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Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games.

Kamei, K. and Putterman, L. (2016) 'Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games.', Economic journal., 127 (602). pp. 1069-1095.

Abstract

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviours are observed.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Cooperation, Reputation, Voluntary contribution, Public goods, Sorting, Endogenous grouping, Group formation, Experiment.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320
Publisher statement:This is the accepted version of the following article: Kamei, K. and Putterman, L. (2016). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Date accepted:29 May 2015
Date deposited:20 July 2015
Date of first online publication:25 July 2016
Date first made open access:25 July 2017

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