ICT and the state in remote and coastal Somaliland

This paper assesses the ability of information and communications technology (ICT) to improve centre-periphery relations and capacity building in Somaliland. Taking as its departure point Herbst's observation on the problematic relationship between authority and location in Africa, the paper uses recent developments in Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police headquarters in Hargeisa to assess ICT's real contribution to changing formal security provision in remote and coastal areas. ICT's potential as a new mode of brokerage connecting Somaliland's government and populace and practice is for now minimal, but identifying the ways in which state-based security actors such as coast guards actually use ICT allows for a more accurate assessment of the variables shaping centre-periphery relations.

Ministers in Somaliland's ministry of the interior have long regarded security and stability as the self-proclaimed republic's most significant achievement. Located in the arid north-west of the former Somalia, and subject to threats ranging from arms trafficking, illegal fishing, uncontrolled migration and terrorism to drought, Somaliland's governance (which refers here to the bargaining conducted amongst relevant actors) is organised around the management of insecurity, with 47% of the state budget of $251 million spent on security. Elections are relatively free and fair but government is decentralised, political culture is militarised, politicians are essentially unaccountable, press freedom is limited, civil society is weak, and access to government offices is difficult. In other words, Somaliland is a hybrid state in which conventional state-based structures are grafted onto traditional clan-based forms of governance.

Despite its failure to achieve international recognition, Somaliland attracts significant levels of support from donors ranging from the UK, Gulf States and Turkey to non-governmental organisations such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG). But with the exception of DDG's work in villages, most of the resultant projects focus on conditions in relatively secure urban areas such as those found in the capital city of Hargeisa (population 750,000), which is where politicians spend their time and most voters live, or the port city of Berbera (population 245,000), Somaliland's commercial capital and only container and general cargo port, donors know little about the details of everyday life in remote areas such as those bordering the Gulf of Aden. Formal accounts of the decentralised governance structures found in regions and districts away from the main urban areas are publicly available, with the Somaliland Law website referring to village councils nominated by elders and prominent persons
and appointed by district councils, but the practicalities and politics of day-to-day security governance are largely unknown.

This is understandable. Such areas are physically inaccessible, insecure and out of bounds to international advisers and consultants; they do not have the physical infrastructure donors rely on or wish to use; they lack the tax-base and technical capabilities needed for sustainable services such as police, water, education and health; and they are notorious for isolation, unemployment, illegal fishing, piracy, and disputes over land and water rights. Consequently, the precise nature of the working relationships developed between the governance core in Hargeisa and informal security actors in remote and coastal settlements is known only to Somaliland officers, officials and advisers with an appropriate technical or political remit.

Yet communications between the centre and the periphery should be relatively easy because despite low literacy levels, Somaliland has the cheapest telecommunications rates in Africa and even in remote settlements people have access to radios or mobile telephones, and subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. Indeed, donors and NGOs working across Africa increasingly promote the use of short message service (SMS) public information messaging, text alert systems and radio phone-ins as a means for promoting community safety, engaging communities in problem solving, improving information management, and developing accountability and transparency in decision making — but in Somaliland such happens only in urban areas. Despite repeated protestations that a locally appropriate form of development-oriented community-policing must be developed for rural areas, donors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have yet to implement such a model, with or without ICT. Meanwhile Somaliland's government enthusiastically welcomes projects exploiting technology, though its support tends to be short-lived. ICT may be a prime example of transnational knowledge that is capable of lessening 'the distance between government and the citizens and communities it is intended to serve' but its transfer is uneven.

This paper considers whether the use of ICT can recast our assessment of state-capacity building and centre-periphery relations in remote and coastal regions such as those found in northern Somaliland. Put simply, it asks whether ICT has made a difference to the everyday relationship between the government in Hargeisa and settlements in remote coastal areas. However, rather than exploring these issues from the viewpoint of external actors from the North (e.g. the UK's Department for International Development, DFID) or the South (Ethiopia) or in terms of Somaliland's political development, it uses the experience of Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police to indicate empirical perspectives and realities; i.e. to explore the relationship between authority and location, and between politics and practice. Specifically, it asks whether ICT can help the non-military law-enforcement actors working within Somaliland's populace to perform a brokerage or mediating function between government officials in Hargeisa and local people living in areas where there is
minimal capacity building and development. It considers whether ICT has the potential to broker a link between the transnational practices and modernity associated with mobile telephones and the state-based police model found in urban areas, and the ways in which security (national and day-to-day) is handled in remote settlements.

