Uckelman, Sara L. and Chan, Phoebe (2016) 'Against truth-conditional theories of meaning : three lessons from the language(s) of fiction.', Res philosophica., 2 (93). pp. 1-19.
Fictional discourse and fictional languages provide useful test cases for theories of meaning. In this paper, we argue against truth-conditional accounts of meaning on the basis of problems posed by language(s) of fiction. It is well-known how fictional discourse—discourse about nonexistent objects—poses a problem for truth-conditional theories of meaning. Less well-considered, however, are the problems posed by fictional languages, which can be created to either be meaningful or not to be meaningful; both of these ultimately also provide problems for a truthconditional account of meaning, because it cannot account for the ways in which we use and evaluate such fictional languages. Instead, a pragmatic or use-based account provides a better explanation for some of the phenomena we discuss.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4|
|Date accepted:||15 July 2015|
|Date deposited:||23 July 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||14 October 2015|
|Date first made open access:||14 October 2016|
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