T.E. Utley and renewal of Conservatism in Post-War Britain.¹

Abstract

This article examines the writings of T.E. Utley (1921–88), a prominent contributor to the Conservative press in the post-war period. It does so in the context of Maurice Cowling’s concept of ‘public doctrine’. While attention is increasingly given to the ideas that shaped the Conservative Party in the 20th century, it has fallen short of investigating the broad foundations of Conservative ideology and their authoritative status expressed in Cowling’s term. Yet Utley’s thought underlines the importance of inquiry at this level, especially in distinguishing Conservatism from rival ideologies after 1945. His concern to ground Conservatism in a theory of moral and political obligation is crucial here; it was targeted against diffuse forms of secular liberalism that conceived ‘happiness’ as the end of human life. The article focuses on the shift in his allegiance from the post-war consensus to the New Right challenge of the 1960s but against the backdrop of his unchanging Tory beliefs. It explores the significance of his association with the Daily Telegraph in this regard and his relationship to ‘Powellism’ and Thatcherism. The article concludes by relating the decline of public doctrine in Conservative Party circles recently to the erosion of the sense of British nationhood that inspired Utley’s Conservatism.

Key Words

T.E. Utley; public doctrine; post-war Conservatism; Enoch Powell; Margaret Thatcher.

Against the emphasis of many Conservatives on experience as the only guide in politics, the ideological basis of Conservative politics in Britain has received close attention recently.² Scholars are much less inclined to separate Conservative practice from theory than they were in previous decades. This is especially so in explaining the trajectory of post-war Conservatism from support for the welfare state and full employment to embrace of the New Right. As Andrew Gamble has argued the Conservative drive for power in this period no less than in others was heavily dependent on the ‘politics of support’. In that domain, ideas played a pivotal role.³

Nevertheless, fruitful though this approach has been, it has concentrated most on changing attitudes towards the role of the state in the maintenance of the ‘Conservative nation’.⁴ Investigation has yet to extend to the wider foundations of Conservative thought and their authoritative status that Maurice Cowling captured in his term ‘public doctrine’. In an essay of 1978 he defined the concept as ‘that loose combination of interlocking assumptions about politics, economics, science, scholarship, morality, education, aesthetics and religion
which constitutes the basis on which decisions are made about public matters’. As such, it was present across the political spectrum. But for Cowling, public doctrine was an ideological weapon against a pervasive liberalism as well as a tool of political analysis. Three years later, he maintained that throughout much of the 20th century, in Britain at least, public doctrine had been dominated by an ‘extended intelligentsia’ across the professions. A left-liberal elite had turned ‘the nation’s mind into a subject for experiment — an atom to be bombarded with whatever charges seem suitable’. In the earlier essay, he emphasised that this hold on public doctrine had not been unchallenged, most recently by the New Right. However, the agenda of that movement was confined to reviving economic liberalism at the expense of social liberalism. More important was a broader attack on liberalism by prominent contributors to the Conservative press, including T.E. Utley, Peregrine Worsthorne, Colin Welch, and George Gale.

Arguably, the most significant of these figures in terms of the intellectual depth and influence of their work was T.E. Utley (1921–88). He wrote for a number of national newspapers and also participated in Third Programme discussions with academics, philosophers and politicians. Immediately after his death, he was remembered as a prominent ‘Butskellite’ intellectual of the 1950s — almost the only such intellectual according to his obituary in The Times; but also as one who championed the economic views of Enoch Powell in the 1960s, becoming a keen, if not uncritical, supporter of Margaret Thatcher thereafter. This account marks him out as a pragmatist, a type often regarded as central to the role of Conservatism in steering politics away from ideological extremes. However, in doing so, it loses sight of the stable set of Tory beliefs that underpinned his shifting allegiances.

Grounded in religion, philosophy, morality and history, this set of beliefs constituted a ‘public doctrine’, one that was in fierce contention with that of the left. At its heart was a view of Christianity as the cornerstone of freedom and subjectivity, particularly as enshrined in British nationhood. But this ideal was increasingly at odds with the permissiveness and corporatism of the post-war state. The Conservative thinker and politician Keith Joseph came to recognise in the 1970s that in promoting collectivism he had been less Conservative in the post-war era than he believed at the time. By contrast, like Margaret Thatcher, Utley’s support for the post-war economic consensus fell away when it failed to enhance financial security and individual responsibility as its architects had promised, failing Conservatism in turn.

A large number of Utley’s signed articles were collected after his death in A Tory Seer. However, his output was far more extensive and has not received the attention it deserves. This article seeks to correct this neglect. It emphasises his importance for understanding ideological change within Conservatism and the divisions between Conservatism and opposing ideologies in the post-war period. It concludes by linking the
The decline of ‘public doctrine’ in recent Conservatism with the erosion of the sense of British nationhood that had inspired Utley’s thought at its deepest level.

**Early Life and Career**

Thomas Edwin (‘Peter’) Utley — who had been blind since the age of nine — was a committed Anglican. He was educated privately and then read History at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge from 1939–42. There he was influenced by the Conservative historian and MP Kenneth Pickthorn and Canon Charles Smyth, two prominent influences on Cowling who went up to Cambridge immediately after the War. With Edwyn Hoskyns, a fellow Cambridge theologian, Smyth sought to restore the Johannine basis of Anglicanism against the latitudinarian trends of the Church.\(^{15}\) Utley also encountered the Conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott in his first year at Cambridge and absorbed his work too. With Cowling, however, and against Oakeshott he upheld the strong religious dimension of Cambridge Conservatism.\(^{16}\) After a brief period as a member of the Anglo-French Policy Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House),\(^ {17}\) he became a foreign leader writer on *The Times* in 1944 and then leader writer on the *Sunday Times* a year later. He rejoined *The Times* in 1948 as leader writer following a year’s interlude with *The Observer* in 1947; he remained there until 1954. Throughout his career he overcame his disability through a formidable memory, unfailing courage, and a stream of assistants — often attractive young women — who became leading journalists themselves; e.g. the late Cassandra Jardine.

