Governing Emergencies: The Politics of Delay and the Logic of Response

The paper focuses on the problematisation of delay in state response to the event of 7/7 in the UK in 2005 as a way of understanding how emergencies are governed. It argues that the widespread political, public and organisational concern in the UK with the delayed state is one expression of a distinct logic of governing emergencies: response. Focusing on the declaration of a ‘major incident’ by the UK emergency services, the paper argues that the logic of response is expressed in the tension between acting in an ‘interval’ as a space-time of emergence and the generation of ‘intervals’ for action. As well as following how the logic of response operates in UK emergency management, the paper offers a conceptual vocabulary designed to understand the multiplicity of ways in which emergencies are governed. Emergency is conceptualised as a ‘mode of eventfulness’ (Berlant 2011) characterised by the hope that action will make a difference as harms, damages or losses emerge. The government of emergency involves situations ‘becoming-emergency’ through particular combinations of apparatuses of emergency and logics. The concern in the UK with delay in response to 7/7 is one example of the intersection of the logic of response with a particular apparatus based on a biopolitics of survival and the promise that lives can be saved by treating emergencies as logistical challenges.

Keywords: Emergency, Response, Government, Events, 7/7
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Introduction: The delayed state

On 6th May 2011, Lady Justice Hallett issued a report under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984 after an inquest into the London bombings of 7th, July 2005. Rejecting arguments that the events of July 7th could have been prevented by better ‘joining the dots’ before the event (de Goede 2014), the Coroner’s report makes a number of recommendations directed to various parts of the UK national and local state. Half of the report concerned emergency response. Hallett frames seven recommendations around a matter of concern – delay - that I will argue characterises a particular logic for governing events or conditions as emergencies: response. Hallett emphasises that her recommendations are preventative of possible future delay despite no actual deaths being attributed in the final report to delay:

“In light of the quantity of evidence I heard about the emergency response, even though I have concluded that any ‘delays’ in emergency response did not contribute to any deaths resulting from 7/7, I do have some concerns that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur or will continue to exist in the future.”

(Coroner’s Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005: 36/37)
What the Coroner’s report does is make untimely response into a risk that may in the future lead to an event generating preventable harm, loss or damage. At the same time, the report invests a hope in reducing delay. The hope is that even if events are unpredictable, even if events may emerge anywhere and at any anytime, state response can protect life. Accordingly, the report makes seven recommendations with the aim of improving the emergency services’ capacity to respond in what is now known as the ‘golden hour’: the first hour after some kind of disturbance and as an event is emerging. The recommendations make emergency response into a logistical matter of coordination and collaboration, including how the emergency services should communicate their declarations of a ‘major incident’.

Claims by the media, public, or affected people that response was delayed and the future orientated promise that delay can be reduced are now common in the UK as events happen and after events have been brought to an end. In this paper I argue that the public, political, and organisational concern with delay is an expression of a specific way of governing emergencies - a logic of response. Response invents multiple ‘intervals’ for emergency action. It is based on ways of meeting something that is in the midst of emerging. Provided the promise of response remains, the fear of those governed through response is of abandonment by a delayed state to the harms and damages that events bring. Accusations of delay happen when the fragile hope of response remains but may be disappointed. Response is partially connected to and folds into other ways of governing in a ‘meta-stable’ (Massumi 2009) or ‘turbulent’ (Amin 2013) world, including preemption and preparedness (Amoore 2014; Aradau 2010). But response is not equivalent to other
logics. It involves distinctive ways of relating to (quasi/non) events, particular ways in which events are turned into actionable emergencies, and specific ways in which a promise is invested in action in the midst of emergency.

The paper examines how the logic of response operates. In doing so it gives one answer to the question of how in the UK events are governed as emergencies. As such, it interrupts received wisdom about the contemporary politics of emergency. After the advent of the ‘war on terror’ critical social science has focused on how a seemingly exceptional measure, the ‘state of exception’, “tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics” (Agamben 2005: 2). What have become normal are not quite actual states of exception but, rather, “the indefinite extension of the possibility” of states of exception across multiple events, situations and regimes (Fassin & Pandolfi 2010: 22). This approach has generated many insights: revealing contemporary (re)arrangements of discretionary authority, troubling the distinction between emergency and normality that the term emergency is founded upon, and revealing the (petty)sovereign apparatuses that characterise exceptionalism today. But those insights have come at a cost. Whether understood as a legal-political technique or as a topology, what is missed by the observation that the state of emergency has become the rule are differences - the multiple ways in which emergencies are now governed, the specific consequences of those ways of governing, and the ways in which lines between emergency and normality are (re)drawn or blurred (after Hinchliffe & Bingham 2008). This erasure of differences matters because if ways of governing emergency vary then so might their spatial/temporal forms and their
ethical and political consequences. So, as well as the substantive argument about the logic of response I offer a conceptual vocabulary – around the concepts of ‘logics’, ‘modes of eventfulness’, and ‘apparatuses’ – designed as a means of remaining open to the specifics of how events or conditions are governed as emergencies. It orientates inquiry to how events or quasi/non-events become emergencies, how specific relations of power are expressed in and through apparatuses of emergency, and how and with what effects particular logics operate.

