Durham Research Online

Deposited in DRO:
29 April 2014

Version of attached file:
Accepted Version

Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed

Citation for published item:

Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a44678

Publisher’s copyright statement:
The definitive peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Environment and planning A, 44 (10). pp. 2428-2444, 2012, 10.1068/a44678

Additional information:

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Governance and the geography of authority: modalities of authorisation and the transnational governing of climate change

Accepted for publication in Environment and Planning A, February 2012

Harriet Bulkeley
Department of Geography
Durham Energy Institute
Durham University
h.a.bulkeley@durham.ac.uk
Abstract

Within debates about the emergence and nature of governance, it has become commonplace to debate the whereabouts and possibilities of authority. Traditionally, authority is conceived as a property of some actor or institution, and regarded as divisible over time and space. Drawing on theories of power which regarded it as constitutive of social relations, this paper proposes an alternative account of authority in which it is seen as one form of power, that can be enacted towards three distinct purposes - instrumental (as consent), associational (as consensus), and governmental (as concord) - involving particular forms of recognition and compliance, and mediated through distinct socio-spatial relations. The paper examines the potential of such an approach through exploring the workings of authority in transnational climate change governance. Given the sustained debates within this field as to the shifting geographies of authority between public/private actors and across different political spaces, this provides an important test of the explanatory value of this approach. The analysis suggests that while these modes are not mutually exclusive, they orchestrate the ‘will to govern’ (Murray Li 2007a) in significantly different ways, with important implications both for how governing is accomplished and for the geographies of global environmental governance.

Keywords
Governance, authority, power, climate change, transnational networks

Introduction

As debates on governance unfold across the social sciences, questions of authority, and in particular by whom it is held and where it might be found, are increasingly bought into view. Scholars have, for example, sought to establish whether or not the authority of nation-states is declining in relation to international and local levels of authority and to consider the growing importance of ‘private authority’ in a variety of fields, from urban regeneration to global environmental politics, security

---

1 This article forms part of the work currently being undertaken under the auspices of a Philip Leverhulme Prize (2008–2012), and also draws upon research upon funded by the Royal Geographical Society Small Grants Scheme (2005) and the Transnational Climate Governance Leverhulme Trust International Network (2008–2010) involving a research collaboration between sixteen academics supported by the research assistance of Tori Milledge at Durham University. I am grateful to these funding bodies for their support and to colleagues for their contributions to the development of the thinking in this area. I would also like to thank Ben Anderson and Matthew Hoffman for their thoughtful reflections on the paper as it has been developed, and three reviewers for their insightful comments, all of which have greatly improved the argument presented. The usual disclaimers apply.
studies to international development (Cutler et al. 1999; Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Hall and Biersterker 2002). However, across many of these debates, the notion of authority remains curiously unexplored. This is a critical omission, for, this paper argues, authority is central to the ways in which governance is accomplished. In order to address this issue, the paper advances an argument for reconceptualising authority through analysing the modes of authorisation through which it is achieved.

Drawing on theorizations of power which regard it as constitutive of social relations, the first half of the paper opens up the potential for authority, as a specific form of power characterized by legitimacy or recognition, to be undertaken towards at least three purposes – instrumental (as consent), associational (as consensus), and governmental (as concord) – each of which are sustained through particular forms of recognition and compliance and mediated through distinct socio-spatial relations. In the second half of the paper, it considers the case of transnational climate change governance as an arena within which to test this proposition. Given the sustained debates within this field as to the shifting geographies of authority between public/private actors and across different political spaces (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Bulkeley 2005; Rosenau 2002; Sending and Neumann 2006), this provides an important field within which to consider the explanatory value of this approach. The analysis suggests that while these modalities of practicing authority are not mutually exclusive, they orchestrate the ‘will to govern’ (Murray Li 2007a) in significantly different ways, with important implications both for how governing is accomplished and for the geographies of global environmental governance. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the main arguments advanced and considers their limitations as well as their implications for future research.

Between Governance and Authority

Broadly speaking, “governance, at whatever level of social organization it may take place, refers to conducting the public’s business – to the constellation of authoritative rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectively manages its affairs” (Ruggie 2004: 504). Central to governing, as a specific social relation, is authority (Conca 2005; Lake 2010; Rhodes 1996, 2000; Sending and Neumann 2006). This stems at least in part from the antecedents of the concept, as made explicit by Hobbes in Leviathan where the term ‘to govern’ was considered as the capacity “to rule with authority, that is to rule with some basis” (Dean 2007: 36). In turn, this suggests that opening up the process of governance to critical scrutiny involves an engagement with the concept
of authority. Broadly speaking, and following Weber, authority is regarded as “the condition in which power is married to legitimacy” (Hurd 1999: 400). Authority can be considered as a particular form of power, distinguished from other “currencies of power” (Hurd 1999: 379), including coercion, self-interest, persuasion, and so on, by the presence of legitimacy (Allen 2003, Bernstein 2011, Hurd 1999, Lake 2010). Understanding the potential, and limits, of authority therefore requires further interrogation of the concepts of legitimacy and power through which it is forged.