Much of Utley’s early journalism was unsigned and his contributions are not easily identified among the leader columns of this period. However, he was also writing leaders for the *Times Literary Supplement* (hereafter *TLS*) from 1948 until the early 1960s, on a regular basis at first and intermittently towards the end of the period.\(^ {18}\) These have been identified in the *Times Literary Supplement Historical Archive*, along with the many book reviews he wrote for the journal. They reveal the depth of his interest in political ideas and their religious and historical foundations. He particularly used the *TLS* to redraw the boundaries of Conservatism in the era of consensus and beyond. His essays were informed by the view he shared with Cowling that however much political belief was shaped by circumstances, it owed something as well to independent reflection on the ends of government and society and the means to their attainment.\(^ {19}\) This he regarded as the core of political doctrine, as set out in his anthology of contemporary political thought in 1957, *Documents of Modern Political Thought*. After the war, Utley maintained, the democracies of Europe had witnessed a revival of interest in political philosophy while ‘official’ ideology — the Catholic Church apart — remained intact in the Soviet Union only. The difficulty lay in disentangling the different assumptions about politics that were in danger of being obscured by acceptance of common institutions and practices across doctrinal divides.\(^ {20}\) Utley’s primary motivation as a political thinker and writer was to keep alive those different assumptions, not least in order to preserve the distinct identity of Conservatism.
In the early years of his career, Utley sought to sharpen the outlines of Conservatism in three main ways. The first concerned the intellectual roots of Conservatism; the second the role of Conservatism in the post-war consensus; and the third an intelligentsia distinct from that of the left.

(i) The Intellectual basis of Conservatism

In some of his early articles Utley argued that for too long the Conservative Party had been hampered by a sense of intellectual inferiority to the left; but the bankruptcy of ideas was most evident among the opponents of Conservatism, despite their claims otherwise. In 1950, he pointed out that E.H. Carr had merely re-clothed socialism in the garb of ‘unphilosophical radicalism’, while F.A. Hayek (a liberal for Utley’s purposes) had advanced a crude thesis concerning the tyranny to which interference in the free market leads. These and other post-war theorists had failed to escape from individualist and Utilitarian assumptions and to address the deeper problems of moral obligation at the heart of political life. ‘In the field of political speculation’, Utley remarked, ‘the new world seems to have been postponed sine die’. For Utley, this vacuum provided an opportunity for Conservatism to engage with the rich resources of its own tradition; but it was to be coupled with an older, more sceptical liberal heritage that had receded as liberalism became a narrow instrument of Utilitarianism and Radicalism. In 1947, for example, he wrote a long essay on W.E.H. Lecky, aligning him with Henry Maine as a Victorian critic who feared that democracy would result in tyranny of a new, socialist kind. He emphasised Lecky’s belief that democracy would revive the customs and practices of an earlier stage of society, particularly those centring on the communal ownership of industry and its regulation in the interests of groups such as guilds. Tellingly, Utley thought that Lecky had gone too far in suspecting even the Primrose League of the regressive tendencies he lamented in modern democracy. Nevertheless, he believed that Lecky was of much interest to post-war Conservatives. He was particularly struck by Lecky’s prophecy that the ‘experiment’ in democratic socialism would one day collapse; then, he added, in a Disraelian gloss of his own, ‘the traditional sense of the people’ would reassert itself.

This conviction was to become a hallmark of Utley’s Conservatism. By ‘traditional’ he meant ‘conservative’. His reading of ‘the people’ was certainly distinct from that of nineteenth-century Radicalism. His opposition to the latter was evident in a feature essay he wrote in 1948 on another liberal critic of democracy in Victorian Britain: James Fitzjames Stephen. There, he championed Stephen’s exposure of the ‘confused sentiments and prejudices’ inherent in J.S. Mill’s later philosophy, grounded as it was in an abstract ideal of both liberty and individuality. Unlike Lecky, Utley pointed out, Stephen, along with Carlyle, feared the breakdown rather than the extension of authority with the advent of democracy. Not surprisingly, he endorsed Stephen’s view that democracy does not enhance but diminishes equality between the government and the governed. This was particularly the case under
socialism to which democracy ‘must lead’. The tide of democracy could not be reversed but its ‘rigours’ could be ‘tempered’ by the exercise of ‘judicious leadership’. By this Utley meant reconciling the conflicting claims of individuals and groups. To engage in concessions was to reduce the leader to the status of a ‘mere delegate’. As we shall see, this issue was to become central to Conservative challenges to consensus politics in the 1960s.

Utley’s concern to enhance the intellectual depth and distinctiveness of Conservatism can be seen further in the use he made of the sixteenth-century Anglican thinker Richard Hooker. In another TLS leader of 1948 he championed Hooker as a great English apostle of the universality of law and the divine spirit it represented; in his view, the thoroughness of Hooker’s advocacy of this doctrine surpassed even that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Hooker was particularly important in emphasising the difficulties rulers faced in balancing the impartiality of human law with the needs of justice in particular cases. ‘Precision’, he maintained, was a quality of justice that belonged to natural law alone. He concluded that the Christian tradition was conservative in preferring the ‘impartial injustice of law to the partial justice of legislation’.

Once again, Utley’s emphasis fell on the cautious use of political power to maintain the stability of law, against recurrent attempts in European history to undermine it. In other TLS articles around the same time he identified the main opponents of the Christian tradition of law as the egalitarian left and the authoritarian right; both were secular in outlook and rooted in claims to popular supremacy. In what sense were individuals obliged to obey governments of these kinds? This was a pressing question for Utley in the late-1940s, not so much out of concern for the revival of Nazism and Fascism as assertions of the will of the majority. His response was that there was no recourse to a ‘right of resistance’ on the part of individuals because the notion of the individual was itself an abstraction. But minorities could appeal to the Church, or ‘a political tradition embodied in well-recognised customs’ as the basis of passive resistance to a command issued in the name of the majority. Here, Utley invoked Hooker’s injunction to heed ‘the general and perpetual voice of men’, together with Burke’s conception of a universal contract of mankind between past, present and future. He regarded such standards of eternal reason as exemplified in the English-British people, the embodiment of Burke’s conception of ‘wisdom without reflection’. At the time of the Festival of Britain he praised his compatriots for their ‘good-humoured thoughtlessness — that quality that sometimes passes for apathy and sometimes for dogged courage’.

