Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to Real Agents

Beyleveld, D.

doi:10.1163/17455243-4681001

Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to Real Agents

Beyleveld, D.

Authors

Professor Deryck Beyleveld deryck.beyleveld@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

According to Bernard Williams, attempts to justify a categorically binding impartial principle fail because they can only establish categorically binding requirements on action by making them non-universalizable (Gewirth), and can only establish impartial requirements by rendering them inapplicable to real agents (Kant). But, an individual cannot be the particular agent the individual is without being an agent every bit as much as an individual cannot be an agent without being the particular agent that the individual is. On this basis, it is argued that, when the actual Gewirthian argument for a categorically binding impartial principle is presented, which Williams does not do, his objections to it do not hold and the argument establishes that agents are categorically bound to accept a substantive impartial principle that, at the same time, permits them to live lives that respect their own personal interests. Consequently, Williams’ dilemma is false.

Citation

Beyleveld, D. (2013). Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to Real Agents. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10(2), 204-226. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681001

Journal Article Type	Article
Publication Date	Jan 1, 2013
Deposit Date	Nov 29, 2012
Publicly Available Date	Aug 25, 2017
Journal	Journal of Moral Philosophy
Print ISSN	1740-4681
Electronic ISSN	1745-5243
Publisher	Brill Academic Publishers
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	10
Issue	2
Pages	204-226
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681001
Publisher URL	http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/10.1163/17455243-4681001