Professor Sophie Gibb s.c.gibb@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure
Gibb, S.C.
Authors
Abstract
Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for it. This essay argues that, insofar as these attempts are successful, they actually establish a far stronger closure principle. Worryingly, the acceptance of this stronger principle presents a new problem for the most popular form of physicalism, that of nonreductive physicalism. The problem shall be referred to as the 'Problem of Strong Closure.'
Citation
Gibb, S. (2012). Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(1), 29-42
Journal Article Type | Article |
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Publication Date | Jan 1, 2012 |
Deposit Date | Jun 2, 2010 |
Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
Print ISSN | 0003-0481 |
Electronic ISSN | 2152-1123 |
Publisher | University of Illinois Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 49 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 29-42 |
Publisher URL | http://apq.press.illinois.edu/49/1/gibb.html |
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