The paper proceeds in four sections. In section one I identify a series of conditions for the emergence and intensification of response, as well as trace some iterations of response as events and conditions are governed as emergencies. The next section then experiments with the concept of ‘logic’ in order to specify what crosses between and is held in common across multiple iterations of response. It links the concept of logic to two others – ‘modes of eventfulness’ and ‘apparatuses’ – as a means of attuning to the multiple ways in which emergencies are governed. Section three returns to response in relation to the event named as 7/7. It hones in on a key technique through which events are governed as emergencies in the UK – the declaration of a ‘major incident’ – to draw out the ‘interval’ based logic of response. The next section then shows how the declarations were problematised in the 7/7 Inquest as an occasion of delay, but in a way that reaffirmed the promise of the logic of response. As well as summarising how response functions, the conclusion considers the implications of the conceptual vocabulary for understanding the politics of emergency beyond a critique of exceptionalism.
States of response

The logic of response is found across otherwise different apparatuses that share, express and enact the expectation and obligation that some kind of governing authority should care for and protect life as and when events happen. Response is oriented to (quasi/non)events and so takes place at the limit of pre-emptive logics that act speculatively over emergent threats (De Goede et al 2014). It is based on the promise that the harmful effects of any event – from a heart attack to infrastructure disruption - can be ended by fast, correct action. Whilst response extends beyond the state, the most significant articulation in the UK of response remains the formalised emergency services. Though there are differences between services, what is common is that response is a moral and logistical imperative in the context of the ways in which emergencies arise from and interrupt everyday life (see Cooter & Luckin 1997). Recently, the problematisation of life as irreducibly contingent and emergent has folded into the birth of new response specialisms within the UK emergency services for particular classes of rare events, types of action, or generic spaces of emergency. In addition to militarised rapid response through specialised police firearm units (Graham 2010), specialist response functions and organisational forms have emerged to enable response to events and sites of unbearable corporeal exposure. We might think, for example, of the UK Fire and Rescue Service’s ‘Urban Search and Rescue Teams’ that are skilled to enter urban disasters zones, or the UK Ambulance Service’s ‘Hazardous Area Response Teams’ that are equipped to care in extreme environments. Improving response for particular classes of events – the ‘slow burning’ or the ‘rapid onset’ emergency – has also involved new ‘real-time’
mapping techniques for tracing the unfolding dynamics of situations (Fearnley 2008). There are parallels here with the importance of rapid response to UK military action. Whilst the capacity to respond rapidly was central to deterrence, Western military force is now organised around rapid deployment of ‘elite units’. This is war based on “customized force configuration” (Martin 2007: 77) organised around a principle of “agility” for ‘operations’ that blur lines between war and peace.

Of course, for many marginalised peoples state response has either long ago been withdrawn or always been a catastrophic threat to be feared and resisted. Apparatuses of response embody a ‘politics of life’ (Fassin 2011) that draws a line between the life to be protected and that which is inimical to that life (from non-human events such as fires to particular classes of ‘dangerous’ individuals). Consider the police activity described by Fassin (2010) in his powerful ethnography of a rapid response ‘anti-crime squad’ in a precinct in a Parisian suburb. Animated by racialised stigmatisation, response brings multiple violences to peoples who are already living with the state’s lack of urgency in responding to poverty, racism and other forms of structural violence that blur the endemic and the evental. In this case, and doubtless many other examples, response is overdetermined by race. Race acts as a mechanism for enacting a division within life between those who should be protected by response and that which is inimical to the life to be protected (see Mbembe (2003) on race and ‘letting die’ in a necropolitics of ‘dead life’). Response, in this example, becomes one mechanism for not only the reproduction of existing patterns of inequality but also for their intensification in scenes of emergency. However, whilst response always involves an encounter with something considered
inimical to a valued life, race is one of multiple possible mechanisms for dividing within life. Mechanisms vary across the different expressions of response. For example, whilst not the focus of this paper, the logic of response is also integral to the configuration of international humanitarianism around intervention in immediate suffering (also Fassin 2011). As Redfield (2013) shows through his ethnography of Médecins Sans Frontières, this means that at least some articulations of response in the humanitarian field are animated by a tension between a commitment to the survival of all life and the inevitability of acts of selection and prioritisation in deciding who or what to try and save.

Whilst recognising that the promise of response has always been unequally distributed and for some has long since been withdrawn, the demand/promise of response is not only central to ways of governing punctual events, but also to ways of governing conditions that blur lines between emergency and normality. In addition to massively distributed problems such as climate change (e.g. Spratt & Sutton 2008), response has become a way of governing the endemic crises of daily life. Crises are translated into discontinuous scenes demanding short term intervention as the systems of safeguarding associated with the welfare state are withdrawn. At a time when the security of welfare is becoming a matter of temporary emergency relief, we find ‘rapid response’ in relation to the provision of time-limited, conditional finance, food, or shelter to people in crisis (Poppendieck 1998). This tendency is, however, complexly articulated with a redistribution of response, most notably through the demand that subjects ‘become resilient’ and so assume the responsibility to respond (Grove 2013). More speculatively, we could
point to the presence of response as something like an affective atmosphere across mediatised political culture. For example, the ‘real time’ mediation of events demands immediate response from various actors – commentators, politicians, corporations and so on (unlike the ceremonial, pre-planned, transcendent media event organised around sovereign glory) (Kember & Zylinska 2012).

There are a series of interlocking ‘mediating conditions’ (Berlant 2011) that fold into how events and conditions are governed through response and underpin the promise/demand of speed of action in relation to emergent events. Whilst the emphasis in this paper is on the UK, these conditions extend to other liberal democracies in the global north that govern through emergency. Mediated scenes of emergency are central to the (re)appearance of the fantasy of sovereign state power and legitimate authority under regimes of liberal governmentality. In Berlant’s (2011: 100) terms, public legitimate state action in an emergency is a “perceptible scene, an atmosphere to be returned to”. As state sovereignty has been placed in question through the geo-economic transformations gathered under the names of globalisation and neoliberalisation and in the midst of anti-state sentiment associated with neoliberal reason, emergency response becomes one of the few remaining scenes for the enactment of a promise of security through the state. In relation to emergencies, the state continues to act as a “reparative resource” (ibid. 104). Response promises protection in a world of events as other sources of safeguarding life have or are being withdrawn (on which see Lorey 2015). Emergencies are simultaneously scenes in which that sustaining fantasy of the protective state and other forms of authority is placed in question. Indeed, the
absence of the capacity of emergency services to respond has become a sign of and/or cause of crisis. As well as long connections between the problematisation of ‘failed states’ and lack of response capability, waiting for an emergency response has become a sign of the austerity state in crisis. A police response time of 58 minutes against a national average of 11 was used to justify the decision to place Detroit under a regime of emergency financial management, for example (Peck 2012). Moreover, and returning to Fassin’s (2010) example of a rapid response police unit, scenes of emergency are often occasions for an intensification of harmful state action, whether through absence, neglect or a response that brings violence. For those already marginalised lives deemed to be inimical to the valued life to be protected, response may be absent, indifferent, withdrawn, cynical or destructive. Mediated scenes of violent response can, therefore, also initiate or intensify challenges to authority and become part of the formation of counter emergency publics (witness, for example, the US ‘BlackLivesMatter’ movement against racist police response and other state violence amidst deep and enduring racial inequality).