Distinguishing between the role and resources of the coast guard and immigration police as sanctioned in Hargeisa and actually used in remote and coastal areas introduces the notion of brokerage, and this matters here because brokerage is embodied in specific social actors, associations, networks or technologies. It is not an abstract function or an empty signifier since it exists only in the various situations or forms in which it is realised or used. It cannot necessarily be tied to individuals either, because in Somaliland the role of the individual is secondary to that of the group. But using brokerage as a tool that expresses or influences (and is influenced by) locally-acceptable processes of security provision and legitimation allows for an investigation of the extent to which ICT affects centre-periphery relations, capacity building and security governance.

This argument is developed in three parts. Taking Herbst's insight as its departure point, the first provides an overview of the environmental and security issues affecting Somaliland's remote and coastal areas, and of ICT's potential to make a difference to their security governance. The second explores Somaliland's broader experience of security-oriented brokerage using the contextualised practices of its coast guard and immigration police. It asks how officers use ICT and whether it makes a difference to their conduct of everyday business or relations with their respective headquarters and the government. The third concludes that ICT may be a new variable within existing power networks but it has yet to affect relations between Somaliland's security-conscious government and the organisations and populace it must deal with. Centre-periphery relations are less problematic than Herbst thought.

The realities of Somaliland are complex, with every aspect of security governance, politics, policing and daily life permeated by clan-based calculations or consensus, yet it offers an opportunity to reassess the relationship between state-based authority and place in a strategically significant and relatively stable entity. This is important because, contrary to Herbst's observation that the fundamental challenge confronting African leaders is how to extend their authority over sparsely settled lands, the record of Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police suggests that the government of President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud 'Silanyo' does not wish to invest in extending its reach or presence. It is content to manage the periphery indirectly and flexibly from the centre, relying on clan-based consensus and informal decision-making to ensure politically acceptable levels of security and stability in the issues that concern it. Even so, the experience of the coast guard and immigration police emphasises that the relationship between politics and practice is far from straightforward, especially when it comes to senior appointments.
Authority and location

In his seminal *States and Power in Africa*, Herbst identified a fundamental problem confronting African leaders: how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely settled lands.\(^4\) The question is as relevant today as it was in 2000, not least because the issues it alludes to are particularly problematic for governments in hybrid entities such as the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, which comprises four million people in a small number of urban centres set in a sparsely populated, arid, insecure and under-developed environment. Further, Herbst's question can be extended to cover Hargeisa's response to the international community's advocacy of a federal Somalia based on Mogadishu.

Even so, there are three main reasons for questioning the applicability of Herbst's insight to Somaliland. First, the government of President Silanyo is, like its predecessors, very security conscious; the republic is not recognised internationally, there are recurrent political crises, al-Shabaab is a persistent presence, and chief security officers are beholden to the president.\(^5\) Yet it governs lightly in the remote and coastal regions where state representatives have long been absent or vulnerable, and its public agenda is dominated by issues such as illegal migration\(^6\) and territorial disputes with Puntland, rather than under-development or radicalisation. Second, the rationale underpinning Hargeisa's response cannot be attributed to ministerial inexperience or naivety because Somaliland's officials and senior officers have many years experience of transnational security governance transfers. In the two decades following independence in 1960, its security organisations were trained by, amongst others, the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany, Israel, Egypt, Sudan, the UK and USA, with many of today's chief and senior officers receiving KGB training. However, the legacy of 20-years of military dictatorship means that for many people state incapacity is of less concern than state power in the hands of a rival clan; anecdotal evidence suggests that memories of the Barre era's repressive approach to 'directing the people' ('hamuunta') remain strong.

Third, the availability of ICT capable of overcoming physical and, perhaps, socio-economic distance introduces a new variable into centre-periphery relations; Somaliland's society may be primarily pastoral and illiterate, but most people have access to radio communications sets or mobile telephones. The question therefore arises as to whether ICT can perform a brokerage function between the political and geographical centre and periphery, and between the reconfigurations of responsibility, social engineering and capacity building associated with modernity and tradition.\(^7\)

A key to understanding why the Silanyo government fails to extend its authority overtly and systematically is to be found in the ways in which Hargeisa-based law enforcement actors such as the coast guard and immigration police operate in remote and coastal areas where the state has a minimal
presence. There are, however, multiple obstacles in the way of acquiring the knowledge needed to analyse recent developments accurately.

