THE TROUBLE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

Abstract

If we are to assess whether our attitudes towards nature are morally, aesthetically or in any other way appropriate or inappropriate, then we will need to know what those attitudes are. Drawing on the works of Katie McShane, Alan Holland and Christine Swanton, I challenge the common assumption that to love, respect, honour, cherish or adopt any other sort of pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is to value X in some way and to some degree. Depending on how one interprets ‘value’, that assumption is, I contend, either false or vacuous. I argue that to assess the appropriateness of a person’s pro-attitudes towards a natural entity one must in some cases appeal to the concepts of status and/or bond, and not just that of value. To develop my argument, I appeal to the works of two nature writers – Robert Macfarlane and J. A. Baker.

Keywords: value, pro-attitudes, respect, love
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Different environmental ethicists often have different opinions about what we should value. They often disagree about what kinds of values different kinds of things can have. But they typically assume that environmental ethics is primarily about values and valuing.

Not all of those who are concerned about environmental issues would be happy with this value-centrism. Martin Heidegger, for instance, once proclaimed that ‘thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being’ (1996: 251). I wouldn’t go that far. But I have often wondered whether our preoccupation with values and valuing prevents us from understanding some of the various ways that things, organisms, processes, places and events matter to us. In the following, I argue that it does.

1. THE HEGEMONY OF VALUES THINKING

What does it mean to say that environmental ethicists are preoccupied with values and valuing? One suggestion is that it means that they typically believe the following:

(A) All moral considerations pertaining to our relations with nature can be conceived of in terms of nature’s values.¹

Yet not even those environmental ethicists who champion what Heidegger calls thinking in values would endorse that dubious claim. Take Joseph R. Des Jardins, for example. Although he maintains that a ‘full account of value determines the ethical domain’, he devotes a large part of his textbook to the analysis of issues which seem to require the application of other
moral concepts (2001: 132; my emphasis). He has much to say about duties, rights, virtues and justice, for instance.

A more plausible suggestion is that environmental ethicists are preoccupied with values in the sense that they tend to assume that the following statement is true:

(B) All the various ways that nature matters to human beings are best conceived of in terms of the values human beings take nature to have.

I am not sure whether environmental ethicists tend to assume that (B) is true. Some of them, certainly, would reject it. For example, although Alan Holland has much to say about the various ways that natural things, organisms, places, processes and events matter to human beings, he worries that the concept of value might be nothing more than ‘an empty place holder’ (2009: 510). Like those who practise environmental hermeneutics, he thinks that references to meaning tend to shed more light on our moral relations with nature (Holland 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; cf. Clingerman, Treanor, Drenthen and Utsler 2014).

Yet references to meaning have one notable limitation. Suppose we are told that a certain wood has personal meaning for Tara. Lacking any context, it is unclear how exactly the statement should be interpreted. The reference to personal meaning implies that Tara is either positively or negatively orientated towards the place. But it is not clear which way her orientation falls. Perhaps the wood is where she used to enjoy playing as a girl; perhaps it is where she met her beloved fiancé. But maybe the wood reminds her of some unpleasant event that she would rather forget. The bare reference to meaning tells neither way. It is impossible to know, from what we are told, whether Tara’s attitude to the wood is positively valenced or negatively valenced – whether, in other words, it is a pro-attitude or a con-attitude.²
That matter would, however, be settled were we to learn that Tara values the wood. Upon learning *that*, the valence would immediately become clear. Tara’s attitude would reveal itself as being a pro-attitude, a metaphorical thumbs up, some sort of ‘hurrah’ rather than some sort of ‘boo’. We would conclude that for Tara the world is, all things being equal, a better place on account of the wood’s existence.

These thoughts indicate a third possibility: that environmental ethicists are preoccupied with values in the sense that they take the following claim to be true:

(C) To adopt any pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is to value X in some way and to some degree.

Which entails:

(D) Any question about whether it is (morally, aesthetically or in any other way) appropriate to adopt any pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is a question about whether it is appropriate to value X in some way and to some degree.

