Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?

Addison, J.; Teixeira, P.; Evers, K.; Bellmann, L.

doi:10.1111/irel.12165

Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?

Addison, J.; Teixeira, P.; Evers, K.; Bellmann, L.

Authors

Professor John Addison john.addison@durham.ac.uk
Professor

P. Teixeira

K. Evers

L. Bellmann

Abstract

At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is contested. The large proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other-country experience suggests that certain industrial-relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross- section and difference-in-differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity.

Citation

Addison, J., Teixeira, P., Evers, K., & Bellmann, L. (2017). Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?. Industrial Relations, 56(1), 73-121. https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12165

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jun 9, 2015
Online Publication Date	Dec 5, 2016
Publication Date	Jan 1, 2017
Deposit Date	Jun 14, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Dec 5, 2018
Journal	Industrial Relations
Print ISSN	0019-8676
Electronic ISSN	1468-232X
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	56
Issue	1
Pages	73-121
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12165
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1406607

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Addison, J., Teixeira, P., Evers, K. & Bellmann, L. (2017). Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations? Industrial Relations 56(1): 73-121, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12165. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.