At the same time, and to draw out a second mediating condition, response is integral to the governmental management of the ‘far from equilibrium’ (Braun 2014) or ‘metastable’ (Massumi 2009) environments required for contemporary capitalism. Given the continuous movements of peoples, things, money and information necessary for capitalism today (on which see Cowan 2014; Crary 2014; Massumi 2009), timely response becomes a requirement, demand and expectation. Response aims to continue and/or restore circulations and connections. The same forces that erode state sovereignty are, however, articulated with changes in the morphology of
events that intensify both the challenges of responding well and the demand and expectation that events must be stopped or halted rapidly. Disruptions happen to connections and circulations, whilst connections and circulations are simultaneously intensifying mechanisms for the effects of events (Dillon 2007). Closely related to the changing morphology of events are a series of amplifying mechanisms that extend events on two temporal axes: an expanded ‘live’ present (Kember & Zylinska 2012) and a premediated future of disruption (Grusin 2010). Any event may, therefore, extend beyond a demarcated scene of emergency. If events cannot be preempted or prevented before they happen, then there is a need to act early and quickly to stop events ‘cascading’, ‘surging’, ‘bolting’ and so on. There is a need, in short, to end disruptions that are inimical to the circulations and interdependencies that underpin and enable contemporary capitalist life. But because of the complex form of events, the hope of response – that anything can be governed as a temporary scene of emergency – is always at risk of disappointment. Faced with events in a complex world, response may be absent, delayed or fail.

**Logics/modes of eventfulness/apparatuses**

How to understand the repetition and difference of something like response as it is expressed in, but exceeds, the various forms described above and as it is complexly articulated with mediating conditions? This is a problem shared with recent work on preemption, resilience and other forms and practices of action that exceed any one domain of life or functionally distinct sector. What I want to experiment with is conceptualising response as a *logic*. A logic is a pattern of effects
and relations that repeats differentially across expressions. It is close to Deleuze’s (1988: 36) description of Foucault’s use of the term ‘diagram’: “a non-unifying immanent cause that is co-extensive with the whole social field”. However, my use of the term logic has two more specific lines of descent. The first is the idea of a distinctive form that underpins and animates the contemporary condition and can be traced throughout different expressions. The archetypal use would be Jameson’s (1991) diagnosis of the ‘cultural logic’ of late capitalism where instead of a base/superstructure model of relations the term logic names a common form of organisation that links separate spheres. The second route is an ‘after-actor-network’ literature that has attempted to understand regularity across differences. Exemplary of such an approach is Mol’s (2008) diagnosis of competing logics in healthcare. For Mol, a logic is a distinctive patterning of relations that endures across differences. Whilst these two routes are different, both show how logics operate and are present as a set of functions and effects that organise worlds. Response, preemption, and so on will each have a specific ‘internal’ logic that governs how emergency action happens, is legitimised, and justified. A society may not be defined by one identifiable logic, nor will logics necessarily replace one another in a relation of linear succession. As oriented but open-ended processes, logics are provisionally stabilised in and through the emergent regularities that are power formations. For an example, let’s return to Fassin’s (2010) ethnography of policing. ‘Rapid response’ policing results in regular scenes of harassment and humiliation for minority youngsters, undocumented immigrants, Roma people and other residents. Minor infractions often lead to spectacular displays of racist violence by the police.
Humiliation and violence become part of those residents’ fear and distrust of the state. Through humiliation and other affects, the logic of response becomes part of the conditions of endurance for affectively imbued patterns of economic marginalization, racial stigmatization, and urban segregation.

The government of events like 7/7 involves more than logics. Much has to be assembled for events – or punctual happenings or endemic conditions that might become events – to be governed as emergencies and, therefore, for response or other logics to operate, be present as effects, and organise worlds. Understanding how events are governed in relation to response and other logics requires that we experiment with conceptual resources designed to follow how events are problematised and transformed as they are governed. Lauren Berlant (2011) offers one such set of resources as she attunes to non-dramatic changes that fold the endemic and evental (fraying, unravelling, attrition, dissolution and so on). In experimenting with categories that disrupt a distinction between an event and its other (e.g. situation, episode, incident), her question is how happenings become events. Answering this question involves learning to sense and attune to many kinds of happening. For Povinelli (2012), for example, ‘quasi-events’ are imperceptible occurrences that may lead to a transformation but for the most part accumulate to make up the background substrate of life and living. Minor disappointments, a lost hope, an injury, may gather and resonate to form an “agentless slow death” that implicates “the complexity of an entire system” (ibid: 146), but they may not. We could add the ‘non-event’: happenings that are already comprehended within some kind of already-existing system. In the context of this shift from what an event is to
how happenings become (quasi/non)events Berlant refuses to ontologise ‘the event’ as a caesura and/or exceptional transformation, as some theorists of the event do. Instead, she attunes to qualitatively different ‘modes of eventfulness’. For Berlant, a ‘mode of eventfulness’ is a barely coherent clustering of qualities concerning occurrence, impact, and end (so the gradual or punctual arrival of something, or a dramatic or slow transformation, or a lingering or immediate departure).

