Globalisation and Roman cultural heritage

Robert Witcher (University of Durham)

Introduction

This chapter explores the intersection of contemporary globalisation and Roman cultural heritage and, specifically, tangible heritage in the form of archaeological landscapes, sites, monuments and artefacts. It works across a number of closely-related disciplines in order to evaluate the distinctive position of Roman heritage and its diverse academic treatments, political appropriations and popular receptions. It will take the imperial frontier provinces and, in particular, the Frontiers of the Roman Empire World Heritage Site (WHS), as a case study. The starting premise is that, just as the intimate historical relationship between archaeology and nationalism had been clarified,1 globalisation has undermined the nation state and hence archaeologists are confronted with the renewed task of redefining the relationship between past and present.2 The particularly close relationship which arose between Roman archaeology and nationalism during the 19th and early 20th centuries raises questions about the continued relevance of this heritage for a post-national global order. In particular, the prevailing rhetoric of the globalised present asserts that borders and boundaries retreated with the nation state and hence the study of Roman frontiers might therefore be perceived as particularly passé. Yet, one of the many paradoxes of recent globalisation is the resurgence of the nation state. In such a context, might Roman cultural heritage be of renewed resonance? Not least, the revival of the nation state has been accompanied by the resurgence of old as well as new borders suggesting that the Roman imperial frontiers might assume a newly relevant role in contemporary mobilisations of Rome’s cultural heritage. Advancing from this starting point, the aim of this paper is to reinforce calls for archaeologists to reflect on the political positioning of their research and how they communicate it beyond the immediate discipline, and to consider the problems and opportunities of Roman cultural heritage at the intersection of archaeology, politics, tourism, economics, and identity.

Globalisation versus globalism

In recent years, a number of scholars have suggested globalisation might be a useful lens through which to understand the Roman world.3 These contributions must be put into wider context. Since the late 1990s, historians and archaeologists of many other periods and places have also employed the concept and/or the vocabulary of globalisation in their research, including studies of the Iron Age/Hellenistic Mediterranean,4 and the Germani of early Medieval Europe.5 These contributions restrict themselves to single period examples and surprisingly few make explicit whether they believe globalisation is only of relevance to their particular case study or whether it is of broader value for understanding other periods and places as well.6

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1 e.g. Trigger 2006.
3 e.g. Hitchner 2008; Pitts 2008; Sweetman 2007; Witcher 2000.
4 Hodos 2010b.
5 Heather 2010.
6 A number of collected case studies have begun to appear including LaBianca and Scham 2006; De Angelis, forthcoming. Also, most recently, note the ambitious integrated comparative study of Uruk, Cahokia and Huari by Jennings 2011.
All, however, are explicit in their use of the concepts and terminology of globalisation. In contrast, though Horden and Purcell’s influential volume *The Corrupting Sea* (2000) has been characterised as a globalising narrative because of its emphasis on connectivity and flows,\(^7\) this description is refuted by at least one of the authors.\(^8\)

These examples, and the others discussed in the introduction to this volume, point toward one clear conclusion: scholars of the Roman empire do not have a monopoly on the use of globalisation for studying the past. Moreover, the chronological and geographical range of these examples is significant because it highlights the fact that the concept of globalisation can be deployed in extremely diverse contexts. One reason for its breadth of apparent significance and applicability is that globalisation is a term which simply describes generic processes of enhanced connectivity and cultural relativisation. The concept itself does not explain any of these specific developments; it is simply a description for periods of particularly intense connectivity and cultural change across the long-term.\(^9\) The Roman empire and the contemporary world are just two phases of globalisation amongst many, each of which requires specific explanation. Whilst there may be some cross-cultural similarities between the mechanisms used by complex societies to expand, interact, and integrate, there are also likely be substantial differences in the specific explanations for the rise of, for example, Uruk, Rome, the Goths and the modern world. To explain why globalisation is particularly intensive today, it is necessary to consider neoliberal political and economic policies, and technologies such as telecommunications; these specific explanations for the contemporary world order have been labelled ‘globalism’. Likewise, alongside descriptions of the Roman empire as globalised, we need to develop an explanatory theory equivalent to contemporary globalism (as also advocated by Nederveen Pieterse in the present volume) to explain the enhanced connectivity of the Roman empire.

During the late 1990s, I wrote a paper entitled *Globalisation and Roman Imperialism* which drew attention to some similarities between Roman imperialism/Romanisation and contemporary globalisation.\(^10\) Though I was careful to note the many differences between the ancient and modern worlds, I was struck by the apparently easy slippage between the two and I subsequently became increasingly concerned that globalisation was simply a fashionable synonym for Romanisation and, worse, one which failed to address the many well-documented conceptual issues associated with the latter. Distinguishing between description and explanation now makes clear to me that the reason Romanisation and globalisation can appear so similar, even interchangeable, is because they are merely descriptions of enhanced connectivity and cultural relativisation. For example, ‘time-space compression’ is simply a generic description which can accommodate both the ancient and contemporary worlds; the explanation for such compression may be as different as the circulation of Roman coinage and the World Wide Web (see also Morley, this volume).

Making a distinction between explanation and description (or cause and effect) also throws light on the debate about whether or not globalisation is universal or uniquely modern. For example, Dench states that ‘[G]lobalisation’ is clearly an anachronistic concept, a phenomenon far more aggressive, divisive and all-seeing than anything of which the Romans were capable even in their wildest dreams’.\(^11\) Pace Dench, I argue that globalisation is not anachronistic; it is a long-term historical phenomenon. The differences between the Roman and contemporary worlds lie not in the existence of such processes, nor even in their scale, but in their specific explanations. Moreover, the real task of the archaeologist and historian is not simply to explain each of these different historical phases individually, but also to explain why some phases were more or less intensive than others.

Recently, the historian Hopkins has suggested that the sudden conversion of many of his colleagues to the cause of historical globalisation was part of a dramatic academic shift following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.\(^12\) The gradual swell of archaeologists’ interest in globalisation may or may not be attributed to this event, but from the particular perspective of Roman archaeology there is arguably a more specific explanation. Around the turn of the millennium, there was a substantial shift in perceptions of the character of contemporary globalisation. In the 1990s, the dominant discourse concerned homogenisation and the levelling of global difference. For the post-colonial generation of Roman scholars, intent on the

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\(^7\) Morris and Manning 2005.

