The Causal Closure Principle

Gibb, S.C.

doi:10.1093/pq/pqv030

The Causal Closure Principle

Gibb, S.C.

Authors

Professor Sophie Gibb s.c.gibb@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics—more specifically, in the philosophy of causation—reveal a serious, general flaw in contemporary formulations of this principle.

Citation

Gibb, S. (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 626-647. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Apr 26, 2015
Publication Date	Oct 1, 2015
Deposit Date	Feb 13, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Apr 26, 2017
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
Print ISSN	0031-8094
Electronic ISSN	1467-9213
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	65
Issue	261
Pages	626-647
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030
Keywords	Causal closure principle, Interactive dualism, Powers theory of causation, Causal sufficiency, Double prevention, Enabling events.

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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'The causal closure principle.', Philosophical quarterly, 65(261): 626-647 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030.