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Vote Buying and Tax Cut Promises

Brooks, Thom

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Abstract

Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax-cut promises is not wrongfulness but enforceability.

Citation

Brooks, T. (2016). Vote Buying and Tax Cut Promises. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 63(146), 20-35. https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2015.6314602

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Dec 3, 2015
Online Publication Date Mar 1, 2016
Publication Date Mar 1, 2016
Deposit Date Dec 4, 2015
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Theoria.
Print ISSN 0040-5817
Electronic ISSN 1558-5816
Publisher Berghahn Journals
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 63
Issue 146
Pages 20-35
DOI https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2015.6314602

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Copyright Statement
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedited version of an article published in Theoria. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Brooks, Thom (2016). Vote Buying and Tax Cut Promises. Theoria 63(146): 20-35 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2015.6314602






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