We can experiment with the idea that emergency is one of a number of geo-historically specific ‘modes of eventfulness’ that have emerged as ways of governing contingency and so coexist with response and other logics. Emergency might be thought of as a quality of eventfulness that anything may have. In an emergency some kind of harm or damage to a valued and normalised order is in the midst of emerging and has been recognised by someone/something. Whilst emergency has a stronger sense of the emergent, in the shared emphasis on transformation it does have a series of affinities with the mode of eventfulness that characterises the term crisis. Whilst clearly connected to a point of decision, a crisis can be a spatially-temporally dispersed condition that names, as Roitman (2014: 19) puts it, a “unique, immanent transition phase, or a specific historical epoch”. Crises are atmospheric in that sense - they surround and envelope life. By comparison with the periodization of crisis (Roitman 2014), emergency involves a demand for immediate, urgent action. In an emergency there is no time except the time of an emergent present - a time that is running out. Emergencies are, in this sense, activating. In an emergency, action can still make a difference to the outcome of a pressing, emergent situation. Here it is worth stressing the (dis)connections but also foldings between emergency and the
modes of eventfulness that typically characterise the apocalyptic and catastrophic. The apocalyptic involves some kind of end through destruction, with the closure of the apocalyptic event being accompanied by a moment of revelation and, perhaps, redemption (Calder Williams 2011). Whilst connected to the apocalyptic the catastrophic is an event made present, as Calder Williams puts it, as an “end without revelation, a historical void, an end of the road that cannot point beyond itself” (ibid. 4). As well as usually having a different sense of duration, extent and intensity, in an emergency hope is still invested in some kind of possible action. Borrowing Calder Williams’ terms, we could say that an emergency always “points beyond itself” to some kind of return to or restoration of normality. Emergencies continue until they are exited, or until the hope that action might make a difference is lost.

As a concept, ‘mode of eventfulness’ is a formalist device. It differentiates in order to sensitise to differences in the form (‘mode’) of events. In practice, ‘modes of eventfulness’ resonate, fold and blur with one another, and any event may move between or combine multiple, partially connected ‘modes of eventfulness’. For example, the lines between emergency and the apocalyptic or catastrophic blur when action can only just still make a difference or when action is suspended. Furthermore, one mode of eventfulness may come to dominate how events are governed. Aradau & Van Munster (2011), for example, track the reconfiguration of security apparatuses as diverse events are problematised and lived as catastrophes, where catastrophes involve a “reversal of what is expected” or an “overturning”. There are, though, counterexamples to the escalation of events to the catastrophic. Preparedness planning in both the UK and USA, for example, remains based around
a non-catastrophic version of emergency (See Collier & Lakoff 2008; Anderson & Adey 2012). We should take care not to extrapolate from how a particular event is governed and claim that one mode now dominates and others are residual or absent.

Logics and modes of eventfulness operate through a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble” (Foucault 1980: 194) of discursive and non-discursive elements. An ‘apparatus of emergency’ is the ‘network’ (ibid.) or ‘system of correlation’ (Foucault 2007: 8) that renders (non/quasi)events governable as emergencies (on apparatuses of emergency see Anderson & Adey 2012). This means that apparatuses have a life. The emergency statements, devices, techniques, relations with life, and other elements that are held in relation are constantly being redeployed, readjusted, reworked, or intensified (after Foucault 1980). Clearly, the relation of a logic like response to an apparatus is not one of efficient causality, where effect follows cause in a linear relation, or between an ideal and the real. We might say, instead, that a logic has an emergent immanent causality in which logic and apparatus become inseparable. Whilst I do not share the emphasis on the autopoietic momentum of logics, my emphasis on their dynamism is close to what Massumi (2009) means by an ‘operative logic of power’. It is not equivalent as I lay more emphasis on the rationale provided by a logic and how a logic happens as a repeated, differentially expressed form that organises worlds.

Beginning from logics/apparatuses might enable us to remain open about how life is governed through emergency as a mode of eventfulness. The starting point for analysis is how (quasi/non) events become emergencies as they are governed and how logics are effectuated and expressed in that process. Let’s look at
this process by returning to the logic of response in the case of 7/7 and honing in on a now routine but key technique – the declaration of a major incident - that, as we shall see, was central to response and to the concern in the UK with the delayed state. One way to understand 7/7 would be to enumerate what happened. At approximately 8.49 am on 7.07.2005 three bombs were detonated at three sites on the London Underground. Approximately one hour later a fourth bomb exploded on a bus at Tavistock square. Over 700 people were injured and fifty-six people died, including the four bombers. “1, 000 adults and 2, 00 of their children” suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, with a further 3, 000 others were “estimated to have been directly affected” by the event (London Assembly 2006: para 11.6). Whilst this raises questions about the boundaries of a traumatic event, the following section focuses on the initial moments at one site – Aldgate Tube Station – as something happening was detected and the emergency services established a series of scenes. My concern in the following section is with how multiple explosions resulting in deaths and injury were governed through a logic of response before they were narrated later that day by Tony Blair and others as a post 9/11 terrorist attack on the “British way of life”.i

I treat 7/7 as a case study in three ways. First, the declaration of a major incident provides one example of emergency response in the UK. After the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (Anderson & Adey 2012), what was done in the immediate aftermath is typical of how multiple events are now governed. Second, the declaration is a singular case of how a particular logic, specific mode of eventfulness and distinct apparatus came together. Third, through a practice of speculation I abstract the mode of operation of response from the case of the
declaration and the Inquest. Because the analysis of a general logic is deliberately rooted in the singularity of an event-case, my claims about how the logic of response operates are provisional and contestable. They are intended as open formulations to be developed rather than settled conclusions.

A declaration and ‘intervals’ of and for action

At 08.57.42 on July 7th 2005, the first police officer at the scene of an explosion at Aldgate station declared a ‘major incident’ in communication to the British Transport Police’s control room: “I think we have to call it a major incident”iv. A ‘declaration of a major incident’ has become a routine technique for activating response as UK wide declarations of a ‘state of emergency’ have declinedv. The ‘declaration of a major incident’ involves a decision by any member of the emergency services (or other named organisations) that an exceptional situation exists, which is also a decision to activate an exceptional response. A ‘major incident’ is an emergency statement that draws two lines: between a normal state of affairs and an event and between events as incidents, which are routinely dealt with, and events as exceptions that require some kind of exceptional response. As we see from the definition that is used across the UK emergency services a ‘major incident’ is qualified as an emergency of sufficient intensity that it exceeds normal response capacity:

“A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services and will
generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people.”

