The National Ideology of the Radical Algerians and the Formation of the FLN 1924-1954

by

Salah El Din El Zein El Tayeb

- 8 OCT 1996

Occasional Papers Series
No. 35 (1987)
ISSN 0307 0654
© Centre for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies
University of Durham, England, 1987

ISBN 0 903011 18 2

Series editors: John Dewdney & Heather Bleaney

The views and interpretations in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies or the University of Durham.
This work is dedicated to Fatima, my mother; to Salwa, my wife; and to Iman, my daughter.

Salah El Tayeb
1986
CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION  
2. FRENCH ALGERIA  
3. EMIGRANT WORKERS AND EXILE NATIONALISM  
   Marxist Roots of the ENA  
   The ENA Programme  
   Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism  
   ENA Reformism  
   The Etattie's Agitation for Independence  
   Critique of the ENA Programme  
4. MILITANT NATIONALISM FROM THE ENA TO THE FPA  
   The FPA Programme  
   Assessment of ENA - FPA  
5. IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE MTD  
   Nationalism and Democracy  
   Liberating Nationalism and Oppressing Nationalism  
   Algerian Nationalism  
   Democracy  
6. FROM ACITATION TO ORGANIZATION, EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONALISM  
   Critique of Radical Nationalism  
   Ideological Inadequacies  
   Doctrinal Deficiencies  
   Strategic Imprecision  
   Tactical Shortcomings  
7. THE FORMATION OF THE FLN  
8. CONCLUSION  
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. INTRODUCTION

This monograph demonstrates that there is a valid distinction between the activities of a movement and the sentiments and attitudes which are embodied in its programmes. This means that there is also a distinction between the study of the national ideology and of the nationalist movement in any country. A nationalist ideology has a programme, usually the creation, sometimes the strengthening, of the state. One can distinguish between such an ideology and patriotism on this basis. Patriotism need not have a programme.

In reference to the distinction between the national ideology and the nationalist movement, Smith indicates that, 'Typologies of nationalism can themselves be subdivided into those which take the ideology of nationalism as their main referent, those which take the type of nation or national group and those which refer to the nationalist movement.' Although this distinction between ideology, group and movement is not always carried through in practice, yet it serves as a convenient way of perceiving the main differences in my approach to the study of the Algerian national ideology. It is believed that national ideology remains a powerful social force and an important focus of investigation in its own right. It should not be confused with nationalism as a movement because every movement creates an ideology, which is the thought of that movement. The national ideology outlines the radical changes which the movement seeks to bring about. In examining the national ideology of the radical Algerians, the essential concern is with the evolution of national ideology as distinct from the historical period under investigation, 1924 - 1954. The focus is on their ideas and programmes that supported national renaissance and the restoration of nationhood and were directed primarily towards decolonization and absolute sovereignty.

The Algerian nationalist press is a crucial source for studying their national ideology - the principal concern being the editorial content, ideological discussions and the nature of appeal. In addition to this source of primary information, I have also relied on the original documents of their different political parties, their pamphlets, declarations, political speeches and the resolutions of the parties' congresses. All these sources of information constituted a vital element in the study of the national ideology of the radical Algerians.

Notes

1. Smith, 1973, 22
2. See El Tayeb, in press
2. FRENCH ALGERIA

In 1830 Algeria became a French colony. It was considered part of French territory and an important part of metropolitan France. In 1930, the French administration in Algeria believed that Algérie Française had become a reality after one hundred years of occupation. The celebrations held by the French administration in 1930 antagonized the indigenous Algerians and gave new impetus to their nationalist feelings. The consequence of this was that the Algerian nationalists started demanding more concessions from the French administration within the French colonial system.

The situation on the ground in Algeria had further alienated the radical Algerians. They were basically concerned with the inequity in economic and social life that existed between the colon and the natives in Algeria. The colonial economy which the Colon established in Algeria was characterized by their monopoly of all the economic activities in the country. Because of the limited chances of employment in Algeria, many Algerian workers emigrated to France. The conflict between the natives and the Colon in Algeria was inevitable since the Colon were absolutely determined not to make any concessions to the natives.

Despite the fact that France was ejected unceremoniously from the Middle East, defeated militarily in Indochina and threatened throughout Black Africa, it decided to keep Algeria French. The Fundamental question in regard to the rise of the Algerian national ideology was whether Algeria was Algerian or French. This issue gave rise to three distinct political groups in Algeria, namely the Europeanized Algerians, the Algerian Ulama and the radical Algerians. It is important to note that all these political groups were reformists before the Second World War. They accepted the sovereignty of France over Algeria, but French colonial policy and the Frères-Noirs' intransigence forced them to abandon their reformist ideologies after the Second World War.

The assimilationist viewpoint was represented by the Europeanized Algerians such as Farhat Abbas. They wanted Algeria to become French and they wanted the Algerians to be assimilated into French culture. The most clear and elaborate statement about spiritual assimilation was made by Farhat Abbas, who denied the existence of the Algerian nation. He stated that, if he had discovered the Algerian nation, he would be a nationalist and he would not blush for it as though for a crime. However, he indicated that we could not die for the Algerian fatherland because it did not exist. He asserted that the doctrine of assimilation in which they believed was part of the reality of life and they were more concerned with the emancipation of the Algerians and the bettering of their social and economic situation.

The systematic or disguised refusal of French colonialism to allow the Muslim Algerians into the French community had encouraged, reluctant though they were, all those who favoured a policy of assimilation to recognize the differences between the Algerians and the French after they had been deprived of French citizenship and it became difficult for them to be assimilated into French culture. In the Algerian Constituent Assembly, Farhat declared that he had discovered the Algerian nation which he could not discern among the Algerian masses in 1936. He maintained that Algeria had its own personality, character and countenance, which it would like to preserve despite the will of metropolitan France. The epoch of assimilation for them was over.
The Algerian Ulama made it very clear that Algeria was not France, could not be France and did not want to be France. They were very much aware and conscious of the remarkable differences between Algeria and France. These differences included Islam as a religion and Arabic as a language and culture. The Algerian Ulama wanted to preserve the identity of the Algerian nation and the integrity of the Algerian personality within the colonial system. The impact of the religious renaissance of the Algerian Ulama and their social and cultural revivalism was that it crystallized al-jinsiya al-Qaumiya (The national identity). The term was coined by Ibn Badis, who believed that nations differed from each other in regard to their fundamental characteristics and attributes, which included language, religion, history and the common feelings and memories of the members of the same nation. Since the Ulama believed that no nation could survive without the survival of its fundamental characteristics and attributes, al-jinsiya al-Qaumiya would represent, in this respect, the solid foundation of the Algerian nation vis-a-vis French Algeria. The most crucial aspects of it were the preservation of the Algerian personality by the struggle against naturalization; the consolidation of the Algerian nation by rejecting the idea of French Algeria; the prevention of marriage with French women and the recommendation of family emigration and, finally, by countering the “Berber policy” which the French had tried to develop in Algeria in the late nineteenth century. The efforts of the Algerian Ulama resulted in the abrogation of “l’Algérie c’est la France.”

It is significant to note that even the radical nationalists were reformists before Second World War. Their political reformism was expressed by their leader, Messali Hadj, when he declared: “We are not asking for independence. We do not want to throw the French into the sea. We know very well we cannot get along without them. If they wished to leave we would keep them by force.” In spite of this moderate attitude, the French Government dissolved his party, Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and imprisoned him. After the war, they abandoned this reformism and demanded independence for Algeria - the consequences of failure would often be that demands increased and new means of action were sought. The radical Algerians inspired the Algerian masses to direct action against French colonialism. Revolution needs the work of political activists and the mobilization of the masses, not towards a separate identity within the colonial system but towards the total rejection of the colonial system itself. It is obvious that significant historical events can have a profound influence in altering beliefs and values and may produce sets of attitudes that are hard to change with later experience. Significant events of this nature in Algeria were the failure of the Muslim Congress in 1926, the repression of the 1945 uprising and the failure of the ballot system in 1948. In reaction to the failure of ideas for assimilation, and for an autonomous Algeria federated to France, a more militant group of revolutionaries concluded that force alone would bring independence. They were convinced that violent revolution was inevitable for the emancipation of Algeria from French colonialism. The radical Algerians believed that ideology is very important to revolutions. It defines the objectives and aspirations of the revolutionaries, stimulates the revolutionaries to action and legitimizes the cause of revolution. Hence, they started to discuss the ideological principles of the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) and to focus on the critique of radical nationalism. It is not my intention to exaggerate the role of ideas. The significance of the diffusion of revolutionary populism in Algeria was that it tapped a potential which was already there. It was similar to adding
Oil to Fire. Violent revolution could not be achieved through the diffusion of ideology only. It needs weapons, trained soldiers and an efficient organization. In order to achieve these goals, the revolutionary populists proceeded to form the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1954.

Notes

1. For a detailed study of this political group see El Tayeb, 1980, 206
2. See Abbas, 1936
3. Abbas, 1962, 154
4. Declaration made before the Constituent Assembly, 23 August 1966
5. Préfecture d'Oran, CIE, 1941a, 24
EMIGRANT WORKERS AND EXILE NATIONALISM

The first Algerian nationalist organization was established in France rather than in Algeria. The Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) was founded in the region around Paris (Île de France) in 1924 by the North African emigrant workers in France. In this respect Wilfred Knapp indicated that, "The Étoile Nord-Africaine was the creation of Hadj Ali Abdé Kader, who became known as Massali Hadj." Since the Étoile relied on the support of the emigrant workers, it could be considered as a true representation of exile nationalism. This highlights the view that nationalism was often born in exile, for the exile feels most deeply the meaning and value of a territory which his compatriots, who reside in it, ignore. From the outset, the Étoile was more radical in doctrine and tactics than any other Algerian political movement which existed in that period (1924-1937). It demanded independence for North Africa from the start and resorted to agitation and propaganda to further this goal. In France, Algerian nationalists could speak and write more freely on all themes, including political ones. Algerian Muslim frustrations were seeking an outlet somewhere and, when they could not find one at home, they erupted in France.

The North African emigrants were influenced by the ideas prevailing in Europe in the late 1920s and early 1930s and setting the pace in Paris: the ideas of fascism, of para-military ex-servicemen's leagues, and of corporatism. By the middle 1920s the troubles of the new democratic states were already developing into constitutional and political crises in which nazism, fascism, communism, and authoritarian regimes, based on or backed by the armed forces, were much in vogue. The environment in which the Étoile operated made it different from the other Algerian political groups. At the same time the customs, traditions and Islamic values of the emigrants encouraged them to retain their own identity. As a result, the Étoile existed as a separate political group in Paris and the North African emigrants were not assimilated into French society. These factors had contributed in shaping the attitudes of the Étoile in two respects:

(i) The broad vision of the basic issue, which was absolute liberation from foreign domination in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

(ii) The choice of the workers as a crucial revolutionary force while the other political groups such as the Europeanized Algerians or the Algerian 'Ulama' relied on the educated elites and the merchants.

With the establishment of the ENA, Algerian nationalism took on its first institutional form capable of attracting the attention of the Algerian masses. Nevertheless, the ENA was not a well-structured party. In this regard Jean-Louis Carlier stated that, "The proper characteristics of Algerian emigration, its fluidity, transience and its psycho-cultural configuration would not permit the construction of a solid movement and a well organized party." An examination of the origins of the ENA will throw some light on the movement's orientation and its ideological directions.

