Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos

Duncombe, Matthew

doi:10.1093/pq/pqu016

Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos

Duncombe, Matthew

Authors

Matthew Duncombe

Abstract

Aristotle's definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18–20 specifies syllogistic consequence as an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle's attempt to brand question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces two problems. First, it fails to consider all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi are deployed. Secondly, irreflexivity rules out only some arguments that Aristotle considers question begging. Here I address these problems. First, I examine all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi can be used. Secondly, I argue that, for each context, irreflexivity makes sense as a condition, but for different reasons. Assuming that a condition which holds in each context is a condition on syllogistic consequence tout court, this explains why Aristotle holds syllogistic consequence to be an irreflexive relation.

Citation

Duncombe, M. (2014). Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos. Philosophical Quarterly, 64(256), 434-452. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu016

Journal Article Type	Article
Publication Date	Jul 1, 2014
Deposit Date	Feb 24, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Mar 31, 2016
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
Print ISSN	0031-8094
Electronic ISSN	1467-9213
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	64
Issue	256
Pages	434-452
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu016
Keywords	Aristotle, Syllogism, Logic, Consequence, Prior Analytics, Question begging.

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This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Duncombe, Matthew (2014) 'Irreflexivity and Aristotle's syllogismos.', The Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (256): 434-452 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu016.