**Remote and coastal areas**

Regardless of the impressive results provided by social and cultural anthropologists working on police and gendarmes in West Africa, researching everyday security in Somaliland’s remote and coastal areas is not feasible. Chronic insecurity, land and political disputes, radicalisation and the risk of kidnapping mean that it is impossible for internationals to ‘go to the field’ in order to understand how people go about their daily routines; the EU advisers charged with developing Somaliland’s coast guard are confined to Hargeisa and the port city of Berbera not only for bureaucratic reasons.

Consequently, open-source international knowledge is based on the anecdotal or visual; satellite images of coastal settlements along the Gulf of Aden show few signs of habitation while planes flying to Hargeisa from Bosasso on the north-east tip of Puntland follow endless beaches of white sand backed by a few isolated settlements of low-quality housing linked by dirt tracks. But it is different for Somaliland officials. The government's few statements on issues relating to coastal areas may be uninformative and its decision-making on security issues opaque and subject to pressure from, reputedly, individuals such as the president’s youngest wife, but ministry advisers are familiar with the region’s settlements. Wall maps in the headquarters of Hargeisa’s coast guard indicate the presence of many villages with an average population of 50-100, and ministry advisers are familiar with their names and location.

Ironically, one reason why remote and coastal areas receive little attention outside the ministry is because the state is not overtly present. Thus security assessments published by the Hargeisa-based Observatory on Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) cover the town of Erigavo in the north-east but do not assess perceptions in settlements like Hareed or Laasa because there are no police present. Like most Somali research organisations, OCVP focuses on perceptions in urban areas such as Berbera, Burco and Sheekh where the police is the main source of security, supplemented in the more remote villages in the district concerned by informal actors such as elders and local committees. The district conflict and security assessment report for Salahley district, 70 km to the south of Hargeisa and adjacent to the Ethiopian border, focuses on Salahley town, paying little attention to the 28 villages that fall under its ambit.

Nevertheless, although OCVP does not provide assessments of remote or coastal settlements in Somaliland, some idea of the situation to be found in them can be gained from its reports covering comparable settlements in South-Central and Puntland. Relevant examples include Hobyo, a district in South-Central where, in the absence of police, security is provided by state-based soldiers and informal groups, or Bandar Beyla and Eyl in Puntland, which in the late 2000s was known as Somalia’s pirate capital. This picture may be supplemented by UNDP assessment missions carried out
in Puntland's remote and neglected districts of Alula and Bargal. The road networks connecting Alula and Bargal to other districts and regions are rough and inaccessible for most of the year, especially for heavy vehicles, youth unemployment is estimated locally as being more than 90%, and there are few local NGOs, contractors or companies. As a UNDP report notes, both 'were piracy hotspots, remote, almost inaccessible, police presence is very limited and under equipped', and the state's only presence was provided by 30 ineffective soldiers. There are few formal links between political centres and periphery settlements in the former Somalia.

This trend also holds for the urban areas in which Somaliland's police stations and posts are found. Wooden stalls may act as police posts in small settlements beside the road between, e.g. Hargeisa and the police training college at Mandeera, 60 km to the north-east, but there are few officers to be found even in peaceful towns such as Baligubadle, 65 km to the south of Hargeisa, where police is the main security provider, albeit with minimal resources. Those in Erigavo, a town of 35, 000 people situated 400 km north-east from Hargeisa, lack handcuffs, walkie-talkies and transport and there is no chance of them responding to a call about a youth snatching a mobile at night, let alone to a robbery in a remote settlement 230 kilometres away. News reports and OCVP's respondents regularly refer to instances of youth violence, rape, robbery involving knives and the theft of mobile telephones in urban areas, and to rape, livestock theft and robbery in more rural areas, but Somalis have long dealt with crime informally and people turn first to elders or customary law (xeer), rather than police. And policing standards are low. As the Hargeisa-based Human Rights Centre reported in 2015, officers regularly demand payment for responding to crime while police stations are used as detention centres and as such are avoided. Despite this, OCVP records many people asking for more police.