Marxist Roots of the ENA

El-Qamh stated that the Étoile was first established as a religious society in 1925 and became a political party in 1926. This point of view emphasized the nationalist dimension of the ENA. On the other hand, the
secret police reports and Ablé Banoun suggested that the ENA was established by the French Communist Party. In 'Note sur l'Etoile Nord-Africaine', the police report stated that, "The Association of the 'Etoile Nord-Africaine' was founded in Paris in 1926 by Hadj Ali Abdol Kader who was of Algerian origin. At that epoch, Hadj Ali was a member of the Central Committee of the PCF and the head of a communist cell in France. The centre of the Association was established in 'Maison Commune', 49, rue de Bretagne." Ablé Banoun stated to Kinanshin that in reality the ENA gave total allegiance to the French Communist Party which guided its first steps against colonial oppression and imperialism. Banoun emphasized that the ENA was established as an answer to the French Communist Party's difficulties in penetrating the one hundred thousand-strong North African (mostly Algerian) labour force in France. Article Ten of the ENA statutes (adopted in 1928) maintained that "the association does not recommend any party or political line", but adds 'nevertheless, it will call for the help of these parties which will support the (ENA) programme and give help towards the achievement of (its) objectives.' Indeed, for all its efforts to maintain a façade of independence, the ENA made no secret of its sympathy for the Communists. The French Communist Party was concerned with the liberation of the people, the struggle against imperialism and the independence of Algeria. The fact that some of the leaders of the ENA used to write in the press of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) would indicate the relationship of alliance between the two parties. According to J. L. Cartier, Hadj Ali used to write in Le Paris from as early as 1924. The Algerian Communists of the ENA used to write in Bairaq, Lavia Ahmer (al-Liya al-Ahmar), Lime (l'Alma al-Ahmar) and Baha Hamra (al-Raya al-Hamra). Bairaq, Lavia, Alama and Raya are all Arabic names which mean flag. Ahmar is an adjective and means red. All these papers were called 'The Red Flag'. The colour red had its significance in being associated with the Communists.) In 1927 Baha Hamra indicated that, by acquiring the most fertile land, French colonialism had forced the indigenous Algerians to live in misery. The headline of the paper carried the slogan 'Vive la colonisation. Vive l'Indépendance de l'Algérie'. Bairaq proclaimed, in its issue of March 1927, that the Algerians wanted their independence. It demanded the abolition of the French Protectorate in Tunisia and the evacuation of French troops from Morocco. The writings in the 'Red Flags' reflected the opinions of the Communists of the ENA and the Algerian members of the colonial section of the Communist party. In 1920, when the ENA was established, Le Paris, Algérie and l'Humanité launched a systematic and violent campaign for the independence of Algeria. Shadali Makki summarized this political line in the following words: 'To carry through the struggle for independence to the very end within the context of revolutionary nationalism.' Class struggle did not disappear from the demands of the ENA communists, but it was not the principal preoccupation of the Association. At the same time, the communist faction of the ENA gave an important place to nationalism in so far as it acted as a catalyst for the immediate aspirations of the emigrants. Shadali stated that the position of the Communist direction of the ENA was that 'The socialist revolution is the only measure to surmount nationalism since nationalism is the inverse reflection of the colonial ideology. The agrarian question should occupy a central position in the national struggle against French colonialism.' What was the ideological significance of the roots of the Etoile? The answer to this question would help to explain the direction of the Etoile and the factors which influenced the shaping of its ideology. It was clear that the Etoile embodied both nationalists and communists, and it was
influenced by these two political trends. Early contacts with French
Communists seemed to have taught Messali the usefulness of organization
among workers and the creation of political cells. Although Messali had
never been a member of the Communist party, nevertheless he was greatly
influenced by the Communists' techniques and organization.11

M. Khairi told the author that he specifically asked Messali the
following question, "Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"
and Messali replied, "Never." Messali also told Khairi that he had been
approached to join the Communist party but had refused. The budding
Algerian nationalism of the ENA was expressed in terms limited by a Marxist
frame of reference. The charter of the ENA (as laid down in 1928) was not
loose, as in a typical front organization, but a replica of the CP model
governed by the same principles of cellular structure, sectionalization,
selective recruiting, active membership, democratic centralism and strict
control on implementation of policy at all levels.12 In the Chapter
setting out the programme, emphasis was put on national liberation rather
than on social revolution, and the former was presented through the prism
of the Leninist view of imperialism and decolonization. French imperialism
was the main enemy, an independent Algerian Parliament was demanded and it
was the large European landholdings in Algeria that the ENA particularly
sought to break up. Speaking in Brussels in 1927, Messali said that the
ENA wanted the confiscation of large agricultural landholdings that had
been seized by "feudalists, agents of imperialism, colons, and private
capitalist societies", and the return of confiscated land to the peasants
from whom it had been taken; the integrity of small and medium-sized
landholdings; the return to Algeria of land and forests that had been
seized by the French state; and the expansion of agricultural credit to
small Muslim landholders.13 The Communists' own agrarian programme at this
time was not very different. The Communist demands were:

(1) expropriation of large holdings in all forms;

(2) the grant of certain rights to small landholders, e.g.,
exoneration from taxes, the return of communal and inherited
property that had been confiscated, free provision of
agricultural equipment and the elimination of middlemen;

(3) the transfer of land to those who worked it with elimination of
both cash rentals and share cropping, both of the traditional
and other kinds; and

(4) an eight hour work day for agricultural workers.14

The programme for Algeria went far beyond standard demands of Algerian
spokesmen (abolition of Code de l'Indigénat, equality of military service
with the plâts-noirs, freedom of press and association, etc.).15

Independence for Algeria was launched as the main battle-cry. It was
perhaps the most seminal contribution of communism to Algerian nationalism
to transmit to it, through the vehicle of the ENA, the doctrines of
independence as a primary goal and an Algerian parliament as the decisive
stage towards its achievement. The ENA would be the sole propagator of
this gospel for a long time, not only in that period of dependence on the
CP, but for a decade after their break with it. Even the Umma who
stressed the uniqueness of Algerian identity were still shy of giving it
political expression, and asked in 1936 for direct attachment to France.
In promoting this new, nationalist line, however, the French Communist
party seems to have unleashed forces it could not control. For a number of
people in the ENA gave themselves to the nationalist thesis with an
enthusiasm that quickly escaped Communist confines. Already in 1929 the
ENA was breaking with the PCF because a majority of its members wanted to
base their programme on Algerian nationalism. Other than the general aim of independence, the early militants of the ENA had only a vague doctrine which was concerned with agitation and propaganda.

The ENA Programme

The ENA could be analyzed as an ideological movement with a political character. The base of the movement consisted of an emigrant proletariat, as has been indicated above. The Marxist rhetoric and the sentiment of nationalism formed the principal aspects of its programme. In reference to the dominant aspect of ENA politics, Carlier stated that "the political practice of the ENA was oriented towards agitation. The activism of its members reflected their extraordinary energy and the stubbornness of their will." The professed aim of the ENA was "to defend the material, moral and social interests of North African Muslims, and to educate its members. What this meant for Muslims in Algeria was a programme of social, economic and, to some extent, political emancipation. Algeria had been reduced to slavery, ENA orators affirmed, and Muslims had been subjected to a multitude of abuses. The ENA sought to eliminate discrimination against Muslims and to gain for them the social, economic and political rights of their European counterparts. Specifically, it called for the elimination of the Code de l'Indigénat, the development of free and compulsory education for Muslim children, the representation of Muslim Algerians in Parliament, and the raising of Muslim salaries." The "Young Algerians" seemed to have demanded these concessions long before the ENA. In all of these respects the ENA demands stressed the immediate, material conditions of Muslim Algerian life. They particularly concentrated on urban Muslims, in Algeria and in France. In the 1924-1926 period, then, the Etoile's programme was a limited one. It was limited, first, to pushing for immediate changes, and this was consistent with the fact that the left-leaning Cartel des Gauches was in power in Paris at the time, and the French Communists may have thought they could pressure it into making reforms on behalf of Algerian Muslims. Second, the programme was limited to Muslims in urban areas, which was consistent with the Marxist frame of reference of those who controlled the ENA. As early as May 1926, statutes were passed which stipulated that the fundamental aim of the association was the struggle for the total independence of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, and the unity of North Africa. That at the time also, it appeared, the organization came out for the formation in Algeria of a national revolutionary government with a constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage, and the return to Algeria of all lands, forests, and other property taken by the French. Then, at a meeting in early 1927, Hadj Ali Abdel Kader called for independence." The following month, Messali attended the Anti-Imperialist Congress in Brussels where he elaborated a "cabinet of Algerian demands." The ENA speakers began at this time to refer to Algeria as "a Muslim nation provisionally annexed to France". Not long after, Shadali wrote an article in L'ikdam entitled, "Our single objective: National Independence, supreme hope and supreme salvation (salut)", which asserted that the ENA had "clearly decided to carry on to the end the struggle for independence, in the context of revolutionary nationalism," an action that brought about his expulsion from France and the prohibition of the ENA paper. These measures were taken against the Etoile for what French authorities called "an attack on the integrity of national territory", that is, opposing French authority over Algeria.
The Étoile realized the importance of a programme which was well defined and adapted to the circumstances, so it decided to launch, in addition to its initial doctrine, a claim for the total independence of North Africa and a programme of social and economic demands which could be realized immediately. On the initiative of Massali Hadj, the French political parties of the Left, especially the French Communist Party, supported and defended the demands. On May 28, 1933, under the presidency of Massali Hadj, the General Assembly of the ENA signed unanimously the ENA programme.

This programme set out three main demands which were included in the second section of the programme:

(i) The total independence of Algeria.
(ii) The complete withdrawal of French troops.
(iii) The formation of a national army.

In addition, the programme also demanded the confiscation of land, banks, mines, railroads, ports and public services seized by the French. The Étoile was seeking a national revolutionary government with a constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage, with universal suffrage to prevail at all levels and all inhabitants of Algeria to be eligible for all assemblies.

Other demands set out on this occasion were for a more advanced organization of irrigation, the development of means of communication and non-reimbursement of government aid to the victims of periodic famines. The ENA wanted the elimination not only of the Code de l'Indigénat, but also of all measures of exception. It wanted also amnesty for all those imprisoned, under special surveillance, or exiled for infraction of the indigénat or for political reasons. It wanted absolute freedom to travel abroad. Furthermore, the ENA programme included the following demands:

(i) Freedom of the press, of association and congregation, and the right to join political organizations and trade unions.
(ii) Replacement of the financial delegations by a national Algerian Parliament elected by universal suffrage.
(iii) Elimination of the mixed communes and military territories, and the establishment in these areas of municipal assemblies elected by universal suffrage.
(iv) Accessem to public responsibilities without any distinction, according to the principle of equal responsibility, equal treatment.
(v) Compulsory instruction in Arabic, access for Muslims to education at all levels, the creation of new Arabic schools, all official acts to be simultaneously published in Arabic and French.
(vi) With regard to military service, respect for the Qur'anic text which says: 'He who deliberately kills a Muslim is condemned to Hell for eternity and deserves the anger and damnation of God.'
(vii) Application of social and work laws to Muslims, the right to unemployment aid for Algerian families and family allowances.

These latter demands were included in the first section of the ENA programme. The ENA programme of 1933 was not totally new. It was clear that some of the ideas included in the programme had appeared already, such as accession of all Algerians to public responsibilities, compulsory instruction in Arabic and application of social and work laws to Muslims. Nevertheless, the programme had emphasized three crucial ideas related to patriotism, socialism and Arabism. In regard to patriotism, the programme demanded total independence for Algeria, the recall of French troops and
the formation of a national army. In connection with socialism, it
demanded the control of all properties by the Algerian state, with the
confiscation of large properties and the return of these lands to the
peasants. In reference to Arabism, it demanded compulsory free education at
all levels in Arabic, creation of new Arabic schools and the printing of
official documents in both Arabic and French. It was important to note
that the programme ignored the separation of religion (Islam) from the
state (France) and the liberty to teach Islamic religion in the schools and
mosques. These two issues were strongly emphasized by the Algerian Islam.

