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Durham Research Online
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Subjective Bayesian beliefs.

Antoniou, C. and Harrison, G. W. and Lau, M. I. and Read, D. (2015) 'Subjective Bayesian beliefs.', Journal of risk and uncertainty., 50 (1). pp. 35-54.

Abstract

A large literature suggests that many individuals do not apply Bayes’ Rule when making decisions that depend on them correctly pooling prior information and sample data. We replicate and extend a classic experimental study of Bayesian updating from psychology, employing the methods of experimental economics, with careful controls for the confounding effects of risk aversion. Our results show that risk aversion significantly alters inferences on deviations from Bayes’ Rule.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Bayes’ Rule, Subjective beliefs, Learning, D03, D81, D83.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5
Publisher statement:The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5
Record Created:18 Jul 2014 10:35
Last Modified:21 Feb 2016 00:31

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