**Authority as legitimate rule**

Authority is commonly understood as the legitimate exercise of power, “construed as the *rightful* governance of human action by means other than coercion or persuasion” (Litfin 2000: 124; see also Agnew 2005, Lake 2010). The ‘rightness’ of authority comes from an interpretation of legitimacy as an intersubjective and relational quality whereby actors within a given community come to regard institutions, rules and norms as those with which they ought to comply because they are right, proper, or appropriate (Bernstein 2011; Hurd 1999; Mol 2008). Essential to the working of authority is therefore its *recognition*. This has important implications for how this particular form of power operates, for it suggests that rather than being orchestrated through force, the calculation of self-interest or inducement, authorisation is driven by “an internal sense of moral obligation: control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as ‘right.’” (Hurd 1999: 387). Further, it implies that once accepted as authoritative, this recognition means that actors do not seek further justification for compliance with individual decisions, but rather accept the judgement of others (Bernstein 2011). As one form of power, authority therefore stands in contrast to coercion—where legitimacy and recognition are absent and power operates through force—or other ‘quieter’ registers of power, such as persuasion, inducement, and seduction (Allen 2003), where other appeals to reason and self-interest are made. This is not to suggest that relations of authority are freely entered into. Far from it. Relations of authority are structured by uneven political economies

---

2 Some theorists suggest that authority and coercion are deeply connected, for “political authority by definition empowers a ruler to use coercion legitimately” (Lake 2006 p.4). Others regard coercion and authority as distinct modalities of power, separated by the legitimacy/recognition that accompanies authority (Allen 2003; Hurd 1999; Mol 2008). In this view, which this paper adopts, while authorisation can be given to governors for the ‘legitimate’ use of force (e.g. through prison sentencing, acts of war within the national interest etc.), coercion is a distinct form of ‘un-reasoned’ force. What constitutes ‘legitimate’ force and coercion is of course relational and intersubjective; authority in this domain, as with others, is constantly in the making rather than being an absolute quality, and will be regarded differently depending on the relative positions of the actors and entities involved.
which shape the dynamics of how and with what effect authorisation is given. For example, in his recent analysis of hegemony in international society, Clark (2011) demonstrates the complex and shifting basis of legitimacy accorded to the US in its various hegemonic guises. It is however to suggest that there is a specific quality to authority as a form of power relation and that this matters because “coercion and sanction are costly mechanisms of control, quite unsuited for regulating activities that require any measure of creativity or enthusiasm (Hurd 1999: 385, see also Bernstein 2011: 20). It is this distinct quality that leads many to suggest that it authority is central to governing.

It has been in reconsidering the basis upon which legitimacy and recognition might be established that the notion of authority has most commonly come under critical scrutiny. Accepting the premise that authority is based on the legitimate or ‘rightful’ exercise of power, the first question that arises is the basis upon which this might be determined (Litfin 2000:124). Frequently, authority is interpreted in Weber’s ‘formal-legal’ sense where it is seen to derive from the institutional positions held by actors and specific, usually democratic, processes (Lake 2010: 594). However, the “attribution of legitimacy to different entities has changed historically” (Agnew 2005: 441), suggesting that such associations are not absolute. Furthermore, the particular association made between democracy and legitimacy, or between certain institutional office and authority, is far from exclusive. In his foundational work on authority, Weber identifies tradition, religion, and charisma as three alternative basses for recognition (Lake 2010: 595). As Agnew (2005: 442) argues, “transparency, efficiency, expertise, accountability and popularity are as much foundations of legitimacy as are rationality and democratic process. … Thus, even ostensibly private entities and supranational governments are often accorded as great or even greater authority than are states.”

Acknowledging that legitimacy can take different forms, and that ‘public’ recognition need not mean that “a state or public institution must be involved’ (Jagers and Stripple 2003: 388), has led scholars to assess the ways in which authority may be accorded to actors beyond the state and to document the rise of so-called ‘private’ authority. This may accrue through recourse to science (Litfin 2000), the market, moral authority, or to illicit sources (Biersteker and Hall 1999, cited in Jagers and Stripple 2003: 388) In a variation on this theme, Rosenau (2002: 271-275) describes non-governmental organisations as deriving authority from several sources: morality; knowledge; reputation; issue-specific competence; and affiliation. In his account of non-state market driven (NSMD) governance, Cashore (2004: 511) also illustrates how “authority is granted to NSMD governance systems by ‘external audiences’ who are encouraged to accept the NSMD governance system based on economic material benefits (market access, price premiums), moral suasion (the
right thing to do), or because it has become an accepted and understandable practice.” These insights are useful in displacing the notion of authoritative governance as the sole prerogative of the nation-state and in expanding the basis upon which legitimacy and recognition may be built, but do little to challenge a view which regards authority as inhering in the qualities of particular actors and institutions (Conca 2005).

Focusing on issues of private authority also brings into focus questions about the entities to which authority pertains. Given that “legitimacy always rests on shared acceptance of rules and rule by affected groups, who constitute the community that grants legitimacy, and on the justificatory norms they recognize” that nature and scope of this affected community is critical to practice of authority (Bernstein 2011: 21; Clark 2011). The traditional focus of authority as a form of power exercised within the context of the nation-state has meant that affected communities have traditionally been regarded as territorially contiguous and delimited. Within debates on governance, claims are frequently made that such ‘geographies’ of authority are being rearticulated, as authority moves above, below and outside the state (Rosenau 2000; Sending and Neumann 2006). However, as Allen (2004: 22) suggests, “for all this talk of a redistribution or shift in capabilities between the different levels of governance … the vocabulary of power is still one of capabilities ‘held’ and the dispersion or distribution of powers between various levels and sites of authority.” This assumption that authority is a capacity which can be attributed to individuals, institutions or particular sets of resources, serves to reinforce the sense that if some are gaining authority this must be at the expense of others (Allen 2004: 22; Sending and Neumann 2006).

