Is India Shining?

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Abstract

We investigate the popular perception about economic reforms having benefitted only the richer districts between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005. Using the spatial dynamics of district-level per-capita income we found that income distribution did not change between the years examined. We argue that this is because of per-capita income across districts being spatially positively correlated. We identify physical infrastructure, human capital, and factories, as factors responsible for increase in income for both the rich as well as the poor districts. Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component of growth in India. A policy impact analysis shows development of better drainage and potable water systems has a large impact on income. For the year 2001/02, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in closed drainage system and potable water, district-level median income increases by 1.39 per cent and 0.21 per cent, respectively.

Key Words: Districts of India, Income, Neighbourhood effect, Spatial Analysis

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1. Introduction

In 2004, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government came to power after defeating the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. This defeat for the NDA government came in spite of the fact that Indian economy was growing fast, at 8.5 per cent in 2003/2004. A popular perception explaining the ousting of the then ruling NDA government lay in its inability to check rise in regional income inequality. How true then, is this perception about economic reforms enhancing regional income disparity? We answer this question by studying the dynamics of income distributional pattern in India. If reforms are favouring rich-income districts then we would see the emergence of twin peaks in the underlying income distribution function: clustering of the rich-income district, and clustering of the poor-income district with pockets of economic growth pulling-up the national average income. On the other hand, a uniform growth process at a pan-India level would lead to a disappearance of such clusters. Considering district-level per-capita income data from the Planning Commission, Government of India, in 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, we find that the income distribution has not changed, thus the perception about economic reforms having benefitted only the rich-income district is not supported by the data. Results suggest that between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005 there was no statistically significant difference in the median adjusted income distribution functions. In fact, the income density function for 2004/2005 has become more platykurtic (with fewer extreme values) than it was during 1999/2000, suggesting that there has been a reduction in inter-district per-capita income disparity.

This idea is in concurrence of Quah (1993, 1996), and Jones (1997), who introduce the notion of twin peaks in the cross-country distribution of incomes. Quah (1993, 1996) found evidence about persistence, and stratification of income density functions. Jones (1997) observed that clustering can be a temporary phenomenon, as may happen with high frequency growth miracles data. Emergence of twin peaks implies

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3 Quah (1993) consider log of per-capita income data for 118 countries between 1962 and 1985. Although our analysis contains data for a short span, we argue that given India’s fast growth experience within this short span (average annual growth rate exceeding 6 per cent between 1999 and 2005) might make it possible to capture emergence of any cluster in the underlying income distribution function, especially at a sub-regional level.
polarization of the cross-country income distribution into rich and poor convergence clubs.

As there has been no evidence in favour of change in the underlying income distribution in spite of the fact that median level of income has increased, we endeavour to investigate why this has happened, and the factors (as captured through development, and other policy indicators) responsible. In the process of analyzing the interaction between income and policy variables affecting income, such as education, health, and other development indicators, we separate out, and quantify the direct (own) effect, the direct neighbourhood effect and indirect neighbourhood effect. A direct effect reflects how the level of development (captured through development indicators) in any particular district \(i\) affects its own income. Direct neighbourhood effect captures how the level of development in any neighbouring district (say, \(j\)) affects the income level of district \(i\). The indirect neighbourhood effects captures how the increase in income in neighbouring district \(j\) affects income in district \(i\).

We find that opportunities to earn income (measured in terms of district-level per-capita income) in the neighbouring districts positively affect income in district \(i\).\(^4\) The indirect neighbourhood effect results in spillovers of income from one district to the other, thereby resulting in concurrent movement in per-capita income across districts. The Indian constitution guarantees free movement of labour and capital across districts in India, thereby, guaranteeing a more balanced spatial distribution of income. In general, development indicators, such as physical and social infrastructure including, electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks positively affect income of any particular region; thereby implying infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component of growth.

To our knowledge this study is the first scientific attempt that makes use of district-level data from India, and quantifies the neighbourhood effect using spatial econometric techniques.

