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Competition in the political arena and local government performance

Ashworth, B.; Geys, B.; Heyndels, B.; Wille, F.

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Authors

B. Geys

B. Heyndels

F. Wille



Abstract

Competition reduces rent extraction in private-sector firms. In this article, we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local-level governments’ performance in Flanders. The results indicate that electoral competition – measured via the number of parties competing in elections – significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy. Intertemporal competition – measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time – has a similar, but weaker, positive effect. These beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments, which is shown to work against their productive efficiency. Overall, though, the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample.

Citation

Ashworth, B., Geys, B., Heyndels, B., & Wille, F. (2014). Competition in the political arena and local government performance. Applied Economics, 46(19), 2264-2276. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2014.899679

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Mar 25, 2014
Publication Date Jul 1, 2014
Deposit Date Mar 29, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Applied Economics
Print ISSN 0003-6846
Electronic ISSN 1466-4283
Publisher Taylor and Francis Group
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 46
Issue 19
Pages 2264-2276
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2014.899679
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1385570

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