Authority as a modality of power

Giving sustained theoretical consideration to the ways in which governance is accomplished requires more than an engagement with the basis upon which legitimacy may be established; it requires an interrogation of the conception of power upon which notions of authority rest. In the main, underpinning the conceptualisation of authority “there is an ingrained idea of power as an instrument of domination, a capacity of some resourceful mix” (Allen 2010: 2899), a quantity to be held or divided by actors usually over particular (territorial) domains. While power may operate in different guises, of which authority is but one, this is often regarded as power that is held by A over B, with the result that authority is regarded as the product of an “explicit, willful agency” operating through a “bilateral, immediate” relation (Conca 2005: 186). There are at least two ways in which such an account of power may be challenged. One involves an understanding of power “as a general
facility for enabling things to happen, where power itself is not conceived as a resource but as something generated by the application of resources and skills over tracts of space and time” (Allen 2010: 2900; see also Barnett and Duvall 2005; Lipschutz 2005). A second approach derives from Foucault’s conception of power as immanent, “inseparable from its effects” (Allen 2003: 65). Of particular importance to the argument here is one form of power which Foucault identifies as ‘government’, achieved through the ‘conduct of conduct’, “modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people” (Foucault 2000: 341). This involves the gathering of “heterogeneous elements ... to address an ‘urgent need’”, sometimes termed an assemblage or dispositif, and its investment “with strategic purpose” (Murray Li 2007a: 264). Through this process, government operates “by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” (Murray Li 2007b: 5), establishing the right ‘disposition of things...arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means” (Foucault 2009: 99).

While facilitative and constitutive perspectives on power differ considerably, taken together they offer significant insights into how we might start to conceive of authority differently. First, rather than being a held and finite capacity, both suggest that power is an effect mediated through social relations (Allen 2003). Rather than a ‘zero-sum’ situation in which one actor’s gain is another’s loss, this in turn implies that new spaces of governance may be generative of new forms of power, and consequently of authority (Allen 2010; Hajer 2009). For Hajer (2009: 22), the success or otherwise of new forms of ‘network governance’ depends precisely “on their abilities to generate authority” (emphasis in the original). Second, perspectives which regard power as facilitative or immanent allow for the possibility that it can take multiple forms. As Allen (2003, 2004, 2010) has so eruditely explained, power relations are always of a specific kind, be that of domination, authority, coercion, seduction, inducement and so on, so that there is a need to pay close attention to their “distinctive characteristics and circumscribed consequences” (Allen 2003: 117). Indeed, as discussed above, authority is often distinguished from other forms of power (Bernstein 2011; Hurd 1999). Allen’s (2003: 117) analysis takes this argument further by suggesting that critical to the understanding of power is not only its form (as authority, domination etc.) but to what purpose it is exercised (Jones and Search 2009: 812). Power may be deployed instrumentally, so as to ‘bend will’, or, after Arendt, through association, creating a ‘common will’ (Allen 2003: 123). While Allen suggests that different forms of power may be deployed to different purposes, notably discussing the instrumental and associational qualities of authority as one example (Allen 2003: 118-120, 126), this aspect of his analysis remains underdeveloped. If both form and purpose are central to modalities of power as
they are practiced, then further work is required to tease out just what this means in analytical terms. Furthermore, Allen stops short of considering other purposes to which power may be effectuated. In particular, his analysis suggests that where power is regarded as immanent, as for example in the work of Foucault, its differences are subsumed to such a degree that it becomes ubiquitous. However, central to Foucault’s work is the recognition that power – as sovereignty, discipline, government – operates in different modalities each of which is invested with distinct purpose. Drawing these insights together suggests that any given form of power, as the effect of mediated social relations, may be endowed with instrumental, associational, or governmental purpose. Authority, as one form of power, could be enacted instrumentally, affected in association, or orchestrated through government. On this basis, the imperative for understanding the ways in which governance is accomplished becomes one not one of establishing the (relative) authority of particular actors or governance arrangements, of a search for authority’s essence and location, but rather one of examining the “various practices of authorisation” (Stripple 2007: 14) employed in pursuit of the will to govern. This in turn means that rather than analyse authority as a singular entity, it becomes possible to analyse authorization as a set of different modalities.

Third, such perspectives on power open up questions concerning the ways in which authority is manifest and mediated relationally. In seeking the basis of its legitimation, authority is commonly defined in terms of the ‘consent’ of the governed and interpreted in terms of some level of obedience to the judgement held over others (Hajer 2009: 19). However, where power is conceived differently, the ways in which authority may be recognised are open to reconsideration. For Hajer (2009: 22) authority is a relational enactment, requiring “communications that allow for reasoned elaboration.” Here, “authority is not about submission, not about acquiescence ... it is achieved through communication; it is about the development of a way of seeing things that can be, and indeed is, taken up by others and which results in the acceptance of a particular line of thinking and acting” (Hajer 2009: 22). Such a view of the process within which authority gains recognition could accord with an associational notion of power relations, whereby recognition is mutually derived, or may also be subject to forms of instrumental power, where the acceptance of such shared ‘ways of seeing’ involves concession. Equally significant here are the ways in which obligations or other forms of enforcement are sustained, for if actors “evaluate with each decision whether to maintain or withdraw support, governance or authority in any meaningful sense of the word is absent” (Bernstein 2011:20). Where power operates governmental, other forms of recognition and compliance may be at play. As Murray Li (2007b: 5) suggests, “when power operates at a distance, people are not necessarily aware of how their conduct is being conducted or why, so the question of
consent does not arise.” The absence of the explicit recognition associated with either consent or reasoned argument, though, need not necessarily mean an absence of ‘authorization’. Rather, authority may operate by placing “action, practices, symbols, and institutions into a meaningful social frame of context” by subjecting “something or somebody to the operation of a system of meaning, significance and power” (Latham 1997: 13, cited in Stripple 2007: 15). Recognition of authority here is implicit and, it seems, central to the conduct of neo-liberal governmentality within which forms of ‘ethical’ self-governing emerge as a means of achieving governmental programmes (Summerville et al. 2008: 697).