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\(^4\) Economies of neighbouring districts are interdependent. This can happen through economic agents such as firms located in different districts trading among themselves; or through peer-group effects where externalities in local labor market due to production, matching, and other market interaction involve movement of labors from one district to another; and even through network externalities of infrastructure.
2. Earlier studies

Whether economic reforms in India has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer states, the evidence is mixed. While examining the growth performance of 14 major states during the pre-reform period (from 1980/81 to 1990/91) with the post-reform period (from 1991/92 to 1998/99), Ahluwalia (2002), finds that not all the rich states have become richer relative to the poorer states. Except for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, all other states have narrowed the distance between themselves and two of the richest states (Punjab and Haryana) during the nineties. Middle-income states such as Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, actually grew faster during the post-reform period relative to their growth rates during the pre-reform periods. Ahluwalia (2013) reinforces this finding where he finds evidence about growth rates of the erstwhile BIMARU states comprising of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are converging with the national average more than what has been reported in his 2003 paper. Ahluwalia (2002, 2013) finds private sector investment, physical infrastructure (such as irrigation facilities, electrification, roads, ports and rail transportation), and literacy rates as factors responsible for variation in state-level income.

Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) on the other hand find evidence in favour of increase in regional inequality, with the state domestic product (SDP) widening more drastically during the post-reform period. Arguing that the comparison in Ahluwalia (2002) is based on two different sets of SDP data, Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) extend the new SDP data series backward to compare growth and regional variation across states with a common database. They find the coefficient of variation in the per-capita SDP growth rate has increased from 0.19 during the eighties to 0.29 during the nineties. This paper finds that higher population growth rate is responsible for slower SDP growth rate in poorer states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The paper by Barua and Chakraborty (2010) also find evidence in favor of widening interregional income inequality during post-1991 reform period. The authors attribute the cause of cross

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5 The new 1993/94 base year SDP data series used for doing post-reform period analysis is different than the old 1980/81 base year SDP data series used for analyzing performance of states during pre-reform period. There has been a change in product classification in the new SDP data series, with more sectors included from the financial services, the real estate and the agricultural allied services, than there are in the old SDP data series (See, Bhattacharya and Sakthivel, 2004).
regional inequalities to disproportionate growth of manufacturing activities across region. They found trade openness is the key factor determining the manufacturing share in income across the regions.

Our study fits well to this strand of literature. We also address the limitation of earlier studies in our analysis. First, we use district-level data to capture spatial variation in income and development indicators that are observed at a sub-state level. Second, we use this district-level per-capita income data to examine the dynamics of the income distribution function. We do this to analyze whether during the post-reform period (that is, between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005) there has been any statistically significant change in the district-level income density function. Finally, to capture the potential for observational interaction across region, such as through technological spillovers, or through good governance, we model the neighbourhood effect. This is because, a regression based approach (cross section, time series, or panel) typically does not capture the neighbourhood effect, and failure to capture neighbourhood effect can result in major model misspecification (Anselin, 1988).

3. Empirical model

The empirical analysis has three parts.

In the first part of the analysis we see how per-capita district-level income distribution (absolute, and median (relative) adjusted) has changed between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005; and between 2001/02 and 2004/2005. To examine the dynamics, we draw density of district per-capita income for the fiscal years, 1999/2000, and 2004/2005. To check for the robustness we repeat this exercise for the time period between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005. We ran Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to ascertain whether there is any statistically significant difference in the median adjusted per-capita income distribution.

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Even the attempt to control for regional variation using binary dummy variables, as is often done in regression, might not yield satisfactory results in terms of capturing intricate geographical relationship. For instance, Gautam Budh Nagar (one of the more progressive district in the State of Uttar Pradesh) can be treated as one of the richest districts in the country despite being part of Uttar Pradesh, which is classified as a poor state. Using district dummy for this region will fail to capture how elements of prosperity gradually spread from the core (say, Noida, the district headquarter of Gautam Budh Nagar) to the rest of Uttar Pradesh.
between different fiscal years: from 1999/2000 to 2004/2005, and from 2001/2002 to 2004/2005. For a given cumulative density function \( F(X) \) the KS statistic is given as:

\[
D_{n,n} = \sup_x \left| F_{1,n}(x) - F_{2,n}(x) \right|,
\]

where \( \sup \) is the supremum of the set of distances given by \( D_{n,n} \). A statistically significant difference in median adjusted per-capita income distribution (that is, \( D_{n,n} \) not approaching zero) indicates that income disparity among districts has increased between two different time periods. To visually inspect formation of twin peaks (if any), we compute the density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth chosen for optimizing normal densities.\(^7\)

The second part of our analysis is a follow-up from the first part. We ask the question: What are the factors that may have led to an increase in per-capita district income in India, with or without any change, in the underlying income distribution function? In particular, we consider the following spatial income level model:

