Che, X. and Klumpp, T. (2016) 'Entry deterrence in dynamic second-price auctions.', American economic journal : microeconomics., 8 (2). pp. 168-201.
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revelation equilibria. Delayed revelation of buyer values decreases social welfare, but is necessary for bidders to have a strict participation incentive.
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140137|
|Publisher statement:||Revised for AEA.|
|Record Created:||17 Jun 2015 16:20|
|Last Modified:||19 May 2016 11:40|
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