\(^8\) Nicholas Purcell, pers. comm. Morris’ (2003; 2005) ‘Mediterraneanisation’ covers similar ground but explicitly acknowledges the influence of globalisation.

\(^9\) Nederveen Pieterse, this volume, describes this situation as ‘globality’ rather than ‘globalisation’.

\(^10\) Witcher 2000.


\(^12\) Hopkins 2010.
deconstruction of the universalising concept of Romanisation, this type of globalisation was anathema. During the 2000s, however, understanding of globalisation shifted significantly in order to emphasise the diversity of local and regional identities which have proliferated alongside global economic interdependence and political integration. This reorientation towards diversity has had much greater resonance for the post-colonial generation with its insistence on the heterogeneity of Roman identities. Arguably, it is this convergence of ideas which explains why scholars of the Roman world have, after initial hesitation, embraced globalisation, or at least its vocabulary, with some speed and enthusiasm.

Whilst my thinking has inevitably evolved over the decade since my previous contribution, I maintain a strengthened belief that globalisation is of great relevance to studies of the Roman past. In part, this relates to my deeper awareness of, and concerns about, the cultural and political context of (Roman) archaeology. Hence, in this chapter, I approach the subject from a very different perspective compared with my previous contribution. Rather than considering if and how globalisation can help archaeologists to understand the Roman past, my aim is to consider the ways in which the Roman past may help contemporary society to understand the globalised present. How have the artefacts, monuments and landscapes of the Roman past been integrated or ignored in the most recent and intensive phase of globalisation?

Globalisation and heritage

The intimate connection between the nation state and heritage has been well studied. During the 19th century, archaeological sites and monuments were constructed into discourses of inclusion/exclusion, as nations mobilised heritage to counter competing claims of sovereignty and to justify overseas colonial ventures. Their central objective was to replace a kaleidoscopic range of ethnic, cultural and religious identities with strong connections between national citizenship and territory through the promotion of shared historical genealogies. This territorial approach meant that heritage became, and remains, a particular focus of dispute; ownership by one state means that it is not owned by another – a ‘zero sum game’ approach to the past.

Across the contemporary world, cultural heritage is implicated in a growing number of disputes and armed conflicts within and between nation states. Historical sites such as the Preah Vihear temple on the border of Cambodia and Thailand, or the city of Jerusalem, are the subject of competing claims which attempt to assert one cultural, political or religious identity over another through territorial control of cultural heritage. Simultaneously, even paradoxically, there are increasing demands upon heritage to promote social cohesion, to stimulate economic growth, and to generate tourist income. It is within this context that the theory and practice of heritage management have been completely transformed over the past 25 years. The discipline may have started with a focus on the physical conservation of historical sites, but it has reoriented to stress the symbolic value of heritage sites in the creation and contestation of historical and contemporary identities, their role in causing and resolving social injustice, in promoting what might, could or should have been, and in building a better future.

In the contemporary world, cultural heritage has therefore been seen to be both part of the problem (e.g. appropriation by nationalist and colonialisit causes) and part of the solution (e.g. promoting social inclusion). Within this scenario, Roman cultural heritage holds an interesting position. González-Ruibal makes the striking point that whereas ancient Greece has been appropriated in cultural terms, ancient Rome has been appropriated in political terms. Whilst this is a simplification, it effectively underscores the way in which the Roman past has been repeatedly and overtly used by political regimes to justify their actions and

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13 Indeed, this perception is still powerful. For example, Mattingly (2006, 17) cautions about the use of globalisation because it may stress conformity rather than diversity.
14 e.g. Woolf has long argued for the need to juxtapose the ‘diversity and unity’ of Roman provincial culture (e.g. 1992) but has not formulated this explicitly in terms of globalisation until much more recently (e.g. Woolf 2010). Similarly, whilst Woolf’s keynote paper at RAC2001 made cautious use of the language of globalisation, there were multiple and unequivocal references to the ‘global Roman empire’ at RAC2010 and TRAC2011. See also Laurence and Trifolò, this volume.
15 e.g. Hamilakis 2007; Trigger 2006.
16 Ashworth et al. 2007, 37.
17 Ashworth et al. 2007, 40.
18 González-Ruibal 2010.
19 See inter alia Hingley (2000); Munzi (2005).
Globalisation, multiculturalism and plurality

As observed above, globalisation in the 1990s was often understood as homogenisation (‘McDonaldisation’) which was a threat to local, regional and national identities, and this remains a widespread belief. More recent work, however, has recognised the proliferation of identities which result from and accompany the spread of global consumer culture and increased interdependence. Some of these identities have resurfaced, as for example with the collapse of the Soviet Union; other identities have emerged due to the increased mobility of people via migration and diaspora. Heritage is increasingly central for the creation, maintenance and assertion of these identities. In their introduction to this volume, Pitts and Versluys argue that the main impact of globalisation on Roman archaeology to date has been through interest in the issue of identity in the past, paralleling a wider shift in the social sciences from class to race, ethnicity, religion and gender as the preferred categories for sociological analysis. Mattingly’s post-colonial concept of ‘discrepant identities’ in the Roman empire provides a particularly developed example arguing that individuals and groups used identity to emphasise difference as much as to stress unity.

If heritage is increasingly considered central to the assertion of identities, it is also seen as a means to manage these identities via policies such as multiculturalism which seek to recognise the value of, and to create respect for, cultural diversity. Significantly, different nations have their own specific multicultural aims and policies. Some require tolerance, others demand equality; some intend the retention of particularistic identities, others envisage the emergence of new hybrid, cosmopolitan societies. Strictly speaking, multiculturalism is therefore a series of nationally-specific political strategies designed to address contemporary social issues. All, however, impinge upon the issue of heritage and shared historical experiences and values.

As a political strategy, multiculturalism is contentious and is the subject of critique from both the Left and Right. The latter argues that multiculturalism leads to social balkanisation and is therefore a threat to community cohesion and national unity. In contrast, critique from the Left argues that multiculturalism fetishises diversity and therefore does nothing to radically rework social relations or to empower the excluded groups it purports to help; by defining cultures as stable and exotically ‘other’, it is has been seen thereby helps to explain why Roman archaeologists of the later 20th/early 21st centuries more have been wary of engaging with political agendas than scholars of some other periods and places.

