Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction

Uckelman, Sara L.; Chan, Phoebe

doi:10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4

Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction

Uckelman, Sara L.; Chan, Phoebe

Authors

Dr Sara Uckelman s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Phoebe Chan

Abstract

Fictional discourse and fictional languages provide useful test cases for theories of meaning. In this paper, we argue against truth-conditional accounts of meaning on the basis of problems posed by language(s) of fiction. It is well-known how fictional discourse—discourse about nonexistent objects—poses a problem for truth-conditional theories of meaning. Less well-considered, however, are the problems posed by fictional languages, which can be created to either be meaningful or not to be meaningful; both of these ultimately also provide problems for a truthconditional account of meaning, because it cannot account for the ways in which we use and evaluate such fictional languages. Instead, a pragmatic or use-based account provides a better explanation for some of the phenomena we discuss.

Citation

Uckelman, S. L., & Chan, P. (2016). Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction. Res Philosophica, 2(93), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jul 15, 2015
Online Publication Date	Oct 14, 2015
Publication Date	Apr 1, 2016
Deposit Date	Jul 15, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Oct 14, 2016
Journal	Res Philosophica
Print ISSN	2168-9105
Electronic ISSN	2168-9113
Publisher	Philosophy Documentation Center
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	2
Issue	93
Pages	1-19
DOI	https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.2.93.4