(London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedure Manual: 7)vi

Despite this being a process that does not involve the formal suspension of law, there are commonalities with Agamben’s (1998) understanding of exceptionalism - principally the indistinction between fact and norm and the appeal to necessity. Whilst declaring a ‘major incident’ enacts a localised state sovereignty, it is best through of as quasi-sovereign in that it happens in the midst of a (quasi/non)event. The inquest testimony from personnel who declared a ‘major incident’ at Aldgate bear witness to decisions being secondary to the sensing of something emerging and being legitimised by the intimacy of personnel to the emergent eventvii. Consider part of the testimony of the first police officer on scene. What we hear from his account of the scene as he made his declaration is uncertainty about what exactly was happening, but certainty that something was happening:

“We’d heard an explosion, the building shook. We had, by that time, I think, a number of injured people who were very apparent within the station area, they were all dazed, soot-covered, and there appeared to be an incident down in the tunnel, something had happened within the tunnel that had caused all these injuries. I'd heard an explosion and, you know, you can make some assumptions, but I hadn't physically been there to see it. So I didn't know”.
What has been detected by the police officer is some kind of ‘incident’ that may or may not be an event in the sense of a radical break that will be responded to as an emergency. Likewise, the first 999 call in relation to Aldgate, made by a member of London Underground staff at 8.51, reported a ‘loud bang’ and ‘dust in the air’ (London Assembly 2006: 25). Berlant (2011: 5) offers a sense of the situation as an activating disturbance from within normality:

“… a state of things in which something that will perhaps matter is unfolding amid the usual activity of life. It is a state of animated and animating suspension that forces itself on consciousness, that produces a sense of the emergence of something in the present that might become an event”.

‘Animated/animating suspension’ is not quite right for the case of explosions because it risks underplaying the force of what was happening, but it captures the quasi-sovereign sense that it is an emergent event that calls for a declaration. Other people caught up in the unforeclosed situation testify to an excess of material and affective effects. One person who was in the carriage as the Aldgate bomb detonated described a world of new light and sounds mixing with screams: “I saw the flash, the orange-yellow light, and what appeared to be silver streaks, which I think was some of the glass coming across, and what I can describe as a rushing sound” (London Assembly 2006: 23). When asked about the “general atmosphere” in the
carriage another witness described a “sort of stunned silence” followed by people screaming: “It was very dark. There was an enormous amount of dust and I guess what was shredded paper or -- the air was very, very full”.

Very quickly the explosions found their genre, to borrow Berlant’s (2011) phrasing, to become a terrorist attack on ‘our way of life’, albeit after it was declared as a ‘major incident’ that activated emergency service response. Closs-Stephens & Vaughen-Williams (2009) are right to stress the speed and ease with which it was decided by politicians and media what had happened and why. In a post 9/11 context, this is not unique to the event of bombings in London on July 07th 2005. Consider how quickly a mediated scene of gunmen in a Parisian street and office became ‘Charlie Hebdo’: an ‘attack on free speech’ and an ‘event of terror’. What characterises the logic of response is that it happens before situations where “something is emerging” find a genre. It is a logic that works in the material and affective force of an emergent present: something happening has been detected, even if it is unclear what that something is beyond material/affective effects such as ‘soot covered’ or ‘stunned silence’. So, response happens in an ‘interval’ of a happening becoming an event in contrast to a pre-emptive logic that works on proto-threats by incorporating the “profound uncertainty of the future into imminent decision” (Amoore 2014: 9). By ‘interval’ I mean the unforeclosed space-time of the emergence of something new. The ‘interval’ is the space-time of an event’s becoming; or the separating of and separation between normal reality and some kind of changed reality and between something happening and effects or impacts being exhausted. It
is testified to when a police officer recalls seeing “dazed, soot-covered” people or when survivors recall atmospheres made of smoke and screams.

Let’s return to the act of declaring a ‘major incident’. We have already seen how the declaration is a quasi-sovereign act as it happens in the ‘interval’ of an unforeclosed situation potentially becoming some kind of event. It simultaneously affirms the potential capacity to govern and that the state has recognised that some kind of event is happening that threatens to overwhelm response capacities. As such, the ‘declaration’ is one emergency device for translating that which is outside of government into something that is governable. In this way, declaring a major incident expresses and incarnates the logic of response. Response depends on the promise that the ‘interval’ can be inhabited in a manner that stops or ends something before harm, damage or loss becomes irreversible. Response functions by translating the space-time of unforeclosed becoming into a space-time for emergency action: a set of calculable spatial and/or temporal ‘intervals’. ‘Intervals’ may be spatial – the dispatch of resource from a remote location to a scene or the setting up of a rendezvous point in proximity to the scene, for example - and/or temporal – the activation of response or evacuation of a site on detection of something happening. Governing by creating and acting in the second type of ‘interval’ aims to close the open-endedness of the first type, or at least that is the promise of response. This means that the ‘interval’ is not quite equivalent to the ‘milieu’ that Foucault (2007) argues characterises the space of security, despite a shared emphasis on the uncertain and unfolding. The ‘milieu’ is described by Foucault (2007: 20) as the “space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold” and therefore both the
“medium of an action and the element in which it circulates”. It is an envelope combining a “set of natural givens” and a “set of artificial givens” (ibid. 21). By contrast, the ‘interval’ is the making of a separation, a divide. It is the space-time between something happening and a (quasi/non) event having ended. It is the discontinuous space-time of breaks, interruptions, stoppages, and disruptions. The ‘interval’ is, then, a split between a before and an after in a non-chronological present in which something is being disassembled and something is emerging. If appurtenances of security “work, fabricate, organize, and plan” milieus (ibid 21), response involves ways of inhabiting temporary ‘intervals’ in order to end them.