Yet if archaeologists have been reticent to address the contemporary and political dimension of the Roman past, others have not. Heritage professionals, museum practitioners, novelists, journalists and TV producers all find the Roman empire a source of particular fascination. From the perspective of communicating with the public about the past and its resonance with the present, the Roman empire delivers an abundance of historical detail, monuments and personal artefacts such as writing tablets and tombstones which provide tangible insights into the lives of individual Roman subjects (Figure 1). This fascination must be understood in terms of the deeply embedded ancestral status many Western European countries ascribe to the Roman past and both actively and passively inculcate through processes such as schooling and ‘banal nationalism’. In the Western imagination, the chronological remoteness of the Roman past has been bridged via engrained societal admiration for the technological superiority of straight roads, flushing toilets and under-floor heating, and the civilising gifts of language, law and art. Even dystopic visions of Rome, particularly popular with Hollywood film makers, tend to contrast the corrupt Rome of the emperors with the lost and honourable ideals of the republic. Given the historical development of Roman archaeology and the centrality of Rome in the Western imagination, what changes if any of perspective and interpretation have occurred as a result of contemporary globalisation?

[Figure 1 Tombstone of Regina near here]
as cosmetic and depoliticising rather than transformative. Still others argue that the concept is useful, but that the terminology has become impractical.

Notwithstanding such critiques of contemporary multiculturalism, there are growing numbers of references to historical multicultural societies in both academic contexts (e.g. the Caliphate of Cordoba, Roman York etc), and in broadsheet newspaper articles and museum exhibitions. These references to historical multiculturalisms find resonance in the past for a key contemporary issue. Most such uses of this term, however, appear to mean simply that two or more cultural or ethnic groups co-existed. In this weak descriptive sense – for which plurality is arguably more appropriate – all societies are multicultural. Empires are particularly multicultural, if not fundamentally so, because of their territorial expansion, strategies of deportation and military recruitment, and the inability to enforce cultural change across large and diverse subject populations; empires also create new opportunities for voluntary movement such as trade. The notion that societies might not be plural is a legacy of 19th century nationalism. Dench considers multicultural Rome to be ‘vague but politically resonant, and generally aspirational”, but finds problematic an approach to ancient societies which are “imagined to be like ‘us’, as ‘we’ aspire to be, or the opposite of ‘ourselves’.

The re-invention of Rome as a model of inclusiveness needs to be treated with caution. As well as concerns about the unqualified use of the term multicultural, there are many examples of national, colonial and neoliberal projects which have eulogised Rome’s supposed tolerance as a means of incorporating others. For example, the French and Italians cited Rome’s ‘openness’ with its citizenship to justify their colonial ventures in North Africa. More generally, the representation of distinct ethnic and cultural groups by colonial powers is rarely a celebration of diversity for diversity’s sake, but rather an assertion of power through the spectacle of varied and exotic conquered peoples. Indeed, the much wider focus on identity and multiculturalism across the social sciences has been critiqued as a smokescreen for the ongoing political and economic project of globalism, obscuring the importance of underlying power asymmetries and inadvertently perpetuating the inequalities it aspires to address.

In sum, multiculturalism is progressive, but may also have some regressive tendencies. In applying this term to the past, or focusing more generally on identity, we should take care to consider the underlying issues of power in both past and present. We must recognise historical diversity and explore its significance, but we must also avoid replacing one unsatisfactory model with another. The significant question is therefore not whether past societies were plural but the ways in which that plurality was constituted, its extent, and its motivations. Were there mechanisms which promoted or repressed plurality? What were the social and political contexts in which identities were asserted? More specifically, was Rome more plural than any other society? Or was it more important to emphasise plurality and consequently it is more visible in the archaeological record?

Globalisation and cosmopolitanism

The intersection of proliferating identities and heritage is expressed through increasing dispute based on territorial claims to specific monuments or landscapes. To challenge such regressive and rooted appropriations of the past, a notion of a common human heritage has been promoted. For example, sub-Saharan archaeology has concentrated on human evolution as the shared inheritance of all. But such a focus conveniently predates recent historical colonialisms which complicate the picture. Meanwhile Meskell, arguing that globalisation is implicated in neoliberal globalism, promotes a cosmopolitan archaeology which

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27 See Ashworth et al. (2007, 19).
28 e.g. Ang 2005.
30 Leach et al. 2010.
31 e.g. Higgins 2009.
36 These issues are certainly not incompatible, as Mattingly (2010) clearly demonstrates through his integration of identity with economy and imperialism. He does not use the term multiculturalism.
intends to encompass a single global community united by diversity and tolerance.\textsuperscript{38} In particular, she stresses the ambition to elide past and present and to make political action the goal of the discipline. Such a cosmopolitan archaeology firmly closes any divide between archaeology and heritage.\textsuperscript{39} Cosmopolitan archaeology, however, must navigate a precarious path between universalism and particularism. Not least, some ideals such as democracy, secularism and even some human rights may be perceived as new forms of Western colonialism.\textsuperscript{40} In this context, González-Ruibal argues that the language of ‘cooperation’ which underpins cosmopolitanism can conceal existing inequalities whilst imposing essentially Western concepts such as choice and individualism.\textsuperscript{41}

Such criticisms aside, from the perspective of Roman cultural heritage, the most significant issue with these attempts to link archaeology and heritage in common political cause concerns the apparent limits of their geographical and chronological scope. For example, the case studies in \textit{Cosmopolitan Archaeologies} notably exclude one whole continent – Europe – and its southern colonial extension, North Africa.\textsuperscript{42} The case studies also focus on recent colonial and contemporary examples and exclude any reference to classical antiquity, including the Roman empire. This raises the question of whether there are regions and periods which cosmopolitan archaeology cannot or does not wish to address. If this is the case, where does this leave the practice of politically-engaged archaeology in Europe and North Africa, and where does it leave wider Roman cultural heritage? Here, we might discern an artificial divide between European ‘public’ or ‘community’ archaeology which seeks to reconcile indigenous majorities with immigrant minorities, and ‘cosmopolitan’ or indigenous archaeology practised elsewhere in the world which seeks to empower either indigenous minorities (e.g. US, Australia) or former colonial subjects (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa). In this scenario, Roman cultural heritage is ignored, and the Roman cultural heritage of North Africa and the Middle East is left doubly so.\textsuperscript{43}

