Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.


Durham Research Online
You are in:

Vote buying and tax cut promises.

Brooks, Thom (2016) 'Vote buying and tax cut promises.', Theoria., 63 (146). pp. 20-35.

Abstract

Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax-cut promises is not wrongfulness but enforceability.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Download PDF
(221Kb)
Full text:Publisher-imposed embargo
(AM) Accepted Manuscript
File format - PDF (Revised version)
(209Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2015.6314602
Publisher statement:This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedited version of an article published in Theoria. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Brooks, Thom (2016). Vote Buying and Tax Cut Promises. Theoria 63(146): 20-35 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2015.6314602
Record Created:17 Feb 2016 13:05
Last Modified:06 Jun 2017 12:02

Social bookmarking: del.icio.usConnoteaBibSonomyCiteULikeFacebookTwitterExport: EndNote, Zotero | BibTex
Look up in GoogleScholar | Find in a UK Library