As I stressed above, the ‘interval’ based logic of response will be differently expressed and articulated in distinct appurtenances of emergency, in this case through the technique of a declaration and the statement of a major incident. The declaration is a bureaucratic measure supposed to activate a pre-existing but exceptional network planned for the rare possibility of exceptional events. It is designed to eliminate a temporal gap between recognition of the intensity of an event and the arrival at the scene of appropriate resource from a remote location. In other words, it connects site of event to site of resource via some kind of remote site of control that receives the declaration and dispatches appropriate resource. Declaring a ‘major incident’ thus promises a transition between two organisational forms. Despite a current emphasis on collaboration, normal UK emergency response is organised around a series of legally and formally separate services that correspond to categorisations of emergencies by cause, type of action needed, or affected system. Outside of their day to day work the emergency services are designated ‘Category
One responders under the 2004 UK Civil Contingencies Act, so have a statutory duty to ‘collaborate’ and ‘coordinate’ in preparation for emergencies. Post a declaration of a ‘major incident’ an exceptional but planned network forms until a statement is made that the event has shifted from ‘response’ to ‘recovery’ phase. For example, response will be managed by a ‘Strategic Coordinating Group’ made up of senior representatives from the emergency services and other agencies.

The declaration is, then, a technique in the ‘interval’ that promises to reduce a spatial-temporal gap between exceptional event and exceptional response. Declaring a major incident folds rehearsed techniques of response into an unforeclosed situation that is responded to as an exceptional but actionable emergency. It is supported and enabled by a range of technical devices, principally rehearsed protocols, which specify calculable sequences of action for the ‘interval’. Consider, for example, the fairly typical mnemonic used by the London Ambulance Service for declaring a major incident and for incident management. Action is formalised in a series of steps that orientate ‘first responders’ to the scene and attempt to delay them from becoming immediately involved in care of individuals:

“On arrival at the scene, the attendant or single person will assume the role of the AIO (Silver Medic); they will adopt the following procedures:

• Don high visibility clothing and safety helmet.

• If incident is at a Section 12 LUL station (as per list issued to all frontline vehicles), collect hand portable radios (supplied for LAS staff in the event of an incident) from LUL Station Office for use underground.
• Carry out reconnaissance of the incident site and report back to EOC (see CHALETS/METHANE).
• Declare a ‘major incident’ based on the criteria in the definition.”

(London Ambulance Service NHS Trust ‘Major Incident Plan’)

What this mnemonic and other protocols attempt to ensure is that action in an ‘interval’ does not itself come to have the qualities of an emergency. There is always a threat that in the midst of the ‘interval’ as a space-time of emergence rehearsed action will itself take on the mode of eventfulness of emergency. Indeed, the event of 7/7 was sensed aurally and visually as an emerging break with normality that threatened to overwhelm capacities to make sense of what was happening. Consider, for example, the uncertainty in a call to the British Transport Police control room. It was made by the first police officer on the scene at Aldgate around eight minutes before he uttered “I think we have to call it a major incident”:

“... I'm a DI ... I don't know if you've had anything, we've got ... just sitting in the office ... a huge big bang. We're just down at the platforms having a look at the moment. I'm not quite sure what's happened. Possibly a train-related incident. There don't appear to be anybody hurt. I don't know ...”

(Transcript of call to BTP control room - BTP167)

Delay and the Promise of Response
Speaking on Day 10 of the 7/7 inquest, the first member of the ambulance service on scene at Aldgate recalls “hostility” and “panic” from Fire and Rescue personnel. He was responding by following the aforementioned ‘major incident’ protocol. After setting up the ambulance as a ‘control vehicle’ near the entrance to the station, he responded by surveying the scene on the surface. Injured and soot covered people were emerging from below ground. Fire officers at the surface demanded he respond to individual suffering rather than the scene. He recalls:

“… I was met by the fire officers and they wanted me to take patients away in the ambulance and I had to explain my role as the incident officer, that I couldn’t touch any patients, all I could do was gather information at that stage.

Q. So they didn't seem to understand what your role was, as the first ambulance on the scene?

A. That's correct, but they were very, very anxious, obviously, to get this patient sorted out.”

(7/7 Inquest. Day 13, 29.10.2010, p11, lines 17-25)

The encounter between different emergency services exemplifies the tension between the two types of ‘interval’ that I argue make up the logic of response. Response happens in the ‘interval’ as space-time of unforeclosed becoming and is expressed in the production of ‘intervals’ as calculable and actionable space-times. Because of the tension between these two senses of the ‘interval’ and the constant threat that the first will undo the second, what counts as good response is always in
question and what has been agreed as proper response may break down. Rather than being treated as an ethical problem of how to relate to suffering, the encounter is treated as a possible source of delay in correct action. The driver estimates “no more than 30 seconds” when asked by the Counsel to the Inquest “how much time did that delay you gathering information about what had happened at the scene?”

