he would say: 'I would like before I sit down to say a word about freedom'. He rooted democratic freedoms partly in specifically British traditions - in 'Whiggish' constitutionalism and history, and romantic stereotypes of the national character - but also in general political principle and, increasingly and most fundamentally, in religion. At the Congress on Education for Democracy in New York in August 1939, he declared:

I would always stress the spiritual rather than the political foundations of democracy. It is a recognition of the dignity of man and of his individuality, and that dignity and individuality are his as a child of God. There is the unbridgeable gulf between ... democracy and the isms that are for the time being in control of so large a part of Europe. An insistence upon Christian faith as the ultimate source and safeguard of freedom had long suffused his speeches. While sharing the characteristic Conservative attitudes that communism was worse than fascism and nazism, and that Mussolini and Hitler were checks upon Stalin, he was not deluded about the character of the Italian and German regimes, nor the German church struggle. Nazis as well as communists persecuted religion because by doing so they struck at the foundations of individuality, liberty and brotherhood: 'if freedom has to be abolished and room has to be made for the slave state, Christianity must go because slavery
and Christianity cannot live together'. The great question had become 'whether the civilisation of Europe ... was to be a Christian civilisation or a pagan civilisation'.45 His annual addresses as Grandmaster of the Primrose League reveal this developing emphasis. Since the mid 1920s he had routinely expounded Conservative doctrine as based upon the three 'Disraelian' precepts of constitution, Empire, and the welfare of the people. But in 1935 he added 'the maintenance of religion', and in 1936 promoted this to first place.46 By the time he retired from government in May 1937, he had come to regard these themes as his political testament:

The torch I would hand to you ... is a Christian truth re-kindled anew in each ardent generation. Use men as ends and never merely as means; and live for the brotherhood of man, which implies the Fatherhood of God. The brotherhood of man to-day is often denied and derided and called foolishness, but it is, in fact, one of the foolish things of the world which God has chosen to confound the wise, and the world is confounded by it daily.

We may evade it, we may deny it; but we shall find no rest for our souls, nor will the world until we acknowledge it as the ultimate wisdom. That is a message I have tried to deliver as Prime Minister in a hundred speeches....47

Yet despite his criticism of totalitarianism, Baldwin insisted that the chief aim of British policy had to be peace. The purpose of rearmament was strictly deterrence and defence, not preparation for an armed crusade. Britain had no ambition to change the government of any other country, it should remain neutral in Spain; democratic and totalitarian states could co-exist. There were limits to Christian solidarity. Speaking privately in July 1936 Baldwin said he would not mind too much if Germany expanded to the East, because if there had to be war in Europe it should be between the totalitarian powers, the 'Bolshies' and the 'Nazis'. Only if Hitler went 'stark mad' and attacked the Low Countries and France should Britain think of going to war; otherwise he was 'not going to get this country into a war with anybody for the League of Nations or anybody else or for anything else'.48 This attitude derived not just from reaction to the Great War, but also from expectation of still greater slaughter in a future war of bombardment of civilians. While studying air raid precautions in 1935 he had, he told the House of Commons:

been made almost physically sick to think that I and my friends and the statesmen in every country in Europe, 2,000 years after our Lord was crucified, should be spending our time thinking how we can get the mangled bodies of children to the hospitals and how we can keep the poison gas from going down the throats of the people.49
This was not humanitarian revulsion alone. The Great War, he sometimes said, had been a 'great sin', which had unleashed 'the manifest forces of Satan': mankind was having to atone for that sin in the economic, social and political ravages of the post-war world. He repeatedly declared that the Great War had shaken civilisation, and that a second war of scientific barbarism would 'be the end of civilisation'. During the Czechoslovak crisis he was a Chamberlainite, and afterwards went so far as to tell the House of Lords that if there 'were a 95 per cent chance of war ... I would hold to the [remaining] 5 per cent till I died'. In the delivery of Hitler's invitation to the Munich conference he felt - as did Archbishop Lang and other witnesses of the overwrought House of Commons scene on 28 September - that the world's prayers had been answered, 'as though the finger of God had drawn the rainbow once more across the sky and ratified again His Covenant with the children of men'.

During the international crises of the 1930s Baldwin found solace and strength in prayer and providentialist faith. As he felt especially after Dunkirk and the fall of France, the operations of Divine Providence had become peculiarly inscrutable; yet even the evils of totalitarianism could be part of God's purpose, and in summer 1940 he shared the view that the defeats of continental democracies seemed to demonstrate that Britain had been chosen as the special instrument of His will. Although he had not earlier thought it Britain's role to fight a war, since 1933 he had declared its chief international function to be that of supplying inspiration and hope to the oppressed peoples of continental Europe: 'saving ourselves to save the world at large'. Here, well before 1940, was a conception of the British people's special responsibility for preserving Christian liberties: as 'the home of freedom' Britain formed 'a tremendous stronghold to the slave state spreading westwards', and had a solemn duty to provide 'spiritual leadership' to the world.

Baldwin also became associated with another indication of Christian Conservative anxiety and faith. The public figures who from the mid 1930s became associated with or interested in Buchman's Christian evangelist movement, the Oxford Group, were remarkable in their
number and eminence: clergymen, sportsmen, trade unionists, businessmen, academics, military officers, society hostesses, civic leaders, peers and politicians. In June 1939 236 MPs of all parties signed a message of support for Buchman's campaign in the United States: 'There is urgent need to acknowledge the sovereign authority of God in home and nation, to establish that liberty which rests upon the Christian responsibility to all one's fellow men, and to build a national life based on unselfishness, unity and faith'. Among the most active of these figures was Lord Salisbury. In October 1936 he arranged a weekend meeting at Hatfield House during which Buchman and his close advisors explained his teachings to a group of Anglican Cabinet ministers, ex-ministers, imperial proconsuls, peers and MPs, including Halifax, Cecil, Wolmer, Percy, Lyttos, Goschen, Bernays, Cazalet and Sankey, MacDonald's Lord Chancellor. During 1937 Salisbury gave public support for the Group, and was joined by the Baptist Cabinet minister Ernest Brown: it was rendering 'the greatest possible service ... to the nations at this critical time'. Another Hatfield participant and public supporter was Davidson, Baldwin's close friend, a former Conservative party chairman and until May 1937 a junior minister. Through Salisbury, Davidson and family members, Baldwin was drawn into contact with the Group. He declared himself 'profoundly' interested by Salisbury's report of the Hatfield discussions, and in December 1936 invited Buchman to explain his work to him at Chequers. Thereafter Group leaders and activists made persistent efforts to persuade Baldwin - described by Buchman as the 'Abraham Lincoln of this generation' - to become in his political retirement the 'authoritative voice in the spiritual rebirth of the Empire'.

