Type-2 Blindsight: Empirical and Philosophical Perspectives

Foley, R.; Kentridge, R.W.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.008

Type-2 Blindsight: Empirical and Philosophical Perspectives

Foley, R.; Kentridge, R.W.

Authors

R. Foley

Professor Robert Kentridge robert.kentridge@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

The articles in this special issue on type-2 blindsight all arose from a three-day workshop at University College Dublin in May 2013. The project brought together empirical researchers and philosophers to address the often-overlooked issue of residual awareness in blindsight (type-2 blindsight). The result is a collection of papers that not only present an overview of the current empirical and theoretical work on type-2 blindsight, but also raise important questions for our understanding of methodological and conceptual issues concerning the attribution of awareness in psychophysics, the nature of visual perception and experience, and their underlying mechanisms. In this introduction, we first give a brief overview of the history of research into residual awareness following striate cortical damage and then summarize the contributions to this special issue.

Citation

Foley, R., & Kentridge, R. (2015). Type-2 Blindsight: Empirical and Philosophical Perspectives. Consciousness and Cognition, 32, 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.008

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Jan 29, 2015
Publication Date	Mar 1, 2015
Deposit Date	May 15, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Jul 29, 2016
Journal	Consciousness and Cognition
Print ISSN	1053-8100
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	32
Pages	1-5
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.008

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Copyright Statement
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Consciousness and Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Consciousness and Cognition, 32, March 2015, 10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.008.