At this stage the ENA was concerned primarily with the question of
independence for Algeria. In June 1933, for example, Inache declared that
Algerians wanted independence "pure and simple". In November he asserted
that "the work of the Étoile Nord-africaine will be fulfilled the day that
the French of Algeria are thrown into the sea", a phrase that would be
picked up by others and that would haunt the ENA for years afterwards. The
following spring, Jean Benoud reported on "the abominable meeting" held by
Messali on April 28th "against the French who gave him hospitality." He
spoke of the unimaginable spectacle of 600 unshashed Muslims, "They speak
of nothing less, in effect, than of cutting the throats of the first
passers-by if and when Messali had given them the order. (They) vow to
refuse military service and to preach desertion to Algerian soldiers ...
facing a green flag at the back, they called for an immediate sacred war ...
cries of 'Death to France!', 'Burn the capital!', 'Soldiers desert!',
'Throw the French from Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco!', 'Let's take their
land, push them into the sea!', 'Long live the revolution El-Mumah will
bring to Islam'". This virulent anti-French direction was coupled with
what Al Ashtaf has called "A sentimental and nostalgic Algerianism," which
Messali, in particular, did much to foster. "We are not comparable with
the Senegalesen". Messali said on one occasion, "But noblemen born of
noblemen." It seemed that Messali wanted to emphasize that, if the
Senegalese were submissive to French colonialism, the Algerians would not
tolerate it.

Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism

As the ENA embraced nationalism, its leaders felt the need to find a
new frame of reference for the party programme. They found it in a
combination of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. The shift could not be
separated from the fact that the ENA was just then beginning to seek a base
in Algeria. A Pan-Arab outlook was just the thing to arouse hope in the
poor, uneducated, powerless Muslims the ENA sought to recruit. Arabhood
was proclaimed to be a common denominator of the Maghrīb as a whole. An
institutionalized expression of this was given in article eight of March
1928, where the ENA was defined as an Arab organization and an association
of the majority of the oppressed populations of North Africa. At the same
time, it was promised that ethnic traditions and mores of the minority
would be respected. This was all the more significant as most of the ENA
adherents were Kabyles who constituted the majority of Algerian and
Maghrībi migration. It was with the national and cultural sense, not the
ethnic sense, that Arabhood was endowed in order not to stir up the
hostility of the Kabyles and their particularistic identity. A reliance on
Islam would also give the ENA programme a legitimacy in Muslim Algerian
eyes that its previous Marxist underpinnings had not. For this reason, the
second theme of the Étoile's propaganda was Islam. The organization was
also defined as an "Association of Muslims."
Through the influence of the Pan-Arabist Shakti Arsalan, Messali had been alert to the cultural-religious theme and he adopted a more Islamic form of Algerian nationalism. Messali returned from exile in Switzerland in a new guise: in the burnous, slippers, cap and beard of a Muslim religious leader. He came as a spiritual guide, or marabout, conveying to Algerians the wisdom of Shakti Arsalan and the Muslim reformers. Appeals to Pan-Arab sentiment and to Muslim religious ties became common in Messali’s speeches then. “France had plunged Algerians into ignorance of their own religion” he said in 1931. “It has infected North Africa with thousands of missionaries, who have tried to christianize its people.” Fortunately, however, “inspired by an ardent faith, the Arab people possess an indestructible moral force. They will never bend before material force.” He acclaimed Muslims for having remained faithful to their religion because God would have no mercy on those who moved toward Christians even in adopting unimportant customs. He condemned Muslims who had renounced their rights under Qur’anic law to become French citizens as “renegades from Islam.”

Like the Milices, the ENA leaders sought recognition from the French that Algerians had their own cultural and religious identity and they asked that they should be put on an equal footing with the French. Within the ENA, Messali began to urge members to follow the faith more closely. At a cultural evening in mid-1931, he encouraged participants to give up gambling, drink and quarrels and to study Islamic history. Through education, he said, Islam would awaken, and heroes would be born who would revive the kingdom of the Prophet. Party members were also required to swear allegiance to the party on the Quran. It was true that Messali was influenced by Shakti Arsalan in regard to Arabism and Islamism to the extent that Shakti became very fond of him and he used to call Messali ‘my son’. The author has seen some private letters from Shakti Arsalan to Ahmed Krimi in which it reads, Shakti wrote to Krimi, “If all the youth become like my son (the reference is to Messali Hadji) Islam would have been liberated a long time ago.” Nevertheless, this shift was not primarily due to the influence of Shakti Arsalan. From the above evidence, which was drawn from police reports, it was obvious that Messali started talking about Arabism and Islam even before he met Shakti Arsalan. The shift was conditioned by the fact that the ENA was beginning to seek a base in Algeria. It took off from Muslim reformism, which held that the Arab peoples of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean could free themselves of colonial control only if they freed their spirits of maraboutism and other deviant Islamic practices which encouraged ignorance and apathy and deprived Muslims of the vitality inherent in Islam. El-Oumma spelled out the new development rather bluntly: “The Algerians did not wait for the founding of the Third International in order to resist (French) inroads into Algeria ... We (i.e. the ENA) receive neither orders nor instructions from anybody or any party whatsoever.” Rather ominously for future communist control, the organ dubbed ENA members as “Islamic nationalists” and not “revolutionary nationalists”, as in the hitherto used cant. It was important to note that it was on the pretext of “religious deviationism” that the PCE turned away from the Etoile in 1934 and formed an independent PCE (Algerian Communist Party)

ENA’s Reformism

The accession to power in France of a government formed of all the parties of the Left raised great hopes in France and in its colonies. The
JO
,'a..

JO
,'a..
methods, and to believe in total independence and absolute sovereignty instead of demanding some concessions within the colonial system.

The Etoile's Agitation for Independence

Despite the obvious reformism of the two above-mentioned programmes, Messali Hadj had agitated for the independence of Algeria. Speaking in Algiers in August 1936, he criticized the resolutions which had been passed by the Muslim Congress and especially the one which called for the attachment "pure and simple" of Algeria to France. It was on this point in particular that Messali differed from all the other Algerian leaders and groups of the period. In this regard, Messali emphasized that the attachment of Algeria to France had been the result of a brutal conquest and he wondered how the participants in the Muslim Congress could dare to demand the attachment of Algeria to France and ask the Algerians to accept this attachment voluntarily. In this respect, Messali emphasized that "We will never accept that our country is attached to another country against its will. We do not want, under any pretext, to mortgage the future, the hope of national liberty of the Algerian people." 42 The journal El-Dumnah published the speech of Messali in a special issue which was distributed all over Algeria. When the Charter of demands of the Muslim Congress was presented, Messali criticized it on the grounds that: "A people who ask to be assimilated to another people break the link that attaches them to God. They break also with their history, with their ancestors, and with their prosperity." 43 Messali was also opposed to parliamentary representation, the financial delegations and the Governor-General. He demanded the creation of an Algerian Parliament elected by universal suffrage and without distinction of race or religion. It was at this point that, scooping up a handful of soil, Messali proclaimed it was not for sale. 44 His speech at that time was very significant because it was directly opposed to the reformism of the Muslim Congress. It aroused the national consciousness of the Algerian masses who listened to it in the municipal stadium of Algiers. M. Kinanish, who was there at the time of the speech, told the author that the Algerian masses had vigorously applauded the speech of Messali and some of the audience were shouting slogans demanding the independence of Algeria. 45 No significant and crucial measures were taken to secure the independence of Algeria and the activities of Messali were confined to rhetorical speeches. Nevertheless, he was able to influence some of the Algerians and make them reject the idea of assimilation and naturalization. The nationalist hymn, composed by M. Zakariya in 1936, reflected this influence and affirmed that:

We do not want naturalization
We do not want assimilation
Whoever prefers (such) tortuous paths
Will be stunned by us like Satan...
Forward, let us take the straight road...
Forward to Independence. Forward to Liberty. 46

The cry of independence, according to Kinanish, drew to Messali many new followers. Kinanish noted that there was an increase in the membership of the ENA but he failed to provide the author with any record of members. He thought that the Algerians supported Messali because he was planning the Algerian national idea in the Algerian soil. Moreover, he argued that Messali was offering emancipation to the Algerians while the other Algerian political leaders were in favour of either assimilation or the attachment of Algeria to France. It was true that Messali was more radical at that
time in his demands in comparison with the other Algerian political leaders. Although he limited his offer of emancipation to the rhetorical level, yet M. Guérin was justified in referring to him as "the pioneer of the Algerian national idea," 47

Critique of the ENA Programme

The basic feature of the ENA programme was the communist rhetoric which influenced it at first. This was due to the infiltration of the ENA by some of the Algerian Communists. The ENA Communists wanted the socialist revolution to rise above nationalism, but they encouraged nationalism because they believed that it was the inverse reflection of the colonial ideology. It was the PCF which pushed the members of the ENA into an anti-colonialist stance in the first place. By doing so, they had unleashed forces which they could not control. The crystallized nationalism of the ENA embraced some cultural and religious themes. The Cahier of "immediate demands" to the Blum Government included the separation of church and state. The religious dimension of the ENA made Messali appear as a messiah, offering Algerians not only a national identity but also a cultural-religious one. Most of the demands presented by the ENA concerned the three North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The frame of reference of the ENA was not only limited to Algeria but extended to North Africa. Despite the rhetorical agitation of Messali for independence, the programme was reformist and it demanded in most cases some concessions within the colonial system. In this regard, the 1936 programme was more reformist than the 1933 one. The agitation for independence did not go beyond planting the national idea in Algeria. Messali had played a major role in this direction when, speaking in 1935, he affirmed that "We want once again to be masters of our country. It was taken from us by force at a time when the right of peoples to dispose of themselves did not exist. Today we must reclaim this right for the peoples of Islam." 48 Examination of the speeches of Messali, as can be seen, indicates that he was like a coin in which you find on one side the agitator and on the other the reformer. This was not surprising, since reformism was dominant at that time amongst the different Algerian political attitudes.

Notes

1. Knapp, 1977, 73. It is important to note that Hadj Ali Abdel Kader and Messali Hadj were two different personalities while Wilfred Knapp thought that the two names referred to one person
2. Interview with Messali Hadj by Ahmad Kinanish, see Kinanish, 1972
3. Carlier, 1972, 951
4. This thesis was supported by Ahmad Kinanish
5. Secret Note, Préfecture d'Oun, GIE, 1936d, 1
6. See "le récit de M. Aklil Banoun" in Bouayed, 1974, 33
7. Goldzieher, 1969, 31-44
8. Bairaou, special issue March 1927, quoted in Carlier, 1972, 953
9. Raia Hamra, February 1927, ibid., 955
10. Shadali Makki, ibid., 960
11. Interview with Ahmad Kinanish by the writer on 7th July 1976
12. L'Ikhdam, no 3, September 1927

14
4. MILITANT NATIONALISM FROM THE ENA TO THE PPA

In March 1937, the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) was formed by Messali Hadj to replace the ENA which had been dissolved by the French popular government in 1937.