It might seem odd that Utley should even be raising such matters as civil disobedience when the constitutional position and moral authority of the Established Church in twentieth-century Britain were at their peak. However, Christianity’s entrenched position in British culture was threatened by what has been termed a ‘quietly growing indifference’. This gave secularist perspectives on religion and morality a clear edge, along with heterodoxy within the Church. Utley opposed the Church of England’s failure to censor the ‘new
morality’ movement that developed from the late 1950s under the leadership of Canon Douglas Rhymes of Southwark Cathedral and the Bishop of Southwark, Mervyn Stockwood. The attempt to dispense with moral rules, both of an ecclesiastical and civil kind, emphasised the priority that modern society gave to ‘convenience of belief’ over truth in religion. At the same time, the heavy dependence of the Church-State establishment on the ability of the monarch to represent what united rather than divided the nation was impressed on him by events in Holland in 1964. There, the Dutch monarchy had been engulfed in crisis by the marriage of Princess Irene to a Roman Catholic. The abdication of Edward VIII and recent controversy over Princess Margaret’s possible engagement to a divorcee emphasised how precarious that dependence was, in Britain no less than elsewhere.

Utley maintained that without a secure grounding in Christianity expressed in the Church, monarchy and the law, respect for human personality could be nothing more than ‘a vague sentiment too weak to be the basis of a system of morals’. In common with Cowling, he pointed an accusing finger at the legacy of Utilitarianism in enabling a shallow conception of the individual to gain ascendency, with major consequences for personal liberty. In an article commemorating the bicentenary of Bentham’s birth in 1948, he emphasised the central contradiction in Bentham’s theory of utility: although deemed to be driven by self-interest, individuals were easily sacrificed to the needs of aggregate happiness. J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism fared no better as he conceded that individuals might not always be the best judge of their own happiness. Determinism and absence of a theory of moral obligation plagued both versions. Later that year, he contrasted the subordinate role of liberty in Utilitarianism with the Christian notion of a moral duty incumbent on all individuals to ‘claim and exercise liberty’. As a result, the Christian churches had become the unlikely champions of civil liberty against the voluntary renunciation of freedom in the last twenty years. Those responsible for that renunciation were all too ready to pursue happiness by other, collectivist means than that of personal liberty.

**ii) Conservatism and post-war Collectivism**

To what extent did Utley support collectivism himself in the immediate post-war period? Defining the approach that Conservatives should take to the collectivism of the Labour government is the second way in which he sought to maintain the distinctiveness of Conservatism in what was rapidly becoming an era of consensus politics.

In an article for *The Spectator* in March 1949 and against the background of acute economic crisis, he dismissed calls on the right of the Conservative Party for a return to a policy of *laissez-faire*. He insisted instead that the party would have to respond to public pressure for a ‘competent technocracy to apply the ultra-revolutionary and coercive measures necessary to rescue a Socialist economy from disaster’. Although he did not specify what he meant here, as Gamble has noted, he could merely have been echoing in rhetorical language his remarks concerning the inevitable collapse of democratic socialism in his essay on Lecky the
previous year. If Utley did not sanction economic libertarianism, neither did he refrain from questioning widely-held principles such as universal benefits that would appear ‘reactionary’ to some in his party.

For Gamble, this has meant that as a ‘Right progressive’, Utley was simply engaged in promoting ‘middle way’ Conservatism, steering between the two extremes of laissez-faire liberalism and socialist collectivism in order to manage social change to Conservative advantage. However, such a balance was informed as much by theoretical argument as political opportunism, and could develop new twists as a result. For example, taking his cue from James Fitzjames Stephen’s critique of Mill for grounding marriage in contract, Utley upheld Stephen’s wider dissent from Maine’s view of progress: that it consisted of the general movement of society from a regime of ‘status’ to that of ‘contract’. Contract, Utley argued, was no less devoid of coercion than the social order it had replaced. This was because of the ‘threat of dismissal’ that underpinned it. As such it was no longer acceptable to what he called ‘the moral sense of the twentieth century’. But almost sotto voce he added, ‘except when it is applied by a trade union’. What did he mean exactly?

The context of the remark was the Conservative Party’s recent Industrial Charter of 1947. Written by senior Conservative frontbenchers led by R.A. Butler, the Charter expressed the party’s commitment to fostering partnership in industry between employers and employees through government, alongside reductions in levels of tax and public expenditure, and maintenance of full employment and the existing nationalised industries. In this the Charter owed much to Harold Macmillan’s notion of the ‘middle way’ in politics developed in the 1930s. As John Ramsden has commented, the warmth shown towards trade unions was an especially significant aspect of the document. However, the details of implementing its recommendations were left open; indeed, along with other Charters issued by the party at the same time — in relation to the empire, for example — it was never implemented. For one recent commentator, the ‘signal’ it sent to voters and to the party itself was more important than its content. This did not prevent the Industrial Charter from being taken in a number of different and conflicting directions.

Utley provided one such path, some distance from the ‘middle way’. In his Spectator article he suggested that the electorate would only respond to the spirit of the Charter if Conservatives drafted a constitution for one of the nationalized industries. In particular, they should provide for profit-sharing and joint control. In another essay the same year, he emphasised the gradual way in which co-operation in industry would spread from such examples, albeit over a number of ‘decades’. He insisted that in rejecting state control, the Conservative ideal of ‘industrial corporatism’ was distinct from Fascism.

However, Utley’s model of industry inspired by the Charter could never be mistaken for socialism, not least because he denied a role for trade unions. Existing as they did to bargain rather than to co-operate, union involvement would be replaced by a ‘right of participation’ on the part of employees. Clearly, this would be limited because management would retain
a right of control over ‘factory administration’ on a day-to-day basis. The employees’ ‘right of participation’ would certainly stop short of decisions over dismissal. While there would be a right of appeal in such cases, this had to be ‘carefully distinguished from the right of elected committees of workers to enforce or veto dismissals’. 46 The Industrial Charter drew no such distinction, in keeping with public acceptance of existing practices.