1. \( Y_1 = X_0 \beta_1 + W X_0 \gamma_1 + \epsilon_1 \) \( (1) \)
2. \( \epsilon_1 = \rho_1 W \epsilon_1 + u_1 \)
3. \( Y_2 = X_0 \beta_2 + W X_0 \gamma_2 + \epsilon_2 \) \( (2) \)
4. \( \epsilon_2 = \rho_2 W \epsilon_2 + u_2 \)

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  u_1 \\
  u_2
\end{pmatrix}
\sim \mathcal{N}
\begin{pmatrix}
  0, \sigma^2
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
  1 & \psi \\
  \psi & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \) are the \( n \times 1 \) vector of cross sectional observations on the log of district level per-capita income for the fiscal 2001/2002 and 2004/2005, respectively. \( X_0 \) is a matrix of development indicators data that are mostly obtained from the 2001 Census (Government of India, 2001).\(^8\) The coefficients \( \beta \)'s measure the direct (own) effect. The coefficients \( \gamma \)'s capture the direct neighbourhood effects. And, the coefficients \( \rho \)'s capture the indirect neighbourhood effects. A negative \( \gamma \) implies spillover effects from the development indicators in neighbouring district \( j \) have detrimental effect on the income of

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\(^7\) Compared to other kernels (Gaussian, Uniform, Triangular, and Bi-weight), Epanechnikov kernel minimizes the asymptotic mean integrated square error, and hence is chosen for this analysis.

\(^8\) It is to be noted that Census of India 2001 was conducted in two phases. Information related to the development indicators were collected during April and September, 2000. Hence, our model does not have any endogeneity problem.
district $i$. A positive $\gamma$ implies otherwise. For instance, it is expected that districts in the neighbourhood of big cities will enjoy some positive externalities and hence will tend to have a higher income as compared to districts located further away. Gautam Budh Nagar (a district bordering Delhi), and Gurgaon (a district in Haryana in the neighbourhood of Delhi) are expected to have a positive $\gamma$. It is also possible that being in the neighbourhood of a highly developed district can suffer from negative externality due to moving away of productive resources to the more developed districts, therefore a negative $\gamma$.

To capture the neighbourhood effect we take into account geographical location of each district and its neighbouring districts, and build an adjacency matrix $W$. We define $W$ such that $W_{ij} = 1$, if district $i$ is adjacent to district $j$, and zero otherwise (for districts that are not adjacent). Spatial relations may exist because of the geographical proximity among the districts or because of the proximity evolving through economic/business relations. Geographical proximity is exogenous in nature whereas proximity arising out of economic relation is not. Because of endogeneity problem that may arise from business relation, we use geographical proximity and not economic proximity, to construct our adjacency matrix.

Before performing our regression we do some pre-testing using Moran Index ($I$), to see whether this $W$ matrix captures the spillover effect. We find that Moran I for 1999/2000 and 2001/2002 are significant at 1 per cent level. It shows that spatial correlation between incomes is statistically significant. Failing to capture such spatial correlations in a regression setting will result in biased estimates.

Thus we model the residual errors as spatially autocorrelated errors that is, any positive or negative shock in any specific district, is likely to affect the neighbouring districts. The extent of spatial correlation is captured through $\rho_1$ and $\rho_2$. The total spatial multiplier at time period 1, that is, for the year 2001/2002, can be derived from:

$$ Y_i = X_i\beta_1 + WX_i\gamma_1 + \varepsilon_i $$

$$ \varepsilon_1 = \rho_1 W\varepsilon_1 + u_1 $$

Plugging (4) in (3) yields:

9 Moran I for 1999/2000 is 0.54, and for 2001/02 is 0.53. It implies in 1999/2000, 54 per cent of the income in district $i$ is influenced by incomes in the neighbouring districts (See, Table 1).
\[ Y_i = X_0 \beta_i + WX_0 \gamma_i + u_i \left[ I - \rho_i W \right]^{-1} \]

That is, \[ Y_i = X_0 \beta_i + WX_0 \gamma_i + u_i \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \rho_i^k W^k \]

Here, \( \left[ I - \rho_i W \right]^{-1} \) is the spatial multiplier in period 1. \( \rho_i W \) is the spatial correlation between neighbouring districts, say district \( i \) with its neighbouring district \( h \). \( \rho_i^2 W^2 \) is the spatial correlation with one degree of separation, that is, spatial correlation between district \( h \) and district \( j \), with district \( i \) lying between district \( h \) and district \( j \). Similarly, \( \rho_i^3 W^3 \) is the spatial correlation with two degrees of separation between the districts, and so on and so forth. This is analogous to AR (1) type specification in time series where information about time periods, \( t \), \( t-1 \), \( t-2 \), etc. comes from \( \left[ I - \rho L \right]^{-1} \), where, \( L \) is the lag operator. The cross equation correlation coefficient between income in 2001/2002 and 2004/2005 is given by \( \psi \). As we are considering a system of equations, we use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to generate efficient estimates. The estimation of the model is done by the method introduced by Kelejian and Prucha (2004).

