Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians

Beyleveld, D.

Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians Thumbnail


Authors



Abstract

Christine Korsgaard claims that Gewirth’s argument for morality fails to demonstrate that there is a categorically binding principle on action because it operates with the assumption that reasons for action are essentially private. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard’s own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and unnecessary. Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.

Citation

Beyleveld, D. (2015). Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 12(5), 573-597. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681026

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Sep 10, 2015
Publication Date 2015-09
Deposit Date Feb 22, 2013
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Journal of Moral Philosophy
Print ISSN 1740-4681
Electronic ISSN 1745-5243
Publisher Brill Academic Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 12
Issue 5
Pages 573-597
DOI https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681026
Keywords Kant, Public reasons, Gewirth, Categorical impartiality, Korsgaard.

Files





You might also like



Downloadable Citations