Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Platonic Dispositionalism
Tugby, Matthew
Authors
Abstract
In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.
Citation
Tugby, M. (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind, 122(486), 451-480. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | Apr 1, 2013 |
Deposit Date | Sep 30, 2013 |
Publicly Available Date | Sep 1, 2015 |
Journal | Mind |
Print ISSN | 0026-4423 |
Electronic ISSN | 1460-2113 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 122 |
Issue | 486 |
Pages | 451-480 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071 |
Files
Accepted Journal Article
(135 Kb)
PDF
Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071.
You might also like
Collective Powers
(2023)
Book Chapter
Dispositional realism without dispositional essences
(2022)
Journal Article
The Laws of Modality
(2022)
Journal Article
A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes
(2021)
Book Chapter