VIII—Defending Dualism

Gibb, S.C.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x

VIII—Defending Dualism

Gibb, S.C.

Authors

Professor Sophie Gibb s.c.gibb@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any physical event. It is widely assumed that the principle of the causal completeness of the physical domain provides a general argument against interactive dualism. But, whether the completeness principle presents a problem for these alternative forms of interactive dualism is questionable. In this paper, focusing on the popular no-gap argument for the completeness principle, I explore one reason why.

Citation

Gibb, S. (2015). VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115(2pt2), 131-146. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Nov 19, 2015
Publication Date	Jul 1, 2015
Deposit Date	Nov 27, 2014
Publicly Available Date	Jul 1, 2017
Journal	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Print ISSN	0066-7374
Electronic ISSN	1467-9264
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	115
Issue	2pt2
Pages	131-146
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x

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This is the accepted version of the following article: Gibb, S. (2015), VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 115(2): 131-146, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.