The PPA was supposed to organize the activities of the Algerian people against French colonialism and lead them towards the independence of Algeria. Messali announced the event to militants gathered in Wannée with these words: "Dear brothers, Mubarak Filali and I have gone today, March 11, 1937, to the prefecture of police to declare the creation of the PPA. This is a great event which will undoubtedly have a strong response in Algeria. A child has just been born. I place it under the protection of God and of the Algerian patriots. May God protect it and may it be the messenger of independence for Algeria." 1 At the inaugural meeting on March 11, the party leaders announced that the PPA envisaged the transformation of the financial delegations and the acquisition by Muslims of certain rights equal to those of Europeans. The name and aim of the party were suggestive: the Party of the Algerian People signified that its action would be limited to the problems which were purely Algerian despite the fact that it supported the struggle which was carried on by the nationalist parties in Morocco and Tunisia. It was working for the moral, social and material improvement of the Algerians. The declaration of the political bureau published by El-Dumnah on April 10, 1937 was very explicit on this point. It indicated that "The PPA is concerned with the immediate task of struggling for the betterment of the Algerians and to explain the public point of view on the Algerian problem and its just solution." 2 Did the PPA defend the political and economic programme of the ENA in its official declarations and legending articles which were published in El-Dumnah and le Parlement Algérien? 3 Did it also maintain the ENA reformism and continue to demand concessions within the colonial system or did it become revolutionary in means and goals in the sense that it demanded total independence, and absolute sovereignty and adopted violent means to achieve these goals? The answer to these questions requires the examination of the PPA official declarations. 4

The PPA Programme

The ENA programme of 1936 demanded, in addition to the concession of democratic liberties, the creation in Algeria of a representative Assembly elected by universal suffrage. The PPA went beyond that programme and demanded an Algerian Parliament elected by universal suffrage without distinction in race or religion. 5 At his trial in 1937, Messali maintained that an Algerian Parliament already existed in the financial delegation, "although, unfortunately, in an anti-democratic manner". He went on: "We ask for its transformation into an Algerian Assembly elected by universal suffrage without distinction of race or religion." In the electoral Manifesto of 1937, the PPA reaffirmed the same ENA demands of 1933. It demanded the abolition of the special laws for the indigenous Algerians, the code forestier and all the laws of exception. It also rejected the politics of assimilation as illustrated by 'le projet Blum-Violetta' and demanded emancipation. The rejection of assimilation and the demand for emancipation were the two strong ideas of the PPA political programme from April 1937 to July 1939. Hardly had the party been founded and even before its statute had been deposited at the préfecture de la Seine, the political bureau had published a declaration in which it presented its political
programme. The programme emphasized that, "ni assimilation, ni séparation
mais émancipation ... le parti du peuple Algérien repousse toute politique
d'assimilation ... NE juridiquement, ni politiquement ni historiquement
d'assimilation ne peut se faire ...." The PPA expressed the same ideas in
its Journal le Parlement Algérien. In an article entitled 'The PPA for
the emancipation of the Algerian people' the idea of assimilation was
rejected absolutely, and the journal employed some new religious arguments.
It seemed to be influenced by the Algerian 'Ulama in this respect. In line
with the Fatwa of Ibn Badis concerning naturalization, le Parlement
Algérien emphasized that "The acceptance of naturalization by the Algerian
Muslims is considered as a heresy. Politically naturalization is an act of
treason because it implies the abandoning of the Muslim community." The
PPA adopted the slogan of neither assimilation nor separation, but
émancipation. The total rejection of assimilation is very clear from this
slogan, but the concept of émancipation was ambiguous. Did the PPA want
émancipation from France or émancipation with France? These two versions
of émancipation were different and they were significant in determining the
political programme of the PPA. Emancipation with France (l'émancipation
avec la France) was reformist and it was similar to the ideology of the
'Ulama in Marhaliat al-Raja. France was expected to help Algeria in its
struggle for independence and independent Algeria was expected to maintain
good relations with France. On the other hand, émancipation from France
was revolutionary. It meant in other words the separation from France and
the independence of Algeria. But the PPA denied the intention of the
separation from France. The programme went further and stated that, "An
émancipated Algeria will be the friend and ally of France. The example
of Syria and France, and of Egypt and England is entirely appropriate and this
is what the Algerian party wants." In this respect, it seemed that the
model of alliance between Syria and France and that between Egypt and
Britain was appealing not only to the PPA nationalists but also to the
'Ulama and the Europeanized Algerians as has been indicated earlier.

The PPA programme was definitely extreme in comparison with the other
programmes of the Algerian groups, but it did not state clearly the total
rejection of the colonial system. It demanded émancipation with France
instead of émancipation from France. The PPA demanded liberty for the
whole Algerian population without distinction in race or religion. It
tried to gain the sympathy of the European minority in Algeria by
emphasizing that it was against racial, class and religious conflicts. In
this regard the programme stated that "The policy of the PPA is to maintain
a friendly relationship with all the other communities in Algeria. It
would only be concerned with the participation of all the people in the
political, economic and social advancement of Algeria. It stood for the
liberty of all the population without distinction in race or religion." The
fact that the PPA wanted to remain linked to France was emphasized by
Messali as well. Later that year, explaining the aims of the PPA, Messali
said, "The final aim of its activity is the emancipation of North Africa,
which will remain linked to France by a system of dominions." The same
ideas were repeated by Messali in an article published by the Tunisian
journal En Zohra on 5 June 1937 when he stated that he was not anti-French
but anti-imperialist and stood for the total émancipation of Algeria. He
went on to summarize the aim of the PPA by stating that, "The principles
of the PPA are concerned with demanding a dominion status for Algeria and to
persuade the French Government to recognize the individuality of the
Algerian people and to give them a constitution or a parliament in which
the Algerian Muslims would be the majority." Messali was explicit in
pointing out that they wanted emancipation, the autonomy of a British
dominion. He made it clear that their nature, their climate, their past
and the character of their country all justified this emancipation. He
promised that if emancipation was granted to them, he would give his
complete and entire support and that of his party to France. What was
crucial was that he denied that the party wanted separation from France,
insisting only that it wanted “emancipation with France.” This was an
obvious example of Messaïl’s reformism which influenced the political
programme of the PPA. This also indicated the other side of the same coin,
the reformism of Messaïl, which has been mentioned earlier. In clarifying
the word “dominion” he said, “We are not asking for independence. We do
not want to throw the French into the sea. We know very well we cannot get
along without them. If they wished to leave we would keep them by force.”

Then he continued saying that the word “dominion” which he used
did not have in his mind the precise meaning given it by the Government
Commissioner. In this connection Messaïl emphasized that, “It is a
question only of a certain autonomy within the framework of French
sovereignty. If the word dominion has a more precise meaning, I withdraw
it.” It should be noted that Messaïl gave the above political
declaration at his trial in 1941. The die-hard Messaliists might argue that
the above reformism of Messaïl was for tactical reasons, e.g. to lighten
his punishment in the trial. This argument was refuted on the grounds that
Messaïl’s reformism was an established phenomenon. Long before his trial,
at the end of 1936, Messaïl reported to the ENA members on his tour of
Algeria that, “Because of opposition to the party programme as it stood and
so as not to divide Muslims, the movement was ready to abandon the call for
independence and demand only democratic liberties.” As early as June
1936, in a statement issued by him the morning after the ENA delegation was
received at the Ministry of the Interior, Messaïl was talking of: “An early
realization of the aspirations of the Algerian people, which will bring
together the spirits and hearts of two peoples linked by historic destiny
for a joint effort.”

The reformism of Messaïl was evident irrespective of the reasons
behind it. M. Zakariya attributed it to Messaïl’s return to Algeria and
his realization that Muslim Algerians were not yet ready to move for
independence because they were not sufficiently politically developed. The
PPA reformism was in line with Messaïl’s reformism and was influenced by
it.

The political programme of the PPA put forward cultural demands
related to Arabic education. Its General Congress in 1936, for instance,
called for construction of schools for Muslims, attachment of an Arabic
faculty to the University of Algiers, transformation of the Ulama
religious Institutes into Muslim universities and obligatory instruction in
Arabic. Pan-Arabic and Pan-Islamic slogans continued to be used in the
PPA Press and they were associated with the more reformist current within
the movement. The slogan of Al-Sha’b, the PPA-affiliated Arabic
periodical, was “The will of the people emanates from the will of God, the
will of God is unassailable.”

The PPA programme also continued to pay lip-service to the North
African theme. The ENA was more outspoken than the PPA in this regard.
The first issue of Le Parlement Algérien in 1936 called for emancipation of
the Arab Algerian people, along with that of the Moroccans and Tunisians.
“The coordination of the efforts of all North Africans” it said, “alone
can bring about the success (bonheur) of North Africa.” In addition to
the North African theme, the PPA also emphasized the unity of the
Algerians. At the cantonal elections of 1937 it expounded its ideas
regarding unity in the electoral programme. It affirmed that, as nationalists, their demands could not be obtained unless they were united and strong. In this connection it indicated that "A platform for our union is to be found in the realm of demands. We should conserve individually our proper ideal by uniting our efforts in a common action." The same idea of unity was included in the minimum programme "Rassemblement Musulman", which seemed to be borrowed from the Popular Assembly constituted in France in 1935. The PPA developed a common programme for unity with the other Algerian groups and political parties. This common programme, which must have been accepted by the other Algerian political parties as well, might have explained PPA reformism. The PPA programme had also included some economic demands. The PPA economic charter was based primarily on the notions adopted by the General Assembly which was held in Paris on 23 and 26 August 1938. It considered economic renaissance to be essential to well-being and the fundamental basis for the social and political emancipation of Algeria. The PPA economic charter was more moderate than the EMA programme of 1933. It moderated its fundamental economic demands (such as confiscation of large properties) in such a manner in order for it not to frighten the French authorities. For the sake of constituting a vote "Rassemblement Musulman", the PPA reduced its programme to the following minimum demands: "The struggle against misery by raising the minimum salary for the workers of all the corporations and the application of the principle of equal payment for equal work; the abolition of Blumensaat; the fixing of peasants in land and granting them credit facilities." This also indicated that the PPA had abandoned the fundamental demands of its 1937 electoral programme with regard to nationalization of industry and the confiscation of private properties. The PPA electoral programme of 1937 demanded "The nationalization of industry and the struggle against unemployment and the protection of local industry against imported products." Reformism appeared to be dominant in both the PPA political and economic programmes. Analysis of the social strata which belonged to the PPA showed that the majority of its members were artisans, traders and small proprietors. The consequence of this was that the doctrine of the PPA had to consider the political, economic and social aspirations of a social stratum which was relatively conservative and nationalist. In fact the PPA leaders confessed this in their reply to the PCA in December 1937. They indicated that "The PPA is an organization which is composed exclusively of Algerians. It is not the organization of the indigenous people in general. To be more precise, it is the organization of the workers who form the majority of its adherents. Some of its members also belonged to the middle bourgeoisie class and very few of them belonged to the liberal and intellectual professions. The politics of the PPA reflects its social composition."

It was not true to assume that the PPA was limited only to reformist concessions and to deny it any role in the agitation phase. In July 1937 the PPA demonstrated in Algiers with 20,000 determined Muslims carrying banners which said "bread, peace and liberty." This slogan in particular was definitely a PCF slogan. Nevertheless, the other slogans of the demonstration were very illuminating. In front of the House of Agriculture, the demonstrators shouted: "Land for peasants!" When they passed in front of the préfecture de police they shouted demands for an Algerian Parliament and finally in front of Algiers mosque they shouted demands for respect for Islam and the Arabic language. In front of the demonstration a red and white flag was carried throughout to arouse the national consciousness of the Algerians. The opposition of the PPA to the
resolutions of the Congrès Musulman Algérien was very significant in rejecting the assimilation and the naturalization of the Algerians. In this regard El-Oummar maintained that Algerians already had a nationality and it was impossible to change one's nationality "as one changes a tie."26

A year later, in one of its most anti-French statements to date, the paper asserted that North Africa had been conquered by force, but it had never accepted the French conquest and emphasized that "North Africa is tied to France by no sentiment if it is not the hate that one hundred years of colonization have succeeded in creating in our hearts."27 "The suitcase or the coffin" would soon become a slogan associated with the PPA as well. Europeans could not, it suggested, remain in Algeria, they would either have to leave or they would die. Along these lines, Messali himself, echoing Amaoz, said that, "Our beautiful country should not be soiled any longer by the presence of the foreigners. All the French will be pushed out of our home and into the sea."28 Despite the ENA-PPA reformism, their call for emancipation was the more striking because they remained the only Muslims in Algeria to make it before the Second World War. The Communists were just moving towards their idea of "a nation in the process of forming", a formula Thorez came up with in 1939 to justify continued French hegemony over Algeria. However, he insisted that, "the right to divorce does not carry with it an obligation to do so."29 The Islam while looking toward eventual independence, were resigned to the painstaking task of forming a Muslim elite to govern the country. As to the Evoluée, after the failure of the Blum-Violette bill, they moved towards a federalist approach that saw Algeria as autonomous within the French system.