The shifting ground of the consensus from the end of 1949 with the devaluation of the pound and the introduction of prescription charges in 1951 would have vindicated the view that Utley also expressed in his Spectator article: that the Conservative opposition should keep ahead of Government policy and public opinion. 47 Conservatives did not have to face a difficult choice between leading public opinion and risking electoral failure, on the one hand, and following it and remaining weak ideologically, on the other.

But for Utley, it was not so much public opinion or the views of the political class more widely but the assumptions of the liberal intelligentsia across a broad area of modern thought that most constrained politicians of his generation. Here, we turn to a third aspect of his attempt to revive Conservatism in the early part of his career: challenging the ascendancy of the left in intellectual as well as political life.

(iii) Conservatism and the Intelligentsia

Writing in 1948, and before Cowling, Utley emphasised that the left in post-war Britain was liberal and not merely socialist in character. This was because its starting-point was the premise that ‘all social ills have assignable and removable causes’. However, despite an exacting moral code that it enforced readily on others, it could not authorise morality because of its ‘dogmatic’ belief in the law of causality. In thrall to science, the left dealt ‘not with obligations but with necessities’, a concern he shared with other contemporary writers. 48

In this light, one might have expected Utley to support the development of an intelligentsia of the right as an antidote to the dominant intelligentsia of the left. However, he disliked the idea of the intelligentsia itself, particularly its suggestion of a homogeneous group of thinkers and writers. This became clear in his response to the philosopher Richard Wollheim in 1956. Wollheim had claimed that the British intelligentsia was still left in political orientation, despite growing support for the Conservative party among academics and the worrying appearance of a new breed of intellectuals on the right typified by Spectator journalists such as Peregrine Worsthorne. 49 In response, Utley drew a distinction between two types of intellectual. The first was typical of the interwar period in believing that all problems were soluble through ‘an organised assault from reason’. The second was of a more empirical, Burkeian cast of mind and represented a diverse range of opinion. In elevating the second over the first, he looked back to what he regarded as its Victorian exemplars; their sharp differences of view on fundamental questions was as striking as the impossibility of deducing their stance on one issue from that which they took on another.
‘Like Samuel Butler, for example, they could denounce God without worshipping science’. He was careful to point out that complex beliefs of this kind were only present beyond the circles of Utilitarianism — the source of the intelligentsia proper in Britain in his eyes. What marked out the Utilitarians for this role was their belief ... that they were engaged collectively in building up an exact science of politics and morality, their passion for talking to each other and corresponding with each other, their zeal for starting reviews and giving lectures...’

Regardless of whether more intellectuals voted Conservative in the 1950s than they had done in the previous decade, the ‘gregariousness’ and rationalism of earlier intellectuals — particularly those of the interwar period — had declined. In this sense, the new intellectuals augured well for conservative if not Conservative thought. He gave as examples Jacob Talmon and Isaiah Berlin, neither taciturn but both prominent critics of rationalism.

For his part, Wollheim wrote a scathing review of Utley’s Documents of Modern Political Thought in the following year. He rejected the Oakeshottian view of ideology as the ‘abridgement of tradition’ that had shaped the anthology at the expense of the political creeds embraced by the left. Both the review and the wider controversy in which it took place emphasise the ideological divisions that persisted among the main political parties in the 1950s. Where did this leave Utley in relation to the so-called ‘Butskellite’ consensus of the 1950s?

**The retreat from Consensus**

With the return of the Conservatives to power in 1951, R.A. Butler — the new Chancellor of the Exchequer — sustained the commitment of his predecessor Hugh Gaitskell to managing the economy in order to maintain full employment. However, as Neil Rollings has argued, the broad agreement at this level expressed in the term ‘Butskellism’ concealed important differences in accommodating other policy objectives.

On the retirement of Sir Anthony Eden in 1957, Utley defended ‘Butskellism’ against its critics on both the Tory right and Labour left; but this was heavily skewed towards the first half of that neologism, particularly the abandoning of most controls over the economy and the de-rationing of food. He invoked the Tory conception of the ‘middle way’ interpreted in Lecky’s terms of a ‘balance of interests’ as the best antidote to majority government. In a post-war context, this emphasised the need to reconcile middle-class demands for the incentives and sound money necessary for growth with a policy which could ‘claim to be national’. He made much, in particular, of the progress of Eden’s government towards the creation of a ‘property-owning democracy’ in Britain, citing the role played by Macmillan as Housing Minister in removing restrictions on building. He addressed widespread allegations on the left of Butler’s electioneering tactics as Chancellor in his pre-election
budget in April 1955 and on the right of his failure to cut public expenditure. He also sought
to disarm criticism of Butler’s so-called ‘brushes and brooms’ budget in October when
revenue was hastily clawed back through an increase in purchase tax as well as profits tax.\textsuperscript{56}
In addition, he defended the Suez venture, though half-heartedly, at best.

However, as well as providing the basis of Utley’s support for consensus politics — such as it
was — the older vein of liberal-conservative thought on which he continued to draw also
sowed seeds of doubt about the direction of post-war government. This was especially
apparent from the late-1950s. In his book \textit{The Ombudsman}, published in 1961, he sought to
establish the case for independent scrutiny of the enforcement of law in an age of
increasing legislative activity. The Mental Health Act of 1959 — which had recently come
into force — particularly concerned him. Invoking A.V. Dicey, another prominent liberal-
conservative thinker of the late-nineteenth century, Utley condemned the increasing
substitution of ‘welfare’ for ‘law’ that the Act represented. In the absence of a modern
Dicey, he asserted that the Act was likely to be praised by all political parties; but he
bracketed the Bow Group on the left of the Conservative Party with the Fabian Society as
most likely to ‘venerate’ the Act. He was convinced that had there been an ombudsman,
detainment under the Act would have been defined in close legal terms, as well as providing
an arbiter to whom the grievances of those affected by mental health legislation could be
brought. As it was, the Act was all of a piece with the Conservative Party’s ‘greater
emphasis on welfare and the provision of prosperity than on the need for maintaining
proper restraints on government’.\textsuperscript{57}