Successive governments have shown no interest in addressing this situation, least of all in remote areas, and the link between authority and location appears to be more flexible than Herbst suggests. Even so, the question arises as to whether ICT could help to overcome some of the logistical challenges associated with increasing the state's presence and enforcement capacity.

**ICT as brokerage**

Although the World Bank's 1997 identification of a link between ICT and state building has had little traction in the self-proclaimed republic, Somaliland's governments have long tolerated donor attempts to improve police-community relations as an aspect of state building even though — or, more likely, because — such projects do little more than provide desirable resources (e.g. buildings and vehicles) and a professional or democratic veneer. Perhaps because of this, donors currently show interest in the potential of ICT to facilitate a reliable, timely and reassuring police response to calls. In the context of Somaliland's governance, ICT means the use of mobile telephones and text messaging for security-related alerts and crime reporting though other uses include the mobile money platform, Zaad and health or literacy-related programmes. For donors such as the EU and DFID, ICT is a means for
local communities to communicate with police and develop joint strategies for dealing with local concerns. Buoyed by Somaliland's high rates of access to mobiles and some of the cheapest call rates in the world, advisers working for the EU believe that ICT can provide a cost-effective and locally acceptable way to do this. The money transfer and telecommunications industries have used ICT to bridge the country's governance gap, exploiting mobiles to leap-frog the limited number of landlines, banks and roads, and there is no obvious reason why ICT could not help to mitigate the police's poor-quality response. However, the only example to date of such an initiative is a flawed project in Hargeisa.

Inspired by a text alert system introduced in rural Ireland, in August 2015 EUCAP (a civilian mission forming part of the EU's External Action arm) introduced a text alert system based on SIM cards at a UNDP-supported model police station in New Hargeisa. The results were disappointing. Ministers supported the initial publicity campaign enthusiastically but no calls were received in the months that followed, and there are no plans to introduce similar projects elsewhere in Hargeisa, let alone in remote or coastal areas. Significantly, the introduction of a toll-free 888 emergency number in Mogadishu has also failed, as has an NGO-run rape crisis line.

The reasons for Somali reluctance to use ICT to report crime or contact state representatives are debatable, ranging from distrust and cultural preferences to concerns about confidentiality and inadequate police resources, but it is clear that donor expectations that ICT can help to facilitate an improvement in police-community relations have not been fulfilled; widespread access to mobiles has not translated into increased crime reporting, improved response rates or better police-community relations in urban areas, let alone a more meaningful state presence in remote areas. This is unsurprising because most people turn first to informal policing providers such as traditional elders and neighbourhood policing groups. Also, most police business is conducted without the use of technology, and even inclusive and traditional forms of ICT such as radios and paper are scarce. Senior officers and officials in headquarters buildings may have multiple mobiles and SIM cards (they do not have land lines), but with the exception of specialised technical officers in the immigration police and the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), whose masked officers confiscate mobiles, laptops or electronics found during raids, most officers have only recently acquired basic items of uniform. Even paper-based systems have problems, with few of the occurrence books open on desks in stations kept up-to-date. Literacy levels amongst Somaliland's ageing and uneducated low-ranking general duties police officers remain low, just as they do in the population as a whole.

Although the government's evaluation of this situation is difficult to assess accurately, it is possible to deduce its political preferences and interest in ICT from discussions held with officials and officers from the Ministry of Interior, Coast Guard and Immigration Police in Hargeisa in December 2015. Nevertheless, a degree of caution is necessary. Government priorities for remote and coastal areas
may, like the evidence for meaningful statehood, be evident from the resources and support provided to the coast guard and immigration police, but the relationship between politics and practice remains opaque. Thus the resources and attention given to immigration operations in Hargeisa and along the Ethiopian border suggest that uncontrolled migration is of greater concern than under-development, illegal fishing or piracy, but the dismissal in February 2016 of the commander responsible for dramatically increasing the deportation of people with illegal stay permits emphasises that political and clan-based imperatives must be factored in. Whatever the explanation, addressing security developments in remote and coastal areas allows for a discussion of whether ICT has made a difference to officers' behaviour, and whether or not it is a tool enabling coast guard and specialist police to broker links between the centre and periphery.