The Oxford Group was controversial, not least in its uncertain relationship to the churches and in its leader being an enigmatic American. For leading Conservatives to have been interested in such an unorthodox movement testifies to their sense that a spiritual crisis had been reached. Many shared the reservations of the Group's clerical critics: its lack of theology and institutionalised authority, its practice of public confession and its emotional style, and its activists' assumed familiarity with God and often embarrassing earnestness, naivety and self-satisfaction. They also disliked its importuning and flattery of themselves and other public figures, and its use of the names of such figures for its own purposes. Baldwin and Inskip both withdrew from its Royal Albert Hall meeting in July 1936 when their intended private
attendance was publicised, and Baldwin declined later invitations. Even so Christian Conservatives were impressed, because in several respects the Group appeared to 'hold out some hope of a remedy' for the 'present state of the world'. It had extraordinary success, exceeding that of the churches, in converting many people and especially the young to active Christian belief and conduct. It placed great emphasis upon individuals and personal relationships rather than the state as the source of improvement in communities and nations. In reaching across denominational, social and industrial divisions, it appeared to promote social harmony and promise that 'violent antagonism in politics' would be 'softened or swept away'. Although Cecil, at least, remained troubled on the issue, most were reassured by Buchman's explanations of his associations with German leaders and of his notorious reported (he claimed misunderstood) statement in August 1936 - 'I thank heaven for a man like Adolf Hitler' - the more easily because, without the positive emphasis, they sympathised with his qualifying clause, that Hitler had 'built a front line of defense against the anti-Christ of Communism'. The more immediate attractions were, first, that the Group seemed a vigorous force against the materialism, immorality and irreligion which these politicians believed to be at the root of all totalitarianism, nazi, fascist and communist. Second, with its reputed large numbers of supporters in continental European countries and influence among their statesmen and royalty, it appeared to have potential as an international movement helping to preserve peace. As Salisbury, Brown and Davidson wrote in a public letter published by The Times in August 1937, the Group's success in inspiring 'loyalty to ... the spirit and principles of Christ' might with the help of 'all the Churches of Christendom' provide the 'effective unifying or harmonizing principle' - a 'Christian Front' - needed to overcome the 'disunity of aim and conflict of interest that now disturbed all human life and relationships' and was 'the greatest menace to modern civilization'. Buchman himself adopted a broader purpose in May 1938, renaming his movement 'Moral Re-Armament', and as the Czechoslovak crisis developed a series of collective public letters from prominent sympathisers began to be published in leading newspapers. This stimulated wider correspondence and comment on the contribution of Christianity to the solution of national and international problems which continued through the autumn. The first public letter came from thirty-three MPs, including Wolmer and sixteen
other Conservatives. The second and most publicised was organised by Salisbury.

Challenging Baldwin to act upon his repeated call for 'spiritual leadership', he wrote that 'many of us are terrified at the crumbling of civilization, ... and ... are convinced that policy, however skilful and honest, is not sufficient to save us from catastrophe: it was necessary to tap 'the deeper springs of human motive'. With war apparently imminent in early September 1938, Baldwin responded by joining Salisbury and his group of eminent peers, ex-government ministers, retired military chiefs, and academics in an appeal in The Times - much reprinted, translated into other languages and circulated across Europe - for acceptance of moral and spiritual rearmament as the fundamental force for peace.

God's living spirit calls each nation, like each individual to its higher destiny, and breaks down the barriers of fear and greed, of suspicion and hatred. This same Spirit can transcend conflicting political systems, can reconcile order and freedom, can rekindle true patriotism, can unite all citizens in the service of nations, and all nations in the service of mankind. 'Thy Will be done on earth' is not only a prayer for guidance, but a call to action. For His Will is our Peace.

While Salisbury and Group leaders hoped the letter would be read by German leaders, Baldwin doubted the likelihood of immediate effects: 'I don't think it can do any good but it is a voice from England to like minded people in every country'. When broadcasting across North America in April 1939, however, he used Buchmanite terms for another pressing purpose. Seeking to counteract those calling for Canadian and American neutrality in any European war he spoke of the Christian as well as political objections to totalitarianism and of the strength of British resolve: the British people were undergoing not only a 'material rearmament' but also a 'spiritual rearmament', preparing 'the defences of body and soul'.

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After Baldwin retired as prime minister in May 1937, his role as the National government's chief public moralist passed to Halifax. Although he delivered fewer lay sermons than Baldwin, Halifax's addresses received similar prominence in the press and sold well as pamphlets, while his speeches as House of Lords spokesman on foreign affairs from 1935 and
as Foreign Secretary from February 1938 displayed unusual sensitivity to their moral aspects. In August 1940 a selection of his speeches and broadcasts since 1934 was published in a volume widely noticed as defining the Christian basis of British policy. He had been moved by the Hatfield House meeting with the Oxford Group leaders: he 'could not doubt that the Holy Spirit had been among our little company as we worshipped together in the family chapel'. He remained privately sympathetic towards its members, and in July 1939 sent a message of support for the Moral Re-Armament campaign in the United States. But he declined requests to add his name to the Salisbury, Davidson and Brown 'Christian Front' letter or to accept other public association with the Group. This was partly its lack of appeal to his own sacramentalism, and partly ministerial and ecclesiastical caution. But it was also because the Group could add nothing to his already considerable authority as a spokesman of lay Christianity. Although a 'high' Anglo-Catholic, he had - at least since the Great War - displayed tolerance and sympathy towards other church opinions and other denominations; and while no longer occupying active positions in the church, his manifest personal devotion, sense of duty and solidity of 'character', and evident assumption that religion was the true basis of social life, meant that he commanded 'the trust, respect, even veneration' of many British Christians, and many others as well.

Halifax used this position to address publicly such questions as 'Is England Christian Still?': it was 'vitaly important [to] recapture for England & [the] world [a] sense of God's presence in the world of men & of men's responsibility to a paramount power'. He used it also to justify both British values in general, and (after privately registering conscientious scruples over the first air rearmament programme) particular government defence and foreign policies. Like Baldwin, Halifax believed that in the face of post-war disillusionment, impatience, intolerance, 'false patriotism', belief in short cuts, 'quack remedies' and other causes of totalitarianism, parliamentary democracy was best defended not so much in terms of its secular benefits as by affirmation of its moral and spiritual foundations. His version focused upon a conception of personality, as understood by reflection upon the moral order. God, it might initially appear, had made strange arrangements for His government of the world. In choosing to work for the good of the world through the agency of men and women and by
endowing them with the power of choice and free will, He had taken the enormous risk that they might misuse this free will - as indeed, they had often done, sometimes disastrously. Insofar as God's patience and willingness to take this risk could be understood, it seemed 'to be taken for one purpose - to achieve, through man's right direction of his free will, the fulfilment of human personality'. It was 'against all our experience and ... understanding of the moral order ... to expect that the way of salvation in our own difficulties' would be 'through surrender of our private will and private judgement to some outside authority'. Halifax's fundamental and much reiterated political message was therefore that the 'ultimate object of government' was 'the fuller and freer development of human life so that each person may be enabled to make the most of his or her personality'. From acceptance of this premise flowed the other democratic political values, together with those qualities of individualism and self-help which generated improved material standards of life.78

Yet Halifax even more than Baldwin displayed the dilemmas of a Christian politician in the face of severe foreign policy pressures. For most of the 1930s he did not spell out the full implications of his argument - that totalitarian governments by exalting the state as an end in itself and by demanding the surrender of private will and conscience, inhibited their subjects from seeking spiritual salvation and so offended against the providential order.79 He too declared that Britain as 'the example and the champion of free institutions' had a 'special responsibility' for 'the future of the world'.80 But moral and political example did not become diplomatic - still less military - crusade against Germany or Italy or the Soviet Union. Like Churchill, he declared that Britain had no 'wish to interfere with a system of government with which we may not happen to agree'. Provided a government accepted the principles of peaceful international relations, the British desire was 'to live and let live in the world'.81 Privately he alerted the German government to British religious and humanitarian concerns - the German church struggle, treatment of the Jews, the fate of Austrian anti-nazis after the Anschluss and Czech refugees after Munich - but he neither pressed the protests hard, nor introduced these concerns into his public statements. At some level he perhaps supposed that non-interference followed his doctrine on the moral principle of choice, which logically required the possibility of wrong choices, and from the democratic principle of tolerance.
public he presented it as a policy necessity, yet with remarkable argumentative subtlety always asserted that expediency was justified by moral principle. In unstable and delicate international conditions 'the tendency to import into our judgements on the issues of foreign policy our likes and dislikes of forms of government elsewhere is full of danger'. A government, like an individual, might 'rightly be moved by indignation' at immoral or criminal acts, but even more than an individual it had 'an imperative duty of weighing the consequences' of acting upon mere moral revulsion. For there were both 'higher and lower calls of duty'. An attempt to interfere, or direct ideological confrontation with the dictators, might precipitate the far greater horror of war. Even when dictators did resort to acts of international aggression, the cause of peace might still make it desirable to accept the outcome. In May 1938 he declared that when 'two ideals - righteousness and peace - are in conflict, and you have to choose between an unpractical devotion to the high purpose that you know you cannot achieve except by a war you do not mean to have, and the practical victory for peace that you can achieve', he could not hesitate 'when both my conscience and my duty to my fellow men impel me directly in the direction of peace'.

