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A hidden Markov model for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in games.

Shachat, J. and Swarthout, J. and Wei, L. (2015) 'A hidden Markov model for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in games.', Econometric theory., 31 (04). pp. 729-752.


We propose a statistical model to assess whether individuals strategically use mixed strategies in repeated games. We formulate a hidden Markov model in which the latent state space contains both pure and mixed strategies. We apply the model to data from an experiment in which human subjects repeatedly play a normal form game against a computer that always follows its part of the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile. Estimated results show significant mixed strategy play and nonstationary dynamics. We also explore the ability of the model to forecast action choice.

Item Type:Article
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Publisher statement:© Copyright Cambridge University Press 2014. This paper has been published in a revised form, subsequent to editorial input by Cambridge University Press in 'Econometric Theory' (31: 04 (2015) 729-752)
Record Created:07 Apr 2015 09:20
Last Modified:06 Aug 2015 13:43

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