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Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience

Ratcliffe, M.

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Authors

M. Ratcliffe



Abstract

In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (a) a scientifically testable claim and (b) a plausible hypothesis serve to open up some important philosophical issues concerning interpretive backgrounds that are presupposed in the assessment of scientific hypotheses. More specifically, I argue that 'naturalism' or 'scientific objectivism' in its various forms is not simply a neutral or default methodological backdrop for empirical inquiry but involves acceptance of a specific ontology, which functions as an implicit and unargued constitutive commitment. Hence these neurological studies can be employed as a lever with which to disclose something of the ways in which different frameworks of interpretation, both theistic and atheistic, serve to differently structure and give meaning to empirical findings.

Citation

Ratcliffe, M. (2003). Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience. Religious Studies, 39(3), 323-345. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006413

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2003-09
Deposit Date May 23, 2008
Publicly Available Date May 23, 2008
Journal Religious Studies
Print ISSN 0034-4125
Electronic ISSN 1469-901X
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 39
Issue 3
Pages 323-345
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006413
Keywords Ramachandran, Evolution, Epilepsy.

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Copyright Statement
© 2003 Cambridge University Press





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