From these perspectives Halifax presented rearmament as a means not just to secure the 'ideals and principles of the British nation' but also to maintain international peace - paradoxical as this second argument seemed after the supposed lessons of the Great War. Defence and peace were compatible; given that Britain's greatest interest was peace, a rearmed Britain would make war 'far less likely'. Here was the delicate balance that the government tried to sustain, as much in rhetoric as in policy. Against the pacifists of the left he asserted that in the dangerous condition of the world it was neither 'politically practicable' nor 'morally imperative' for a nation to forgo 'both the will and the right to defend what it believes to be right'. Against Churchill and other anti-appeasers he shared and expounded the objection of wider peace opinion towards balance-of-power doctrine and alliances, that these would divide Europe into armed camps and so precipitate war. Against isolationists he argued that British policy could not be merely passive avoidance of international difficulties. Beginning in ostensible support for the League of Nations, in early 1938 this became a moral presentation of 'appeasement' as positive activity for peace. 'No great country has a right, even if it could,
to throw away its power and its capacity to exert influence on the problems that lie at its door'; it was 'our plain duty to bend all our efforts to the avoidance of catastrophe'. Throughout, he spoke of Christian values as the basic solution to the international crisis. The weakness of covenants, pacts and treaties, and the suspicions, fears and misunderstandings which blocked 'the path to the temple of peace' had arisen because 'the world as a whole has not yet called clearly enough to its aid the old cardinal qualities on which all life is based, the qualities of Faith and Hope and Charity'. They must therefore hold firm 'to the faith that can remove mountains; the hope that will not be denied; and the charity that seeks always to think and to find the best, and not the worst, in other people'. He spoke also of the most fundamental solution. He asked whether the world's problems were not directly due to 'the half-heartedness and dullness' of their prayers; even the 'humblest' could pray, and this might 'achieve more than the greatest efforts of those we rank as statesmen'.

Nevertheless, from late 1938 Halifax made his criticism of Nazi Germany and later all totalitarian regimes more explicit, and as war became more likely arguments he had earlier offered for national rearmament changed almost seamlessly into justifications for international resistance. Following Kristallnacht he spoke of actions 'directly opposed to the Christian doctrine on which European civilization has been built'. Speaking after the German seizure of Prague in March 1939 of the need, if people were to be asked to fight in war, for a cause appealing to 'the highest elements in their nature', he invoked Christian principles and moral values. After the outbreak of war he spoke of 'the ... denial of elementary human rights' arousing 'something instinctive and profound in the universal conscience of mankind'. By February 1940 the war had become a crusade to defend the 'free expression of the human personality' against 'the Devil's work' - 'an active force of evil which, unless we fight it, will rapidly reduce our civilization to a desert of the soul'. Then in July, a week after the Churchill broadcast with which this article began, Halifax also spoke on the radio, in answer to Hitler's public demand that Britain should submit to his will. The German people, he declared, had 'given their consciences to Hitler' and been reduced to machines, unable to distinguish right from wrong. Hitler had inverted all values, ordaining that force, bad faith, cruelty and crime were right: 'that is the challenge of anti-Christ, which it is our duty as Christians to fight
with all our power’. Speaking as he was after the Norwegian defeat, Dunkirk, and the fall of France, with Britain alone and facing invasion, he offered comfort and hope:

Where will God lead us? Not, we may be sure, through easy or pleasant paths. That is not His way. He will not help us to avoid our difficulties. What He will do is to give to those who humbly ask, the spirit that no dangers can disturb. The Christian message to the world brings peace in war; peace where we most need it; peace of soul... And there is one thing we can all do... which may be more powerful than we know. And this is to pray.

... [P]rayer is not only asking God for what we want, but rather the way to learn to trust Him, to ask that we may know His will, and to do it with all our strength. If we can really do our work, whatever it is, as well as we can in God’s sight, it will become His work, and we can safely leave the issue in His hands.

This... is the spirit in which we must march together in this crusade for Christianity... We shall go forward, seeing clearly both the splendour and the perils of the task, but strengthened by the faith, through which by God’s help... we shall prevail.91

It has been suggested that by the 1930s a tradition of ‘prophetic’ statement by British politicians had withered to Churchill’s secular warnings.92 A more authoritative verdict might be that of a great learned Anglican bishop and, it should be noted, fierce contemporary critic of British foreign policy - Henson of Durham. Like numerous other church leaders of all denominations, Henson thought Baldwin’s May 1937 political testament ‘a magnificent prophecy’: that ‘the Prime Minister of Great Britain should have delivered it in the face of the world as it now stands is infinitely consoling’.93 He similarly considered that Halifax’s July 1940 broadcast gave ‘noble expression to the Christian conscience’:

It is not the first time in History that God elects to speak through a Layman rather than through His ordained servants. The fumbling and calculated platitudes of Pontiffs and Preachers count for little before the simplicity of a layman’s faith ....94

* * *

So far a particular form of Conservative public argument and rhetoric has been examined. This was deployed to support rearmament and government foreign policy, and more generally to stiffen moral and ideological resistance to the totalitarian powers. If the political, indeed partisan, purposes are evident, this ‘language’ nevertheless expressed elements of personal
belief and spiritual anguish. As such it assists understanding not just of public persuasion but also of the dilemmas felt by leading policy-makers. Can recognition of this Christian Conservative politics help further? Can it help explain other aspects of British politics in the 1930s and early 1940s? There are three central matters where it was important: the 1935 general election, the transformation of policy after the Munich crisis, and the sense of national solidarity in 1939-40.

At the 1935 general election the National government defended a huge House of Commons majority of almost 500 won in 1931. As it eventually retained a majority of 242 seats, in retrospect it can seem that ministers and Conservative organisers had no serious reasons to fear defeat. From October 1933, however, by-elections had revealed slumps in the Conservative vote - East Fulham is only the most notorious - and during the winter of 1934-35 a series of disputes and setbacks created the impression that 'every section of the population has now been alienated from the government'. The Conservative Central Office was 'rattled' and regarded 'no seat as safe', and Baldwin felt obliged to reassure nervous money markets that the government was not disintegrating. This was an unusually low point, and the real fear was less a Labour election victory than intervention by 'spoiling' groups which would so greatly reduce the government majority that its claim to be 'national' would be destroyed - weakening the coalition, its leadership, and its ability to carry its policies, including the crucial rearmament programme. In Central Office's assessment of by-election results and general election prospects, the 'Socialist Party' itself had made no 'substantial positive advance' but the government had lost support due 'in large part to the widespread fear of war and a latent suspicion that the Conservative Party is linked up with the theory of large armaments'. In these circumstances, 'the Liberal vote is vital, and no political issue is likely to influence them more than the question of peace or war and the future of the League of Nations'.