Fourth, recognising the generative, multiple and relational qualities of power in turn provokes questions of its spatiality (Allen 2003). Where power is viewed as a held set of capacities, its geography is usually considered to be a straightforward matter of the spatial extent or scale over which it may be exercised. As discussed above, new forms of governance are thought to change and challenge these demarcations, extending some forms of authority there, limiting others here (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Mol 2008). Viewing power as constitutive of social relations, however, challenges such an interpretation. Rather than having any fixed quality, particular spatialities are constituted and (re)produced through the mediated socio-technical relations within which power is effectuated (Bulkeley 2005; Painter 2010), so that “power relationships are not so much positioned in space or extended across it, as compose the spaces of which they are a part” (Allen 2011: 284). Allen and Cochrane (2010: 1073) suggest that central to the contemporary working of the state are forms of topological power, whereby conventional understandings of time and distance are undone by the folding, embedding and abstraction of social elements through which state power is “reassembled in terms of spatial reach” (emphasis in the original). Rather than considering reach as a matter of extent, here reach is regarded as a matter of pervasiveness (Allen and Cochrane 2010: 1074). As one form of ‘topological politics’, reach can take different forms, such as ‘reaching into’ political arenas or ‘drawing within close reach’ key actors. Allen (2011) argues that such a topological perspective is important for it enables us to examine how power is practiced. The question becomes then not one of how any one form of power is dispersed across fixed tracts of space and time, but rather of how actors and institutions “make their leverage and presence felt through certain practices of proximity and reach” (Allen 2011: 291).

While the distinction that Allen (2011) draws between contemporary power dynamics and historical conditions, and between the ways in which topological politics and the politics of other spatial orderings (territory, borders, networks etc.) are produced can be questioned (Painter 2010, Elden
2011), this analysis is useful in drawing attention to the socio-temporal dynamics of the ways in which power is practiced, of how “spatiality is constitutive of power relations not only in general, but also in the particular ways in which different modes of power take effect” (Allen 2003: 102, emphasis in the original). Rather than seeking to document the relocation of power and authority, the analytical task becomes one of considering how different socio-spatial relations are constitutive of different modalities of power and how these processes in turn serve to sustain distinct spatial orderings (such as the local, community, territory, the transnational and so on) (Allen 2003; Painter 2010). Authority is a case in point. For Allen (2003: 3), the quality of authority as a modality of power that depends on recognition means that while it “can be geographically far-reaching or it can be exercised close at hand ... the more distant it is, the greater the possibility for both the position and the act to pass unrecognized.” In this original argument, Allen (2003; 147-149) takes to task assumptions that authority can be readily practiced at a distance. His more recent analysis of topological politics, however, provides one means of thinking about how recognition may be engendered through different practices of reach and connection (Allen 2011; Allen and Cochrane 2010). In analysing how authority is manifest and orchestrated, a critical analytical task is to consider how, and to what end, it is constituted through distinct spatialities and what this might mean for governing those issues which appear not to adhere to particular territorial domains. Such an analysis provides a different means of considering the fundamental issue of to which entities, or communities, authority might pertain (Bernstein 2010). It suggests that rather than being cast over one or other form of bounded community, the practice of authority itself serves to create and sustain the socio-spatial nature of the community through which it is realised.

Conventionally, authority is viewed as one form of power that takes various guises depending on the source of the legitimacy with which it is conferred. The analysis offered here suggests instead that authority can be undertaken in distinct modalities, each of which is constituted through the purposes for which power is deployed, the nature of recognition and compliance, and distinct forms of socio-spatial relations. On this basis, Figure 1 distinguishes three ‘ideal type’ modalities of authority – consent, consensus, and concord. Given the facilitative and immanent approach to power that underpins this analysis, whereby “authority is not an achieved condition ... but a complex and variable practice” (Stripple 2007: 15), these are necessarily abstractions. Nonetheless, they serve to provide a starting point for considering the means through which authority might be pursued. Regarding authority as an effect means that for each modality it is critical attend to the messy actualities of: the purposes to which authority is put, and the rationalities and techniques by which it is generated and maintained; the ways in which recognition and enforcement are
established; and the spatial relations through which authorization is constituted. In the remainder of
the paper, these propositions are explored further by putting them to work in a particular case, the
transnational governance of climate change.

Figure 1: Ideal-typical characteristics of different modes of authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consent</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Concord</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Associational</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognition</strong></td>
<td>Concessional</td>
<td>Mutual</td>
<td>Habitual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Normalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spatiality</strong></td>
<td>Connection</td>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>Presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Practicing Authority with transnational climate governance arrangements

Within the field of global environmental governance debates on the nature and whereabouts of
authority have assumed a central role as authors have sought to account for the emergence of
ostensibly ‘private’ forms of authority and what it means to govern beyond the boundaries of
nation-states and state-based institutions (Biermann and Pattberg 2008). Scholars have identified a
range of actors and institutions which are not only concerned with influencing the actions of others,
but which are engaged in governing “in the sense of bringing together a sufficient marriage of power
and legitimacy to establish, operationalize, apply, enforce, interpret, or vitiate the [network’s]
behavioral rules” (Conca 2005: 190). In the main, despite the significant complexity of the term,
authority itself has received relatively little scrutiny in this context. Given its importance to ongoing
debates in the field, this provides a useful arena within which to examine the potential of this
approach for understanding the ways in which the practice of authority comes to matter in
accomplishing governance. The analysis focuses on one distinct subset of this area of research:
transnational climate governance (Andonova et al. 2009; Bäckstrand 2008; Hoffmann 2011; Kolk and
Pinske 2008). The term ‘transnational’ has been used to capture arrangements\(^3\) that work across the
boundaries of nation-states and between public and private actors. How governing is accomplished
within such arrangements is a particular puzzle given the lack of recourse to traditional forms of

\(^3\) The term ‘arrangement’ is used here rather than other terms used in the literature (including network,
initiative, or coalition) that also have more specific social or spatial meanings that may create analytical
confusion in this context.
authority and the absence of a distinct community through which authority might be manifest. Deploying the analytic of authority developed above, however, poses the problem rather differently. Rather than seeking to locate authority and its extent, the task becomes one of understanding how different modes of authorization are socially and spatially constituted, and how they come to matter in the governing of climate change transnationally. Using illustrative examples, the three modes of authorization identified above – of consent, consensus and concord - are put to work in an analysis of transnational climate governance. The intention is not to regard each of these modes as operating in isolation – as it clear from the examples used, different transnational governance arrangements may deploy more than one mode of authorization. However, for the sake of exposition and analytically clarity, they are presented in sequence, and the connections between them reflected on in the conclusions.

