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Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning

Evans, J. St. B.T.; Thompson, V.A.; Over, D.E.

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Authors

J. St. B.T. Evans

V.A. Thompson



Abstract

There has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of deductive reasoning. Many researchers no longer think it is appropriate to ask people to assume premises and decide what necessarily follows, with the results evaluated by binary extensional logic. Most every day and scientific inference is made from more or less confidently held beliefs and not assumptions, and the relevant normative standard is Bayesian probability theory. We argue that the study of “uncertain deduction” should directly ask people to assign probabilities to both premises and conclusions, and report an experiment using this method. We assess this reasoning by two Bayesian metrics: probabilistic validity and coherence according to probability theory. On both measures, participants perform above chance in conditional reasoning, but they do much better when statements are grouped as inferences, rather than evaluated in separate tasks.

Citation

Evans, J. S. B., Thompson, V., & Over, D. (2015). Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, Article 398. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00398

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Apr 1, 2015
Deposit Date May 12, 2016
Publicly Available Date May 24, 2016
Journal Frontiers in Psychology
Print ISSN 1664-1078
Publisher Frontiers Media
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 6
Article Number 398
DOI https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00398

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Published Journal Article (912 Kb)
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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Copyright © 2015 Evans, Thompson and Over. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.




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