By 'the Liberal vote', the Central Office chiefly meant moral and religious opinion. That concern about 'public opinion' interacted to an unusual degree with diplomacy and defence policy in the run up to the 1935 election has become familiar. But the extent to which in this context the 'public' meant a religious public has been obscured, as part of a wider assumption that after the Great War religion 'declined' and became negligible as a political
factor. What really declined, however, was less religious belief itself than the denominational disputes which had earlier defined party-political conflict - and what declined too was the Liberal party, which had articulated the political culture of nonconformity. Along with other post-war shifts, these changes contributed to complicated electoral regroupings of religious and moral opinion, with some nonconformists moving towards Labour but many others reinforcing Conservative strength from 1924 or accepting the 'National' cause at the 1931 election. With another election approaching, moral issues had become more prominent and urgent than economic and social matters, yet in ways which could now threaten Conservative and 'National' electoral supremacy. These issues, relating to rearmament, international peace, collective security and the League of Nations, were sensitive enough in themselves, but were sharpened by the Abyssinian crisis and a possibility of British involvement in a Mediterranean war. The effect was a highly uncertain and delicate state of opinion and, it seemed, a possibility that a popular moral crusade could develop, with unpredictable and damaging consequences for the government. Hoare, as Foreign Secretary, wrote in a diplomatic despatch in July 1935 that 'feeling here is becoming more and more anti-Italian and there is every sign of the country being swept with the kind of movement that Gladstone started over the Bulgarian atrocities'.

One expression of this atmosphere was a public appeal by the Anglo-Catholic and pacifist Labour party leader, Lansbury, asking the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to join with the Pope in summoning a convocation of the world's religious leaders in Jerusalem, and 'from Mount Calvary call a truce of God and bid the war spirit rest'. While Archbishop Lang was scrupulously loyal to the government, he too contributed to the atmosphere by building upon the interdenominational discussions on church reunion of the early 1930s to lead public statements and deputations to Hoare by Anglican, Free Church and Scottish church leaders in support of peace and the League. Much more significant was Cecil's League of Nations Union. The core of the Union's membership and local organisation was a great band of church and more especially Free Church opinion. Its corporate members included some 2,600 religious congregations, of which over 2,000 were Free Church, and its meetings had a distinctly religious or 'revivalist' character. After it joined with the National Council of Free
Churches and numerous other religious, 'moral' and voluntary groups in the so-called Peace Ballot, the Union became a formidable movement of opinion, made more so by early government misjudgments. Criticisms of the Ballot's wording and purpose by Conservative officials, Baldwin, and Simon in November 1934 backfired, making it appear that the government was opposed to 'the best elements in the country', and attracting support for the Ballot from the opposition parties. With liberal opinion and more particularly the nonconformist conscience apparently aroused once again, and with 11.6 million people participating in the Ballot by June 1935, it seemed possible that an effective 'national' opposition to the National government might be created. Lloyd George, as the government critic with the strongest roots in nonconformist politics, duly seized upon this possibility. After failing to force his way back into Cabinet by means of his 'New Deal' economic campaign between January and May, he tried with Gladstonian precedents in mind to revive political nonconformity and to pre-empt and exploit the announcement of the Peace Ballot results by forming a Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction. Its manifesto, 'A Call to Action', published on 13 June, was signed by members of the National Free Church Council, other leaders of the various denominations, and the editors of the main Free Church newspapers. At the Council of Action's inaugural convention on 1-2 July, addressed among others by Cecil, the 2,500 attendance included some 400 Free Church ministers.

Baldwin was worried by the Peace Ballot, and especially by Lloyd George's activities. The Peace Ballot might reinforce the electoral appeal of the Labour and Liberal oppositions, while Lloyd George's implicit aim was to threaten a repeat of the 1929 general election stalemate, securing the parliamentary balance of power for himself by sponsoring some 350 candidates. Yet at the election five months later, these movements came to very little. The chief explanation is that Baldwin and the Cabinet retrieved their initial misjudgment, and by a simple yet pregnant manoeuvre both finessed the Peace Ballot movement and deflated the Council of Action. On receiving the Ballot results on 23 July and over the following four months, they expressed strong support for the League of Nations both in general and on the Abyssinian issue in particular, and justified their new rearmament programme - really intended as a deterrence against Germany - as a means to support the League. This had the desired
effect: Cecil committed the League of Nations Union to support the government's international policy.\textsuperscript{109} A second explanation lies in the decision to hold an early election - exploiting not just the start of the Italo-Abyssinian war, Labour's acceptance of an armaments policy (however qualified) and Lansbury's consequent resignation as party leader, but also, according to Baldwin's later recollection, striking before the Council of Action had organised itself adequately.\textsuperscript{110} A third relates to difficulties faced by Free Church members of the Council. Since the Great War many in the Free Churches had argued that their denominations should occupy a 'non-political' position, to avoid compromising their spiritual purposes and to reduce internal divisions. Consequently when the Council of Action manifesto was published there was much criticism of its signatories among the Free Churches, followed by defections from the Council once Lloyd George's anti-government objectives became clear.\textsuperscript{111}

There is, however, a further explanation: Baldwin's place in much liberal, religious and more particularly Free Church opinion. Since 1924 Baldwin's speeches and addresses - with their insistent moral character and theologically-liberal, almost non-denominational Christian idealism - had struck deep chords in the Free Church mind. Free Church spokesmen made much of his Methodist ancestry and invited him to address their various assemblies, at which they routinely acclaimed him as a 'Christian gentleman' - most recently at the National Free Church Council conference, just two months before the 'Call to Action'.\textsuperscript{112} Here was a leading element in the disarray of the Council of Action. Not only did its Free Church critics publicly declare that Baldwin and his government deserved support; this view was shared and stated even by signatories of the 'Call to Action'. The Rev. S.M.Berry, General Secretary of the Congregational Union and Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, sent Baldwin his 'sincere good wishes' on his becoming prime minister for the third time: there was 'no-one whom we [in the Free Churches] love and trust more than you'. Similar private or public statements came from the Rev. S.W.Hughes, the Baptist General Secretary of the National Free Church Council, the editors of the leading Free Church newspapers, and other signatories.\textsuperscript{113} The Council of Action's vice-president and most eminent Methodist of the time, the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett, publicly contradicted Lloyd George's whole objective by declaring that 'like great multitudes of Free Churchmen, [he had] welcomed the messages to
the nation given by Mr. Baldwin', and the Council's purpose was to support 'the ideals enunciated by Mr. Baldwin'.

An understanding of Baldwin's Christian Conservative appeal not only explains how the National government so easily absorbed the effects of the Peace Ballot and confounded the Council of Action. There is a more general point. Plainly the votes of ordinary Free Church members cannot be deduced from the statements of their spiritual leaders. Nevertheless, if those leaders can be taken to represent the more committed moral activists, it seems probable that much of their following was of more conservative disposition. What had once been firmly Liberal opinion had become for many an acceptance of a Conservatism - or, as they probably regarded it after the formation of the National government in 1931, a 'national' or even 'non-political' cause - made morally and spiritually respectable to them principally by Baldwin. His command over much of this opinion helps to explain how the government recovered and maintained massive domestic support for its policies during 1935. Baldwin, not Lloyd George, was, it seemed, the modern Gladstone. Trust in his integrity enabled expanded and accelerated rearmament to be successfully presented as consistent with the Peace Ballot and the League of Nations, best symbolised in his address during the election campaign to the Peace Society, and published verbatim in the Free Church newspapers. In giving them 'my word that there will be no great armaments' he intended not any commitment to limit the scale of rearmament but rather a pledge about its purpose - addressing the assumption of the opposition parties and wider peace opinion that 'great armaments lead inevitably to war'. Trust in Baldwin also ensured that no 'Bulgarian atrocities' campaign developed to complicate the Cabinet's efforts to avoid war against Italy over Abyssinia. Privately he remained distrustful of the Free Church leaders who had in his view lent themselves to Lloyd George's intrigues, privately disparaging them as 'the Men of God'. When a deputation came to present its views on the international situation in early October he spoke 'with great plainness to them of the position of our defences', but again left them reassured about the government's intentions. A week later the Congregational Union Assembly 'gave its earnest support' to the government's stand 'for the collective maintenance of the Covenant'. After Baldwin called the election, The Christian World stated that the two main election issues, the League of
Nations and rearmament, seemed at first sight 'utterly inconsistent' - yet it considered them reconciled in the prime minister's pledges.\(^{118}\) Conservative election managers became so sure the political challenge on international issues had been neutralised that in mid campaign they switched the emphasis more towards domestic issues.\(^{119}\)