**Creating consent**

At the heart of traditional definitions of authority is the sense that it involves the ‘consent’ of the governed (Lake 2010; Litfin 2000). While consent is usually associated with the formation of democratic states (Litfin 2000), as interest in alternative, non-state forms of governance has grown, scholars have demonstrated how such forms of consent can be based on a range of other attributes, including expertise, moral suasion, market potential and so on (Cashore 2004; Rosenau 2002). As consent, authority is practiced in a concessionary form, where the ability to enlist “voluntary agreement” or “acquiescence in what another proposes or desires” (Oxford English Dictionary 2011) is critical. In this sense, authority as consent has an instrumental quality, “designed to make others act in ways that they otherwise would not have done” (Allen 2003: 117) (Figure 1). Within the transnational climate governance domain, evidence for this first mode of authorisation can be found primarily within those arrangements concerned with monitoring or standard setting. A number of such arrangements have been established which seek to report on progress towards reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, for example the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which charts the

---

4 These examples are drawn from the existing literature in the field and two different research projects. In the first, Governing climate change: hybrid networks and new state spaces (RGS-IBG Small Grant Scheme 2005), documentary analysis was undertaken and interviews were conducted in the UK, US and Australia with members of eight climate governance networks. In the second project, Transnational Climate Change Governance (Leverhulme International Network 2008 – 2010) analysis of grey material, websites and policy documents was conducted with a larger sample of sixty climate governance networks (for details, see Bulkeley et al. forthcoming). The paper draws on these sources in order to illustrate the three ideal types derived above. The intention is not to exhaust the possible forms that authority might take, nor to examine in detail the multiple forms of authorization adopted in any one network.
progress of FT500 companies and the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) programme, which provides municipal governments with tools for assessing their GHG emissions reductions. In terms of standard setting, the emergence of the voluntary carbon market, within which individuals and institutions seek to purchase, trade and sell carbon, has spawned a wide range of governance arrangements aimed at forms of ‘voluntary’ regulation. Although there are thought to be some seventeen standards in operation, in 2008 four initiatives had captured 79% of the market - The Voluntary Carbon Standard, The Climate Action Reserve, The American Carbon Registry and The Gold Standard (Bumpus et al. 2010). Although these arrangements differ, they characteristically involve constituents who are either “voluntarily applying the standards or are certified to be in compliance with the initiative” and who concede to be bound by its authority (Smith and Fischlein 2010: 515).

Such arrangements have had to engage in a process of ‘generating’ authority. As Hajer (2009) argues, in this sense authority takes effect only where it is enacted and this, he suggests, means that consent is only forthcoming where authority is “worthy of acceptance” (Friedrich 1958: 35, cited in Hajer 2009: 22). In this arena, attempts to create such forms of worthy acceptance have followed similar lines. First they have engaged a heterogeneous array of actors in efforts to claim both legitimacy and independence. For example, although established by different actor groups, as the CDP, Gold Standard and Voluntary Carbon Standard have developed, they have sought to engage partners from across the public, private and civil society spectrum with the specific intention of enhancing their legitimacy (Bumpus et al. 2010; Kolk et al. 2008; Smith and Fischlein 2010). Second, in most cases such networks have served to meet (latent) demand amongst the constituents who are bound by their rules. In the case of the voluntary offset market, the emergence of standards has been critical in lending legitimacy to the process of trading emissions in terms of both its environmental effectiveness and additional benefits (Bumpus et al. 2010; Lovell et al. 2009). For the CDP, the intention has been to develop standard forms of reporting on the climate-related business activities of major firms, with a view to providing the investment community with knowledge of the business risks and opportunities that climate change may present (Kolk et al. 2008). Here, authority is not pre-given, but rather generated in the relation between standard setting/monitoring networks and the constituents who require, accept and embody the new rules of the (climate) game. Third, and critical to this process, has been the process of setting, monitoring and verifying standards (Eden 2009). In such networks, authorization stems from the types of standards or forms of disclosure adopted – for example, a focus on ‘high quality’ additional sustainable development benefits for the Gold Standard – the presence of independent verification, and their general applicability – any offset project or firm could be subject to assessment through the same means. In this manner, such
networks fulfil the criteria which Hajer (2009: 22) suggests is critical for the enactment of authority – they contain the potential for ‘reasoned elaboration’, providing a set of rationalities and practices through which their rightfulness can be accepted not only on face value but continually demonstrated and achieved.