Assessment of ENA-PPA

Although the ENA was established by the Communists in order to infiltrate the North African emigrants in France, it turned out to be the first nationalist organization for them. The example of the Étoile demonstrated the incompatibility of nationalism and communism in countries like Algeria in the phase of the struggle for national liberation. It was significant to note that while the communists of the ENA had encouraged the promotion of nationalism, they had been superseded by it.

The ENA-PPA was a movement which was based on programmes. It lacked a well-formulated and worked-out doctrine in comparison with the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), which was established in 1946. Moreover, it was even difficult to get access to these programmes and, as the result of this, the ideological aspects of this movement were not deeply investigated. In this connection, and in reference to the ENA, M. Carlier indicated that, "Les difficultés que nous avons rencontrées sont également pratiques en raison même des sources, rares et d'accès difficiles. L'oubli dans lequel est tombé le rôle ENA trouve ici une autre raison car les aspects idéologiques de la question n'expliquent pas tout."30 The pre-World War II ENA-PPA represented a low-profile approach to Algerian emancipation which concentrated on agitatory speeches and techniques only. On March 17, 1941, Messali was condemned by the tribunal of Vichy to sixteen years hard labour. The PPA was dissolved and it went underground from 1939 to 1946 when the MTLD was established. During this period, the members of the PPA infiltrated the Europeanized Algerians and tried to influence their ideas in regard to French colonialism. Their efforts were manifested in such documents as the Manifesto of 1943. The had experience of the Algerian nationalists with the French colonial system and the introduction of new Ideas to Algeria during the war period had
resulted in an escalation of the conflict in Algeria. The Algerian national ideology had transformed itself from reform to nationhood. New demands were put forward by the Algerian nationalists which were totally different from the demands of the pre-war period. There was a total transformation in the ideology, tactics and means of the Algerian nationalists. In reference to the clandestine PPA, the Algerian documents of the period stated that, "Just before the start of the Second World War, the PPA was dissolved and its militants were imprisoned. Under these circumstances, the only available option for the party was to go underground and organise clandestinely. The tactics and the means of struggle have also been considered." This indicated the role of the colonial system in the escalation of conflict and the transformation of national ideology. The moderate demands of the ENA-PPA were rejected by the French colonial system. The consequences of failure would often be that demands were increased and new means of action were sought. French intransigence seemed to lead inevitably toward the radicalization of the reformist movement in Algeria including the Evolués, the Tnmas and the radical nationalists. The examination of the ideological principles of the HTLD reveals this quite clearly.

Notes

1. Police report, March 1937
2. El-Dummah, no.48 of 10 April 1937
3. El-Dummah and Le Parlement Algérien were two press organs which belonged to the PPA and they were published in French. Al-Sha'ik was also affiliated to the PPA and it was published in Arabic.
5. These demands were included in the ENA programme of 1933. See Comité de l'Afrique Française, 1933, 576; see also El-Dummah, August-September 1935
6. El-Dummah, 10 April 1937
7. Le Parlement Algérien, 17 June 1939; see also the editorial of no.1, 18 May 1939 and of no.2, 3 June 1939
8. An article by Mannali Hadj in Tunisian paper Es Zehra of 5 June 1937, quoted by Ahmad Khamlish, 1972
9. Préfecture d'Oran, CIE, 1941a, 18
10. Ibid., 24
11. Ibid., 25
12. Police report, November 28, 1936
13. Benazet, 1947, 35
14. Memorandum written for the French, Préfecture d'Oran, CIE, 1940a, 12
15. El-Dummah, no.66, August 28, 1938
17. Aitamor, n.d., 41
18. La Justice, 14 October 1937
19. El-Dummah, 11 October 1938

21
20. "L'Union oui, mais avec qui et autour de quoi?" Le Parlement Algérien, 3 June 1939
22. El-Dummah, 27 August 1938
23. "Appel à l'Union", El-Dummah, no. 58, December 1937
24. El-Dummah, January 1938
25. El-Dummah, July-August 1939
26. Comité de l'Afrique Française, 1936, p. 650
27. Speech at PCE Congress of Arles, La Lutte Sociale, 3 November 1939, 10 November 1939 and 17 November 1939
28. Carlier, 1972, p. 908
29. MTLD Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, nd, p. 37
The Algerian nation, its existence, sovereignty and total independence was the core of the Algerian struggle against French colonialism. The radicals of the MLD believed that "Algeria forms one nation". According to them, analysis of the elements that constitute a nation would definitely confirm this. Algeria had a definite territory, an established economy and the Algerian nation was distinguished by its national character and creed. Religious and linguistic factors had helped greatly in formulating the national character of the Algerians. From the Moroccan to the Tunisian frontiers, the mentality of the Algerian people was similar.

This would not eliminate the existence of certain regional diversities. Even within the Messalint movement, there was a division between the Kabyles and the Arabs to the extent that in the late 1940s the Berberists said explicitly: "Algeria is not Arab but Algerian." Algerian culture is influenced by Arab and Islamic characteristics including the Berber ethnic group. Most of the Algerians believed that the Berbers were of Arab origin who emigrated from Arabia to North Africa before the emergence of Islam. Evidence for this assumption was deduced from linguistic studies and the dialect of the Berbers. In this regard, the MLD documents stated that, "The existence in Algeria of a Berber dialect beside the national language would not impede the mutual comprehension between the Arabs and the Berbers. The Berberophones (Kabyle, Mozabite or Chaouia) used to work and live in the Arabophone regions and at the same time the Arabophones used to sell their grain in the Berberophone regions. For this reason, there was no difficulty in communication between these two groups in Algeria or the Maghrib."

The resolutions of the first Congress of the MLD referred to the incontestable reality of the Algerian nation. It emphasized with extreme satisfaction that the suppression of the Algerian state, the policies of direct administration and of assimilation would never entail the disappearance of the Algerian nation. It also affirmed strongly that the Algerian nation was inscribed inside the heart of each Algerian and this would destroy the untrue allegations of French colonialism and its propaganda of division among the Algerian people. With a view to the discussion of the Algerian statute, the MLD deputies, in conformity with the mission received and the will of the Algerian people, had decided to institute proceedings against French colonialism, to affirm the profound and legitimate aspirations of the Algerian nation in connection with its liberty and absolute sovereignty; and to adopt the tactics of non-cooperation in regard to the discussion of the statute. Due to this fundamental issue of the existence and incontestable reality of the Algerian nation, the Algerians waged an unceasing struggle to achieve their legitimate aspirations for a free life.

Nationalism and Democracy

The concepts of nationalism and democracy were the two major principles of the Algerian nationalist movement against French colonialism. Nationalism was the fundamental principle of the Algerian liberation struggle. Faced with French colonialism, the Algerians struggled for the sake of the Algerian nation and for the liberation and prosperity of the whole geographical, historical, economic, social and cultural entity which was Algeria. Hence the MLD nationalists believed that "Nationalism ought to be defined as the love of the nation. It is a reaction against
annexation and the affirmation of the national values and the will for their triumph. To be a nationalist is to have a soft place in one's heart for the solution of the politics, economic and social problems of the native country.

Liberating Nationalism and Oppressive Nationalism

The radicals of the MTD asserted that many people have condemned nationalism as being chauvinistic. However, they believed in the distinction between two types of nationalism: liberating nationalism and oppressive nationalism. On the basis of their definition of nationalism as being the love of the nation, they deduced that "Any nationalism which exists in a country of oppressed people is a liberating nationalism, because it is concerned with the liberty of the colonized people and the consolidation of their moral and material values." Liberating nationalism was democratic in its content and it was revolutionary in its ultimate goal, which was the liberation of the nation, the exercise of its own sovereignty, the speaking of its own language and the practising of its religion.

Liberating nationalism was the only thing which was consistent with the sacred rights of man. On the other hand, they argued, oppressive nationalism was the one which characterised most of the European nations. It considered the nation as a dogma elevated above all other things and always sustained by hypertrophy of historical, linguistic and racial factors. This oppressive nationalism preached that all rights should be sacrificed for the sake of the nation which was considered as an idol. Expansion by annexing the neighbouring countries was considered as essential for the survival of the regimes that adopted the ideology of oppressive nationalism. The MTD nationalists asserted that oppression of the conquered nations would be inevitable in such circumstances, because individual liberties would certainly be suppressed among the conquered people. Thus they concluded that oppressive nationalism was imperialist in essence because it focussed on conquering and dominating other nations, while liberating nationalism was progressive because it centered on the emancipation of the colonized people. It was obvious that the MTD nationalists wanted to say quite explicitly that Algerian nationalism was progressive because it was mainly concerned with the liberation of Algeria. It was also important to note that the term 'oppressive nationalism' was deliberately coined in order to attack French colonialism. Then they proceeded to discuss the essentials of Algerian nationalism.

Algerian Nationalism

Algerian nationalism, being the reaction of an oppressed nation against colonialism, was a liberating nationalism. It was by definition opposed to the chauvinistic and imperialist European oppressing nationalism. Algerian nationalism was the love of the Algerian fatherland and the restoration of Algerian sovereignty. It was the voluntary struggle for the political, economic, social and cultural liberation of the Algerian people. The ultimate goal of Algerian nationalism was the desire to eliminate colonialist oppression and to lead the Algerian nation towards liberty, democracy and well-being.
Algerian Nationalism and Race

In some of the European countries, race was one of the fundamental elements of their expansionist nationalism. The superiority of the colon and the inferiority of the colonized was on the basis of race. On the same basis also, one nation could be highly civilized and another could be very primitive and incapable of making any progress. Liberating Algerian nationalism condemned this attitude. The liberating struggle in Algeria against French imperialism was not a struggle against a racial group at all; it was a struggle against an alien political system which enslaved the Algerians and put an end to their material and cultural development. They argued that the problem of the European minority in Algeria was not a racial problem. In this regard, they indicated that the colonies in Algeria would be treated as if they were in their original native homes: 'Cette minorité se considère comme chez elle'.

The Algerians had no desire to force them to abandon their natural rights as human beings in order to live in Algeria and work there. The Algerian nationalists opposed the fact that the European minority wanted to preserve certain colonial privileges and be considered as a superior class with reference to the indigenous population. They wanted them to be treated as equals among equals. The attitude of the MTLD nationalists in connection with the European minority in Algeria rejected the colonialist propaganda of 'the suitcase or the coffin'. The Algerian nationalists denied any intention to 'throw French into the sea or to cut their throats'. The Algerian nationalists were not in favour of a free Algeria for one person or one oligarchy in particular. This was not their objective. They wanted to create an Algerian state 'for the people and by the people', where all the Algerians, without distinction of race or religion, would be free and cheerful. To oppose the colonialist campaign which presented them as a party of fanatical and chauvinistic nationalism, the MTLD members affirmed that, in independent Algeria, the colon would have the right of Algerian citizenship. In connection with the strategic point of view, the MTLD nationalists thought to mobilize the European minority, and made them know, by profound explanatory work, the repression which was done in their names and from which the Algerian people suffered.