If the scale of the National government's election victory - and congratulatory letters from leading Free Churchmen - was a measure of the confidence of much religious and moral opinion in Baldwin, so too was his survival of the Hoare-Laval crisis. The contrast between the government's ostensible League idealism before the election and its apparent abandonment of League principles shortly afterwards produced one of the great moral revulsions in British public life, appalling many of its own supporters and even Archbishop Lang.\(^{120}\) Yet although Baldwin made a humiliating retreat and plainly sacrificed Hoare in order to save his own and the Cabinet's position, his reputation was weakened rather than irreparably damaged. He publicly apologised, took some of the blame upon himself, and justified ditching the Hoare-Laval scheme as a response to 'the conscience and honour' of the nation.\(^{121}\) Free Church leaders and newspapers said surprisingly little. Shocked as they certainly were, they did not turn upon Baldwin. The response of one leading Free Church newspaper was probably representative: after initially refusing to believe that Baldwin would betray the nation's trust, it later judged that as he had 'frankly confessed to an error of judgement', he should 'now have the assurance of the nation's support in carrying out its will'.\(^{122}\) A good man could be forgiven if he admitted his mistakes.

A second effect of Christian Conservatism lies in the shift in Cabinet foreign policy after Munich. Since the mid 1960s it has been well understood that this was primarily the work of Halifax,\(^ {123}\) but more precision can be given to the sources of his change of mind. There are conflicting views about the relationship between his religion and his opinions on policy. One is that his religion detached him from the messiness of worldly affairs, making him an innocent towards the depravity of the dictatorships. The other view is that his religion was almost wholly personal, and that in political matters he was almost shamelessly worldly, even cynical.\(^ {124}\) It would be more accurate to describe him as a Christian realist. One of his constant themes was 'the need for adapting ideals to facts in this hard world',\(^ {125}\) and he was
acutely aware that the 'facts' required confrontation with - not escape from - moral complexity. As he wrote after the Anschluss:

we go badly wrong if we allow our judgement of practical steps to be taken to be perpetually deflected by our moral reactions against wrong that we can in no circumstances immediately redress. The world is a strangely mixed grill of good and evil, and for good or ill we have got to do our best to live in it and not withdraw from it into the desert because of the evil, like the ancient anchorites.126

Halifax's conduct of policy as well as his speeches long turned upon this need to face and accept the 'facts', if the higher end of international peace was to be achieved. This meant not just acceptance of the Anschluss but also British non-intervention in Spain and a proposed recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia - justified with arguments Bishop Henson attacked fiercely as 'cynically opportunist', only to be floored on moral points by Halifax.127 Acceptance of facts also eventually came to mean agreement to German occupation of the Sudetenland. Yet during the Czechoslovak crisis Halifax by opposing Chamberlain in Cabinet over the Godesberg terms took Europe to the brink of war. After the Munich agreement he increasingly accepted war as likely. Following the German occupation of Prague in March 1939, one sensible interpretation of 'the facts' might have been that Britain could do nothing militarily to save eastern European states, while one intelligible version of British interests might have been that expressed by Baldwin in 1936 - allowing German aggression to turn eastwards into conflict with Soviet Russia. Nevertheless Halifax was chiefly responsible for the Cabinet decision to offer a military guarantee to Poland, which six months later took Britain into war.

Halifax's shift from appeasement towards resistance has been explained by his dawning realisation (in September 1938) that Hitler could not be trusted to prefer negotiation to armed force, and (in March 1939) that he was not - as Halifax had originally thought - a nationalist with an understandable desire to resist communism and re-unite the German people,128 but had unlimited territorial ambitions. It has been explained also as a response to domestic criticism, from the Labour and Liberal parties and from Conservative anti-appeasers. If considered largely as concern to avoid defeat at the next election this may be too reductionist, but preservation of national cohesion was certainly one of Halifax's leading preoccupations. For
him this was not just a prerequisite for successful foreign and rearmament policies, but an
elemental Conservative aim and a matter of moral and religious belief - that properly
understood, beneath the various differences of view, the nation constituted a union of souls. From this perspective it was deeply disturbing when, after explaining to a Labour deputation in
his best manner the 'moralties and expediences' of the Czechoslovak crisis, one of its members
said: 'listening to you, we are ashamed to be Britishers'.

It seems likely that there was a more fundamental reason, best indicated by Halifax's
relationship with Lord Lloyd. For a decade Lloyd had been one of his sharpest critics, at first
over India and then over foreign policy. Nevertheless they remained personal friends, and
twenty years earlier they had been political allies, linked by an Anglo-Catholic Conservatism
which they expounded in a joint book, The Great Opportunity. Here they had written that the
churches 'must act ... as sharp goads to the conscience of the nation, and fearlessly draw
attention to matters that belie the nation's Christian profession'. As an anti-appeaser, in
autumn 1938 Lloyd believed that the nation's church leaders had abandoned this function.
During the Munich debate in the House of Lords and in the newspapers he publicly rebuked
the churches for preaching only peace, when 'the true message' was that 'justice is greater than
peace'. Earlier, as the crisis was developing, Lloyd spoke with Halifax and afterwards
reinforced his arguments with a letter which ended:

War is truly terrible, but to consider it as the worst issue, to be avoided at all costs, is
utterly unchristian and wrong. There are worse issues even than war - a still worse
issue would be if we were found morally too feeble to stand up and too cowardly to
sacrifice ourselves for what is Right over what is manifestly evil and Wrong. It would
be worse than war to be unwilling to be the champions of weak peoples or that we
should, through a shrinking from suffering, fail in a task surely set by Providence. Now
is the moment to play the man, to face clearly what is coming, confident that we are
capable of drinking the cup and that we shall not be left without the power to do so.

This and further appeals to 'right' from Cecil and others prepared the way for the sleepless,
tormented, night famously inflicted on Halifax by Cadogan, his chief official, and which
resulted in his reversing his view to provide a 'fine moral lead' against the Godesberg
ultimatum. These appeals had acted as 'sharp goads' to Halifax's conscience, recalling him
to principles he had expressed on 11 July 1937 in a broadcast and widely published address at
the church which provided a focus for peace opinion, St Martin-in-the-Field. There, after defining the Christian objection to war as the 'interruption of God's purpose - the union of all men in Himself, he had, in the context of government rearmament, opposed Christian pacifism with a Christian doctrine of the just war:

while war is the product and symptom of evil, it is plainly not the only manifestation of evil in the world, and it may well be that refusal to face war might have the consequence of encouraging in worse forms the evil of which war is the visible outcome. To Christian people, therefore ... the problem must present itself in terms of a comparison of evils, of which war, however deplorable in itself, may legitimately ... be felt in special circumstances not to be the greatest.135

In contrast to Chamberlain's triumphalism, Halifax treated the Munich settlement in public and private alike as a matter raising deep moral difficulties and touching his 'own conscience'. His ultimate defence of the agreement was precisely in terms of his July 1937 address: not Chamberlain's 'peace with honour', but the lesser of 'a hideous choice of evils'.136 The anti-appeaser Cecil bitterly conceded that his House of Lords apologia was 'disgustingly good', and he again outclassed the professional moralist - in this case another supporter of the Munich agreement, Archbishop Lang.137 But if in September 1938 the balance had ultimately fallen towards acceptance of evil in central Europe rather than on the 'catastrophe of war', during the crisis Halifax privately resolved that 'the ultimate end which he wished to see accomplished' was 'the destruction of Nazi-ism'.138 From October and especially after the Kristallnacht pogrom in November,139 his stance in Cabinet on policy towards Germany and on rearmament became markedly tougher. When Hitler broke the Munich agreement in March 1939, Halifax was insistent that the balance between evils had now shifted. Arguing in Cabinet Committee for the Polish guarantee - even while admitting that Britain had no military means of fulfilling it - he stated that 'if we had to choose between two great evils he favoured our going to war'.140 And this view, drawn from his conception of the Christian doctrine of the just war, became a leading theme of his speeches: 'if, for fear of the tragedy of war ... we rest inert before action which we hold evil, we are surely surrendering to annihilation the ... spiritual values which have inspired and guided all human progress'.141 After the outbreak of war Halifax gave his imprimatur as Foreign Secretary to a pamphlet by Lord Lloyd, endorsing his
argument that the war was fundamentally being fought to defend those Christian ideals which taught that 'man redeemed by Christ could never again be enslaved to man and that he must, to fulfil the purpose which he had now learnt to be the very core of his being, be a free moral agent'.