In fact, despite the perceived centrality of the Roman past for Western Europe (and via colonialism, the wider world),\textsuperscript{44} Roman cultural heritage is barely mentioned in wider debates by archaeologists and heritage professionals. For example, only one paper on Roman archaeology can be found in each of the volumes: \textit{Cultural Identity and Archaeology} and \textit{The Politics of Archaeology and Identity in a Global Context}.\textsuperscript{45} Of course, with their global coverage, we should not expect many papers on Roman archaeology in such volumes; perhaps more telling is the recent issue of \textit{Archaeological Dialogues} (2008, volume 15.1) on European Archaeology which scarcely mentions the subject (Breeze’s two-page contribution on the \textit{Frontiers of the Roman Empire} WHS is a welcome but late addition). Hence, despite developing an impressive post-colonial literature of its own,\textsuperscript{46} Roman archaeology appears to be of marginal interest or relevance to the wider archaeological community. It seems that for other academic archaeologists, Roman cultural heritage is tainted by nationalism (Europe) and colonialism (North Africa and the Middle East). Past historical appropriations, combined with a misperception that the subject is theoretically-uninformed and text-driven, makes Roman archaeology appear irrelevant at best and toxic at worst. Yet, in sharp contrast to its marginalisation within academic archaeology, the Roman past remains as popular as ever within wider public discourse through television, film, tourism, museums and books.

Roman cultural heritage therefore occupies an interesting position, straddling not only historical, political and religious divides, but a major theoretical fault-line. More than ever, it is imperative for Roman archaeologists to grasp the full breadth of the empire – a global empire – and not to fragment it into East and West, in either the Roman or contemporary senses. It is the case study \textit{par excellence} of the questions of value raised by a common heritage divided between nations of very different subsequent histories.

\textsuperscript{38} Meskell 2009, 25.
\textsuperscript{39} See also Samuels (2008, 80-2).
\textsuperscript{40} Ashworth \textit{et al.} 2007, 28; Holtorf 2009, 679.
\textsuperscript{41} González-Ruibal 2009; 2010.
\textsuperscript{42} Meskell 2009. The exclusion of North Africa seems to support Garcea’s (2005, 111) observation that only sub-Saharan Africa is seen to contribute to sensitive issues of indigenous archaeology leading to a general marginalisation of North Africa by archaeologists.
\textsuperscript{43} Mattingly’s (1996) paper on Roman archaeology in the Maghreb is an early and important exception.
\textsuperscript{44} e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000.
\textsuperscript{46} e.g. Mattingly 2010; Webster 2001.
Globalisation and the Roman frontiers

During the 1980/90s, scholars of globalisation heralded the imminent demise of the nation state and, concomitantly, international frontiers. For example, Giddens and others argued for a radical de-territorialisation, with the nation state and its sovereign borders receding under pressure from market and technological forces. Frontiers were out; networks were in. Within Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall opened the way to recreate the European border as ‘past’ or heritage. The subsequent Schengen Agreement means that borders are now most often encountered as irritating queues at a city airport rather than as a peripheral and militarised border. During the early 21st century, however, resurgent nationalism has led to a process of re-territorialisation and (Schengen Europe aside) a proliferation of political frontiers, from Israel/Palestine, via US/Mexico, to the Arctic. Giddens et al. can now be seen to have overstated the imminent demise of the nation state and are even viewed by some as apologists for globalism. Against this shifting background, heritage has become more contested and arguably the Roman frontiers have acquired renewed resonance.

The city of Rome is traditionally seen as the cosmopolis, the world city where it was possible to experience the diversity of the empire as a whole. In contrast, the frontiers were physically and culturally peripheral. Through imperial agency, however, the diversity of the empire was just as visible on the frontiers as at Rome itself. John Steinbeck captured this perfectly: ‘…one bicycle trip along Hadrian’s Wall makes you know the Roman Empire as you never could otherwise’. The remainder of this chapter therefore turns to the imperial frontiers and the frontier provinces as a case study to explore the intersection of archaeology, politics, economy, tourism and identity.

Hadrian’s Wall

Given its high profile and protected status, it would be easy to imagine that Hadrian’s Wall has always been culturally valued; much of this attention, however, is relatively recent. A new phase in the monument’s biography began in 1987 when the Wall was inscribed on the UNESCO list of WHSs in recognition of its ‘Outstanding Universal Value’. Since then, the Wall has undergone a marked physical and symbolic renaissance. It has been made to serve as an international tourist destination but also to promote regional economic regeneration and social inclusion. Its primacy in these roles has been recognised more recently through the creation in 2006 of Hadrian’s Wall Heritage Ltd, subsequently renamed Hadrian’s Wall Trust in 2012; this organisation is charged with the dual task of managing the WHS and promoting regional economic regeneration. It may have been a marriage of convenience, but the choice of partner is no less significant. The agency’s name signals that one heritage (Roman) is valued over others (e.g. coal-mining, ship-building, Northumbrian Christianity, Border Reiver, etc.). At the eastern end of the Wall, on Tyneside, the renaissance of Hadrian’s Wall as a tool for economic regeneration has been characterised as a shift in values away from the recent post-industrial legacy of economic decline towards the more positive and inclusive opportunities offered by the Roman past. Across the wider region, since 2009, major new museum galleries focusing on the Roman past have been opened at Carlisle, Newcastle, Vindolanda and York, as well as Glasgow in Scotland. Compared to the protracted and disputed proposals for Stonehenge, the political momentum and economic resource invested in Hadrian’s Wall and the Roman heritage of northern Britain speaks volumes.