Algerian Nationalism and Religion

In the second Congress of the MTLD in 1953, it was declared that the Algerian people were composed of ninety per cent Muslims and ten per cent Christians and Jews. The MTLD members thought that Algerian nationalism should neither be confused with racism nor be identified with a cult of religion. In this regard they demanded respect for religious belief in conformity with the spirit of the tradition of Islam. The Islamic religion did not recognize the existence of frontiers. The MTLD nationalists expressed the view that geographic frontiers would create a whirl of interests, suspense and communal aspirations before which religious confession would wear away or become obliterated. They also emphasized that religious fanaticism would destroy the unity of the nation. For this reason, they wanted sometimes to play down the role of the religious factor. In this regard they indicated that "The nation is the major core of liberating nationalism which should not involve any principal action of a religious nature." While the radical nationalists sometimes wanted to suppress the religious factor, the Algerian 'Ulama associated Algerian nationalism with Islam. It seemed that the radical nationalists wanted to
make a distinction between religion and politics in order to undermine the influence of the 'Ijama. Or this might have been deliberately done in order not to antagonize the European minority and to gain their sympathy for an independent Algeria for all Algerians without distinction in religion or race. The leftist members of the MLTD argued that Algerian nationalism was basically a political movement. They thought that the role of religion was secondary in the Algerians' struggle for their political, cultural, economic and social liberation. This point of view ignored the fact that Islam is both a state and religion and the Algerian national culture was deeply imbued with an Arab-Islamic character. To demonstrate the validity of their argument, the MLTD nationalists relied on the Syrian-Lebanese example. They thought that the secondary role of the religious factor in the political liberation process was evidenced in the Syrian-Lebanese national struggle against French colonialism. The Syrian-Lebanese Christians struggled equally with the Muslims for the liberation of Syria and Lebanon. The MLTD nationalists believed that the era of crusades and religious wars was over. The struggle was between nations which were oppressed and nations which were oppressors. It was no longer the Muslims who opposed the Christians but the colonized who opposed the colonizers. In order to serve their own interests, the French colonialists confused Algerian nationalism and Islam. The MLTD nationalists remarked that the French imperialists constantly opposed the Europeans or French to Muslims, that was to say they opposed a nationality to a religion. The fact that the Algerian people were composed of different religious communities pushed the radicals of the MLTD to play down the religious factor and exclude the Islamic religion from Algerian nationalism. They wanted all the Algerians, irrespective of race or religion, to unite against French colonialism and struggle jointly for the total liberation of Algeria.

Democracy

Democracy was the second principle of the MLTD doctrine. It had always been inherent in the character of the Messalit movement. It had been expressed in Messali's denunciation of communism as 'red-fascism' as well as in the movement's call for a constituent Assembly "elected by universal suffrage without distinction of race or religion." Messali said it meant 'Gouvernement du peuple'. "Democracy", he continued, "is first of all democracy in the political realm, participation by all of the people in the governing of the country, general and local management of its affairs, its permanent control to ensure respect for fundamental liberties." But what would be the form of government of this democratic state? Would it be a constitutional monarchy or a Republic? The MLTD radicals did not like to opt for the first because the time of monarchies was past. In addition to this, they knew well that the Algerian people were composed of different communities. Because of this they argued that "The best form of Government for Algeria is the Republic (la forme République). Therefore, Algeria should be a Republican state." The term democracy implied liberty and represented the most dear aspiration for the colonized people. Being thirsty for this democracy, the Algerians struggled for their political liberties, for the respect of their dignity and their cultural heritage. In this regard the MLTD members stated that "This is why we consider democracy as an essential principle which guides us in the anti-colonialist struggle and in the restoration of our nation in the future." As a result, and by preserving this democratic spirit, they
introduced an ideological factor in their struggle. In addition to
government by the people, the MLD nationalists referred to economic
democracy "la démocratie sur le plan économique". According to them,
poverty should not exist in Algeria. The democracy which they advocated
was a political-economic democracy capable of providing economic
prosperity. The Algerian masses who suffered from hunger and need wanted
the creation of a new regime where social justice ruled. The MLD
nationalists did not want a free Algeria where only the capitalists
governed. They wanted an Independent Algeria where all the people were
prosperous and each man had what satisfied his needs. For the realization
of the politico-economic democracy, the MLD nationalists thought it was
necessary to attain certain reforms in the economic and social fields:

(a) In the economic field:

(i) The creation of a truly national economy by contrast with the
existing imperialistic-colonialist economy.

(ii) The reorganisation of agriculture in the general interest of
the Algerians e.g. Agrarian Reform.

(iii) The establishment of industry, in accord with the great natural
possibilities of Algeria.

(iv) The nationalization of the instruments of production.

(v) The harmonization of the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian
economies with the objective of making a common market of
production and consumption. There was no indication here of
whether Algeria would have any economic ties to France. Yet
the report represented the first attempt in decades to relate
the MLD socio-economic demands to a view of Algeria.

(b) In the social field:

The suggestions in the social field consisted of material and
cultural plans. The material plan included the equitable re-
distribution of the national revenue to attain social justice, and
the liberty of the syndicates. The cultural plan included the
diffusion of national culture, technical education and the struggle
against illiteracy. In the social domain, democracy would encourage
the development of the individual personalities, the manifestation of
popular sentiments and the development of the intellectual. With the
fulfillment of these conditions, the MLD concept of democracy would
then be political and economic and it would go hand in hand with
social justice and the economic prosperity of the Algerians. The
MLD nationalists believed that democracy was vital to the Algerians
in their struggle against French colonialism. It was true that there
was no genuine democracy with illiteracy and hunger. In such
circumstances the people would not decide freely and they would be
dominated by those who owned the money. Economic democracy and
political democracy are the two sides of a single coin. They go
together, and they are inseparable. No genuine democracy would be
realized in the absence of one of them.
Notes

1. Zagoria, 1973, 264
2. Interview by the writer with Dr M. 'Inaymou, political adviser to Bounedienne, on 10 July 1979
3. MTDL, Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, 1951, 6
4. MTDL, 1947, 1; see also Maghreb Arabi, no. 7, 1947
6. MTDL, Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, 1951, 25
7. Ibid., 26
8. MTDL, 1953, 29
9. MTDL, Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, 1951, 28
10. MTDL, 1953, 40
11. MTDL, Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, 1951, 27
12. Interview by the writer with Manawar Maroush on 13 August 1976
13. Ibid.
14. MTDL, 1947, 2
15. MTDL, 1953, 30
16. Ibid., 29
17. MTDL, Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation, 1951, 28
18. MTDL, 1953, 29
6. FROM AGITATION TO ORGANISATION, EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION

After the first Congress of the MTLD in 1947, the radicals of the MTLD started talking about the means of action for achieving Algerian sovereignty. In this regard, the first national Congress emphasized equally the following means of action:

(1) The political struggle in all forms against colonialism.
(2) The organisation of the masses.
(3) Uniting propaganda affirming the sacred rights of the Algerian nation and denouncing implacably the crimes of imperialism and its political and military supporters.

The second Congress of the MTLD in 1953 represented a landmark in the evolution of the Algerian national ideology from agitation to Revolution. It represented the shift from agitation (supposedly the ideology of Messali Hadj) to organisation and education. The agitation ideology had produced an excitable state among the Algerian masses and concentrated on demanding independence for Algeria through legalistic means such as emancipation by law or through the ballot box. No crucial results were obtained from the practice of these policies. The MTLD nationalists thought in terms of changing their demands and the means of achieving them. This evolution in the national ideology of Algeria necessitated the organisation and the education of the Algerian masses. The opening speech of the second MTLD Congress referred to this point explicitly as follows: "Passer de la phase d'agitation à la phase d'organisation et d'éducation." 

Ahmad Mazerene also indicated that, in order to achieve their ultimate objective of liberation, it was essential that they should internationalize the Algerian problem by creating sympathy for their cause. He thought that, unless they internationalized the Algerian problem, they would never attain their independence. In reference to the question of internationalization, the report of the second MTLD Congress emphasized the importance of seeking the help and the support of the Arab-Asian bloc.

Messali Hadj participated in the second MTLD Congress. He confessed that in his life he had made many mistakes but they were all good lessons for him. He admitted to the participants that "To make a mistake is not a crime, but to insist on making mistakes is a dangerous error. Throughout my militant life I committed several mistakes but each one of those mistakes has been a good lesson for me." It appeared that the mistakes he made were related to his confidence in the French parties of the Left and the Popular Front in particular. He thought that he could convince those political parties to support independence for Algeria. This might account for the reformism of Messali Hadj and his belief that he could gain some concessions from the French colonial system. At last he was totally convinced that the Algerian nationalists should depend on themselves alone in their struggle against imperialist France. He emphasized that a really serious political party would depend on itself, on its spirit of sacrifice and on its will to conquer the exploiter by all means. He told the members of the MTLD to depend upon themselves in order to liberate Algeria. He emphasized that they should not expect anybody else to do this job for them because there was no trace whatsoever in history that some people were liberated by another people for the love of humanity. Hence the radical nationalists of the MTLD concluded that liberty could never be given but only taken by force. The emancipation of Algeria could not be realized without the organization and education of the Algerian masses. The shift from agitation to organization and education would also require the reconsideration of the ideology, doctrine, strategy, tactics and methods of
The NITD existed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or threaten the use of nuclear weapons. The NITD was established by the United Nations (UN) in 1968 to promote arms control and disarmament. The NITD is an international organization that monitors the implementation of arms control agreements and remains committed to promoting disarmament.

The NITD's role is to monitor and verify the compliance of states with their nuclear disarmament commitments. It does this through inspections and other means, ensuring that states are meeting their obligations under international law. The NITD is an important forum for discussing disarmament issues and for promoting international cooperation in this area.

The NITD is headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and has a network of representatives in many countries around the world. It works closely with other international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In recent years, the NITD has faced challenges in its work, including a lack of political will to address nuclear disarmament issues and the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons. Despite these challenges, the NITD remains committed to its mission and continues to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, the NITD is an important organization that plays a crucial role in advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Its work is essential in ensuring the security of the global community and in promoting a more peaceful world.
independence was not a political act only in the sense of having a flag, a parliament and a constitution. They thought that that was a formal independence as opposed to a real and genuine one. They emphasized that, if a country was granted this formal independence and it remained economically subordinated to the previous imperial power, then it should still be considered a colony. The radicals of the MTLD emphasized that genuine independence was political as well as an economic and social emancipation from the dominating colonial regime. The problem which confronted Algeria, according to them, was not only to become free and sovereign, but also the formulation of the principles on which its institutions would be based after independence. Their discussions highlighted the question of whether the MTLD should take any measures beforehand for the building of an independent Algeria and they all agreed that the answer was simply 'No'. This reflected for them the ideological inadequacies of radical nationalism. As a matter of fact the post-independence problems of development and the transformation of nationalism into socialism were not discussed until the Algerians were convinced that independence was possible. Certain measures in connection with these issues were included in the Tripoli programme of 1962. It was important to note that the MTLD radicals had reserved the term ideology for the post-independence issues of development. In this regard they stated that "ideology is a statement of objectives which could be realized after independence. On the other hand, all the objectives before independence are related to the field of doctrine." Thus the MTLD nationalists had drawn a distinction between ideology and doctrine, which was totally different from what had been recognized in political science. The national idea and the means of struggle before independence were confined to the realm of doctrine, while the ideas of development in the post-independence era were confined to the realm of ideology.