This leads to the third, more speculative, suggestion, about the national solidarity achieved in 1939 and 1940. In September 1938 much British opinion - especially that of the churches - was strongly for peace; yet twelve months later there was negligible opposition to the outbreak of war, and remarkably few Christian pacifist conscientious objectors. It may be that this transformation was primarily caused by the further actions of the German government:

*Kristallnacht*, the occupation of Prague and the invasion of Poland. Yet those actions were interpreted to the British public, above all by political leaders: they presented the most influential justifications for a stiffening of resistance to Germany and for the sacrifices that war would necessarily bring, and they were the most prominent in seeking to create the national spirit and co-operation which total war and civilian fortitude under aerial attack would require. This was true of Conservative ministers and ex-ministers as well as Labour, Liberal and Conservative 'anti-appeasers'. After *Kristallnacht* Inskip and Zetland publicly expressed their dismay and implied that it shook the hopes invested in the Munich settlement, while Baldwin with unpublicised government support headed a fund-raising appeal organised by all British religious communities to aid Jewish and non-Aryan refugees, launched with a broadcast invoking a challenge to 'Christian charity'.

Halifax’s sharpened anti-totalitarian rhetoric from late 1938, as well as his pressure for the shift in policy symbolised by the Polish guarantee in March 1939, were crucial in shaping the shift towards national acceptance of war. There was also a momentous convergence of rhetorics among leading Conservatives. Baldwin and Halifax now adopted the balance-of-power 'doctrine' they had earlier eschewed, presenting it as the historic tradition, even Providential purpose, of British policy - 'the fight against Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, leading up to the fight against tyranny to-day' - while Churchill, as has been seen, increasingly introduced allusions to Christianity and moral values. Nevertheless, during 1939 Churchill’s speeches still lacked the spiritual appeal of Halifax’s.

For all the obvious exaggeration, there was some substance in Archbishop Lang’s comment on
a Halifax speech of July 1939: it had 'united the whole nation. Its reception had been a tribute to the confidence of all parties in his spirit, his motives, his calmness, his steadiness of judgement'.

The significance of what Halifax represented is indicated by the way his reputation, in contrast to Chamberlain’s, not only survived the decline of their shared policy of appeasement but increased and remained strong during the first nine months of war. He replaced Eden as the Conservative with the widest public appeal, and in May 1940 was the preferred candidate of most leading politicians of all parties - including Labour - to replace Chamberlain as prime minister. This plainly had much to do with his tougher stance in Cabinet, seepage of information about his differences with Chamberlain into wider political circles, and knowledge of his longstanding desire for a reconstructed, all party, government of national unity. But there were also further, public, contrasts. When Eden had resigned as foreign secretary in February 1938 he seemed well placed to exploit a personal cross-party appeal and become in time the 'national' successor to Chamberlain, a position Baldwin encouraged him to confirm by a series of speeches reaching well beyond his foreign policy specialism. Eden made the speeches, yet gradually faded. Aside from his awkward efforts to balance between criticism and support of the government, his version of Conservative international idealism was both less dramatic than Churchill's and relentlessly secular - so doubly failing to catch a growing public mood. Chamberlain's difficulties in preserving his policies and eventually his leadership were closely connected to the way in which, for all his efforts in international conciliation, in domestic politics he aggravated conflict with his Liberal and Labour critics, to the extent that when he finally and reluctantly accepted suggestions for a government of 'national unity', the Labour condition was his own removal. This was a product not only of political manner, but of argumentative substance and tone. Chamberlain did not sufficiently distinguish his desire for international peace from his statements about the character of the Italian and German governments, and he could not express his undoubted political and moral distaste for these regimes in forms adequate to repel damaging suspicions and insinuations. This reflected an insensitivity or deafness towards a now highly-sensitised and vocal range of opinion reaching across party boundaries. Chamberlain was a lapsed Unitarian, a spiritual status which in a
prime minister 'grieved' Archbishop Lang, even though Chamberlain described himself as a 'reverent agnostic' - the sort, evidently, who did not attend church even for form's sake, but liked his wife to do so. That most church leaders gave unqualified praise to a politician who was so obviously not a Christian, as they did during the Munich crisis, is not just ironic. Such admiration indicated their distance from much lay political opinion which, though greatly relieved that war had been avoided, was also much exercised by the moral predicament and so came to be more impressed by Halifax than by Chamberlain (and may indeed have regarded Halifax as a surer moral guide than Lang). During the Munich debate Chamberlain acknowledged the charged atmosphere to the extent of saying that the 'prayers of millions have been answered', but when he went on to speak of a 'spiritual revival' he meant only the call to national service. If he half-apologised for and qualified 'peace for our time' - as was only necessary if continued rearmament was to be justified - his still more egregious 'peace with honour' remained. But the damage had begun before Munich. Halifax's earliest hesitations about appeasement dated from the difficulty he perceived in May 1938 over domestic presentation of the proposed agreement with Italy, in the context of what he found to be Labour 'hatred' for Chamberlain. In the House of Commons debate on the agreement Chamberlain shocked and infuriated Labour leaders by a eulogy of the 'new Italy' and favourable comparison of Mussolini with Cavour, Mazzini and Garibaldi. As Chamberlain himself noted, the purport of Labour criticism was not just that he was 'a Fascist' and 'enemy of the League', but also that he was 'a materialist'. His policy was publicly criticised as 'immoral'. Even in private TUC leaders asked whether Chamberlain intended a military alliance 'with fascists'. After Munich Attlee stated that Labour was 'convinced that [he] truckles to the dictators because he likes their principles'. In trying to support Chamberlain by counteracting such accusations, Halifax eventually found himself widely regarded as his obvious replacement.

* * *

British politics and policy in the 1930s were not treated by all those chiefly concerned as wholly secular matters. Conservative high politics contained strands of Christian faith and
witness which shaped reactions to the totalitarian powers, had some effect upon policy, and
helped recruit support for government objectives. A vast amount has been asserted about
Churchill's opposition to Germany in the 1930s, and about his rallying the nation from May
1940. Even now there are historians who assume that Churchill stood pretty much alone
among leading politicians in detecting the evils of nazism - a prophet in the wilderness, far
removed from complacent, naive, or otherwise culpable Cabinet ministers. It is an enduring
tradition of British belief. Yet much of what Churchill had to say about the nature of the
fascist powers - certainly in 1940 - was very similar to what had been said by Baldwin since
1933 and Halifax since 1937. Indeed, Baldwin and Halifax presented a moral and ideological
resistance to totalitarianism and especially to Germany which was every bit as impressive as
Churchill's, and which in its Christian aspects had wider and deeper resonances. Churchill
himself came to recognise the importance of these aspects, not only in his own speeches but
also by bringing the anti-appeasing Bishop Henson out of retirement to preach at Westminster
and by warm approval of Halifax's July 1940 broadcast: 'he became very eloquent about his
firm conviction of the necessity of ultimate sanctions, and explained how convinced he was
that it had been the loss of this conviction that had done England great harm'.153 At the very
least, Baldwin's influence over much 'moral opinion' in the mid-1930s eased the acceptance of
rearmament, while Halifax's eased the acceptance of a second world war.