The Wall has long been implicated in English/British national identity, a trend which continues. For example, the (now defunct) government sponsored website www.icons.org.uk named Hadrian’s Wall as one of a series of English icons for the 21st century, serving to reaffirm the Wall’s significance for national identity. A particular trend has been to describe the Wall as multicultural; for example, a recent exhibition sought to transform the Wall from a monument of/to imperial might into an exemplar of cultural diversity. For some Roman specialists, the recent attention given to the Wall’s cultural diversity is something of a

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47 Giddens 1990.
49 Ashworth et al. 2007, 55.
51 Steinbeck 1989, 709.
52 For a taste of the changing valuations and disputes, see Hutton (1802); Davies (1974); Norman (2008).
53 Usherwood 1996.
54 Hingley, 2012.
55 Tolia-Kelly 2011.
surprise, as the ethnic and cultural identity of the Wall’s garrisons has long been a focus of enquiry. \textsuperscript{56} The novelty of a multicultural Wall, however, is not in the discovery of diversity in the past, but rather a new sensitivity towards it and the political desire to act upon it by authorities, archaeologists and public alike. \textsuperscript{57} Yet such re-imagining is not unproblematic. These appropriations of Hadrian’s Wall tend to perpetuate the well-known tendency to recreate the past as better than the present. Unpleasantness, inequality, brutality, and evil do not serve the purposes of those attempting to reconcile social differences, to regenerate economies or to attract tourists. \textsuperscript{58} If the past is to be a model for the future, it has to be made to reflect that aspirational state. Superficially, the pluralism of the Wall’s population looks attractive for the idea of a model community of diversity and tolerance; but as noted above, “multicultural” means different things to different people and in many cases is simply used as a synonym for plurality. Either way, there is limited attempt to explain why these different groups co-existed on the Wall and why they felt it important to express their different ethnic and cultural identities. What is missing in such accounts is the issue of power. In this Utopian society, each identity is placed on an equal footing. This may be politically desirable for presentist purposes, but it obscures the inequalities between legionaries and auxiliaries, military and civilian, men and women, colonisers and colonised in the past. More significantly, the wider political context of the Roman world is ignored. The population of the Wall did not live in a Western democracy; what brought these people together voluntarily or by force was an autocratic regime based on an expansionist military project. The integrative power of the Roman world was colonialism – hardly an aspirational model for the present. \textsuperscript{59} This colonialism created and sustained a highly plural Roman society, but once the expansion of the empire slowed, so too did its power to disperse and mix populations. In other words, once we begin to explain the dynamic of the plural/multicultural Wall, rather than simply to describe its existence, its value as a straightforward model begins to unravel.

The problem with all of these narratives, as Morley has recently noted, is that those making these appropriations are frequently untroubled by ‘academic’ details such as context and hence they are free to make highly selective use of the evidence. \textsuperscript{60} Rome’s cultural pluralism was not underpinned by any ideological respect for cultural difference (i.e. a policy of multiculturalism), but rather by the fact that it had limited power to enforce an alternative even if had so wished. Rome tolerated diversity as long as it was supplemented by acceptance of a limited set of core values (e.g. law, property) and political loyalty (e.g. the imperial cult, the military cult of disciplina). But further, Rome did not simply insert a set of core values amongst a diversity of existing identities; Rome’s actions also served to create or even exacerbate cultural difference. For example, the strategy of recruiting garrisons of soldiers from one region and deploying them to another can be seen to have created the conditions in which the expression of ethnic and cultural difference might have become particularly important. Derks and Roymans note that ethnic identities are always constructed in association with power – and often colonial power. \textsuperscript{61} Far from homogenising difference, Roman incorporation stimulated a wealth of new identities. In sum, current re-imaginings of the Wall as a model for the present and future are well-meant, but one-sided. They achieve their goal by taking a selective approach to the evidence, static snapshots which describe but conveniently do not explain and which ironically reduces their resonance for the globalised present (see below) and also leaves them vulnerable to nationalist counter-narratives which assert parity on the grounds of equally selective use of the evidence. Instead of idealising the past, we need to find ways to accommodate ambivalent or troubling heritage and to acknowledge its inherent conflicts. \textsuperscript{62} This should also make our interpretations more robust and therefore less vulnerable to ideological misappropriation.

In fact, the Wall offers a striking opportunity to communicate a story with real significance for contemporary identities in a globalised world. Just as we debate plurality and the extension of citizenship, so Roman society also reflected on the consequences of imperial expansion for its own and others’ identities. \textsuperscript{63} Just as neoliberal globalist policies have empowered some and marginalised others, so the Roman empire similarly created both opportunity and oppression. In this context, we should recognise that the characterisation of Hadrian’s Wall as plural is simply an initial and descriptive step. It provides no explanation for that plurality.

\textsuperscript{56} See Hingley (2008); most recently, Swan (2009).
\textsuperscript{57} Ashworth \textit{et al.} 2007, 45.
\textsuperscript{58} Ashworth \textit{et al.} 2007, 52; Silberman 1995, 260.
\textsuperscript{59} See de Souza Briggs (2004).
\textsuperscript{60} Morley 2010.
\textsuperscript{61} Derks and Roymans 2009, 2. For similar arguments, see also Ando 2010 and Woolf 2009.
\textsuperscript{62} Copeland 2002; González-Ruibal 2010.
\textsuperscript{63} See Dench (2005, 5).
Indeed, the explanation (i.e. colonialism) might be seen to undermine the value of the Wall as an ideal for contemporary society. Yet, if we refuse to reduce the past to a simple model to be imitated, then explanation can add much more nuance and resonance to the story. In particular, it can address the complex ways in which individuals and groups were brought together in a colonial context and simultaneously empowered and marginalised. It is an approach in which Regina can be acknowledged as an example of a ‘mixed marriage’ but also as the former slave of her husband; (Figure 1); where African soldiers were deployed as auxiliaries against their will but whose military identity afforded them some privileges and powers denied to others; and where Britain was garrisoned by a ‘Roman’ army whilst British men were posted elsewhere as ‘Roman’ soldiers to garrison other peoples’ land. In short, if archaeologists can claim a particular contribution to addressing some of the problems of the contemporary world, it is by demonstrating how identities are contextually and culturally-constructed and how they have evolved over time.  

From Hadrian’s Wall to the frontiers of the Roman empire

In 2005, the Hadrian’s Wall WHS was renamed as the Frontiers of the Roman Empire and extended to include a stretch of the Roman frontier in Germany; in 2008, it was further extended to include the Antonine Wall in Scotland. The ultimate ambition is to extend this WHS to encompass the entire frontier system through Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in recognition of its ‘Outstanding Universal Value’. This is a highly ambitious, long-term project which intends to create a WHS which is not simply transnational, but transcontinental – a WHS fit for the globalising times. Given the many and diverse countries involved, the official documentation is a powerful medium through which the conceptual unity of the frontiers is to be created and reinforced.