Doctrinal Deficiencies

The radical nationalists of the MTLD maintained that their party suffered from doctrinal deficiencies as it did in the ideological field. The doctrine of the MTLD, according to them, was concerned with the national idea and the means of the struggle. In this regard the report of the second MTLD Congress stated that "the doctrine with which we are concerned is related to all the necessary means for achieving independence. A coherent doctrine is necessarily an idea and the proper means and methods for struggle." The Algerian nationalist idea was the principal force and substance of the MTLD doctrine. The Algerian nationalists considered it as a psycho-political force in the sense that it was essentially related to the political field and assimilated by the masses for its psychological appeal. The MTLD had provoked the ardour of organization and won over the Algerian masses to its side because of this nationalist idea. The enormous sacrifices of the Algerian people and the MTLD militants reflected the psycho-political force of the nationalist idea. The doctrinal deficiencies were related to the fact that the MTLD did not display great efforts in explaining the nature of the Algerian nationalist idea. Algerian nationalism was accused of being chauvinist, fascist and communist. In fact the MTLD did show some efforts to explain its nationalist idea. The MTLD literature referred to Algerian nationalism and race, Algerian nationalism and religion, etc. But the efforts manifested along these lines were insufficient to negate the accusations leveled against it.
Part of the doctrinal deficiencies were related to the side of organization in relation to the Algerians inside and outside Algeria. In order to counter these accusations, they suggested that the Algerians ought to be organized internally and externally. The knowledge of the actual circumstances was crucial in formulating the relevant doctrine. The Algerian nationalist idea had five major characteristics of being defensive, democratic, liberationist, non-communist and non-materialist. The organization of the Algerian masses and the explanation of these principles to the colon population would help in creating favourable conditions for the independence of Algeria. The choice of the means of action was crucial to the doctrine of the MTLD. In this respect the MTLD nationalists demanded that the party should evaluate the necessary means which were possible and could be modified to suit the desired objectives. They insisted that the means utilized should be revolutionary. They believed that "the revolutionary means the one who utilizes all the possible ways authorized by the law to reach his objectives." The basic doctrinal deficiency of the MTLD was that its concept of the revolutionary was confused. How could a revolutionary limit himself only to the legal means, and what would be the difference between a revolutionary and a reformist in this regard? Moreover, how could the MTLD be a revolutionary party with this reformist doctrine? On these grounds one could hardly distinguish between the MTLD reformism and that of the communists, the "Islam" or the secular reformism of the western educated elites. In addition to this reformist doctrine of the MTLD, it appeared to be pragmatic as well. It noted that "only the acts command the action of the revolutionary" and no real revolutionary could exist without constant touch with reality. In this connection it emphasized that "The revolutionary must therefore descend from the pedestal of his theory to root himself in concrete life, in order to draw upon it and to verify therein his principles of action. The historic occurrences taught that it was necessary to shift from the phase of agitation when the people absorbed the diffused ideas of the psycho-political phase." Before the second MTLD Congress, the doctrine of the party was concerned with agitation primarily and it was limited to the psycho-political phase. By the second Congress, the MTLD nationalists made the crossing from the psycho-political phase to the phase of organization and education. The fundamental inadequacy of the educational and organizational phase was that it was limited only to the party and did not include the entire Algerian people. To organize the party and strengthen it could constitute a strategic objective, but not a definite phase to be emphasized in the doctrine. The education of the entire Algerian masses was crucial to the party's doctrine in this phase. In order to instigate a national revolution in Algeria, the radicals of the MTLD needed to consider not only the forces at their disposal within the MTLD, but also the favourable potential forces that could be found outside it. The MTLD efforts could have been more effective if they were waged at the national scale as were those of the FLN at the beginning of the war for national liberation.

Strategic Imprecision

The MTLD nationalists defined strategy as follows: "A strategy is the precise and detailed description of the methods of struggle." It was essential to consider the determining factors in the strategy and the forces behind them. On one side these forces were related to colonialism, its army, its police, its system of administration, and the strong imperial
economy, and on the other side were those which were related to the national movement and the Algerian masses. It was very obvious that the forces of colonialism were superior to the forces of the national movement. The principal strategic objectives of the national movement which could counter the colonial forces were:

(i) The struggle against repression.
(ii) The reinforcement of the union.
(iii) The mobilization of external forces.
(iv) The organization of national cadres, youth workers and women.
(v) The diffusion of national culture.
(vi) The organization of the emigrant workers in France.

These strategic objectives were further categorized into three major groups by the radicals of the MTLID.

(i) The obstacles-objectives which were concerned with the struggle against colonialism. In this regard repression was the most serious obstacle to the realization of the essential objectives of the party. The MTLID radicals recommended that the struggle against colonial repression should be pursued immediately until the realization of the independence of Algeria.

(ii) The fundamental objectives which were concerned with the organization of the para-political forces such as the workers, the youth, the women and the diffusion of national culture. The radical nationalists suggested that these objectives should also be pursued immediately and seriously. In regard to the expected role of the Algerian workers, they noted that, in most of the colonies, the workers had played an important role in the struggle for liberation. The example of Tunisia in this respect was the most edifying. They thought that the Algerian workers constituted a strong force which had been neglected by the national movement. The organization of the workers, the youth and the Algerian women was crucial to the liberation of Algeria not only in the political sense, but also in economic and social respects. The national culture should also be emphasized along the lines of the struggle against illiteracy and the diffusion of the national language. They noted that special attention should have been given to the instruction of the militants and the Algerian masses.

(iii) The direct instruments and objectives which were related to reinforcing the party internally and allowing it to accomplish its tasks conveniently. These direct instruments included the organization of the Algerian emigrants in France, the organization of the national cadres and the unity of the Algerian people. The Algerian emigrants in France should be organized in collaboration with the national movement in Algeria and in view of finding possible allies among the French masses. The Algerian national movement had suffered greatly from the lack of coordination and the absence of unity within the ranks of the nationalists. The unity of the Algerian nationalists was an effective force against French colonialism.
The tactical operation of the political maneuvering process is the prime object of action in the political arena. The essential role of the political maneuvering is to create a situation where the interests of the party are best served. This is achieved through the strategic deployment of resources, including personnel, financial, and organizational assets. The political maneuvering process involves the manipulation of public opinion, the strategic placement of candidates, and the crafting of legislative proposals to gain an advantage for the party's agenda.

The strategic deployment of resources is crucial in the political maneuvering process. This includes the allocation of financial resources, the placement of candidates, and the crafting of legislation. The strategic placement of candidates is important in ensuring that the party's goals are achieved. This involves the identification of key constituencies and the selection of candidates who are most likely to succeed in these areas.

The crafting of legislation is also an important aspect of the political maneuvering process. This involves the identification of legislative proposals that will benefit the party's agenda. The strategic deployment of resources is critical in ensuring that these proposals are successful. This includes the allocation of financial resources, the placement of candidates, and the crafting of legislation.
Along these lines the doctrinal, ideological, strategic and tactical deficiencies needed a proper examination and suggestions for the most adequate remedies. The phase of organization and education itself represented a prelude to direct action and revolutionary populism.

Notes

1. MTLD, 1947, 3
2. Discours d'ouverture prononcé par Ahmad Mezerna à la Deuxième Congrès National, MTLD, 1953, 7
3. Message de Hessali Hadj in MTLD, 1953
4. Ibid., 11
5. MTLD, 1953, 28
6. Ibid., 30
7. Ibid., 33
8. Ibid., 37
Joan Gillespie argued that the MİLD's reaction to the collapse of the statute of 1947 and election rigging was more violent and more internally divisive than that of the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). She proclaimed that "Shortly after the passage of the statute, a group of young FPA militants, who had worked underground during the war period, proceeded to form a para-military force, the Organisation Spéciale (OS). From 1947 to 1950, the OS collected arms, trained recruits, and planned a strategy for the eventual take-over of Algeria. When they received the blessing of Messali, the young leaders of the OS, Ait Ahmad, Ben Bella and Kheirad did not succeed in convincing the MİLD leader that the moment was ripe for attack."\(^1\) The second MİLD Congress in 1953 was crucial in the evolution of the Algerian national ideology because it resulted in the split of the party and the emergence of the revolutionary populists. The split within the MİLD was the result of the dispute between Messali Hadj, the leader of the party, on one hand, and the members of the central committee of the party, on the other. In fact the dispute between Messali and Al-Ahwal, the leader of the centralists, began in 1946 over a tactical question which was related to ideas of participating in the elections of that year. The division between the two factions over parliamentary participation carried over to another tactical issue: that of a united Algerian front. Al-Ahwal and the other "centralists" were generally in favour of the formation of an Algerian front and they were prepared to make some concessions to achieve one. They looked in particular to the UDMA as a political ally, being considerably more suspicious of the PCA. At its meeting of September 1953, the central committee decided that "Union being a vital question for the Algerian cause, the party must imbue the people with the idea and act to impose it on all the national groups."\(^2\) J. D. Zagoria stated that a similar division developed within the leadership of the MİLD over the question of North African unity. The "centralists" joined in creating the committee for the liberation of the Arab Maghrib in 1952. Messali tended to treat Bourguiba and Ali al-Fasi as reformists and refused military support for the Tunisians.\(^3\) On the other hand, Muhammad Harbi indicated that the "centralists" wanted a revolution geared specifically to Algeria, without international or pan-Arab overtones. He explained that their opposition to Messali on tactics extended to strategy and programme.\(^4\) The two factions of the MİLD were therefore deeply divided over the direction the movement should take and the methods it should employ. The major criticism of the central committee against Messali was that he developed a cult of personality which became a kind of political maraboutism. The first issue of La Nation Algérienne, the organ of the centralists, proclaimed that "one conflict began when Messali demanded full powers from the newly-formed central committee in September 1953. The central committee believed, on the one hand, that personal power was inconceivable in a revolutionary party, and, on the other hand, that the situation did not permit the vesting of full powers in one man. In reality the conflict had as its profound causes the questions of leadership and methods."\(^5\) At the meeting of l'Ahrar in March 1953, the central committee rejected the formula "president for life" and the presidential right of veto. The centralists wanted collective leadership and argued that a number of heads were better than one.

The dispute between Messali and the central committee alienated some of the young revolutionaries of the MİLD who decided to reject these two factions and to establish the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unicité et d'Action
In the spring of 1954, twenty-two men met secretly in the rue de Chartres in Algiers to create the CRUA. Six of the men associated with this meeting eventually earned the title of 'historic chiefs': Muhammad Boudya, Mustafa Ben Boul'isaid, Mourad Didou, Al-'Arabi Ben Mehadi, Belkacem Karam, Rabih Birat, Hussein Alt Ahmad, Ben Bella and Muhammad Kheidar. The three last-named were fellow conspirators although in Cairo at the time. The meeting decided on a date for the revolution and began the work of organization by dividing Algeria into different Wilayat. Thus, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was born.

The first tract of the FLN made clear that the Front was totally independent of the two factions of Messali and the central committee. In this regard it emphasized that:

We wish to make it quite clear that we are completely independent of either of the two factions which are struggling for power. According to true revolutionary principles, we place the interests of our nation above petty and misguided personal disputes or considerations of prestige. Our only enemy is the hostile and blind colonialism which has always rejected our demands for freedom, when presented by peaceful means.

We consider we are justified in presenting our new movement under the title: Front de Libération Nationale. We hope thereby to avoid association with any particular group, and to provide all Algerian patriots, from all social levels and from all truly Algerian parties and movements, with an opportunity of joining in the fight for freedom, unch harmoned by any conflict of loyalty.

The young revolutionary populists of the FLN wanted to preserve the unity of the Algerian people, an idea which, according to Boudya, 'obsessed them'. They wanted to rid the Front of the cult of personality that had developed around Messali. Disillusion with Messali's authoritarian rule explained the careful preparations the third force made to ensure collective leadership of the Algerian Revolution. The FLN wanted to narrow the scope of action to Algeria and to concentrate above all on obtaining national independence. The radical Algerian national ideology demanded total independence and absolute sovereignty for Algeria. The broad outline of the FLN's political programme indicated that the aim of the Algerian Revolution was national independence by restoring the sovereign, democratic Algerian state within the framework of the principles of Islam. In order to avoid misinterpretation, the programme specified that:

To show our sincere desire for peace, and to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and loss of life, we suggest honourable negotiations to the French authorities if they are willing to act in good faith and accept once and for all the right of the peoples they rule to self-determination and to recognize the Algerian nation by an official declaration abrogating all edicts, decrees and laws which make Algeria French soil in the teeth of her history, geography, language, religion and customs.

