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Questioning Executive Supremacy in an Economic State of Emergency

Greene, Alan

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Authors

Alan Greene



Abstract

This paper compares and contrasts state emergency responses to national security crises with responses deployed in a period of economic crisis. Specifically, this paper challenges the appropriateness and legitimacy of the standard emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the executive when confronting such economic crises. This will be done by questioning the significance in periods of economic crisis of the two principal factors that justify deferring to the executive during a state of emergency pertaining to national security: (i) the necessity of the action taken; and (ii) that the executive has an expertise in decision making in the specific area in question. Ultimately, this paper questions the application of the emergency paradigm to economic crises, arguing that such responses are rarely temporary and instead usher in a ‘new normalcy’.

Citation

Greene, A. (2015). Questioning Executive Supremacy in an Economic State of Emergency. Legal Studies, 35(4), 594-620. https://doi.org/10.1111/lest.12082

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 26, 2015
Online Publication Date May 4, 2015
Publication Date Dec 1, 2015
Deposit Date Mar 17, 2015
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Legal Studies
Print ISSN 0261-3875
Electronic ISSN 1748-121X
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 35
Issue 4
Pages 594-620
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/lest.12082

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Greene, A. (2015), Questioning executive supremacy in an economic state of emergency. Legal Studies, 35(4): 594-620, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lest.12082. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.




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