The productivity effects of multiple pay incentives

Pendleton, A.; Robinson, A.

doi:10.1177/0143831x15583099

The productivity effects of multiple pay incentives

Pendleton, A.; Robinson, A.

Authors

A. Pendleton

A. Robinson

Abstract

Drawing on recent incentive theory and the growing use of multiple incentives by firms, this article examines the effects of combining incentives on workplace labour productivity. Utilizing data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey, the article explores whether multiple incentives are more effective than single incentives. It is found that the productivity effects of individualized incentives are enhanced by profit sharing though not by collective payment by result schemes (PBR). Profit sharing also enhances the effect of collective PBR, and it is found that two group incentives are more effective than a single individual incentive. However there are limits on the number of incentive schemes that can be combined effectively. The effects of mixed incentives tend to be greater in workplaces with worker discretion and task variety, thereby providing support for a contingency perspective.

Citation

Pendleton, A., & Robinson, A. (2017). The productivity effects of multiple pay incentives. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 38(4), 588-608. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831x15583099

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Mar 20, 2015
Online Publication Date	Jul 9, 2016
Publication Date	Nov 1, 2017
Deposit Date	Mar 23, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Mar 31, 2015
Journal	Economic and Industrial Democracy
Print ISSN	0143-831X
Electronic ISSN	1461-7099
Publisher	SAGE Publications
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	38
Issue	4
Pages	588-608
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831x15583099
Keywords	High performance workplace, Pay, Productivity.
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1411042

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