The revolutionary populists argued that, under colonialism, justice, democracy and equality were but holl and illusion. They appealed to the indigenous masses to reconquer their freedom at the price of their blood. The first tract of the Revolution which appeared in various parts of Algeria in November 1, 1954, emphasized that "God is with the fighter of just causes, and no force can stop them now, save glorious death or
national liberation." Fanon proclaimed that the revolutionary leadership found that if it wanted to prevent the people from being gripped by terror it had no choice but to adopt forms of terror which until then it had rejected. In other words, he believed that the revolutionary populists were forced to use force and violent means against the French. He specified that:

The decision to kill a civilian in the street is not an easy one, and no-one comes to it lightly. No-one takes the step of placing a bomb in a public place without a battle of conscience. Yet the rebels were forced to use terror. They were not born as terrorists. On the contrary, they were all reformist.

Notes

2. La Nation Algérienne, no 2, 10 September 1954.
5. Gillespie, 1960, 84.
Although the ENA was established by the Communists in order to infiltrate the North African emigrants in France, it turned out to be their first nationalist organization. The rejection of the reformist demands presented to the Popular Front in February 1936 pushed the nationalists to extremism in the sense that they thereafter abandoned the legal and legitimate methods and believed in total independence and absolute sovereignty instead of demanding some concessions within the Colonial System. The radical nationalists wanted all the Algerians, irrespective of race or religion, to unite against French Colonialism and struggle jointly for the total liberation of Algeria. They concluded that liberty could never be given, but only taken by force. The emancipation of Algeria could not be realized without the organization and the education of the Algerian masses.

The radical nationalists proceeded to form a para-military force, the Organisation Spéciale (OS), who from 1947 to 1950 collected arms, trained recruits, and planned a strategy for the eventual take-over of Algeria. The MTLD Congress in 1953 resulted in the split of the Party and the emergence of the revolutionary populists who were alienated by the dispute between Messali and the Central Committee. They decided to reject these two factions and establish the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (the CRUA). This in turn led to the formation of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) which started the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARRAS, Farhat (1936) "En marge du nationalisme! La France c'est moi" L'Entente, 23rd February

ARRAS, Farhat (1962) La nuit coloniale. Paris: Juillard


L'Algérie Libre. 11 March 1950

L'Ami du Peuple. 17 May 1934

ARON, R. et.al. (1962) Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie. Paris


BAJIAWI, Muhammad (1971) Hana'tiq 'an al-thaura al-jaza'iriya. Cairo


Cahiers du Maghreb (1932) May

CARLIER, J-C (1972) "La première Étoile Nord-Africaine 1926-1929" Revue Algérienne. 9 (4). December

COLLET, Claude (1972) "L'Union Populaire Algérienne 1937-39" Revue Algérienne. 9 (4), December

COMITE DE L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (1933) Bulletin

COMITE DE L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (1936) Bulletin. 46 (12), December

COMITE DE L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (1937) Bulletin année 1937

Le Cri du Peuple Algérien. no 2 November 1962

DELISLE, Bene (1962) "Les origines du FLN" La Nef. October

DÉMIA, Sabah (1974) "Pour une analyse critique du nationalisme algérien" Revue Algérienne. 7 (3), December


DUNN, J (1972) Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
EL TAYEB, S E E (1966) "The Europeanized Algerians and the emancipation of Algeria" Middle Eastern Studies, 22 (2), April, 206-235


L'ÉTOILE NORD-AFRICAINE (1936a) L'activité de l'Étoile - meetings des 14 janvier 1936 (From the private collections of Ahmad Kinanish)

L'ÉTOILE NORD-AFRICAINE (1936b) Note sur "l'Étoile Nord-Africaine": Plan de revendications immédiates pour l'Afrique du Nord. présenté au "Front Populaire" par l'Étoile Nord-Africaine et le Comité de Défense des Intérêts Marocains en février 1936 (from the private collections of Ahmad Kinanish)

L'Évolution Nord-Africaine, 29 April 1927


FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE (1954) The proclamation of the Algerian Revolution, October 31


GOLDZETIGER, A R (1969) "Quelques témoignages pour une étude du PCA de 1939 a 1937" La Méditerranée, 1969, 31-64


HADJ, M (1936) Note sur l'Étoile Nord-Africaine, Discours prononcé par Messali Hadj au meeting du 2 août 1936 au Stade Municipal d'Alger (from the private collections of Ahmad Kinanish)

HADJ, M (1948) Appel aux Nations Unies, Paris

HABRI, Muhammad (1979) Aux origines du FN, Paris : Bourgeois

L'Ikad, Hebdosadaire de défense des Intérêts musulmans africains, 5 February 1926, no 1 - September 1927

JOHNSON, H N (1968) "Ideology and the social system" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7

JULIEN, C A (1952) L'Afrique du Nord en marche, Paris

La Justice, 14 October 1937


KINANISH, Ahmad (1972) "Interview with Messali Hadj" Al-Assala, no 11, November-December, p27


LACHERAFA, Mostepha (1955) "Le patriotisme rural en Algérie" Esprit, no 3

LECA, Jean (1976) "Idéologie et politique en Algérie" Etudes, May


La Lutte Sociale, special edition April 1925 and issues of 3rd, 19th and 17th November 1939

Maghreb Arbi. published in French, no 7, 1947

La Mornax, 2 November 1962

MTLD (1947) Notes et résolutions adoptées par le Conseil National du MTLD de 7 9 1947 à Alger

MTLD (1953) Deuxième Congrès National du MTLD. Algiers

MTLD Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation (1951) Considérations générales

MTLD Commission Centrale d'Information et de Documentation (nd) Le problème Algérien. édité par la commission. Algiers


NABOUN, Amar (1961) Farhat Abbas ou les chemins de la souveraineté, Paris: Danoel

La Nation Algérienne, no 2, 10 September 1954


El-Qumah, published in French by the Parti du Peuple Algérien


PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1936a) Note dated 31 August 1936

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1936b) Note sur l'Étoile Nord-Africaine, Direction Générale des Affaires Indigènes et des Territoires du Sud, 31 August 1936

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1936c) Note sur l'Étoile Nord-Africaine: but, tendances, organisations, nouveaux d'action, Direction Générale pour les Affaires Indigènes, 31 August 1936, no 110 (from Kinanish private collections)

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1940a) Note dated 27 November 1940

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1940b) Le Procès des Messalistes, Algiers 29 October 1940

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1941a) Note dated 18 March 1941

PREFECTURE D'ORAN, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes (CIE) (1941b) Le Procès des Messalistes, Algiers, March-April 1941

KINANISH see Kinanish


Raia Hamra: published in French February 1927

SA'D ALLAH, A (1965) The rise of the Algerian nationalism: 1900-1930, PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota


SHILS, Edward (1968) "The concept and function of ideology" JESS, Vol 7

SMITH, A D (1973) "Nationalism" Current Sociology, 21(3)

TARET, Ahmed (1968) "Le mouvement du 8 mai 1943 dans le Nord Constantinois" 
DESS monaie, University of Algiers

TORELLI, M (1932) "La guerre révolutionnaire et ses applications en Algérie" Cahiers du Bolshevisme, May

VATIKIOTIS, F J (1966) "Tradition and leadership: the example of Algeria" 
Middle East Studies, July


ZAGORIA, Janet D (1973) The rise and fall of the movement of Messali Hadj 

Da Zohra, Tunis, published in French 5 June 1937
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES

N.B. Nos 1,2,3,5,8,10,13,16,17,18 & 19 are OUT OF PRINT and will not be reprinted

No. 3 (1973) A Bibliography of Saudi Arabia.
J.H. Stevens & R. King

G.H. Blake & W.D. Swearingen

No. 6 (1979) Modern Syria: An Introduction to the Literature.
C.H. Bleaney

H. Dodgeon & A.M. Findlay

Y. Bar-Gal & A. Soffer

I.J. Secombe

P. Auchterlonie

A.M. Findlay & A.M. Findlay

M.S. Abdel Hakim & W. Abdel Hamid

M.W. Daly

J.S. Burks & J.A. Rimmer


W. Floor

I.J. Secombe, C.H. Bleaney & B. Al-Najjar

N.C. Grill

W. Floor
No. 27 (1985) Ataturk's Legacy to the Women of Turkey, J. Browning

No. 28 (1985) Foreign Policy Issues in the Middle East: Afghanistan-Iraq-Turkey-Morocco, R.I. Lawless (ed)

No. 29 (1986) Middle Eastern Exports: Problems and Prospects, B. Yilmaz, R. Wilson, P. Stevens, T. Hamauzu

No. 30 (1986) The Territorial Disintegration of a State: The Case of Lebanon, N. Kliot

No. 31 (1986) The Gulf in the Early 20th Century - Foreign Institutions and Local Responses, R.I. Lawless (ed)


ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS

No. 2 (1974) The Role of Commercial Banking in the Arab Oil States. A.M. Underwood
No. 3 (1975) Rural Employment and Land Tenure: An Egyptian Case Study. R.J.A. Wilson
No. 4 (1975) The Arab Common Market and Inter-Arab Trade. R.J.A. Wilson
No. 7 (1980) Possibilities for Industrial Integration in the Arab Middle East. E. Ghanas
No. 11 (1983) An Evaluation of Egypt’s Attempts at Export Diversification. R.J.A. Wilson
No. 15 (1986) The Impact of New Liberalization Programmes on Direct Foreign Investments in Turkey. B. Yilmaz
Department of Economics
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PROJECT

The International Migration Project was a study commissioned by the International Labour Office, Geneva, as part of the World Employment Programme. The project was co-directed by Drs J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair. The following working papers have been prepared:

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

The State of Kuwait, July 1977
The Sultanate of Oman, July 1977
The State of Qatar, February 1978
The Arab Republic of Egypt, March 1978
The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, March 1978
The Republic of Tunisia (A. Findlay), March 1978
The Republic of Turkey (W.M. Hale), March 1978
The State of Bahrain, May 1978
The United Arab Emirates, June 1978
The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, July 1978
The Yemen Arab Republic (with J.A. Socknat), Sept 1978
The Syrian Arab Republic (M.E. Sales), Oct 1978
The Democratic Republic of Algeria (R.I. Lawless), Oct 1978
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, November 1978
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, March 1979

TOPIC PAPERS

A Study of International Migration in the Arab Region - An Outline of the Aims, Scope and Methodology of the International Migration Project, Commissioned by the International Labour Office, April 1977

Outline for Working Papers of Country Case Studies, May 1977

Movements of Migrant Labour from Part of the North of the Sultanate of Oman, May 1977

Aspects of the Demography of the Sultanate of Oman, Sept 1977

Migration for Employment Abroad and its Impact on Development in the Yemen Arab Republic, July 1978

Spatial Dimensions of Tunisian Emigration to Libya (A. Findlay) Dec 1978
CURRENT BRITISH RESEARCH IN MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

No. 1  1969   OUT OF PRINT
No. 2  1971   OUT OF PRINT
No. 3  1977   £1.75 (inland)  £2.25 (overseas)
No. 4  1983   £2.50 (inland)  £3.00 (overseas)

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

Arab Architecture: Past and Present.
An Exhibition presented by the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce at the
Royal Institute of British Architects (24th January - 17 February 1984)
Editor A. Hutt
£5.50 (inland)  £6.00 (overseas)

Training Seminar for Engineers
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs
Municipality of Jeddah. Training Seminar for Engineers, 13-15 February
1984.
£5.50 (inland)  £6.00 (overseas)

Theses and Dissertations on the Middle Eastern and Islamic World Submitted
to the University of Durham and Deposited in its Libraries 1957-1983.
Compiled by Heather Bleaney & Avril Shields
£2.00 (inland)  £2.50 (overseas)
Postage and packing
A standard charge of £10.00 for up to 50p
A size page £0.20 per page
A size page £0.25 per page

Photocopying
If required, additional pages will be individually quoted.

£25.00 P.A. (imported) £30.00 P.A. (overseas)

Accessions Lists

Topic on request.

Items from our comprehensive computerized catalogue can be scanned on a particular basis at a charge of £0.30 per page.

Accessions Lists
Please send orders to: CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUDIES
University of Durham,
South End House,
South Road,
DURHAM CITY,
DH1 3TG, England. Tel: (091) 374-2823