Breeze’s account of the Frontiers of the Roman Empire WHS nomination process catalogues some of the many challenges encountered. Notably, his discussion is connected with the pragmatic issues of differing national approaches to Cultural Resource Management (e.g. legal, linguistic, procedural, etc.). There is limited consideration of the wider social and political dimensions that such an international site of Roman cultural heritage raise across the diverse nations of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Clearly, those involved are well aware of such issues, and it is no criticism to observe that in order to make progress they have focused on finding common ground; legal and technical standards are easier to agree than social, political and cultural values. But what is the ‘Universal Value’ of a Roman frontier for countries as diverse as Scotland, Bulgaria, Syria and Morocco?

Critics of the concept of World Heritage stress the way in which universalist rhetoric is used to legitimise national heritage discourses. For example, Long and Labadi note the wide international appeal of WHS status is not a ‘shared and altruistic appreciation of cultural diversity’ rather ‘nations use the alleged universalism of the World Heritage Convention for their own nationalistic purposes’. Indeed, ‘it is this very universalised and de-politicised veneer that seems attractive to nation-states’. Ironically, World Heritage has not only perpetuated nationalist agendas, but actually strengthened them. One effect may be to disenfranchise local expressions of identity beneath larger national formulations. For example, beyond their state-sponsored value for tourism, Silberman notes the potential ambiguity of sites such as Ephesus, Baalbek, Jerash and Petra for local populations. Transnational or even transcontinental WHS status may promote the language of international cooperation, but is susceptible to nationalist appropriation and may also lead to tensions with more local and regional expressions of identity.

Political authorities have repeatedly appropriated the physical and symbolic heritage of earlier regimes to legitimise their status. Some claim direct cultural or ideological connections, but the shared aim of all states is to secure the power which rests upon the preservation of the symbolic significance of heritage as signs of political authority. Indeed, nation states are particularly adept at integrating and deploying disparate

64 Jones and Graves-Brown 1996, 19.
65 Breeze and Young 2008.
66 e.g. providing multilingual documentation including Arabic; the integral discussion of sites in the Middle East and North Africa in the volume on the European Dimension of a WHS, Breeze and Jilek (2008).
67 Breeze 2007.
69 Ibid., 9.
70 Salazar 2010, 134.
71 Silberman 1995.
monuments, with which they may not claim any shared values, for their own nationalist ends. When it comes to the past, it seems that territorial control trumps ideological affiliation. A journey along the Roman frontiers, starting in the UK, well illustrates this situation.

The markedly differing public profiles of Hadrian’s Wall (England) and the Antonine Wall (Scotland) arguably relates to the very different contexts in which these monuments have been historically investigated and incorporated into political discourses. The successful nomination to UNESCO of the Antonine Wall as part of the Frontiers of the Roman Empire WHS in 2008 can be understood as a Scottish nationalist enterprise. Historically, as a relic of Roman (and by association, English) oppression, the Antonine Wall has played a limited role in Scottish history and identity. But within an increasingly autonomous Scotland, and with strong support from the devolved Scottish National Party administration, the Antonine Wall now forms part of an international WHS which commands national parity with not only the ‘English’ Hadrian’s Wall, but also the Taj Mahal, Angkor Wat and the Pyramids.

In much of Western Europe, the centrality of Roman cultural heritage to national identities is long-established. Through historical colonialism, the Roman heritage of the Middle East and North Africa has also been appropriated to European national causes. The ‘value’ of Roman heritage to Middle Eastern and North African nation states may therefore appear doubly problematic, representing not simply one (ancient) Western occupation but also a number of more recent interventions justified by repeated reference to the first. What may appear as monuments to (repeated) colonial oppression, however, can be re-imagined by these states for their own nationalist purposes.

Unlike in much of Western Europe, in the Middle East, the Roman past forms just one part of a broader Classical heritage and is just one of many colonial experiences; the archaeology of these different periods is also crosscut by religion. In Jordan, pre-Islamic archaeology has been used to assert the historical legitimacy of the Jordanian people and their territory, tracing an indigenous Nabataean identity to the monuments which command national parity with not only the ‘English’ Hadrian’s Wall, but also the Taj Mahal, Angkor Wat and the Pyramids.

Meanwhile, across the Israeli border, the site of Zippori (ancient Sepphoris) is promoted as a multicultural Roman city with a mixed religious population which lived in peace and respect. But tourists will find no mention of the forcible depopulation of the Palestinian village which was removed in order to excavate and display the site. Moreover, although the site is presented as a multicultural city, Bauman’s research demonstrates that the majority of visitors leave with the message that it was a specifically Jewish city. For Israel and its neighbouring states, the Classical/Roman past might therefore be seen as universally useful but with no agreement about its ‘Universal Value’. It is not, however, simply religion and the Arab-Israeli conflict which complicates the value of such heritage across the Middle East and North Africa.

Silberman argues that post-colonial states in these regions have invested in archaeology as the tried-and-tested means of building national pasts for both domestic and international audiences. In particular, many of states perpetuate the archaeological practices of former colonial regimes in order to assert equal status as sovereign members of the global community; this has led to a prioritisation of certain types of site with an emphasis on large-scale, impressive, masonry constructions. In the Mediterranean... that means sprawling, marble-column-filled classical sites. It also means urban sites along the tourist coast rather than the military frontier sites of remoter inland areas.

This appropriation of Classical/Roman cultural heritage for national purposes has also been detected in Turkey. Here, Atakuman argues that the choice of candidate WHSs reflects Turkey’s specific relationship

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72 The example of the Imperial Palace in Beijing is informative. The new Communist state recognised its central importance for stability and political legitimacy both at home and abroad. Rather than destroy this monument to the former emperor’s power, the Palace was transformed into an international symbol of feudal oppression shared by all, but simultaneously a monument to a specifically Chinese nation state (Hamlish 2000, 150).
73 Silberman 1995.
74 Addison 2004, fn.74; Maffi 2009.
75 See also Addison (2004); Hazbun (2004, 326).
76 See Bauman (2004).
77 For an identical situation at Dougga in Tunisia, see Samuels (2008, 84-5).
78 Bauman 2004, 221.
79 Silberman 1995.
with the West. In order to signal its readiness to join the EU, Turkey promoted multi-period sites which stressed tolerance and plurality (e.g. The Old City of Istanbul). But following the most recent blockage to Turkey’s entry into the EU, nominations switched to Classical/Roman sites such as Aphrodisias and Sagalassos. Atakuman interprets this as an assertion of the territorial possession of sites which historically have been appropriated into a Western genealogy. In other words, Atakuman argues that the nomination of Classical/Roman sites is not a request for recognition of their ‘Universal Value’, but a claim of nationalist control in a game of international diplomacy intended to mark out the distance between Turkey and the EU.