The concern with whether proper response was delayed is an expression of the continued expectation of response outlined in section one: to end a scene or situation of emergency in a manner that protects life and so realises and sustains the fantasy that provided response is right any emergency can be exited. Exiting the emergency involves, in part, returning scenes to normality, minimising disruption extending beyond the site, and ensuring systems continue to function. As such, response is folded into the continuous management of capitalist life as a complex of circulations unpredictably interrupted by temporary scenes of emergency. In the case of 7/7 this involved minimising disruption to London’s transport circulations by re-routing or stopping flows of people and vehicles and, in the case of the underground, reopening stations after a brief complete shutdown of the system. But it also involved the emergency services protecting people affected at the scenes. Whilst some aspects of response were over-determined by the police search for perpetuators (Edkins 2009), emergency action at the scenes did not simply involve the production of ungrievable ‘bare life’ (after Agamben 1998). To return to the confrontation between service personnel, both the tending to an individual and the surveying of the whole scene expressed relations of care. Both involved a concern with the alleviation of immediate suffering, albeit in different ways (and the
testimony by personnel narrates them in terms of care for the injured)\textsuperscript{xvi}. Perhaps we can understand them as enactments of a pastoral mode of power orientated to each individual in so far as they may be harmed (after Foucault 2007: 125-130). The relation with life at the scene being inclusion of all alongside a prioritisation of care through triage, rather than a paradoxical relation of ‘inclusive-exclusion’. Happening at the intersection between quasi-sovereign and pastoral modes of power, action at the scene involves a form of ‘minimal biopolitics’ (after Redfield 2013). By which I mean that the emphasis is on survival of all, rather than ‘making die’ in order to ‘foster life’ that has characterised the intersection of bio and necropolitics in the ‘war on terror’ (after Mbembe 2003). However, the disagreement between services is also a disagreement about how to balance the tension between caring for each life with caring for all those affected. The tension was resolved by following the ambulance service’s ‘major incident’ protocol. Embedded in that protocol is a prioritisation of care for the population over any individual: immediate casualty care is delayed so as to try and ensure that sufficient resources can be mobilised to care for all at the scene. As the encounter between personnel from different services illustrates, how to prioritise the affected population without sacrificing any individual life is a recurrent problem that leads to intense scenes of competing ethical demands. Compare this relation with life to the case of Jean Charles de Menezes who was killed by UK anti-terror police as he boarded an underground train at Stockwell station, London on July 22 2005. Animated by the threat of terrorism, the ‘mistake’ of killing someone unconnected to terrorist activity expressed the bio/necro-political
imperative that some lives must be killed to protect others (see Vaughen-Williams 2009).

Through the articulation of the logic of response with a ‘minimal biopolitics’, and notwithstanding the uncertainty of personnel responding to something becoming event, the scene of emergency is characterised by an asymmetric relation between those affected by the event and the state, or that which responds. This does not necessarily reproduce and intensify existing social inequalities, as we have seen in other examples of response. But it does make possible different kinds of abandonment by the protective state (as became articulated with race/class in the event of Hurricane Katrina in the USA (Braun & McCarthy 2005)). In the case of 7/7, the concern amongst some families and loved ones was whether delay in emergency response led to deaths or led to otherwise preventable suffering. The critique was focused on delay in administrating care i.e. a type of abandonment to the event (and it is this critique that the Coroner responds to in identifying risks of future deaths despite no actual deaths being caused by delays in emergency response). This coexisted with a critique that the dead and their loved ones were not treated with dignity by the state. As the event became named and governed as a terrorist attack dead bodies were treated as evidence by the police in their search for perpetuators. The resulting delays in allowing loved ones to see their dead relatives resulted in the formation of a political demand that people be treated with dignity and a critique of the reduction of life in Disaster Victim Identification processes (Edkins 2009).

The 7/7 Inquest focused primarily on delay in casualty care. It enacted the hope of response - that any event can be ended by inhabiting the ‘interval’ - by
treat response as a technical problem of how to optimise a network. At the same time, this turns questions about the prioritisation and treatment of life in scenes of emergency into logistical issues (see Cowen (2014) on the antipolitical effects of the emphasis on technicity in the military art and business science of logistics). This is not unique to UK emergency response as expressed in the 7/7 inquest. The constitutive, irreducible, uncertainty of emergencies is made manageable through the identification of gaps internal to response that generate unreasonable delays. For example, international response by the WHO (World Health Organisation) to the most recent Western African Ebola outbreak was widely condemned as “slow and feeble” (Lakoff 2014). Condemnation centred on a range of gaps, principally between the WHO being notified of an outbreak and it declaring an official emergency. Likewise with the floods that followed UK winter storms of 2013-14, criticism of response focused, in part, on delays in ordinary emergency assistance to affected areas, including the provision of sufficient sandbags despite flood warnings. In this process of identifying gaps, questions of how to respond to life in peril become solvable logistical challenges of how networks come together to end ‘intervals’.

Let’s return to the inquest for one example of how the ethical challenge of acting in an ‘interval’ is translated into a logistical problem of actionable gaps. The sense/impression of the exceptionality of 7/7 means that what is problematised in the final Inquest report is not delay per se - delay is inevitable. Rather, through a genre of the event that combines a linear timeline with an attempt to recreate decisions in a past emergent present, aspects of past response are evaluated for whether they pose a risk that in the future the state will be delayed. The delayed
state is enacted in the Inquest as a mundane state whose assumed benevolent desire to care for each individual life is frustrated by mundane logistical problems. Recommendation 4 returns us to the key technique of declaring a major incident. A scene of emergency is both the focal point for multiple networks of activation and mobilisation and a site for the coming together of multiple agencies. Delay can be introduced by poor communication at and between scenes. Therefore:

“I [the coroner] recommend that TfL [Transport for London] and the London Resilience Team review the protocols by which TfL (i) is alerted to major incidents declared by the emergency services that affect the underground network, and (ii) informs the emergency services of an emergency on its own network (including the issuing of a ‘Code Amber’ or a ‘Code Red’, or the ordering of an evacuation).”

(Coroner’s Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, 41)\[vii\]

The recommendation is one example of attempts to de-exceptionalise action in an emergency by making response a logistical matter organised through protocols. By which I mean that emphasis is placed on managing response as a set of fragile networks and lines of movement designed to converge at temporary scenes. Response becomes logistical not only when speed is valorised, but when the promise of ending events is invested in the optimisation of networks (through, for example, techniques such as ‘interoperability’ or collaboration and coordination). The becoming logistical of emergency action is achieved through protocols such as those
for informing other services of a declaration of a ‘major incident’. Protocols fold pre-rehearsed sequences of action into the ‘interval’ of an emergency with the aim of making response immune to the disordering forces of (quasi/non) events. For example, a wide range of protocols now specify action for ‘major incidents’: for the setting up of exceptional functions, such as temporary mortuaries or rest centres; for inter-agency communication; for detection and diagnosis, and so on. Protocols may be understood, then, as the latest iteration of the attempt to establish forms of emergency action that do not have the mode of eventfulness of emergency. As such, protocols connect the ‘interval’ of response to articulations of an accompanying logic – preparedness (see Aradau 2010; Lakoff & Collier 2008; Anderson & Adey 2012). Their relation with events is different but complementary. Response happens in the discontinuous ‘interval’ of emergence as events happen, whereas preparedness happens in the ‘future anterior’ (Aradau 2010) of preparation in a non-evental present. The concern of response is with ending a scene or situation that is already happening in an emergent present. Preparedness is orientated towards readiness in the present for a range of possible futures. Exercises, training, and other techniques of preparedness stage future events to prepare for the next emergent present of an emergency. In this sense, preparedness is one means of keeping the fragile hope of response alive by de-exceptionalising response to exceptional events.