In the third section, we do a policy exercise by analyzing the effects on the spatial income distribution because of changes in policy variables such as school enrollment (proxy for human capital); banks, electricity, closed drainage system, and drinking water (proxy for social and physical infrastructure); and factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and opportunities to earn income).

4. Data, and the results

The data on district-level per-capita income is taken from Planning Commission, Government of India. We include districts from 29 states and 6 union territories in India. We consider the time period between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, and between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005. Data for the years after 2004/2005 are not available for all the districts, resulting in significant drop in the number of observations.\(^{10}\) Also many districts are newly formed, and information about per-capita income for them is not available for the

\(^{10}\) Planning Commission does not report data on district-level per-capita income data for the period after 2006/07.
earlier years. Therefore, to maintain uniformity, and to get a more robust result, we consider the aforementioned time period. For the fiscal 1999/2000 an important omission in the Planning Commission data is district-level income for the State of Gujarat, and Delhi. During 1999/2000, we have 508 data points (out of 585 districts) in India. For the latter fiscal years (2000/2001, and 2004/05), we have data points covering 536 districts. This increase in number of observation is due to the inclusion of per-capita district income data from Gujarat and Delhi, which are not available for 1999/2000. The per-capita district income data for Gujarat and Delhi are taken from Indicus Analytics, Delhi. Data relating to the development indicators are mostly taken from the 2001 Census (Government of India, 2001). These development indicators are: number of factories per 1 lakh population, percentage of households using electricity as a source of light, percentage of households with closed drainage system in their neighbourhood, school enrolment as a percentage of total population, number of hospitals and dispensaries per 1 lakh population, percentage of households availing banking service, and percentage of households with tap drinking water within the household premise. The data on number of murders by use of fire arms for the year 1999 in each district was collected from National Crime Record Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. We have calculated the gini coefficient data from the Lorenz ratio obtained from Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009). To merge the data suitably across indicators missing observations for certain districts are dropped from the final data set. In total we have 485 observations. For 51 districts we do not have complete information for all the

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11 In 2000 there are 585 districts, and in 2011 there are 627 districts in India. Many of these districts are newly formed, and for some of them information about the income variable is not available. The case in point is Delhi. The Census 2001 contains information about many variables related to north, north-east, north-west, south, south-west, west, east, and central Delhi. However during 2001, when it comes to per-capita income we find information only relating to Delhi as a whole, and not its constituent districts. Source: Planning Commission, Government of India<http://districts.nic.in/dstats.aspx>. Accessed (02/04/2011).

12 Indicus Analytics collect data from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. CSO collate data from respective state governments. Planning Commission database also uses the CSO database. Therefore introducing per-capita district-level income data for Gujarat and Delhi for 2001/02 and 2004/05 is not going to affect (bias) our results.
development indicators, and we drop them from the final data set. The results are generated using MATLAB.

Results

We find some interesting results. We do not find evidence in support of twin peaks: clustering of the rich income districts, and clustering of low income districts, across India. There has been uniform increase in income among all the districts.

(TABLE 1)

We notice from Table 1 that there is an increase in the mean and in the median per-capita district income. We also notice that there is an increase in standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis measures of income. In fact, as kurtosis has become very high during the latter period, that is, during 2004/2005, the assumption of normality might not be valid. So we use the non-parametric sign test to test for the increase in income across different time periods. The results in Table 2 show that there is a significant increase in the mean and median per-capita district-level income between 1999/2000, and 2004/2005, as well as between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005. Since the income distribution is skewed as well has a high kurtosis (evident from Table 1), we perform the same set of tests for the log per-capita income. Here also, we get similar results, indicating that there is an overall increase in the level of income.