We environmental ethicists tend to accept both claims. To ask whether we should respect, love, esteem, honour, cherish or adopt any other pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is, we typically assume, to ask whether it is appropriate to value X in some way and to some degree. Indeed, this assumption is so widely held that it is rarely stated, let alone defended. In books or papers on environmental ethics, the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental values is often made in the first few pages. The various attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective values are often discussed a few pages later. But it is
typically supposed, without question, that the key question is whether it is appropriate to value nature.

Are we justified in accepting (C) and (D)? It depends on how those claims are interpreted. In what follows, I argue that (C) - and therefore (D) – is either false or vacuous, depending on how ‘value’ is interpreted. It follows, I suggest, that if we are to determine whether our attitudes towards nature are appropriate, we will need to think not just about values and valuing, but about other concepts as well. I argue that we will need to appeal to the concepts of status and bond.

2. THREE NOTES ON MY APPROACH

(1) To understand the valence of our attitudes towards anything, one must appeal to psychological research. But if one wishes, as I do, to bring that research to bear upon metaethics, then one must also engage with moral philosophy. Now most of those moral philosophers who have investigated the topic of attitudinal valence have done so in the context of discussing neosentimentalism, and this is not surprising, since neosentimentalists hold that to be valuable simply is to be an appropriate object of a pro-attitude. In what follows, however, I do not presuppose the truth of neosentimentalism, nor do I aim to contribute to the literature on that topic. In my view, the question of how we are to determine what attitudes it is appropriate to adopt towards nature is (or at least should be) of interest to environmental ethicists generally, and not just to those who also happen to be neosentimentalists.

(2) My main aims in this paper are descriptive rather than normative. That is to say, my primary concern is to understand what attitudes people do in fact have towards nature. It is not to argue that any of those attitudes ought or ought not to be taken.
(3) When people say they are sceptical about values, they sometimes mean that they are sceptical about certain second order claims made about values. Take J. L. Mackie. He is sceptical about values in the sense that he denies that they belong to ‘the fabric of the world’ (1977: 15-6). Nonetheless, he seems to assume that all first order moral and aesthetic claims can be adequately conceived of in terms of values and valuing (see, e.g., 1977: 15). And, as one would therefore expect, he seems to assume that all of our pro-attitudes are ultimately forms of valuing. My argument is very different. I take no stand on the second order question of whether values belong to the fabric of the world. Instead, I ask whether all of our pro-attitudes are best conceived of as kinds of valuing. In asking this, moreover, I am concerned with ‘value’ construed as both a verb (as when one values something) and as a noun (as when one finds a certain sort of value in something).

3. THE IMPERTINENCE OF ROCK CLIMBING

In *The Wild Places*, Robert Macfarlane recounts his abortive attempt to scale the pinnacle of Sgurr Dearg on the Isle of Skye:

> We had talked of climbing the Pinnacle, had brought ropes to do so. But here, suddenly, there seemed neither point nor possibility to such an act. It would be dangerous and impertinent. (2007: 57)

Although the reference to impertinence will make some uneasy, it would be uncharitable to suppose that Macfarlane is attributing human thoughts and feelings to the Pinnacle. *The Wild Places* is not a fairy tale. So what was Macfarlane’s attitude to that hard-to-scale mass of basalt? The fact that he wished not to be impertinent in his dealings with it suggests that his
attitude was a pro-attitude, a metaphorical thumbs up. Yet references to thumbs up (or thumbs down) are, like A. J. Ayer’s old hurrah/boo theory of metaethics, extremely crude. What more can be said about Macfarlane’s pro-attitude towards the peak?

