The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights

Beyleveld, Deryck

doi:10.1007/s12142-011-0210-2

The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights

Beyleveld, Deryck

Authors

Professor Deryck Beyleveld deryck.beyleveld@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

Alan Gewirth’s claim that agents contradict that they are agents if they do not accept that the principle of generic consistency (PGC) is the supreme principle of practical rationality has been greeted with widespread scepticism. The aim of this article is not to defend this claim but to show that if the first and least controversial of the three stages of Gewirth’s argument for the PGC is sound, then agents must interpret and give effect to human rights in ways consistent with the PGC, or deny that human beings are equal in dignity and rights (which idea defines human rights) or that they are agents (and hence subject to any rules at all). Implications for the interpretation of the international legal system of human rights inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 are sketched.

Citation

Beyleveld, D. (2011). The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights. Human Rights Review, 13(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-011-0210-2

Journal Article Type	Article
Publication Date	Nov 1, 2011
Deposit Date	Dec 5, 2011
Publicly Available Date	Aug 13, 2013
Journal	Human Rights Review
Print ISSN	1524-8879
Electronic ISSN	1874-6306
Publisher	Springer
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	13
Issue	1
Pages	1-18
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-011-0210-2
Keywords	Gewirth, Human Rights, Kant, Principle of Generic Consistency

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