'Soldiering' in remote and coastal areas
Somaliland governments have yet to engage systematically in capacity building in the country's remote and coastal areas while international commentators know little about everyday security practices in their settlements. This lack of interest is striking, given that Somaliland's 865 km (520 miles) of coastline on the Gulf of Aden — and its proximity to Yemen (known locally as Aden) — make it of potential strategic significance for not only Hargeisa as it seeks international recognition, but also for donors such as the UK, with its large Somali population and vulnerability to radicalisation, and for UK-based companies such as Mott MacDonald, which provides consultancy to the UK-supported Somaliland Development Fund on developing public and private power providers. Maritime trading nations such as Denmark and Norway have an interest too, though shipping industry projects on 'Somalia coastal development' appear to be confined to Berbera. Surprisingly, the formerly high incidence of piracy did not fundamentally affect this approach. Even before August 2015, when the Financial Times reported that there had been no incidents involving Somali pirates in the preceding eight months, the international shipping community's attention focused on Puntland's coastal villages as a source of piracy, rather than on Somaliland's. Thus a joint venture involving the UNDP, Maersk, Shell, BP, Stena and the Japanese shipping companies NYK, MOL and K Line in a project designed to develop alternative livelihoods to piracy for youths in coastal villages focuses on Eyl, Bandar Bay, Bargalin, Hafun, Gara’ad and the adjacent districts of Adado, South-Galkayo and Abudwaq. Somaliland's prison for pirates may have been a news story in 2012, but its coastal settlements have never attracted attention.

A detailed, coherent and internationally accessible picture of security in Somaliland's remote coastal settlements is unlikely to emerge for the foreseeable future, yet conversations with officials and advisers in Hargeisa in December 2015 suggest that the government's own knowledge is far from unsatisfactory (the actionable intelligence provided by the secret police in Hargeisa is reputedly
For now, the role played by Somaliland's coast guards and immigration police offers an indicative outline of government-sponsored initiatives and priorities and local realities.

The state's presence is signified by a small number of coast guards and immigration officers. The coast guard and the immigration police are not civilian or general duties police dealing directly with the public, but they are part of Somaliland's overall law enforcement system. Somali notions of policeness, of what it means to be police, are flexible so it comes as no surprise that the boundaries between the roles played by security actors in remote and coastal settlements blurs: coast guard, security guard or pirate — their work is the same.

Additionally, both represent a potential source of government revenue, from port and customs charges in Berbera to entry visas at Hargeisa's airport.

The significance of the two forces for donors and the local population is debatable. In theory, the coast guard matters for donors because its capacity to manage maritime and land-based maritime security affects counter-piracy, illegal fishing, maritime governance and development more broadly, but in practice it receives little attention from non-specialists. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in practice donors find many of coast guard in Berbera to be unreliable, unprofessional and ineffective, with all that this implies for standards in isolated posts, and similar considerations may apply to their views on the immigration police. The inhabitants of the few coastal settlements where coast guard and police are stationed are unlikely to share these views. Indeed, they may, as part of a clan-based, legally plural and entrepreneurial society, regard issues such as ineffectiveness, trust and corruption as irrelevant. Meanwhile the officers concerned are few in number and too vulnerable to do other than accommodate many local preferences and practices.

Officers from both forces probably share similar flaws of casualness or impunity too, especially when based in isolated settlements where qat chewing and a propensity to look the other way for a small fee are common; if a lack of technical skills, discipline and 'professionalism' is common in coast guard posts in the port city of Berbera or amongst elderly low-ranking officers in Hargeisa's immigration offices, there is no reason to assume that the situation is different in remote areas where officers are few in number and physically vulnerable. If, however, we look at remote and coastal areas from the point of view of senior officers in the two forces' headquarters in Hargeisa, a different picture emerges, one which offers an informative overview of centre-periphery relations and the dynamics underpinning it.

When viewed from this perspective, the Silanyo government's seemingly relaxed approach to centre-periphery relations reflects Somali preferences for clan-based consensus over the hierarchical processes associated with bureaucratic models of government. The downside is, in Somaliland as in
Puntland and Mogadishu, that line ministry representatives are changed unexpectedly, resulting in discontinuities in governance projects and policies. For example, until recently it appeared that the nature of the state's presence was partly determined by the quality of leadership and resources available to its security agencies, for chief officers are chosen by and beholden to the president. Judging from the record and performance of the coast guard and immigration police, this implied that the Silanyo government prioritised immigration control over responding to illegal fishing and piracy. It meant that, contrary to the picture Dua identified as emerging in 2011, counter-piracy in Somaliland was no longer (if it ever was) 'a form of protection … tied to the project of state recognition'. Recent changes to the immigration police's command suggest that similar considerations may yet apply to immigration.