One plausible suggestion is that Macfarlane felt it would be impertinent to climb the Pinnacle because he felt that the thing had a certain status. On this reading, Macfarlane felt it would be wrong to climb the Pinnacle in something like the way that it would, in other circumstances, be wrong to tease a venerable elder or to use an antique dinner plate as an ashtray. Furthermore, just as age is essential to the concepts venerable elder and antique dinner plate, so geological antiquity would seem to be part of the Pinnacle’s status. ‘[T]his rock had once been fluid’, Macfarlane reflects, just before turning away from the peak. ‘Aeons ago it had run and dripped and spat.’ (2007: 57) The status of the Pinnacle would seem to reflect its immense age.6

The relevant status-acknowledging pro-attitude here is, I believe, respect. For Macfarlane, the Pinnacle had a certain status on account of its immense age, and it deserved to be treated with respect on account of this status. This is not (or not just) the healthy respect that a prudent person will extend to any dangerous thing.7 It seems, rather, to be a form of what Stephen Darwall (1977) calls recognition respect: a sort of attitude that someone - or in this case, something - can be said to deserve.8

Grant, for the sake of argument, that that last claim is true. Suppose that Macfarlane really did respect the Pinnacle on account of its status. Can that claim about status and respect be plausibly framed in terms of values and valuing?

If (C) is true, then in principle it can. If (C) is true, then respect, or any other pro-attitude, simply is a form of valuing. But is (C) true? Katie McShane, for one, would argue that it is not.9 It is possible, she maintains, to adopt the pro-attitude of respect towards something without seeing it as ‘enjoyable, as worthy of favour, or as a good thing for the
world to contain”; it is possible, indeed, to respect it without valuing it (2012: 761). To be sure, one can consistently value something about X and yet deny that X is of value all things considered. Yet McShane is making a bolder claim: that to respect something may not even be to value it *pro tanto* (2013: 753). Nonetheless, McShane continues, even if one does not value it, the object of one’s respect will be presented as having a special *status*: ‘as important, as to be taken notice of, as worth attending to in some way or another.’ (2012: 761; emphasis removed) And this status will, she adds, bear upon the question of how it may permissibly be treated. Regarding something as worthy of respect is, in her view, ‘incompatible with regarding it as cheap, dispensable, or a mere convenience, and also incompatible with its wanton destruction or exploitation.’ (2012: 761)

Those claims are plausible. The statement that Person A *values* X seems to entail that A regards it as being *pro tanto* a good thing that X exists: not necessarily good from the point of view of the Universe (if that phrase makes sense), but good, at least, from A’s own perspective. This seems to hold true of some pro-attitudes. To *cherish* or *admire* X must (arguably) be to regard it as being *pro tanto* a good thing that X exists. Pro-attitudes involving respect present a different case, however. Return to the example of the antique dinner plate. Even if the object is hideous, it is plausible that it deserves to be treated with respect simply because it is old. Alternatively, consider our attitudes to evil elderly people, such as Livia from the television drama *The Sopranos* or her classical namesake, Augustus’s aged widow, as portrayed in Robert Graves’s *I, Claudius*. It is not obviously wrong to think that the world would be a better place without such wicked people. Yet one could, without inconsistency, believe that the Livias of this world (along with their equally unpleasant male counterparts) nonetheless deserve to be treated with respect on account of their great age.

Something similar may be said of Macfarlane’s attitudes towards the Pinnacle. He did not leave the peak unclimbed simply because he valued it. He turned back because he felt that
it deserved to be treated with respect. To assess whether Macfarlane’s pro-attitude towards
the mountain was morally, aesthetically or in any other sense appropriate one must therefore
ask whether it was appropriate to regard the mountain as having a status that rendered it a
worthy object of such respect. I will not address that question here. For now, I merely note
that to answer it one must think in terms of the concept of status and not simply that of value.

One objection to these claims runs as follows. As we saw, McShane rejects (C). She
endorses

the narrow sense of ‘valuing’, according to which valuing is just one pro-attitude
amongst others.

Hence it makes sense for her to ask whether respecting is a form of valuing. Yet the narrow
sense of ‘valuing’ conflicts with the way that term tends to be used in philosophical debates
regarding, say, neosentimentalism. Those party to such debates tend to believe that (C) is true
by definition. They tend, that is, to endorse

the broad sense of ‘valuing’, according to which all pro-attitudes are forms of valuing.