(TABLE 2)

Since there has been an increase in the mean and the median per-capita income, does it indicate that districts with high per-capita income have become well-off relative to the districts with low per-capita income? In other words, do we find any evidence in favour of cluster or divergence of income between the richer and the poorer districts? To analyze this we plot income density function for 1999/2000, 2001/2002 and 2004/05, in Figure 1.

We observe through considering districts’ income data there is definitely no evidence about emergence of twin peaks in any of these periods. There is a shift in the per-capita income density function during these time periods. This is due to a significant increase in the mean, and the median per-capita income, from 1999/2000 to 2004/05.

(FIGURE 1, here)
The income distribution functions also show evidence about first-order stochastic dominance: Income distribution function for 2004/05 lies everywhere below (that is, to the right of) income distribution drawn for 2001/02. Similarly, income distribution for 2001/02 lies to the right of income distribution drawn for 1999/2000. This implies that between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, poverty has fallen. This result is not surprising. It is widely documented that when economic growth happens absolute poverty falls. What is more interesting is to examine whether among districts there is any significant change in the median adjusted per-capita (log) income distribution function between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, and between 2001/02 and 2004/05? This is relevant, especially, because we observe income density function for 2004/05 had become more platykurtic (with fewer extreme values) than it was during 1999/2000. We ran KS test to ascertain this (See, the addendum in Table 2).

Results suggest that between 2001/02 and 2004/05 there is no statistically significant difference in the median adjusted income distribution functions. This result is true whether we consider log of income, or income without log. Considering level income, we arrive at a similar conclusion, that is, the income distribution function has not changed between 1999/2000 and 2004/05. In fact, a glance at the median adjusted per-capita income densities drawn for 1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2004/05, suggest that these distribution functions are more or less similar (Figure 1). The data suggests that both the rich and poor districts have equally become well-off. There has been a reduction in absolute levels of income poverty among districts.

Next we examine the common externalities of income processes, if any, across geographical boundaries. Put differently, we want to find out the channel through which growth is translating to development, and vice versa. To select the appropriate variables we take note of various growth models (such as Solow growth model, endogenous

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13 An income distribution function stochastically dominates another if the percentage of people below any given income is higher in the first (1999/2000) than in the second (2004/05). The income distribution function that stochastically dominates the other also has higher poverty than the other.

14 For an excellent discussion on this topic, see, Fields (2001), pp.102-104.

15 We do not find evidence suggesting that there has been a statistical significant increase in standard deviation.

16 However, when we consider income without log we find a change in income distribution function at a 5 per cent level, between 1999/2000 and 2004/05.
growth models, or models dealing with micro-foundation of macroeconomics like rational expectation type models), and existing literature on India’s income and development dynamics.

For instance, we consider gini coefficient on the basis of the study by Tendulkar (2010). He admits that there has been a rise in summary measures of relative inequality (gini coefficients) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12). Similarly, following Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982), and Rosenzweig (1990), we choose number of hospitals, water and sanitation infrastructure, and school enrollment, respectively, as these variables have significant effect on growth and development indicators of a region. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) find child mortality in India falls in the presence of more clinics per-capita, and in the presence of a better water and sanitation infrastructure (such as closed drainage system). Rosenzweig (1990) finds that higher male wages have a positive income effect on schooling, and raise school enrollment.

As a proxy for access to finance, we choose bank branch, and as a proxy for governance and institution, we choose numbers of murder. Burgess and Pandey (2004) finds that the rural bank branch expansion program in India has a significant effect in terms of reducing rural poverty and in increasing non-agricultural output. Kochar et al. (2006), finds that states with weaker institutions and poorer infrastructure have experienced lower GDP, and lower industrial growth. Menon and Sanyal (2007) find that labor unrest, credit constraints, and indicator of state’s economic health influence location decision of foreign firms investing in India. We take total murder as a proxy for governance.

Finally, Aiyar (2001), Ahluwalia (2002), and Purfield (2006) find, investment in productive capacity (especially, private sector investment) is an important factor explaining the variation in state-level income. We include the number of factories per one lakh population as an explanatory variable as a proxy for productive capacity.

Therefore, the independent variables\textsuperscript{17} that we consider for our study are gini coefficient (proxy for income inequality); school enrollment (proxy for human capital);

\textsuperscript{17} One limitation of the data is failure to capture the quality issue for the services that are provided. For example, there are issues relating to teacher absenteeism, quality of drinking water, healthcare services, etc. Modeling this quality aspect requires experiment such as randomized controlled trial – something outside the scope of this paper.
banks, electricity, closed drainage system, drinking water, and hospitals (proxy for social
and physical infrastructure); factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and
opportunities to earn income), and murder (proxy for governance). Our dependent
variable is log of per-capita income for 2001/02, and 2004/05. All these data are at a
district level.