Meanwhile, in Tunisia, the World Bank and the former Ben Ali government used heritage and tourism to instigate neoliberal economic restructuring. The choice of sites for development was politically and culturally significant, such as the selection of Oudna (ancient Uthina) for $1.29m of investment; this prioritised a Roman site, attractive to Western tourists rather than sites of, for example, local Berber or Islamic significance.

By inscribing the frontiers of the Roman empire as a WHS and promoting cooperation across international borders, UNESCO could be seen to be moving with the globalising times. Yet, any extension of this WHS across other European, Middle Eastern or North African countries is likely to be based on the national claims of those countries, just as in England, Scotland and Germany, to ‘their’ Roman cultural heritage. Hadrian’s Wall has become an English monument and the Antonine Wall a Scottish monument, in the same way that the Pont du Gard is a French monument, and Lepcis Magna is a Libyan monument. World Heritage designation, and the concomitant commodification and tourism which follows, epitomise the globalising tension between the universal and the particular.

Finally, in pondering the value of the Roman frontiers, it is instructive to remember that these are not the only problematic historical boundaries to cross Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Some, such as the Moroccan Wall in the western Sahara are poorly known and little visited. Others, such as the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain have been appropriated into new inclusive heritage discourses which stress German and European integration. The Iron Curtain, in particular, has been creatively re-imagined as the European Greenbelt (Das Grüne Band), a corridor of biodiversity and ecological cooperation stretching from the Arctic Circle across central Europe to the Black and Adriatic Seas (www.greenbelt-europe.eu, Figure 2). Under the slogan ‘Borders divide, nature unites’, it seeks to promote international environmental cooperation across Europe, finding new meaning and resonance without losing sight of its unsettling history. The Frontiers of the Roman Empire WHS might similarly take a line which once divided and re-imagine it as a line which connects. But more importantly, it should value this line not for what it was, but for what it can tell us about the present and future. This must involve incorporating the full (i.e. pre- and especially post-Roman) biography of these landscapes and monuments in order to draw out the diversity of their local, national and international significance. Paradoxically, the Frontiers of the Roman Empire cannot be a uniquely Roman cultural heritage; if it is to have wide resonance, it must encompass the diversity of responses to the Roman past as well. In practice, this means reversing the usual process through which heritage is globalised. Typically local heritage supplies the unique and particular places which the market commodifies and sells as tourist destinations for global consumption; instead we need to take a ‘global’ Roman heritage and to reconnect it to local communities. This may also address the classic tourist problem of substitutability, that is, why visit a destination if you have already visited somewhere similar? The closely-spaced and superficially similar forts of Hadrian’s Wall are a case in point. By developing such sites as local and unique expressions of a global culture, with rich post-Roman histories, there is more scope to differentiate them and to encourage tourists to visit more than one of them.

80 Atakuman 2010.
81 Samuels 2008, 76-8.
82 Brooks 2005.
83 Baker 1993.
84 UNESCO has recently published a manifesto on the contribution of World Heritage to global ethics (Albert et al. 2012). The Frontiers of the Roman Empire WHS is explicitly identified, if only with a single sentence, as a valuable example of the history and evolution of globalization, alongside other examples including the Silk Roads and pilgrimage routes such as that to Santiago de Compostela (von Droste 2012). The Roman frontiers aside, a few individual Roman monuments have been appropriated for new causes, most obviously, the Colosseum as a symbol of the campaign for the abolition of capital punishment, Hopkins and Beard 2005.
85 For some of the challenges of marketing Hadrian’s Wall, see Warnaby et al. (2010). On the post-Roman biography of Hadrian’s Wall, Hingley et al. 2012.
Globalisation in the past versus globalising the past

One possible definition of heritage is: ‘the use of the past as a cultural, political and economic resource in the present’. 86 It treats the past as a ‘quarry of possible raw materials from which a deliberate selection can occur’. 87 Arguably, such presentism and selectivity are no less characteristic of archaeology. In this context, I question the premise that we can and should make a clear distinction between globalisation in the past and globalising the past. For example, above it has been noted that the universal values and international mechanisms espoused by UNESCO can be subverted for nationalist purposes. This observation seems little different from interpretations which argue that Greco-Roman models were adopted and adapted by non-Romans to reassert their local or hybrid identities – whether building a Hellenistic theatre at Pietrabonda to declare Samnite identity, 88 or adopting the accoutrement of a polis in the Syrian desert to assert a distinctively Palmyrene identity. 89 Similarly, when Whittaker argues that the question is not whether the Roman empire was full of multiple ethnic identities, but what values or mechanisms underpinned this plurality, how far can his question be separated from our contemporary concerns about cultural cohesion and pluralism? 90 And to what extent can we distinguish the idea that foreigners have been written out of accounts of British national history, 91 from the observation that local German groups were written out of the history of Roman Xanten and Cologne? 92 Are we reading the present back into the past? Or has ‘the classical world come back to us’? 93 I suggest that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish globalisation in the Roman past from globalising the Roman past.

Likewise, what or for whom is a multicultural Hadrian’s Wall intended? Is it to explain the Roman past? Or to engage the public, especially those groups who may not previously have seen Roman cultural heritage as ‘theirs’? Is it intended as a model of social cohesion for the present and an aspiration for the future? Is it a way of catching the media’s attention, attracting more tourists and winning research grants? In the globalised world, where archaeology is at the intersection of politics, identity, tourism and market forces, all these uses and more blur together.