What Utley perceived as the grip of the Bow group on Conservative Party thought and policy
at this time was something that concerned him increasingly. In an article in the \textit{Daily
Telegraph} in 1960, he maintained that criticism of Butler — now the party Chairman — for
capitulating to the left was misplaced.\textsuperscript{58} But he could only have done so through gritted
teeth. For example, as Home Secretary since 1957, Butler had initiated a raft of social
reforms that brought forth the permissive society, including the Betting and Gaming Act of
1960. This enabled the poorer classes to engage in betting without incurring the risk of a
fine and greatly expanded the opportunities for doing so. The legislation defied middle-
class expectations that a Conservative government would encourage responsible behaviour,
especially among the working class.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite his show of support for Butler, Utley emphasised that the ‘sane Right’ held the key
to the renaissance of the party. This consisted of those who — like Butler himself, Utley was
careful to add — recognised the need for a careful balance between principles and
expediency.\textsuperscript{60} A prominent leader of the ‘sane Right’ was Enoch Powell. Utley shared fully
the importance that Powell had attached from the outset of his political career to personal
liberty within a framework of law and social provision that respected freedom. This was
despite being to the right of Powell on moral issues and capital punishment.\textsuperscript{61} On the eve of
the party’s conference at Blackpool in 1963, which was left in turmoil as a result of
Macmillan’s resignation, he interviewed Powell for the *Sunday Telegraph*. Powell’s philosophy, Utley reminded his readers, was more in keeping with the spirit that had brought three consecutive election victories to the Conservative Party than the alternative ‘programme of bigger and brighter Government intervention all round’. Reinforcing the point in an article in *The Spectator* while the conference was taking place, he urged the party to resist ‘Wilsonian state-sponsored materialism’.

Utley continued to defend the record of the Conservative Government. In May 1963, he maintained that it had introduced greater freedom within the post-war consensus, citing the Rent Act (1957), in particular. He further maintained that the failure of the economy to grow was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Government, for example the rejection of its application to join the Common Market. But he made no mention of the resignation of the three key members of the Treasury in 1958 — Peter Thorneycroft, Enoch Powell, and Nigel Birch — over the excessive level of public expenditure. This was to feature prominently in his wholesale indictment of Macmillan’s government in 1979, as did the incomes policy introduced by Macmillan and a reformism that he characterised in 1979 as degenerating into ‘an uncritical acceptance of the shibboleths of collectivism’.

Utley’s damning verdict in 1979 was that the ‘myth’ of Macmillan as a statesman who practised the ‘politics of reconciliation’ was far from the truth; the fact was that his “middle way” veered remorselessly to the Left. In the light of these later remarks and his support for Powell at the time, the least one can say is that Utley’s heart was not in the encomium he wrote for the Conservative government in May 1963. Only a month previously he had extolled the recognition that Powell shared with Cowling that, mostly bound by ‘necessity’ though politicians are, there is a small opening in which they can ‘change by persuasion those tacit assumptions that necessarily dictate Government policy’. It was that opening he was now to exploit to the full.

**The Daily Telegraph and Conservative Dissent.**

Following a year as editor of the *Spectator* on leaving the *Times* in 1954, Utley had worked as a freelance writer and journalist, contributing frequently to the *Sunday Telegraph*, in particular, from its foundation in 1961. But in 1964 he joined the *Daily Telegraph* as a sub-editor and leader writer; he was to become the deputy editor under William Deedes in 1980. He used his influence within the paper to redraw the ideological lines of Conservatism away from social democracy.

In doing so, Utley reinforced the counter-cultural status that the Telegraph had been developing for some time. A key figure in this respect was Colin Welch, the deputy editor who had been instrumental in his appointment. Supported by the editor, Maurice Green, and working closely with the *Institute of Economic Affairs*, Welch had already done much to align the newspaper with a Conservatism centred on the virtues of the free market. This went against the grain of the Keynesian views of its owner, Michael Berry (later Lord Hartwell).
The Telegraph’s critique of Keynesianism was especially apparent in the satirical column ‘Peter Simple’. From its inception in 1955, the column attacked what its various writers regarded as the enslavement of the Conservative Party to the social and economic policies of its main adversary, the Labour Party. However, they also targeted the shallowness of post-war Britain, and from a traditional Tory perspective. This was apparent in the distinction that Michael Wharton — who took over the column in 1960 — drew between ‘true’ satire as practised by Swift, Defoe, Pope and others and the irreverence typical of Private Eye and the radio programme ‘That was the Week That Was’. Satire proper was informed by a clear set of values. By contrast,

[what we are now threatened with is a kind of mass-satire in which the whole population can join, giggling uncontrollably and brandishing mass-produced plastic rapiers and bludgeons as it thrashes away at the already shaky props which have hitherto supported our lives — patriotism, organised religion and a conventional moral code — in the name at best of a vague convenient liberalism, at worst of aimless nihilism.]

Wharton and other Telegraph journalists held government in large part responsible for the wider social and moral malaise. This is clear in the support they gave to Britain’s entry into Europe as a means of challenging a political consensus that was centred on collectivism. The eleventh of twelve editorials on ‘Tory Policy’ in the months leading up to the 1964 election characterised Labour’s new-found attachment to the Commonwealth as an ‘escapist reaction’ against the European Economic Community, particularly the free market and free trade policies of its existing member states. It maintained that the Commonwealth was seized on by Labour as ‘offering a promising prospect for an elaborate bulk-buying and State-trading apparatus of a Socialistic kind’.

This leader and the others in the series too, was undoubtedly Utley’s work. He was more cautious about the implications of Common Market membership for British sovereignty than Welch, for example; but the pithy comment on Labour’s approach to the economy is much in his style. A revealing indication of the new direction in Conservative thought that he would have forged as keeper of the newspaper’s Tory conscience lay in the twelfth editorial. It turned critique of the policy of laissez-faire against the Labour opposition. Laissez-faire, the editorial maintained, led ‘not to general freedom but to a multiplicity of tyrannies’.