(TABLE 3)

Our findings suggest that with the exception of total murder (proxy governance);
direct effects of the development variables are statistically significant and are of expected
signs. The significant gini coefficient indicates that for any district income inequality is
good for income generation. The ongoing reform process cannot be blamed entirely for
this occurrence. Reforms encourage more active market participation and hence will not
guarantee equal returns to all. While returns to skilled labour are going to increase (due to
scarcity in number), unskilled labour will be left out unless necessary skills are developed
by that group. However, as the KS test in the earlier section indicates, income inequality
within any given district is not contributing to divergence in median income across
districts, or regional income inequality. Both the coefficients on factories and school
enrollment are positive, and statistically significant, indicating that these factors
positively affect income. Similarly, better physical and social infrastructure such as
electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks, help business to
grow in any particular region. This in turn creates opportunities to earn more income. The
coefficient on murder rate is statistically not significant. This may be because of poor
conviction rate in India.\footnote{Between 2005 and 2009 the average conviction rate for murder is only 36.2 per cent. Out of nearly 1.27 hundred thousands murder only 44601 people were convicted. See, Times of India News Service. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Conviction-rates-for-murder-bysmal/articleshow/8720229.cms.} Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component that
affects income, positively.

While analyzing the direct neighbourhood effect we find the coefficients on
factories and electricity are significantly positive, whereas, the coefficient on bank is
significantly negative. There is a positive influence on income in district \(i\) (captured as \(W \times \text{Number of factories total}\) if there are more factories in the neighbouring districts. Similarly, better electricity, by facilitating growth of factories in the neighbouring

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districts may contribute positively towards district i’s income. This result is similar to that of Ahluwalia (2002), where he finds private sector investment in productive capacities such as factories, and in social (such as human capital) and physical infrastructure (such as ports, airports, national highways, telecommunication, etc.), positively affect state-level income.

A negative neighbourhood coefficient in the banking variable (captured as W × banking service) implies banks in the neighbouring districts can lure away productive investment from district i, and hence adversely affect its income. Alternatively, bank lending money in the neighbouring districts, will have less money to lend in district i, thereby contributing negatively to income. De and Vij (2012) find a negative neighbourhood coefficient for the banking variable while examining response of commercial banks in giving loans to the drought prone districts in India.

The coefficients $\rho_1$ and $\rho_2$, capturing the indirect neighbourhood effect, are significantly positive with values, 0.096 and 0.094, respectively. It means that the spillover effect of income is around 10 per cent: if income in district i increase by 100 per cent, income in the neighbouring district j increases by 10 per cent. In accordance to our expectation about persistence in income across time we find a high cross-equation income correlation ($\psi$). Income across both the time periods, 2001/02 and 2004/05, are highly correlated ($\psi = 0.91$). F-test statistics confirmed no change in structural coefficients. We accept the hypothesis: $\beta_1 = \beta_2$ and $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2$. High cross-equation income correlation also implies that the districts with higher per-capita income will continue to perform better. However, as is evident from the KS test results in the earlier section, a higher cross-equation income correlation does not automatically imply an increase in income disparity between the richer and poorer districts, something suggested by Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) in their state-level analysis. Although it might sounds slightly presumptuous, we believe that the private sector (without depending too much on the government) is taking lead in moving capital and labour to areas with lesser input costs (that is, investing more in backward districts), thus contributing to uniform growth process in India.

**Policy analysis**

We do a policy exercise to quantify percentage change in income variable resulting from one percentage change in policy covariates. This policy exercise is done

(TABLE 4)