This does not mean that we can and should simply impose the present on the past, nor should we recreate the past as we would like it to have been. Rather, it recognises that the data we select, the questions we ask and interpretative frameworks we employ cannot be separated from our contemporary perspectives. Globalising heritage should not aim to find a universal history for all, nor should it accept the fragmentation of heritage into seven billion ancestry projects. Rather, it needs to develop an approach which acknowledges the tensions of global and local, and which blurs the distance between past and present without disregarding their real differences. 94 In practical terms, the development of more plural and inclusive histories is not predicated on finding individual sites to serve specific interest groups, but drawing out the full biography of multi-period sites, whether recognising mosques in the ruins of Roman towns in North Africa, or stressing the cultural diversity of ‘Roman’ soldiers on Hadrian’s Wall in wider colonial context. 95

Conclusions

One reason that archaeologists and historians have been cautious about exploring globalisation in the ancient past has been the broader debate about whether or not contemporary globalisation represents a ‘good thing’. And if it is not a good thing, does talk of globalisation in the Roman past provide legitimacy and historical pedigree to a Western version of global history? These are not debates which need to be resolved before exploring the value of the concept for the Roman past. Indeed, Rome’s cultural heritage is one of the means

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86 Ashworth et al. 2007, 3.
87 Ashworth et al. 2007, 40.
89 Sommer 2005b.
90 Whittaker 2009.
91 Tolia-Kelly 2011.
92 Derks and Roymans 2009, 8.
93 Mount 2010.
95 Witcher et al. 2010.
through which we might explore such questions. Significantly, debate over whether globalisation is both good and bad can be seen to parallel discussion in the Roman past about the positive and negative effects of imperial expansion on Roman identity.96

Another specific issue about exploring ancient globalisations is the concern about the imposition of anachronistic ideas and terminology on the past.97 In this context, it is useful to remember that, whilst the concept of Roman imperialism is now ubiquitous, its initial application to the Roman past provoked much controversy.98 Terms such as imperialism and Romanisation have now become orthodox and their original controversial status has been eclipsed. A strong argument in favour of the use of terminology and concepts such as globalisation is that it is more obviously ‘modern’ and therefore we are more alert to the complexities of the debate (see also the introduction to this volume).

If we accept a presentist definition of heritage and archaeology, then different periods of human history will become more or less useful depending on the changing requirements of the present: promoting social cohesion, regenerating economies, or boosting tourism. Yet, Rome has loomed large in the consciousness of European societies for centuries. It seems capable of continual reinvention for presentist purposes; this centrality speaks volumes about the ancestral value ascribed to it and, moreover, implicates Roman cultural heritage in the current global order. In this context, Morley has recently argued that the core task of the Roman historian is to expose Rome’s centrality in order to critique the current global order.99 Globalising the Roman past helps to relativise – or perhaps more appropriately, provincialise – Rome’s cultural heritage so that it sits alongside other historical societies, within and beyond Europe. For example, by putting the Roman empire into comparative and long-term perspective, both Rome and contemporary Western dominance may be exposed as anomalous episodes in a longer process in which China and the East have been more dominant.100

Within academia, Roman archaeology has sought to de-colonise itself through explicit recognition of its past complicity; in the process it has addressed the legacy of colonialism through innovative post-colonial perspectives. But as we move into the wider domain of heritage, museums and the media, there are still plenty of examples where old colonial categories are perpetuated or which promote well-meant but flawed visions of the Roman past which lack awareness of historical context and political misuse. This is not an argument for academic smugness. We must do more than simply write better post-colonial critiques as part of an internal dialogue; we also need to influence wider public discourse and to address popular (mis)conceptions. It is a call for a closer relationship between archaeologists, heritage professionals, museum practitioners, journalists and TV producers.101 Archaeologists can no longer assert the objectivity of their data and interpretations in order to maintain a neutral position whilst blaming others for misusing their work.102 We need to become more, not less involved in communicating the Roman past and its relevance to the present.

Specifically, we need to tackle uses of the Roman past which promote entirely positive (or negative) visions; instead we need to promote more robust interpretations which engage critically with the data and all its complexity. We need to get past the use of Roman cultural heritage as a mirror, a model or a moral lesson and to communicate its subtleties. There are indeed strong similarities between the Roman past and contemporary world – and the most striking similarity is that it is simplistic to present either as inherently good or bad. Just as modern commentators struggle to reconcile the balance-sheet of contemporary globalisation, so understanding of the Roman period has come to recognise that the Roman empire could both empower and marginalise simultaneously.103 This does not mean, however, that we cannot or should not sit in judgement. But we should do so from a position informed by as much of the evidence as possible, rather than by highly selective samples; the same is true of the contemporary world. In this context, questions about identity asked in the Roman past, such as ‘could a North African be Roman’? resonate with

96 See Dench (2005).
98 See Erskine (2009); Morley (2010).
99 Morley 2010.
100 See Mutschler and Mittag (2008); Scheidel (2009b).
101 e.g. Baram and Rowan 2004, 6; Samuels 2008, 72.
103 Hingley 2009; Mattingly 2010.
questions about identity asked today, such as “is Turkey European?” The point is not to use the past to answer these questions decisively, but to give historical depth to the fact such questions exist and that different answers can and have been proposed. Despite its academic marginalisation, Roman cultural heritage is of central relevance to the globalised present precisely because it has inspired individuals, communities and states for centuries – for the very best and for the very worst of reasons.

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References


104 For example, Suetonius’ Vita Terenti preserves debate between Augustan writers about the identity of the playwright Terence. It is agreed that he was born at Carthage, but perceptions of his precise heritage are affected by the date and circumstances of his enslavement. Snowden (1970, 270) reviews contrasting modern perspectives. The identities of Septimius Severus and Tertullian as Roman and/or African have been similarly debated in the modern literature, Birley (1971); Wilhite (2007).


Captions

Figure 1. Tombstone of Regina (RIB 1065). D(is) M(anibus) Regina liberta et coniuge / Barates Palmyrenus natione / Catuallauna an(norum) XXX (To the spirits of the departed and to Regina, freedwoman and wife of Barates of Palmyra, a Catuvellaunian by tribe, thirty years old). Photo: author.

Figure 2. Map of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East showing the frontiers of the Roman empire (solid black line), Das Grüne Band (dashed line) and the borders of the European Union (solid grey line). (Based on BlankMap-Europe-v4.png available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 licence. © 2006 Roke.)