Uppermost in the leader writer’s mind was the need for government to resist pressure from the trade union movement for protection against the power of the courts to control their affairs. This was in the wake of the Rookes-Barnard judgement that curtailed the right of unions to take action against third parties in industrial disputes. Just before the annual conference of the TUC in September, Utley addressed the issue of trade union power in a signed article. He did so in terms that recalled his critical approach to the unions in the late 1940s. The Government was right to consider opening up for independent investigation the
place of trade unions in a society based on the rule of law. No longer were they ‘emerging from the semi-criminal twilight’ of the previous century; they were instead, he continued, referring to closed shop agreements, ‘powerful corporations with mixed purposes, enjoying unequalled legal privileges: membership of them is rapidly becoming a condition of employment, and therefore survival’.  

In an editorial shortly afterwards, the *Telegraph* confined its criticism of the Conservative Manifesto to lack of support for greater discrimination in welfare payments and for a Tory equivalent of Labour’s “employee’s charter”. However, once the election had been lost the newspaper urged the party leadership to cut its links with the past and claim the radicalism which in its view was now crucial to success. Galvanised by the Young Conservatives’ conference in April 1965, it welcomed the emergence of what it called ‘a new and popular Conservative doctrine’ that bore strong comparison with the “social market economy” of Ludwig Erhardt, the German Minister of Economics. The editorial reminded the leadership that,

> Young Conservative opinion is a touchstone. No party body more strongly supported Mr. Butler in his doctrinal heyday in the late 1940s. But the day of Butlerite Conservatism, that unlikely synthesis of Beveridgism, Keynesian opportunism and popularised Disraeli, has probably passed.

Perhaps the most interesting component of this ‘unlikely synthesis’ is ‘popularised Disraeli’. Quite plausibly, this referred to the aggregate of interests by which policy was now framed, not the reconciliation and balance of interests that Utley had defended as the essence of Toryism in recent decades. An editorial welcoming Edward Heath as new party leader in July commented that the ‘hitherto dominant Tory philosophy of one nation has sometimes conceived the national interest as something including and compounded out of all sectional interests’; however, Heath was committed to the triumph of ‘the general good over all that thwarts and denies it’. Those who would lose out included traditional Conservative Party supporters: the opponents of Common Market membership and those whose livelihood depended upon Resale Price Maintenance that Heath had abolished in the previous year. But the newspaper had earlier identified ‘the new salariat’ as the class that was now most receptive to the enduring principles of the Conservative creed as defined by Disraeli.

The hopes that the *Telegraph* pinned on Heath to take the Conservative Party beyond the consensus years were quickly dashed. Impatience became the hallmark of its editorials, unlike the *Times* which remained a pro-Heath newspaper to the end of his premiership. For the *Telegraph* the failure of the Conservative opposition to challenge the ‘visionary’ figures for growth in the Government’s National Plan in the autumn of 1965 was bad enough; worse was the welcome it gave to Richard Crossman’s Rent Act at the same time. A leading article castigated senior Conservatives for their immersion in the small print of such legislation. Once again, the disquiet expressed by the Young Conservatives with the failure of the Party to strike out in new directions became the signal for change.
Utley, Enoch Powell, and ‘One Nation’ Conservatism.

At the heart of this perception of the reactionary nature of both Wilson’s government and the Conservative Party leadership under Heath was Enoch Powell. His role as a focus for Conservative opposition among journalists on the *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph* in particular was emphasised by Cowling in the first volume of his *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England* in 1980. For Cowling, Powell’s role was ‘to persuade them of what they had only half-believed, that the conclusions of a pessimistic sub-section of the intelligentsia were in many ways the opinions of the people’.\(^8^3\) This was consistent with the small but significant part of Disraeli mythology that Powell thought alone was true: the view that the Conservative Party contained large reserves of radicalism that its prophets could mobilise on behalf of the people against oligarchies that sought to capture the party for their own ends.\(^8^4\)

Cowling’s interpretation of Powell’s influence was certainly borne out by Utley’s review of *Freedom and Reality* — a volume of Powell’s speeches — in the *Sunday Telegraph* in 1969. Dismissing any suggestion that Powell would ever be leader of the Conservative Party, Utley cast him instead in the role of John the Baptist; he was essentially engaged in a bid for his party’s soul, and with that the soul of the nation itself. Such a figure was needed because of the ‘imposed and artificial conformities of consensus politics’.\(^8^5\) He maintained that Powell’s force lay in the realms of defence and economic policy, the implication being that his energy had been misspent on immigration.\(^8^6\) This echoed his critique of Powell’s views on immigration in his book on Powell the previous year.\(^8^7\)

If Utley was seeking a new basis for Conservatism through endorsing ‘Powellism’, it was within the same Tory mould that both men had consistently upheld. He believed that that heritage had been betrayed by both the ‘dirigisme by default’ of the consensus years and the sterile monetarism that had replaced it in the 1970s. Reviewing Cowling’s *Religion and Public Doctrine*, Utley underlined the eclipse of the nation in post-war Conservative thought of all stripes, a theme at the heart of the book.\(^8^8\) This was something he sought to reverse in his lecture to the Conservative Party conference later that year marking the centenary of Disraeli’s death. He used the occasion to wrest Disraeli’s legacy from the left of the party — the so-called ‘Wets’. He emphasised Disraeli’s concern to reduce the gap between rich and poor, not in the interests of social justice but of patriotism and an enhanced sense of national unity, immigrant communities included. He also used Disraeli as a foil for the ‘international idealism’ to which Conservative Party leaders had succumbed (he would have had Mrs Thatcher in mind especially), as well as the pacifism that seemed to have gripped the Labour Party.\(^8^9\) No nation, he maintained, could afford to associate only with other nations which shared their moral ideals. This echoed Herbert Butterfield’s view of international relations as a ‘predicament’ rather than a clash between good and evil, the view to which Mrs Thatcher subscribed.\(^9^0\) However, unlike Powell he did not push this belief
to its logical extreme of rejecting the defence of Europe in alliance with America and through the policy of nuclear deterrence. 91