For instance, for the district Bangalore Urban, every one per cent increase in the number of factories will increase income in Bangalore Urban by 0.18 per cent. Likewise, one percentage point increase in electrification, closed drainage, school enrollment, banks, and drinking water, increases per-capita income in Bangalore Urban by 0.30 per cent, 0.41 per cent, 0.25 per cent, 0.17 per cent, and 0.27 per cent, respectively. We also compute the spillover effect for the neighboring districts. One per cent increase in number of factories in Bangalore urban increases per-capita income in neighbouring Dharmapuri district by 0.03 percentage points. Similarly, for the neighbouring Bangalore Rural, Chamarajanagar, and Kolar districts, one per cent increase in number of factories in Bangalore urban raises income in these districts by 0.03 per cent, 0.01 per cent, and 0.01 per cent, respectively. Likewise, one percentage point increase in electrification, closed drainage, school enrollment, banks, and drinking water, in Bangalore Urban, increases income in Dharmapuri district by 0.06 per cent, 0.09 per cent, -0.07 per cent, -0.02 per cent, and 0.01 per cent, respectively. Having more schools and banks although helps generate more income in Bangalore Urban also adversely affects income earning potential for the neighbouring districts. This may happen because the bank lending money in Bangalore Urban may have less money to lend to the neighbouring districts – something that we have stated earlier while analyzing our results from SUR model. Likewise, more schools in Bangalore Urban may attract more talent from neighbouring districts, and therefore adversely affect supply of skilled labour in the neighbouring districts.

(FIGURE 2.1 and FIGURE 2.2)

We visually compare the spillover effects of these different policy variables at a pan-India level for the year 2001/02. Closed drainage system has the maximum impact (See, Figure 2.1) on income through own and spillover effects. For one per cent increase in closed drainage system, income increase between 0.96 per cent and 2.58 per cent. The second biggest factor is the availability of potable water. A one per cent increase in
availability of tap water systems within households, increase income between 0.16 and 1.30 per cent (See, Figure 2.2).

Given the positive impact of closed drainage (sanitation) and potable water on income, from the policy perspective it would be interesting to analyze the own effect, direct neighborhood effect and indirect neighborhood effect of these two important policy covariates. For the year 2001/02, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in closed drainage system, district-level median income increases by 1.39 per cent. This is the own effect. The direct neighborhood effect is 0.59, that is, for 1 per cent increase in closed drainage system in the neighboring district (say, j), median income of district i increases by 0.59 per cent. Similarly, because of increase in median income in neighboring district j (made possible through better closed drainage system), median income of district i increase by 0.79 per cent – the indirect neighborhood effect. The own effect of closed drainage system on 95th percentile and 5th percentile income cohorts are 1.96 and 0.68, respectively. For the year 2001/02, the own, direct, and indirect neighborhood effect, of potable water on median income are 0.21, 0.09, and 0.12, respectively. The own effect of potable water on 95th percentile and 5th percentile income cohorts are 0.39 and 0.16, respectively. We get similar results for the fiscal 2004/05.

Many districts in India do not have a proper drainage system and lack drinking water. Poor drainage systems usually have stagnated water thereby becoming a breeding place for mosquitoes. This could result in increase of malaria and water related disease in the vicinity, adversely affecting income. Similarly, proper potable drinking water systems have positive public health outcomes. If people are healthy, they can work harder and assimilate knowledge more efficiently which translates to higher productivity and income growth (Grossman, 1972).

Among other policy variables investigated, banking services, school enrolment, factories, and electrification, increases income by 0.01 to 0.25 per cent, -0.57 to 0.14 per cent, 0.24 to 0.60 per cent, and 0.10 to 0.75 per cent, respectively. 19

5. Conclusion
This paper finds that during the post-reform period, India has not only managed to grow fast but has also performed well in terms of providing quality life (measured in terms of

19 Figures of these results are available on from the authors at http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.n.banerjee/
per-capita income) to its citizens. Working with district-level data for the periods between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, our results suggest no divergence in income across districts in India. The income dynamics provide no evidence in support of the twin peaks hypothesis: clustering of the rich and poor income districts at a pan-India level. Income growth has been spatially correlated through social and physical infrastructures as well as indirectly through income spillovers. This analysis about dynamics of per-capita income shows development indicators such as infrastructure as an important component for income generation.

Consequently income generation and infrastructure development in one district aids in income generation in others in the neighbourhood. This leads to a reduction in income disparity among districts.

Finally, a comparative static policy analysis shows that public expenditure in development in closed drainage systems has the most impact on income generation, possibly though greater public health outcomes.