There is no country ... where there are not somewhere lovers of freedom who look to
this country to carry the torch and keep it burning bright until such time as they may
again be able to light their extinguished torches at our flame. We owe it not only to
our own people but to the world to preserve our soul for that.

This might have been Churchill in 1940, but it was not. It was Baldwin speaking in 1934.154

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3 I am grateful to members of the Oxford modern British religious history seminar and the Durham history seminar for helpful comments, and to two referees for bringing further material to my attention.


8 In addition to the 14 July broadcast, see Churchill, *Into Battle*, pp. 181 ('we trust in God', 30 March), 208 ('all the strength that God can give us', 13 May), 212 ('as the Will of God is in Heaven, so let it be'), 19 May), 223 ('in God's good time', 4 June), 234 (upon the Battle of Britain 'depends the survival of Christian civilisation', 18 June), 274 ('let God defend the Right', 11 Sept.).


11 Details in The Times for the appropriate periods. The churches also organised additional, less official, days of prayer for peace at Whitsuntide 1939 and 1940, for thanksgiving after Dunkirk (9 June) and for the safety of France (16 June 1940). Archbishop Lang found in early 1940 that the government declined to support further official Days of National Prayer, as likely to be 'misunderstood, or misrepresented, by the enemy' (presumably as an indication of weakness or desperation), so he instead resorted to the formula of acting with 'the express desire of the King': The Times. 2 April, 22 May 1940; Lockhart. Lang, p.427. In The Times, 2 July 1940. Lang and Archbishop Temple, again with the King's express approval, publicly proposed that every day should be observed (at noon) as a day of national prayer.


14 See, however, M.Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 1975). This remains the most sophisticated and comprehensive analysis so far of political responses to the totalitarian threats. It has been the unconscious or under-acknowledged source for 'revisionist' biographies and monographs since the mid-1980s.


18 The Cabinet also included a Jew, Hore-Belisha, if one with 'non-sectarian' religious interests which included Roman Catholicism. During the Czechoslovak crisis he wrote privately of Britain as the trustee of a civilisation which presumed 'decent treatment of human beings towards one another': R.J.Minney, *The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha* (London, 1960). pp. 88. 303-4. 146. Nevertheless he does not appear to have expressed any explicitly Jewish concern about events in Germany.


21 For Zetland (formerly Lord Ronaldshay) as author, president of the Society for Promoting the Study of Religions, and host of the World Congress of Faiths, see G. Studdert-Kennedy, *British Christians*, *Indian Nationalists and the Raj* (Delhi, 1991), pp. 102, 172-3. 167. 244n.74.

22 Lay churchmanship is a neglected aspect of numerous politicians' careers. Past lay members of the Church of England's Convocations or from 1919 the Church Assembly included, among other active politicians, Ormsby-Gore (to 1919) and Hoare (to 1925), while Salisbury, Inskip (since 1917), and Wolmer (since 1919) were current members: details in *Crockfords Clerical Directory*. For Cecils and their relatives effectively controlling the House of Laity, see Hastings, *English Christianity*, pp. 63-4. 252-3. Lord Cecil was chairman of the Archbishops' Commission on Church and State 1930-35, which received evidence from Wolmer and Inskip.


26 Ormsby-Gore to Baldwin, 24 May 1935, Baldwin papers 47/56, Cambridge University Library.
27 The Times, 6 Sept. 1938. The approach of the congress had aroused 'considerable feeling' among Conservative MPs from late 1937, with repeated calls for it to be banned or its foreign delegates denied entry into Britain. House of Commons Debates 5th s. [HCDeb] 328, c.1836-7; 329, cc.2233-4; 331, cc.369-71; 334, cc.498-9; 337, cc.1251-3. Hoare as Home Secretary felt that given British conventions of religious toleration he could, or should, do nothing. The manifesto, sent to leaders of all churches, became the alternative means of expressing this disquiet.


31 Cecil to Halifax, 6 July 1938, FO 800/328/113-5. Public Record Office: Cowling, Impact of Hitler, p.229, but see pp. 377-8 for other Cecils being divided over Soviet Russia's possible contribution to the diplomatic problems.


34 Wilkinson, Dissent or Conform?, ch.4, pp.139-40, 165, 170-81; Hastings, English Christianity, pp.348-9.

35 Churchill, Into Battle, p.17 (9 May 1938).

36 See, however, Winterton, 'The Churches and Politics', The Nineteenth Century and After, cxix (1936), and Duff Cooper, Old Men Forger (1954), pp.197-9, for some replies to clerical pacifism.

38 Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 115 (Baldwin letter, 14 Sept. 1933). For fuller analysis of Baldwin's anti-totalitarianism, see Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 313-26, 329-35.

39 At Ashridge, The Times, 3 Dec. 1934 (references to newspaper reports of Baldwin's speeches are to the press cuttings in the Baldwin papers, vols. 201-4). It should be acknowledged that Baldwin used speech-writers: but if the words he spoke were not always his own, the meanings were. This issue is considered in Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 157-66.

40 At Edinburgh, Glasgow Herald, 19 Nov. 1933.


43 HCDeb 302, c. 371 (22 May 1935); at Conservative conference, The Times, 5 Oct. 1935.


46 The Times, 4 May 1935, 2 May 1936.

47 S. Baldwin, Service of Our Lives (London, 1937), pp. 166-7. The speech was drafted by Jones, but these words were 'earnestly' approved by Baldwin: Jones unpublished 'diary', 18, 20 May 1937. Thomas Jones papers, National Library of Wales (this compilation includes many letters, but the term 'diary' is used here for ease of reference).

48 To Conservative defence deputation, 29 July 1936, in Gilbert, Churchill V/3, p. 291.

49 HCDeb 302, cc. 372-3 (22 May 1935).


52 House of Lords Debates 5th s. (HLDeb), 110, c.1394 (4 Oct. 1938); Lang broadcast, The Times, 29 Sept. 1938.


54 To Primrose League. The Times, 4 May 1935; and see Baldwin, Service, p.151 (12 May 1937).

55 At Ashridge. The Times, 3 Dec. 1934; Baldwin, Torch, pp.5-6; 23; Baldwin, Service, p.120.


58 Salisbury speech at Birmingham, and Brown at Wolverhampton, The Times, 30 March, 28 July 1937.

59 Salisbury to Baldwin, 19 Oct. 1936 (bearing annotation of Baldwin’s reply, 22 Oct.). Baldwin papers 171/272; Lean, Buchman, pp.254-6. Baldwin’s wife had attended Group luncheons, while his cousin Margaret Mackail and her husband Professor J.W.Mackail were enthusiastic supporters of the Group.

60 Ibid., p.255; Buchman to Davidson, 29 April 1937. Davidson papers 229. Davidson’s papers contain several requests from Group members that he might seek Baldwin’s support. The 1938 letter in Baldwin, My Father, p.327-8, was addressed to an ‘insistent’ Group supporter, probably Mrs Mackail.


62 Lean, Buchman, p. 255; Jones, Diary with Letters, p.233 (31 July 1936); Rose, Later Cecils, p.100; Davidson-Baldwin letters, 2, 20 Aug. 1941, Davidson papers 283, for a ‘certain distrust of Group methods’.


Salisbury to Baldwin, 4 Aug. 1938, Baldwin papers 174/79.

