Category signaling and reputation

Negro, G.; Hannan, M.T.; Fassiotto, M.

doi:10.1287/orsc.2014.0935

Category signaling and reputation

Negro, G.; Hannan, M.T.; Fassiotto, M.

Authors

G. Negro

M.T. Hannan

M. Fassiotto

Abstract

We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast. Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.

Citation

Negro, G., Hannan, M., & Fassiotto, M. (2015). Category signaling and reputation. Organization Science, 26(2), 584-600. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0935

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Sep 25, 2014
Publication Date	Mar 1, 2015
Deposit Date	Jul 20, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Jul 30, 2015
Journal	Organization Science
Print ISSN	1047-7039
Electronic ISSN	1526-5455
Publisher	Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	26
Issue	2
Pages	584-600
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0935
Keywords	Sociology of markets, Organization theory, Signaling, Reputation, Categories, Wine industry, Alsace.
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1425024