On this interpretation, ‘valuing’ is a place-holder term, which can be used to refer to any
particular pro-attitude. In one case, ‘valuing’ might refer to respect; in another to admiration,
say, or to love.\textsuperscript{10} So, working with the broad sense of ‘valuing’, to say that Macfarlane
respected the Pinnacle just is to say that he valued it in some way.

That last claim is, I believe, true but unilluminating. The claim that Macfarlane’s
attitude towards the Pinnacle was one of valuing (in a broad sense) tells us nothing about the
specific nature of that attitude. For sure, one could try to be more precise by writing of non-instrumental value, rather than just value. Yet this claim would also be unilluminating. To say that Macfarlane took the Pinnacle to have non-instrumental value is little more – maybe nothing more – than another way of saying what we already knew: that he felt it would be in some sense wrong to ‘use’ the thing by climbing it. Here, Holland’s worries about the concept of value appear to be justified. To say that Macfarlane saw value (in a broad sense) in the Pinnacle is, it would seem, to use ‘value’ as nothing more than an empty place holder (cf. Holland 2009: 510).

In sum, then, the example of Macfarlane’s encounter with the Pinnacle casts doubt on (C). If ‘value’ is construed in a narrow sense, then (C) would seem to be false. If it is construed in a broad sense, then (C) would appear to be vacuous. Either way, it is hard to see how talk of values and valuing could do justice to the phenomenology of that encounter.

4. FALCONS AND OTHER FELLOW CREATURES

J. A. Baker’s book The Peregrine provides a second example of the limits of what Heidegger called ‘thinking in values’, though one which illustrates the importance of bonds rather than status.

The Peregrine is a breathtakingly beautiful account of Baker’s observations of peregrine falcons in the fens and fields of East Anglia. It is also a striking expression of misanthropy. Baker records his hatred of ‘the sound of man’ and his desire to ‘let the human taint wash away in emptiness and silence as the fox sloughs his smell into the cold unworldliness of water’ (2005: 144, 10). Identifying with the falcons he follows, he writes that:
We live, in these days in the open, the same ecstatic fearful life. We shun men. We hate their suddenly uplifted arms, the insanity of their flailing gestures, their erratic scissoring gait, their aimless stumbling ways, the tombstone whiteness of their faces. (2005: 95)

Upon finding a gravely injured heron, partly frozen to the ground, Baker notes that all was dead in the bird but ‘the fear of man’. ‘We are the killers’, he reflects: ‘We stink of death. We carry it with us. It sticks to us like frost. We cannot tear it away’ (2005: 121).

As in the works of writers such as Robinson Jeffers, Baker’s misanthropy can be contrasted with his love of wild animals. The following passage from the opening chapter of *The Peregrine* is a case in point:

I came late to the love of birds. For years I saw them only as a tremor at the edge of vision. They know suffering and joy in simple states not possible for us. Their lives quicken and warm to a pulse our hearts can never reach. They race to oblivion. They are old before we have finished growing. (2005: 10)

Later on, Baker expresses his feelings about the animals that must face the harshness of winter:

There is an animal mystery in the light that sets upon the fields like a frozen muscle that will flex and wake at sunrise. I feel compelled to lie down in this numbing density of silence, to companion and comfort the dying in these cold depths at the foot of the solstice: those… whose blood now courses from the hunting frost, whose frail hearts choke in the clawed frost’s bitter grip. (2005: 123-4)
What pro-attitudes are expressed in those last two passages? One option is love – the love Baker professed for birds. If we follow McShane in adopting a narrow sense of valuing, then it makes sense to ask whether loving is a form of valuing. Is it? Many would contend that it is not. So, for instance, Roberta De Monticelli maintains that ‘you do not love someone because she is a person of value’ (2006: 64-5). Holland agrees. There is, he writes,

> a subtle though clear distinction between the logic of ‘love’ and the logic of ‘value’.