It is through these techniques that recognition, in which constituents concede to standards and standard making bodies, takes place. Alongside this concessional form of recognition, obligations to comply are sustained through various process of exclusion where, for example, those voluntary offset projects which do not meet the grade are barred, or companies who refuse to report their climate related activities are ‘named and shamed’ (Kolk et al. 2008). This is not to suggest that such practices are always universal or complete. In their study of the reporting of FT500 companies under the CDP, Kolk et al. found that reporting that is actually engendered by the CDP process is far from a comprehensive and comparable assessment of climate-related activities, meaning that it “is very difficult to get insight into reported emissions, let alone firms’ actual achievements” (Kolk et al. 2008: 741). While firms may have conceded authority to the CDP on the one hand, their compliance with the reporting requirements suggest that this process is met with considerable contestation. These relations between concession and compliance are mediated as arrangements seek to both explicitly distance themselves from constituents in order to retain the sense of impartiality, and draw them ‘within reach’. Through the use of all manner of protocols, reporting devices, toolkits and standardised measures, as Allen and Cochrane (2010) suggest, such arrangements reach into and form part of the activities of constituents. At the same time, through the use of case studies, visual imagery, personal endorsement, and so on, constituents are also ‘drawn within close reach’ of the arrangement itself (Allen and Cochrane 2010). This is a form of socio-spatial relation that is mediated through connection, where ties may be stretched or compressed as some form of distanciation between the certifying body and its constituents is maintained in order to defend its raison d’etre (Smith and Fischlein 2010: 515) while simultaneously constituent elements are bought close to hand and deployed in order to give vitality to the arrangements claims and intentions. By focusing on the “substance of the connections, not the fact of them or their extension ... it becomes possible to think about networked relationships as mutable and shifting” (Allen 2011: 289) as the practice of authority unfolds. While enabling arrangements to pull constituents within reach, the connections through which such forms of authority unfold also allows actors to withdraw their active participation while ostensibly remaining part of the arrangement (Allen and Cochrane 2010), serving to undo the concessionary recognition upon which authority as consent depends.
Constructing consensus

In turning to consider the associative way in which power may be deployed, a second mode through which authority may be practiced within transnational climate governance arrangements, consensus, can be derived. Unlike consent, based on an instrumental sense of ‘bending’ the will of others, an associational view of power, following Arendt is “about the power to connect, to bring together but not to suppress the interests and differences that commonly divide” (Allen 2003: 123). The basis of authority in consensus is of course familiar in science, where “scientific truths are those that enjoy a consensus within a scientific community. Authoritative knowledge claims are those that enjoy scientific consensus” (Litfin 2000:130). It is also regarded as central in the operation of “transverse relationships of power: that is, those which cut across conventional lines and practices” including human rights and environmental campaigns (Allen 2003: 58). Given the concern of climate governance arrangements with issues of science and with green politics, it is hardly surprising to find that consensus is a mode of authority which they employ. Described as a “classic instance of trying to reinforce the good” (Interviewee, November 2005), one example of an arrangement where authority as consensus is practiced is The Climate Group, established in 2004 in order to provide a means of exchanging ‘best practice’ on climate change action amongst businesses and sub-national governments in the US and UK. From this position, The Climate Group has grown to involve some seventy-five members (as of January 2011), including large businesses, regional/state and city governments. Central to this initiative has been the “language of opportunity” (Interviewee, November 2005), epitomised in such phrases as ‘profits up, carbon down’ – a slogan used to brand a series of case-study reports as to the achievements of businesses with regard to emissions reductions (The Climate Group 2007). As one of the banner headlines of the website used to opinie, “The Climate Group believes reducing emissions is good for business.” The Climate Group actively seeks to practice authority by forging consensus amongst different sectors (of industry, and between industry and government) around the notion that addressing climate change could provide (economic) opportunities. A second example of transnational climate governance where authority as consensus is practiced is the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Established by then Mayor of London, Ken Livingston and his deputy, Nicky Gavron, together with The Climate Group, the original C20 was formed by 18 cities in 2005 as a parallel initiative to the Group of Eight (G8) Gleneagles summit on climate change. In 2007, this network entered into a partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative and expanded its membership to include 40 of the largest cities in the world together with 18 affiliate cities. For C40, consensus has been built around the notion that “the battle to prevent

catastrophic climate change will be won or lost in our cities” and that global cities can and should respond to this challenge, and should be recognised for this effort (C40 2011).

The practice of authorisation as consensus takes place through a variety of techniques by which arrangements seek to secure constituents around common positions and translate their efforts into standardised measures of benefit. One core technique deployed is the development and take up of ‘best practice’, regarded as a means not only through which learning can occur but by which common baselines for what might be expected can be established. Indeed, so central is ‘best practice’ to The Climate Group that its mission is sometimes described as putting “the world on track for a low carbon economy by rapidly expanding the uptake of best practice on reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (emphasis added). Through the dissemination and exchange of best practice, the development of policy tools including, for example, the Greenhouse Indicator which provides real-time emissions data for Australian states, the use of standards, including The Climate Principles for financial investors, as well as the deployment of particular projects and programmes, The Climate Group has sought to gather, maintain and reproduce a consensus as to what constitutes ‘good’ climate governance. Likewise, C40 also engages in the active production of case-studies of best practice and exemplar projects as a means through which to develop an understanding of what constitutes climate governance. In seeking to bring a diverse range of cities and urban conditions into one governable community, like The Climate Group, they also employ a diverse set of techniques. For example, a bi-annual summit brings the political leaders of C40 Cities together in order to make public their declarations of commitment and to ‘share’ learning. Also significant are efforts which seek to smooth out the differences between cities, including specific programmes – for retrofitting office buildings, developing new urban planning – as well as reporting efforts that gather together the diverse climate-related activities being undertaken into one whole, so that C40 becomes seen as, for example, “40 cities, 297 million residents, 4,734 climate actions” (Arup 2011: 1).