The *Times*, 10 Sept. 1938: the other signatories were Lords Kennet, Clarendon, Lytton, and Desborough (Conservative), Amulree and Sankey (National Labour), Stanmore (Liberal) and Stamp, and Field Marshals Lord Birdwood and Milne. RAF Marshal Lord Trenchard, Admiral Lord Cork and Orrery, and the academics Mackail, W.Bragg and W.D. Ross. For the wide publicity given to this letter, see Lean, *Buchanan*, p.275.

[Ibid.]: Baldwin to Lady Davidson. 9 Sept. 1938. Lady Davidson papers (quoted by permission of Mr R. Oldfield and Lord Baldwin).

*S. Baldwin*, *An Interpreter of England* (London, 1939), p.106: lectures delivered at the University of Toronto, but also broadcast across Canada and the U.S.A. For his intentions, Baldwin to Dawson, 8 April 1939, Bodleian Library, Dawson papers 80/155.

Baldwin to Halifax, 16 Aug. 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.14.6, expressing admiration for two such Halifax addresses, is indicative.
Notes for speech to the Church Union, 11 July 1935. Halifax papers A4.410.1.49.

Halifax to Baldwin, 19 July 1934. Baldwin papers 1/108. sent 'for the sake of my own conscience' to ask that the announcement should stress the Cabinet's continued hope for disarmament.


See ibid., pp.9, 96, for careful formulations.

Ibid., pp.97, 11, and see pp.86, 143, 225, 228.
81 Ibid., pp. 179 (21 June 1938), and see pp. 207, 262-4 (the latter, 19 April 1939, embraced Soviet Russia, in the context of the proposed rapprochement with Moscow).

82 Ibid., pp. 94 (8 July 1937), 221-2 (3 Feb 1939), 229-30 (13 March 1939): speech to Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Times, 2 Dec. 1936.

83 Halifax Speeches, p. 160, also pp. 154-5 (on proposed recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia), and see pp. 221-2, 229-30.

84 At York. The Times, 28 July 1934; Halifax Speeches, pp. 38-9, also pp. 13-14, 42, 74, 78, and see below pp. 000 for his major address dealing with pacifism.

85 A persistent theme: ibid., pp. 34, 37, 47, 79, 115, 143, 179, 205-6.

86 Ibid., pp. 75 (3 March 1937), 174-5 (21 June 1938), and see pp. 143, 165-6.

87 Ibid., pp. 38-9 (23 March 1936; substantially repeated at Edinburgh, The Times, 27 Nov. 1936), and see pp. 51 (8 April 1936), 109-10 (21 Oct. 1937), 227-8 (13 March 1939).

88 Ibid., pp. 103-4 (11 July 1937).

89 Ibid., pp. 221 (3 Feb. 1939), 268-9 (19 April).

90 Ibid., pp. 331 (broadcast on 'The purpose of the struggle', 7 Nov. 1939), 363, 367 ('The challenge to liberty', 27 Feb. 1940), and see pp. 342, 351-2.

91 The Times, 23 July 1940, and see Lockhart. Lang., p. 431.

92 Robbins, History, Religion and Identity, p. 110-16 (essay 'On Prophecy and Politics').


96 Gower to Baldwin. 1 Aug. 1935. and see Topping to Lloyd. 8 April 1935. Baldwin papers 47/103-8.


99 Hoare to Drummond. 27 July 1935. FO 800/295/78.


Later, Cecil's position was also compared to that of Gladstone: Noel Baker in 1945, quoted in Birn. League of Nations Union. pp.3-4.
is a good account. a fuller version of S.Koss. Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (London.
1975), ch. 9.


107 These included: 11.1m (95.9%) favouring League membership and 10.5m (90.6%) for international
c disarmament, but also, in the event of military aggression by a state, 10.1m (86.8%) supporting
economic and non-military sanctions, and 6.8m (58.7%) prepared 'if necessary' to accept military
measures. The results confirmed the delicacy of rearmament yet indicated a rhetorical strategy for
advancing it.

General Election of 1935 (London. 1980), is not as helpful here as might appear. Its concentration on
parties and a 'Nuffield election studies' attention to campaign details misses how far the existence of a
National coalition government stimulated a corresponding politics of 'national', cross-party,
movements, and how the decisive political action took place before the election campaign began.

109 Hoare memo. 21 Aug. 1935. 'was Cecil saying the Union was 'entirely behind the Government', and see
memo. 13 Sept. and Hoare to Cecil 16 Sept. 1935. accepting a Cecil offer to avoid any embarrassment
to the government by postponing a Union demonstration at the Albert Hall: FO 800/295/116-7. 217.
233. At the Church Congress. 10 Oc t. 1935. Cecil declared 'uttermost' support for the government:

110 Gilbert. Churchill VII. p.288 (28 July 1936). For evidence that it had this effect, Ashley to local Council
George and Nonconformity'. p.100.

111 Ibid., pp.88-97. Goodman. 'Faded Heritage'. pp.62-3; and see the vigorous reaction, including resignation
from the National Free Church Council executive, of the general secretary of the Baptist Union, in

112 The Times. 9 April 1935: Williamson. 'Doctrinal Politics'. pp.205-6. Koss. 'Lloyd George and
Nonconformity'. p.87n1. quotes one religious correspondent declaring that Baldwin's appearance at
the conference had 'no political significance whatsoever'. But this refers to the Free Church Council's 'non-party political' stance, rather than to Baldwin's place in Free Church opinion.


114 *The Times*. 19 June 1935. For Scott Lidgett's break with Lloyd George and declaration of support for Baldwin during the general election campaign, see Koss, 'Lloyd George and Nonconformity', pp. 102-4.

115 For Free Churchmen admiring Baldwin in these terms. see Williamson, *Baldwin*, p. 349.


119 'Notes for Chequers Conversation', 8 Nov. 1935. CRD 1/7/24. This resolves a debate on whether the content of Baldwin's election speeches could determine if the chief election issues were international or domestic: Stannage, 'East Fulham'. pp. 199-200; J. Robertson, 'The British General Election of 1935', *Journal of Contemporary History* 9 (1974). pp. 159-64.

120 Lang to Baldwin, 13 Dec. 1935. Baldwin papers 123/247: despite his 'constant desire to do anything to help you', he could not 'resist the impulse' to say he was 'beset by anxiety'.


125 *Harvey Diplomatic Diaries*, p.138 (11 May 1938).

126 Halifax to Lumley. 21 March 1938. FO 800/328/79-81.

127 Henson, *Retrospect* ii.409-10 (journal, 13, 18 May 1938); Chadwick, *Henson*, pp.249-53: Halifax's reply was the speech cited in n.8 above.


135 *Halifax Speeches*, p.100. The address aroused bitter pacifist criticism, as it was recognised to have 'struck deep' into their position: A. Campbell Johnson, *Viscount Halifax* (London, 1941), pp.423-4.

137 *Harvey Diplomatic Diaries*, p.208 (3 Oct.1938), and see pp.264-5 (20 March 1939).


146 An earlier generation of historians, without access to private papers, thought this 'impossible to explain':


148 Mrs Chamberlain to Lang, 4 Nov.1941. Lang papers 191/322-7, partly quoted in Lockhart. *Lang*, pp.426-7. Lang's statement that Chamberlain came to rely on the 'help of God' may have been less descriptive than a comfort for his devoutly Anglican widow.

149 *HC Deb* 339. cc.41, 45. 551-2 (3, 6 Oct.1938).
150 *Harvey Diplomatic Diaries*, pp. 128, 139, 140 (22 April 12, 19 May 1938).

151 *HC Deb* 335, c.545, and Attlee cc. 645-51 (2 May 1935); N. to H. Chamberlain. 8 May 1938. NC 18/1/1050.


154 To the Ashridge Fellowship, *The Times*, 3 Dec. 1934.