> Love is something one declares, or is smitten by; one does not declare or profess one’s intrinsically valuing attitude to someone… (2011a: 385)

Likewise, Christine Swanton argues that to understand the phenomenon of love one must refer to concepts other than that of value. To make her case, she asks the reader to imagine a scenario in which a kidney surgeon with three children is forced to decide whether to kill one child to save the lives of the two others. Swanton concedes that doing so may well bring about a state of affairs which, all things considered, would be ‘less disvaluable’ than a state of affairs in which the two children were left to die (2003: 217). Still, she claims that it would be wrong to use any of one’s children in this way, even to achieve a valuable end. Doing so, would, she maintains, amount to

> an extraordinarily serious violation of a love bond between parent and child. Requirements of bonding demand that one not do this, but that one grieve in great sorrow for the children who die as a result of inability to treat. Demands of bonding, then, do not track demands of value. (2003: 217)
Granted, some would claim that to love X must be to think that the world is, all things being equal, a better place because of X’s existence. And if that claim is true, then love, unlike respect, would seem necessarily to involve valuing (in the narrow sense). Nonetheless, De Monticelli, Holland and Swanton are surely right to say that it cannot be reduced to a form of valuing. So, when Baker says that he loves birds, he is not saying merely that he values them (in the narrow sense). Even if he stopped short of declaring his love for birds, his attitudes towards them cannot be entirely captured in talk of values and valuing.

Turn now to the broad sense of ‘valuing’. Is it the case that Baker valued birds and other wild animals in this sense? It is unilluminating to say that he did. Whether or not Swanton (2003: 103) is right to say that loving is ‘basically a bond-based response’, she is, I believe, right to draw attention to the bond-based nature of some of our pro-attitudes. Certainly, Baker’s attitudes towards birds seem to reflect his sense of his bonds with them. Birds may race to oblivion, yet we are also headed there, albeit at a slower pace. The frail hearts of animals may choke in clawed frost’s bitter grip, yet eventually we too will die and grow cold. Baker’s writings beautifully convey the sense that animals are what Cora Diamond once called ‘fellows in mortality’, those with whom one feels a sense of common fate. To understand why Baker felt compelled to companion and comfort the dying, one must refer not just to the value he saw in animals, but also to his sense of these bonds. True, this fellow feeling probably wasn’t reciprocated. While Baker felt close to the animals, it is very unlikely that they felt close to him. Nonetheless, it is because he felt so bonded that he was moved to compassion.

The same general point holds true of Baker’s misanthropy. It is not (or not just) the case that Baker found little value in human beings; that he saw humans as we see them but simply accorded them less value. It is not that they shone less brightly in his moral universe. For Baker, in his more misanthropic moments, human beings are no longer fellow women and
men, no longer those who love and are loved, who have mothers and fathers, who sometimes long for security and comfort, and who fear illness and death. They are others: those against whom one defines oneself.

The point can be made with reference to an anecdote from George Orwell. In his essay ‘Looking Back at the Spanish War’, Orwell recounts how, hunkered down in his trench, he spotted an enemy soldier running across the parapet not far from him. He took aim and was about to squeeze the trigger when he noticed that the man was holding up his trousers as he ran. Orwell found himself unable to fire. ‘I had come here’, he writes, ‘to shoot at “Fascists”, but a man who is holding up his trousers is not a “Fascist”, he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you do not feel like shooting at him’. Orwell came to see this man as a fellow man. I suspect that Baker’s transformation was in the opposite direction. As the narrative of The Peregrine unfolds and Baker comes increasingly to identify with the hawks he follows, he starts to see human beings less as fellow men and women and more as he thinks a hawk must see them: as objects of hatred and fear. To reiterate, that transformation is not best conceived of in terms of his coming to value people less and animals more. To understand it, one must refer to Baker’s changing bonds with animals and people. And to assess whether Baker’s attitudes towards animals and people were morally, aesthetically or in any other sense appropriate one must therefore ask whether his bonds with them were appropriate. I will not address that question here. For now, it is enough to note that the question calls for one to consider not just values and valuing, but also bond-related attitudes such as compassion and pity.