Where authority is practiced through consensus, recognition is mutually constituted – that is, it is experienced and performed between constituents with regard to one another, and held in common between them. Members gain legitimacy for the positions adopted on climate change because of their membership with other key actors. Important to this form of associational authority is the way in which the heterogeneity of interests is turned to ‘common will’; such arrangements frequently define themselves in terms of their leadership in creating a ‘coalition of the willing’ (see also Smith

---

6 See: http://www.v-c-s.org/founders.html (accessed January 2011); see also Andonova et al. 2009
and Fichlein 2010: 514). This is not to suggest the process of creating consensus is without struggle, dissent and contestation. The very process of creating consensus about the climate governance problem necessarily involves the exclusion and negation of other accounts of what climate governance might entail. However, resulting conflicts and contradictions are managed “less by technique than by compromise in its dual sense: parties to the assemblage make compromises and, in so doing they become implicated, their positions compromised and their critiques contained” (Murray Li 2007a: 279). Where authority as consensus is practiced, compliance is not subject to sanction, but instead constantly mediated and renegotiated through compromise in this dual sense. Goals are not reached, but principles hold; constituents may not deliver on specific outcomes, but continually justify their intentions to do so in order to remain party to the consensus at hand. As consensus, authority is constituted through seeking to establish proximity between the constituent members, positions, resources, artefacts, and so on, that make up a particular transnational climate governance arrangement as mutuality and compromise are forged. Individual examples of best practice are bought into contact through new lines of reasoning and argument, summits and committees draw individual members together in real time/space, virtual ‘webinars’ are used to develop common standards and forms of knowledge. In such a manner, constituent members become ‘adjacent’, so that, for example, officials at Melbourne can argue that they hold more ‘in common’ with London or New York than with other Australian cities. These are then not ‘space spanning’ networks, but arrangements within which authority is generated through the mediation of social relations which make proximate the seemingly politically and geographically distant, and within which the experience of one may serve to approximate for another.

**Configuring concord**

As modes of authorization, consent and consensus are more or less conscious processes in which power is deployed instrumentally to seek concession or through means of association to generate a commonality of will for governing climate change. As discussed above, a third register of power, where its operation is regarded as immanent to social relations and it is achieved through the conduct of conduct, gains its purchase through disposing of things in such a manner that particular ends may be accomplished (Foucault 2009: 99). In this mode, rather than involving a process of explicit recognition or consent, authority “emerges through doing those things that are naturalised discursively and normally” (Lipschutz 2005: 766; see also Rosenau 2002: 270). In this manner, a further mode of authorization can be identified, one which operates through a process of concord the ‘bringing into agreement’ of heterogeneous elements - social and material - in such a manner
that they are taken for granted as authoritative in the shaping of conduct. As Rose and Miller (1992: 183) put it, gaining routine authorization is “a question of the complex assemblage of diverse forces ... such that aspects of the decisions of individuals, groups, organisations, and populations come to be understood and regulated in relation to authoritative criteria.” As with the working of power in its instrumental and associational registers, power in its governmental guise is seen here as working through the generation of socio-spatial relations. In an analysis of the disputes over Chesapeake Bay, Lipshutz (2005: 766) draws our attention to one such example. Here, the authority of First Nation and environmental groups to determine the environmental management of the area was not determined by their capacities or by forms of public recognition, and neither did either party poses authority in isolation; “the moral power associated with protests against logging is not ‘possessed’ or owned on the basis of righteous analysis. That authority has to be created in action” (Chaloupka 2003 p.77, emphasis in the original, quoted in Lipschutz 2005: 766).

Authorization as concord emerges as the result of both the strategic normalisation of particular discourses concerning, in this case, the climate problem, the mundane practices through which networks operate, and the artefacts which they put in place to hold networks together (see also Rutland and Aylett 2008). Several examples of the practice of concord were cited during research interviews with The Climate Group and the REEEP. In both cases, the work of aligning previously unconnected elements in order to normalise climate change was regarded as central to their day to day operation and raison d’être:

“California’s 80% emissions reductions target ... they wouldn’t have done that without us, not because they were not able to design the target ... but they were very naturally worried about the reaction they would get from businesses, so the same day that they announced it, we organised a business leaders forum, on the same day and in the same place, so business leaders got to be on the telly talking about how progressive and successful they were, we produced a brochure on success in California, and Arnie was pleased because he got to make his statement surrounded by business leaders looking like they supported him. We ... haven’t provided them with the specific tools, but we’ve made, we’ve helped make things happen, and that’s what we’ll continue to try and do””. (Interview, The Climate Group, January 2006)

The practice of concord involves not only the ‘bringing into agreement’ of diverse social actors and discourses, but also the mobilization of particular artifacts and materials, such as press releases,
targets, carbon accounting tools, or renewable energy technologies through which this is achieved. Discussion with the REEEP as to the roles of the projects funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) shows the importance the resulting material changes in the energy landscape were seen to have for the network as a whole:

“those projects are supposed to be about lesson learning, spreading best practice, and about influencing policy ... a bunch of relatively small projects on their own which doesn’t influence wider policy is a bit of a waste of time, so there is no logic in the FCO putting the money in to support projects if ... those projects ... [don’t] influence on policies, and bigger projects. Making that link is quite complicated ... but that is certainly the aim” (Interview, REEEP, November 2005)

On the one hand the process of concord is a strategic one, as suggested in the two quotes above, through which the central actors in climate governance arrangements seek to authorize particular policy positions (for a deep cut in emissions in a state government in the US) and knowledge of the policy problem and its solutions (what form renewable energy should assume). On the other hand, the relatively mundane nature of much of the work of concord means that it can also be considered as routine, receiving little explicit attention and regarded as just what networks ‘do’, as this example of a discussion with The Climate Group as to their role in the C40 network and London’s climate change policy suggests:

[We had good relations with] the Toronto Atmospheric Fund, so we asked them to come and advise Nicky Gavron on setting up the London Climate Change Agency [LCCA], and then we held a dinner, where we bought together some of our corporate members together, BP, etc., to help to convince them to put some money, into the LCCA. So in fact, the [LCCA]... is nothing to do with us really, we facilitate’. (Interview, The Climate Group, January 2006).

