Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Nomic Necessity for Platonists
Tugby, M.
Authors
Abstract
After identifying some existing explanations offered by nomic necessitarians for the alleged necessary connections between natural properties and their dispositional or nomic features, I discuss a less explored necessitarian strategy. This strategy is available to Platonists who hold that properties exist necessarily, as most do.
Citation
Tugby, M. (2013). Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4), 324-331. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | Dec 1, 2013 |
Deposit Date | Apr 8, 2014 |
Publicly Available Date | Sep 1, 2015 |
Journal | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 2 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 324-331 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99 |
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Copyright Statement
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tugby, M. (2013), Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4): 324-331, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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