5. CONCLUSIONS
To recap: Environmental ethicists tend to accept both (C) and (D). Each of those claims can be taken to have either of two meanings, depending on how the word ‘value’ is interpreted. In a narrow sense, according to which valuing is one sort of pro-attitude amongst others, it makes sense to ask whether any particular pro-attitude is a form of valuing. If McShane is correct, then in some cases the answer will be ‘no’. Respecting, she argues, is not a form of valuing. It is true that one could work with a broad sense of ‘value’, according to which all pro-attitudes are forms of valuing. And working with this very diffuse sense of ‘value’, one could no doubt frame Macfarlane’s attitudes to mountains, or Baker’s to peregrines, as forms of valuing. But maybe, by the same token, one could translate both into talk of ecosystem stocks and services or, even worse, the Newspeak of Orwell’s 1984. Perhaps it could be done; however, the exercise would be unilluminating. One’s description of the attitudes would, in each case, be poor – and poorer than it would have been had one appealed to other concepts.15

I have tried to avoid taking a stand on normative questions. So I have not argued that mountains ought to be treated with respect or that we ought to try to regard nonhuman animals as fellow creatures. Instead, my aim has been descriptive. I have set out to understand how mountains, birds and (by implication) other parts of the natural world do in fact matter to us. I have argued that if we are systematically to determine whether our pro-attitudes towards these various things, organisms, processes, places and events are appropriate, then we will need an adequate account of what those pro-attitudes are. To develop such an account, moreover, I have suggested that we will need to work with a rich conceptual palette. Talk of pro-attitudes in the abstract certainly is not enough. Value pluralism is a step in the right direction. But it isn’t enough either. No, if we are to understand the various ways that nature matters to us, then we will need to consider status, bonds and, I expect, a range of other concepts as well.16
That would only be a first step, however. Trying to comprehend our various pro-attitudes towards nature (or anything else) is not simply a matter of identifying more and more such attitudes. The relations between the various attitudes must be considered, too. It must also be asked whether some pro-attitudes can only be taken up by a person if she is already attuned in some more general and basic way towards the world.\(^1\) I do not have space to pursue these complicated and difficult matters here, still less to consider how my discussion of environmental valuing relates to valuing in general. All I have tried to show is that we will need to take account of more than just values and valuing if we are to assess whether our pro-attitudes towards nature are appropriate.\(^2\)

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1 By ‘nature’ or ‘the natural world’ I mean those parts of the biosphere whose current states are not for the most part the intended products of human actions – lynxs and taiga, for example, rather than hair dryers and shopping malls. That is not, I stress, my definition of ‘nature’. It is just a rough and ready way of indicating what I mean to refer to when I use that
word. For the purposes of this paper, that rough sketch should, however, be enough. At least, the argument I develop below does not presuppose any more precise or defensible conception of what nature is.

2 It is true that Tara might have both pro- and con-attitudes towards the wood. It is likely, moreover, that some of her attitudes towards the place fall into neither category. However, my aim in this paragraph is not to provide a comprehensive account of Tara’s attitudes towards the wood. It is simply to clarify the distinction between the concept of a pro-attitude and that of a con-attitude.

3 Although, in what follows, I focus on the relations between pro-attitudes and valuing, the claims I make are also meant to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the relations between con-attitudes and disvaluing.

4 See further, McShane 2013: 748, n.1. For a summary of the psychological literature on attitudinal valence, see Prinz 2004: Chapter 7.

5 See, for instance, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004: 401, McShane 2013. McShane 2011 provides a good introduction to neosentimentalist views and their bearing on environmental ethics.

6 On the relations between status and age, see Erich Hatala Matthes’s account of how ‘historical artifacts expand our access to times from which we are otherwise isolated’, in a way that can ‘offer a sense of unity with the significant moments that have shaped both the earth and ourselves.’ (2013: 62; cf. Swanton 2003: 44-5, James 2013) The reference to the earth indicates that Matthes takes this to apply to natural historical artifacts, such as mountains, and not just to material culture.