In both a strategic and a mundane sense, authority practiced as concord gains recognition through becoming taken for granted, as part of the landscape through which governing climate change has to be achieved. In this sense, authority depends on its habitual recognition and the shaping the ‘disposition’ of constituents through governmental rationalities and technique. Rather than being achieved externally, compliance works through creating what constitutes ‘normal’ expectations, actions and so on, and seeking to govern the conduct of others through the creation of ‘self-
governing’ subjects. Critical to achieving such forms of authority are the practices through which such arrangements are able to make their presence felt, even where they may appear to govern at a distance. Being ‘present’ appears to be a critical means through which authority as concord is spatially mediated, for example by being explicitly ‘on hand’, operating as a backdrop for the activities of others, or by normalizing particular ways of saying and doing climate governance. By way of illustration, both REEEP and The Climate Group have established regional centers within their networks through which to engage with different actors and policy arenas to this end, in each case particular moments (press conferences, side events of global climate summits, launches of reports) are also used as a means of establishing their presence, and they seek, as the examples above suggest, to broker relations between their constituents in such a manner as to become taken for granted as part of the way in which governing climate change is accomplished. In this sense, it is the mediation of socio-spatial relations within transnational climate governance arrangements through practices of making present that serves to constitute concord as a particular mode of authority and the ways in which it takes effect (Allen 2003: 102).

Conclusions

Conventionally, authority is regarded as a capacity derived from the marriage of power with legitimacy. While retaining the essence of this relation, this paper has argued for a more critical and sustained engagement with the concept of authority that attends, in particular, to the notion of power. Drawing on the work of John Allen (2003, 2004, 2010, 2011; Allen and Cochrane 2010), it argues that authority can be regarded as one modality of power, constitutive of and constituted through distinct socio-spatial relations. However, rather than retaining a singular analytic of authority, as Allen’s work does, this paper suggests that by considering the purposes for which power is exercised, the ways in which recognition and compliance may be achieved, and the socio-spatial relations through which authority is practiced, three distinct modalities of authorization – as consent, as consensus, and as concord – can be discerned.

In the case of transnational climate governance, authority as consent can be found in those arrangements who adopt monitoring and standard setting procedures. Recognition here rests on the concession or submission of constituents to the rules of the game established through the practice of standardisation, and various forms of exclusion are practiced where constituents fail to abide by these obligations. Authority as consent is in these cases mediated by socio-spatial practices of
connection, which work to hold constituents at arm’s length, to enter into their routines, and to draw them into the making of particular standards and arrangements. In a second mode, authority operates in an associational register through consensus and rests on the ability of networks to generate narratives and techniques through which to establish mutual recognition and continually undertake the compromises through which obligation is maintained. The dynamics of consensus and compromise shift across different arrangements, but those studied here are dominated by consensual positions on the ‘good (economic) news’ story of climate change, reducing the scope for more radical critique and action. In forging authority as consensus, practices of proximity are critical, and serve to draw constituents adjacent in the rationalities and techniques through which transnational climate governance arrangements are composed and maintained. As concord, authority is practiced through the bringing into agreement of heterogeneous elements in order to shape the conduct of network constituents. In place of the acquiescence of consent, or the conscious mutuality of consensus, concord works through it’s taken for granted and habitual nature, where compliance is policed by processes of normalization and the government of the self. Examples suggest that the creation of concord is both a strategic endeavor and also a routine matter for transnational climate governance arrangements. Such relations are mediated through practices of making present, which, for example, serve to create windows of opportunity, political momentum, and common knowledge, as well as to cement day to day routines. In each case, rather than regarding authority as an attribute ascribed to a particular entity by a predetermined and geographically delimited or contiguous community, this approach suggests that authority and the socio-spatial order to which it pertains are co-produced.

While, for the sake of exposition, each of these modes of authorization is presented in isolation, the examples included suggest that this is rarely the reality. Transnational governance networks appear to deploy multiple modes of authorization simultaneously, utilising the different ways in which power is practiced in each mode and investing each with different strategic purpose. An intriguing, but empirical, question concerns their relation and succession: for example, whether some modes are required before others, or some necessarily pursued in tandem. A task for future work is to explore and explain in more detail how, why and with what effect modes of authorization are deployed within particular forms of (transnational climate) governance arrangement. A further concern is with the contestation and limits of authority. For Swyngedouw (2009: 608), such “new forms of ... ‘governance’ are expressive of the postpolitical configuration” in which radical dissent, critique and fundamental conflict are evacuated. Rather than being free from such forms of contestation, it is possible to regard consent, consensus and concord as the means through which
such forms of conflict emerge and are held at bay. As hinted at above, authorisation comes undone – whether this be in relation to the degree of concession granted, the unravelling of compromise, or of mundane forms of disruption and resistance. Regarding governing as a project rather than a “secure accomplishment” (Murray Li 2007b: 10) means insisting on its limits. The implications of the argument offered here are that where these limits are encountered authority comes to its end, and the different modalities that power can assume – persuasion, coercion, inducement and so on – may come into play. Where authority is undone, governing may be replaced by alternative forms of social relation, most often, in this case, of that form of persuasion often termed advocacy. Understanding this dynamic, and the ways in which transnational climate governance arrangements may move through different modalities of power, also warrants further sustained attention. Nonetheless, by thinking of the nature of power, and legitimation, differently, this paper offers some novel ways of examining how governing is accomplished. This is significant for it implies that the absence of the ‘power over’ others in governing arrangements established between and beyond traditional political arenas of the state does not negate their authority. It also raises questions about the basis upon which issues concerning the legitimacy and accountability of such arrangements should be assessed. Rather than seeking to look for ‘state-like’ forms of authority beyond the nation-state, we need to consider the multiple and often mundane ways in which authorization is achieved, and to consider how practices of accountability and transparency might be woven into this fabric in a different way.
Bibliography