As well as the nation, Utley believed that the hold on Conservatism of the idea that the state should sustain the Christian ethos was also weakening, along with the sceptical approach to politics that rejected the pursuit of utopian ideals. He strove to keep Mrs Thatcher and her government in touch with these keynotes of what he termed ‘a brand of English Conservatism ... [that] represented the unstated assumptions of many generations’. 92 He wrote her famous speech to the Scottish Church Assembly in 1988 that articulated these assumptions alongside her familiar pitch for the free market. 93 Previously, he had berated her for extolling the virtues of capitalism in the abstract, not in the patriotic context that she invoked readily in other respects. 94 In this, he maintained, she was the captive of intellectuals — economists, in particular — who had seized the policy agenda. The tendency of the party elite to deliver ‘semi-academic’ lectures on political themes — there are echoes here of his earlier critique of the Utilitarians — exacerbated the problem of the remoteness of her government. As such, Mrs Thatcher was no match for Joseph Chamberlain and Enoch Powell, her predecessors in seeking to mobilise the people against the political establishment. In 1977, he wrote that they had created ‘a genuinely Tory democratic movement with a firm working-class base’. However, being non-party men, they had been political failures, despite the achievements of Powell’s late career in Ulster. 95 Indeed, Utley — by now much interested in the politics of the province himself — tried, though failed, to persuade Mrs Thatcher to implement the integrationist approach to Ulster’s problems that Powell upheld in the wake of the murder of Airey Neave. 96

Utley insisted that nothing Mrs Thatcher set out to achieve in terms of policy was alien to the Conservative tradition. In that sense, there was no such thing as ‘Thatcherism’ distinct from Conservatism. In the recent past, her goals had been shared by Eden and Powell, a remark that suggests that Utley was as much concerned to establish the continuity of his own thought as Mrs Thatcher’s. 97 But the grip of specialist advisors on the New Right deprived it of much needed democratic legitimacy. This Utley interpreted in the Tory — certainly Cowlingite — terms of the ‘assumptions’ of a distinct people, the English-British people. In his contribution to Cowling’s Conservative Essays in 1978 he conceived the ‘assumptions’ on which British society turned as still rooted largely in the idea of ‘status’. 98 This was a way of avoiding the divisive and hierarchical implications of ‘class’ while emphasising popular acceptance of the idea of clear social distinctions. 99 It was the same idea he had upheld against ‘contract’ in the late-1940s in defending the Industrial Charter but without jeopardising the authority of management. His point in 1978 was that the adoption of classical liberalism by Conservatism jarred as much with the Tory right as with the egalitarian left; it represented the emergence of a new oligarchy (to use Powell’s term) within the party on the back of a revolution to displace the old. At risk was the Tory understanding of politics as the ‘management of prejudices and reconciling of interests’. 96
The party seemed more concerned with constructing policy around abstract, timeless truths centred on individuals.\textsuperscript{100}

**The End of the Conservative-Tory Line?**

Increasingly, Conservative politics moved away from the principled Toryism that Utley sought to uphold, as did the *Telegraph* following the purchase of the paper by Conrad Black’s Hollinger group in 1985. Having lost influence on editorial policy, Utley left the newspaper for the *Times* in January 1987.\textsuperscript{101} He took over the column that Roger Scruton had written since 1983 and wrote a revealing review of a recent volume of his predecessor’s essays — *Untimely Tracts*. The essays emphasised Scruton’s ‘potential’ as a Tory philosopher, he wrote, as they were recognisably English in character, ‘not obsessed by Hegelianism, Marxism and all the other unfortunate ingredients in his education’.\textsuperscript{102} The connecting thread throughout Utley’s career had been the need for Conservatism to maintain its popular roots, to develop an intelligentsia only in so far as it served this end, and to make the nation — not self, class, ideology or race — the focus of loyalty and attachment. The renewal of Conservatism for which he called in the late–1940s, the early–1960s and the early-1980s entailed a return to these objectives. As a regular columnist on the *Times* — the first such post he had occupied — he was now well placed to cultivate a wide following. However, his influence was cut short by his early death in June 1988.

Since then, Utley’s doctrinal brand of Conservatism has fallen out of favour. On the ‘progressive’ wing of the Conservative Party, ‘doctrine’ is now associated with the right’s commitment to the spread of market forces in Britain. So conceived, it is regarded as a threat to the ‘compassionate’ face that Conservatism assumed in the initial years of David Cameron’s leadership, before the onset of ‘austerity’ created a different and misguided set of priorities.\textsuperscript{103} The progressive perspective has been challenged in turn by a range of opponents in the parliamentary party, anxious to reassert traditional Conservatism against the fashionable causes embraced by the party leadership in recent years: European integration, renewable energy, economic regulation, and same-sex marriage.\textsuperscript{104} But missing from the movement both for and against ‘modernisation’ is a clear foundation in public doctrine. In the past, this had focused heavily on England-Britain, a nation which Conservatives, perhaps more than others, took for granted. Roger Scruton has argued that the devolutionary settlement of 1999 created a situation in which Conservatives lost sight of what it was they were seeking to conserve.\textsuperscript{105} Utley’s journalism well illustrates the close alignment of nationhood and public doctrine that had once been central to Conservatism and has proved difficult to recover.

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\textsuperscript{1} I am very grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions for improving the article.


10 See Gamble, Conservative Nation, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 50.


14 An informative but brief account of his life and thought is included in M. Garnett and K. Hickson, Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributors to the Political Thought of the Modern Conservative Party (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).


16 On the sharp difference between Cowling and Oakeshott on this score, see K. Minogue, ‘Liberalism, Conservatism and Oakeshott in Cowling’s Account of Public Doctrine’, in Crowcroft, Green and Whiting (Eds), ibid., p. 33.

17 He expressed his concern about the right-wing extremism of the group in France with which Chatham House was seeking collaboration in his letter to Sir Andrew MacFadyean, 29 September 1945, MacFadyean Papers, 9/1, File 3, British Library of Political and Economic Science. The project was abandoned soon after.


19 For Cowling’s theory of political action, see P. Williamson, ‘Maurice Cowling and Modern British Political History’, in Crowcroft, Green and Whiting (Eds), op. cit., Ref. 15, esp. pp. 140–1 for the importance of ‘rhetoric’.

20 T.E. Utley & J. Stuart Macalur (Eds), Documents of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 1-5. This was written as a sequel to Oakeshott’s Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (1938).