**References**


**Acknowledgements**

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Table 1: Per-capita income summary statistics (in 1999 Rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999/00</th>
<th>2001/02</th>
<th>2004/05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15512.3</td>
<td>16882.7</td>
<td>19600.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>14029.5</td>
<td>15154.5</td>
<td>17084.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>7660.9</td>
<td>9126.5</td>
<td>12093.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addendum Statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moran Index (I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita income 1999/2000</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>19.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita income 2001/02</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita income 2004/05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita annualized income growth 1999/00-2004/05</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>13.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita annualized income growth 2000/01-2004/05</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Tests for significance in mean and variance of Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999/00 and 2004/05 (without Gujarat and Delhi)</th>
<th>2001/02 and 2004/05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-test of Mean Difference: Income</td>
<td>19.41 (0.00)*</td>
<td>16.08 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-test of Mean Difference: Log Income</td>
<td>23.22 (0.00)</td>
<td>22.11 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z-Value of sign test of median: Income</td>
<td>6.87 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.98 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z-Value of sign test of median: Log Income</td>
<td>6.78 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.99 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addendum Table: Test for difference in distribution function</td>
<td>1999/00 and 2004/05 (without Gujarat and Delhi)</td>
<td>2001/02 and 2004/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) one sided test statistics (median adjusted log income)</td>
<td>0.042 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) one sided test statistics (median adjusted income in level form)</td>
<td>0.084(0.02)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-values are in the parenthesis
Table 3: SUR Estimates of Income Distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Equation 1 Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Equation 2 Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log income 2004/05</td>
<td>Log income 2001/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System R-square</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-equation correlations ((\psi))</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-bar Square</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. observations, No. Variables</td>
<td>485, 19</td>
<td>485, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables (2001 Census)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.3647 (^{*}) 86.48 8.2919 93.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of factories total</td>
<td>0.0004 (^{*}) 2.38 0.0004 2.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient(^a)</td>
<td>0.6409 (^{*}) 2.31 0.6116 2.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder(^b)</td>
<td>0.0003 (^{*}) 0.76 0.0003 0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity connection</td>
<td>0.003 (^{*}) 2.28 0.0031 2.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed drainage</td>
<td>0.0067 (^{*}) 2.95 0.0044 2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrolment</td>
<td>0.009 (^{*}) 3.72 0.0085 3.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals and dispensaries</td>
<td>0.0034 (^{*}) 3.65 0.0031 3.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking services</td>
<td>0.0064 (^{<em>}) 2.92 0.0062 (^{</em>}) 3.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tap drinking water</td>
<td>0.0029 (^{*}) 2.81 0.0023 2.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)No. of factories total</td>
<td>0.0002 (^{*}) 4.37 0.0002 3.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.108 (^{*}) 1.20 0.1064 1.30</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)Murder</td>
<td>0.023 (^{*}) 0 0.023 0.29</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)Electricity connection</td>
<td>0.0004 1.16 0.00008 2.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>(W^*)HH closed drainage</td>
<td>0.0003 0.40 -0.0002 -0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>(W^*)School enrolment</td>
<td>-0.0002 0.40 -0.0002 -0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)Hospitals and dispensaries</td>
<td>-0.0003 0.80 -0.0003 -0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>(W^*)Banking services</td>
<td>0.002 (^{*}) 3.53 -0.0019 3.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W^*)Tap drinking water</td>
<td>0.0003 1.32 -0.0004 1.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\rho_1, \rho_2)</td>
<td>0.096 (^{<em>}) 10.48 0.094 (^{</em>}) 10.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicates the coefficient is significant at a 2.5 per cent level, and \(^{*}\) indicates the coefficient is significant at a 1 per cent level. \(^a\) On the basis of 61\(^{st}\) Round of National Sample Survey conducted in 2004/05. \(^b\) Figures for 1999. \(W\) is the weighting matrix.
Table 4: Comparative Statics for Bangalore Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factories</th>
<th>Electrification</th>
<th>Closed drainage</th>
<th>School enrollment</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Drinking water</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore Urban</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dharmapuri</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangalore Rural</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chamarajanag ar</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>Kolar</td>
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<td>Salem</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erode</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandya</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Viluppuram</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tiruvanamala</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vellore</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Impact of Closed Drainage and Drinking Water on Median Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log Income 2001/02</th>
<th>Direct Own Effect</th>
<th>Direct Neighborhood Effect</th>
<th>Indirect Neighborhood Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed drainage</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log Income 2004/05</th>
<th>Direct Own Effect</th>
<th>Direct Neighborhood Effect</th>
<th>Indirect Neighborhood Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed drainage</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Median adjusted densities and distribution of district-level log-income in 1999/2000, 2001/02, and 2004/05.
Figure 2.1: Percentage change in income due to 1% growth in closed drainage in 2001/02

Figure 2.2: Percentage change in income due to 1% growth in tap drinking water source within premises in 2001/02.