For an example of protocol as a logistical technique that establishes a rule for the exceptional, consider the London Ambulance Service’s revision to their ‘major incident protocol’ in response to one of the Inquest’s recommendations. The protocol
attempts to reduce the delay between declaration and mobilisation by specifying what should move to the scene of a ‘declared major incident’:

“The pre-determined attendance for a declared major incident consists of 20 ambulances, 10 officers, all available ESVs, an ECV, a command unit with FCT, and a doctor. Ambulance liaison officers and hospital liaison officers should also be deployed to the appropriate hospitals.”

(London Ambulance Service NHS Trust ‘Major Incident Plan’)xviii

Here a gap between declaration and mobilisation is made actionable through a process of normation around what constitutes a ‘major incident’. The solution to the problem of delay is, in part, to specify what should move and arrive at a scene. Mobilisation is made automatic and what should be at a scene is standardised. The promise of establishing protocols for response is that there are always rules, even whilst it is acknowledged that actual response will always exceed protocols. Protocols promise to ensure the spatial form and relations of an exceptional network as it meets the affective and material forces of something becoming emergency. Standardisation as a solution to the problem of delay exemplifies the hope that expresses and incarnates the logic of response - that there are no real exceptions and that the ‘interval’ of emergence can be inhabited so as to end an emergency.

Conclusion: Emergency politics
Through the case of 7/7, I have argued that response is a logic based on the tension between the ‘interval’ as a space-time of becoming and the ‘interval’ as an actionable, emergent space-time for proper forms of action. Because I have extracted a general logic from a singular case, this is a contingent claim that is intended to be an initial formulation that is open to revision. When expressed through some apparatuses, including ‘UK Civil Contingencies’, this tension is translated into a logistical problem of the ‘gaps’ in the networks that compose the emergency state. It is in the context of this particular way of governing emergencies - of de-exceptionalising the exception by making response logistical - that we can understand the UK state’s concern with delay. Delay becomes a political problem once response, first, becomes necessary for the continuation of circulations and interdependencies and, second, becomes an occasion for the (re)enactment of the fantasy of the protective state. This means that the concern with delay has a twofold political status. On the one hand, the accusation of delay reflects anxiety about the fragility of government in the face of (quasi/non) events becoming emergencies. On the other, the emphasis on reducing or avoiding delay is one means of reproducing the promise of the becoming logistical of state response: that any emergency can be exited. What the concern with delay does is close down concern with how life is related to in a ‘minimal biopolitics’ based on survival. Questions of the politics of life in emergency become logistical challenges of how to optimise networks. What is occluded in this process is that response can be an occasion for the intensification of power formations, including those surrounding (quasi)sovereignty. Nevertheless, this articulation of logic and apparatus does not involve the relations of ‘letting die’
or ‘making die’ that characterise other formations. It is based on the presumption that delay should be ended or avoided because all of life in a scene of emergency should survive, without exception. In a scene of emergency, what is antithetical to life is the event itself. Of course, as the case of Jean Charles de Menezes shows, this articulation of response is partially connected to police apparatuses based on ‘making die’ some people and groups in order to protect others.

In the midst of claims that the ‘state of exception’ has become the rule, this paper has offered a conceptual vocabulary for understanding how emergencies are governed that aims to interrupt a-priori diagnoses of the politics of emergency. So, a politics of emergency does not always involve exposing the becoming normal of exceptional measures and, in response, attempting to de-exceptionalise emergency action (through, for example, recourse to legality or deliberative procedures). Instead, I advocate an agnostic stance to the political consequences and effects of the government of emergency, but only before analysis of how government happens. The politics of emergency are always specific to the relation between one or more logic (here ‘response’) and one or more apparatus (here ‘UK Civil Contingencies’) and in the context of the material and affective force of particular events. This leads to five research questions for understanding how the government of emergency happens. First, how do (quasi/non) events become governable and felt as issuing particular kinds of political demands through emergency or other ‘modes of eventfulness’? Second, how are space-times of government (in)action opened up and action legitimised through specific logics? Third, how do apparatuses enact, intensify or disrupt existing power formations? Fourth, how do logics and apparatus incorporate
and express particular relations with life? Fifth, and extending beyond the concern with government in this paper, what alternative models of emergency politics might be found in the encounters that make up scenes of emergency? The government of emergency happens, then, through complex ensembles that do not necessarily involve a becoming general of the extra-legal or exceptional. In the UK, the government of emergency happens through protocols and other unexceptional techniques that materialise the hope that any emergency can be exited; and it happens in relation to events that threaten to disappoint that always fragile hope.
The paper draws on publically available empirical material – including testimonies and documentation - from the 7/7 inquest gathered as part of a genealogy of the UK emergency state, funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

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The fire brigade declare a major incident at approximately 09.05, British transport Police at 09.06, London Ambulance Service at 09.24. Major incidents are declared at the other sites. For example, at Edgware Road major incidents are declared by the ambulance service (09.29), police (09.32), fire and rescue service (09.34). Times are based on the 7/7 Inquest report.

‘Charlie Hebdo’ refers to events that happened between January 7th and January 9th in Paris, principally an attack on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo in which 8 journalists, 1 caretaker, 1 visitor and 2 police officers were killed.

The London underground was shutdown at 9.59. Bus services were suspended across central London at 11.08. Timings from 7 July Inquest.

See testimony by ambulance and fire and rescue service personnel involved in the incident at 7/7 Inquest (Day 13, 29.10.2010).
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