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22 For the wider intellectual context of this conception of the primacy of community in primitive society, particularly as the ideological foundation for indirect rule in India from the 1860s, see Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).


25 Utley, ibid., p. 661.


29 Utley, Political Obligation’, ibid., p. 25.


33 He had expressed this concern in a leader centred on Charles Smyth’s biography of the nineteenth-century scholar and Anglican Dean Henry Hart Milman; he emphasised Milman’s importance in transmitting the eighteenth century emphasis on reason in religion against its distortion for partisan, including democratic ends: ‘High and Dry’, TLS, 9 December 1949, p. 809.

34 Utley reflected on the issues raised for the remaining monarchies of Europe by the marriage of Princess Irene of the Netherlands to a Catholic in 1964: ‘Defender of Which Faith?’, ST, 9 February 1964, p. 12.


38 Even before the 1945 General Election, Conservatives such as the future Chancellor Reginald Maudling urged the Party to embrace state control as ‘part of the machinery of freedom’, not a trade-off with it: ‘Conservatives and Control’, The Spectator, 12 November 1943, pp. 452–3.


40 Gamble, Conservative Nation, op. cit, Ref. 3, p. 50.

41 Gamble, Conservative Nation, op. cit, Ref. 3, pp. 52-3.


47 Cf. Powell’s memorandum in 1953 to fellow members of the ‘One Nation’ group, warning the party against the folly of pursuing — like the Thracian boxer in Demosthenes — ‘delayed reactions’ to threats already passed rather than warding off threats that were imminent; quoted in Seawright, *The British Conservative Party*, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 50–51.


53 Utley, *Not Guilty (The Conservative Reply)* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), p. 38. See also Utley’s two letters to the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* as the Suez Crisis deepened and party unity became imperative. He urged the Government to withstand pressure from the Conservative right to change course on the domestic front; but at the same time, to articulate ‘the more permanent aims of Tory policy’ it would be free to pursue once the current need for ‘makeshifts and compromises’ had passed: ‘Obstacles to Unity: Need to Explain Policy’, DT, 14 August 1956; and ‘Newly-Found Strength: Conservatism’s Tasks Ahead’, DT, 24 October 1956, p. 6.

54 Utley, *ibid.*, pp. 78–9, 84; for Lecky, see ‘A Critic of Democracy’, op. cit., Ref. 23, p. 597.


59 Bale, *The Conservatives since 1945*, op. cit., Ref. 4, p. 73. Utley did not comment on the Act although the limits of his tolerance of unleashing ‘the gambling instinct’ is clear in his defence of Macmillan’s introduction of Premium Bonds in 1957 against Nonconformist critics in the Labour party: such a provision ‘appealed to a modest form of [that instinct] and offered a small reward in private fortune as an incentive to keeping money out of circulation’. *Not Guilty*, op.cit., Ref. 53, p. 69.
Utley, ‘Toryism at the Crossroads’, op. cit., Ref. 58, p. 4

Garnett and Hickson, op. cit., Ref. 10, p. 108. Utley was to endorse Stephen’s views concerning the need for morality to be enforced through law against the permissive trends of the 1960s. He now championed the will of the majority that, following Stephen, he had previously condemned, against the agendas of Private Members whose bills were largely responsible for this trend: ‘What Laws may Cure: A New Examination of Morals and Law’, (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1968), in Moore and Heffer (Eds), op. cit., Ref. 13, p. 319. An example of such a Private Member’s bill was Leo Abse’s Matrimonial Causes and Reconciliation Bill, allowing for divorce without matrimonial offence. Utley criticised this in ‘Let no Man Put Asunder’, ST, 7 April 1963. For Powell’s conception of morality and religion as lying beyond the brief of politicians, see Camilla Schofield, “A Nation or no Nation”: Enoch Powell and Thatcherism’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (Eds), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 102–105. However, Schofield’s contrast between the views of Powell and Mrs Thatcher in this respect is limited to economic morality. For Mrs Thatcher’s non-judgemental views on sexual and private morality: see Moore, Margaret Thatcher, op. cit., Ref. 12, p. 165n.


Utley, ibid., p. 62.


It was echoed in his acerbic remarks on the White Paper on the steel industry the following year: ‘Steel: the Road to Monopoly’, DT, 6 May 1965, p. 18.


‘Advance on Known Lines’, DT, 18 September 1964, p. 16.
77 ‘New Tory Radicalism’, DT, 12 April 1965, p. 16.


79 See respectively R.F. Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961–63: the Anti-Marketeers (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); and Ramsden, Appetite for Power, op. cit., Ref. 50, p. 374. For Margaret Thatcher, Heath’s timing on the question of abolishing Resale Price Maintenance was wrong, costing the Conservatives the election: see Moore, Margaret Thatcher, op. cit., Ref. 12, p. 170.

80 ‘The New Salariat’, DT, 18 January 1965, p. 12. For the background to this championing of the ‘salariat’ in growing recognition among Conservative party policy-makers of the need to transform British society through a radical re-shaping of the tax system, see Daunton, Just Taxes, op. cit., Ref. 57, pp. 305-8.


83 Cowling, Religion and Public Doctrine, op. cit., Ref. 6, p. 432.


86 Utley, ibid., pp. 49-50.


95 Utley, ‘The Rise and Fall of Enoch’, _ST_, 1 May 1977, in Moore and Heffer (Eds), _op. cit._, Ref. 13, p. 60.


99 For an attempt to explain popular acceptance of inequality in the post-war years, not least within the working class itself, see P. Dorey, _British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality_ (London: Tauris, 2011), ch. 5. For an opposite appraisal to Utley’s of the role of ‘status’ in Britain at this time — as exacerbating rather than softening class divisions — see C.A.R. Crosland, _The Future of Socialism_ (1956; Jonathan Cape, 1964), pp. 109–11.

100 Utley, ‘The Significance of Mrs Thatcher’, _op. cit._, Ref. 98, pp. 46–7.


104 D. Davis, B. Binley and J. Baron (Eds), _The Future of Conservatism: Values Revisited_ (London: ConservativeHome, 2011); Robin Harris, ‘Here Lie the Remains of Tory Modernisation’, _Standpoint_ (June 2013).