I. Chatterjee
Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining
Chatterjee, I.; Saha, B.
Abstract
We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within-firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models.
Citation
Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2017). Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining. Managerial and Decision Economics, 38(4), 607-621. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2807
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Apr 5, 2016 |
Online Publication Date | May 27, 2016 |
Publication Date | Jun 1, 2017 |
Deposit Date | Apr 6, 2016 |
Publicly Available Date | May 27, 2018 |
Journal | Managerial and Decision Economics |
Print ISSN | 0143-6570 |
Electronic ISSN | 1099-1468 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 38 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 607-621 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2807 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1384645 |
Files
Accepted Journal Article
(626 Kb)
PDF
Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Chatterjee, I., and Saha, B. (2017). Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining. Managerial and Decision Economics, 38(4): 607-621, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2807. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
You might also like
Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games
(2023)
Journal Article
Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation
(2023)
Journal Article
Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy
(2020)
Journal Article
Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak
(2020)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Durham Research Online (DRO)
Administrator e-mail: dro.admin@durham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search