Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Legislator dissent as a valence signal

Campbell, Rosie; Cowley, Phil; Vivyan, Nick; Markus, Wagner

Legislator dissent as a valence signal Thumbnail


Authors

Rosie Campbell

Phil Cowley

Wagner Markus



Abstract

Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents (profile effects). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences (conditional evaluation). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.

Citation

Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N., & Markus, W. (2019). Legislator dissent as a valence signal. British Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 105-128. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000223

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 1, 2016
Online Publication Date Jun 24, 2016
Publication Date Jan 31, 2019
Deposit Date Feb 1, 2016
Publicly Available Date Apr 18, 2016
Journal British Journal of Political Science
Print ISSN 0007-1234
Electronic ISSN 1469-2112
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 49
Issue 1
Pages 105-128
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000223

Files

Accepted Journal Article (1.9 Mb)
PDF

Copyright Statement
This article has been published in a revised form in British Journal of Political Science https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000223. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Copyright Cambridge University Press 2016.





You might also like



Downloadable Citations