Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders?

Li, Daniel Z.

Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders? Thumbnail


Authors

Profile Image

Daniel Li daniel.li@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor



Abstract

This paper provides a more general sufficient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders' valuations. Specifically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then there's no difference between revealing information or not.

Citation

Li, D. Z. (2016). Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders?. Economics Bulletin, 36(1), 349-354

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 17, 2016
Online Publication Date Mar 17, 2016
Publication Date Mar 17, 2016
Deposit Date Apr 28, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Economics Bulletin
Print ISSN 1545-2921
Publisher Economics Bulletin
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 36
Issue 1
Pages 349-354
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1383416
Publisher URL http://www.economicsbulletin.com/

Files




You might also like



Downloadable Citations