8 Mountaineers often say that mountains deserve this sort of respect. Consider, for instance, the frequently voiced claim that Cesare Maestri’s high-impact climbing techniques evinced a

9 To be accurate, she suggests that if Kantian respect is a pro-attitude (and there is, she acknowledges, some debate on this question), then it does not seem to be a kind of valuing (see McShane 2013: 760-1).

10 Cf. Holmes Rolston III’s claim that ‘value’ just is ‘the generic noun for any positive predicate’ (1989: 74). The subsequent discussion implies that to ask whether our attitudes towards nature should be positively or negatively valenced simply is to ask whether nature has economic, life support, recreational, scientific, aesthetic, life, diversity, unity, stability, spontaneity, dialectical or sacramental value (see 1989: 74ff).

11 That claim, I admit, open to question. Although my intuitions about love match those of De Monticelli, Holland and Swanton, others see things differently. For instance, both J. David Velleman (1999: 362) and Irving Singer (2009) maintain that love is at root a form of valuing (an ‘arresting awareness of value in a person’ and a bestowal of value, respectively). Adjudicating this matter requires argument, and not just the comparison of intuitions. Unfortunately, however, there is not enough space, here, to defend the claim that loving cannot be reduced to valuing. So I can only ask readers to accept that whether or not it is true, that claim is at least plausible.


13 Two points: (1) It might be objected that Baker could not really have suffered with the animals - either because the animals themselves were mere mechanisms and so incapable of suffering or (more plausibly) because their sufferings were too unlike Baker’s for sympathy to be possible. But even if Baker did not feel compassion, he might nonetheless have been
moved to pity. For, as Brian Carr (1999: 428) points out, ‘Compassion rests upon an appreciation of the suffering as conceived by the one who suffers, whereas pity involves a grasp of the misfortune of which the sufferer is unaware.’ In fact, Diamond (1978, pp. 474-5) connects the sense that animals are ‘fellows in mortality’ with the concept of pity. (2) Swanton implies that compassion is, like love, a bond-based response (2003: 24). I am not sure that it is. Consider Buddhist conceptions of compassion (karuṇā). The following claims form an inconsistent set: (a) bonds are attachments, (b) an awakened person is necessarily without any attachments, (c) karuṇā is a bond-based response, and (d) an awakened person can exhibit karuṇā. One way to try to restore consistency would be to deny (b), by suggesting that the development of karuṇā involves the expansion and transformation of one’s bonds with others, rather than their eradication (see Jenkins 2013: 466-7). Another would be to deny (c), by claiming that karuṇā is unlike ordinary, bond-based compassion.


15 Couldn’t one say, at least, that Macfarlane valued the Pinnacle because of its status or that Baker valued birds because of his bonds with them? Certainly, this could be said. But it is not clear that much would be gained by saying it. For once we know that Macfarlane saw the Pinnacle as a worthy object of respect, what does it add to say that he valued it as an object of respect? The nature of his response can be captured by referring to status and respect; no appeal to the concepts of value and valuing is needed. Similarly, once we know that Baker felt compassion for the birds he regarded as fellow creatures, what is added by saying that he valued them because he saw them as fellow creatures? Everything that needs to be said about Baker’s response can be said in terms of bond-based concepts. Again, no appeals to value are required. In such contexts, references to value are, as Holland maintains, ‘dispensable’ (2011b: 317).
16 Cf. Iris Murdoch’s (1961: 20) claim that ‘We need more concepts’ if we are to make ‘moral progress’.

17 Despite my cheap shot at Heidegger in the opening section, I think it is likely that his account of a *Grundstimmung*, a fundamental attunement or mood, would prove useful here. See further, Swanton 2010.

18 As one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper pointed out, it may be worth investigating how the thesis defended above bears upon the body of empirical research on the relations between environmental attitudes and environmental behaviours. Consider, for example, Anja Kollmuss and Julian Agyeman’s (2002: 252) claim that the impact of the former on the latter is ‘usually very small’. It would be interesting to test whether a more fine-grained analysis of attitudes, couched in terms of concepts such as *respect* and not just *values* and *valuing*, would reveal a closer connection between environmental attitudes and environmental behaviours.