Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Causal Nominalism and the One Over Many Problem
Tugby, Matthew
Authors
Abstract
The causal nominalist theory of properties appears at first glance to offer a novel nominalist approach and one that can provide an illuminating response to the one over many problem. I argue, however, that on closer inspection causal ‘nominalism’ collapses into either a version of realism or a mere variant of one of the traditional nominalist approaches. In the case of Whittle’s specific brand of causal nominalism, I suggest it is best thought of as a version of what Armstrong calls ‘ostrich’ nominalism, a view which ultimately refuses to acknowledge the one over many problem rather than provide a solution to it.
Citation
Tugby, M. (2013). Causal Nominalism and the One Over Many Problem. Analysis, 73(3), 455-462. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant038
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | Jul 1, 2013 |
Deposit Date | Oct 7, 2013 |
Publicly Available Date | Sep 1, 2015 |
Journal | Analysis |
Print ISSN | 0003-2638 |
Electronic ISSN | 1467-8284 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 73 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 455-462 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant038 |
Keywords | Dispositions, Nominalism, One over many. |
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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.', Analysis., 73 (3). pp. 455-462 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/3/455.
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