**Coast guard**

Formerly a functioning navy based on the Soviet model, the coast guard or maritime police consists of 600 officers whose formal functions include presence operations, search and rescue, and anchorage patrols. Like the Somaliland police, the coast guard receives significant technical and financial support from international organisations, prominent amongst which is EUCAP-Nestor, a civilian mission that assists host countries to develop a sustainable maritime security capacity. This is understood as including land-based maritime security in relation to development as well as addressing piracy and threats arising from Somaliland's proximity to Yemen, which is seen as a source of weapons, terrorists and illegal fishing, and EUCAP's vision of the coast guard has been accepted by Somaliland's ministries, the Berbera Maritime & Fisheries Academy, and local NGOs and universities. Its press releases show young coast guards receiving training in, e.g. navigation, boat handling skills, engine maintenance and first aid as well as basic maritime law, customary law (*xeer*), police work at sea and detecting improvised explosive devices, but the reality is less professional than EUCAP might wish.

International advisers informally define success for the coast guard as evidence of limited operational capability, but achieving this is challenging because its technical and functional capacity is inadequate. It cannot patrol the sea or the land because it lacks sea-going boats, vehicles, fuel, communications equipment and land transport, and it cannot build cases against pirates or illegal fishing boats because it lacks the necessary policing (i.e. procedural) skills. Cultural issues intrude, too; senior officers do not display a sense of time or urgency while many sailors (or, depending on who is speaking, soldiers) do not understand English, the maritime language, or recognise the notion of a chain of evidence or manning list but are too embarrassed to ask for clarification. International advisers say that being a coast guard is regarded as a 'low' job. Although many are said to join for a sense of belonging, and older men are thought to be prepared to learn, young recruits join for the money but leave quickly, being unwilling to follow orders, let alone spend months learning new skills. The budget for salaries is $56,000 per month, and guards are paid regularly each month though
many also work as guards in hotels and oil installations, which typically provide an extra $85 a month. ICT's limited availability has not made a difference to the ways in which coast guards see their role or conduct their business.

The coast guard is significant here because its officers act as police in areas where there is no police but where (or when) illegal fishing, migration ('Taahrib') or the trafficking of weapons or narcotics is a political issue for the government or for donors. Officers may, for instance, be required to find witnesses though in practice they rarely show initiative, and while there was a recent attempt to give them police powers, the practical problems associated with this (e.g. managing chains of evidence or hot pursuit) meant that the proposal was not accepted. More positively, the potential of the coast guard — and ICT — to act as a link between the centre and periphery may be developed by EUCAP's 'Maritime communications and coastal safety initiative', which is a new coastal safety project that aims to provide fishermen and seafarers with communications equipment. EUCAP is also developing plans to introduce community-liaison officer teams, which will visit coastal communities regularly.

For now, ministry officials in Hargeisa say that the coast guard controls up to 25 points on the coast, most of which are located in places where illegal migrants traditionally cross — and where state representatives are paid to look the other way or, perversely, display an atypical degree of initiative by, for example, selling permits for illegal fishing. Approximately 100 officers ('agents') work in plain clothes so as to avoid being identified as coast guards. They also recruit informers who tell them when and where illegal activities take place, with one or two incidents logged each week, and ICT facilitates this. Communication between informants and the coast guard is made using pre-paid text messages on mobile telephones; credit is put onto the informant's mobiles, with the sum depending on the informant's record. Although not a conventional form of brokerage, this use of ICT helps to facilitate working relations at the local level and, in some cases, between the periphery and the centre. The extent to which the possession or use of ICT affects the behaviour of individuals is, however, unknown.

The coast guards' record in the field is uneven, in remote areas as in Berbera, but — and this is key — it reflects the situation at the HQ in Hargeisa, which in turn reflects the government's assessment of its functional utility and political value. Thus the commander (admiral) appointed by the president in March 2015 had no background in maritime matters; he came to the post after spending four years as commander of the corrections force, a post which by all accounts he held very successfully, but before that he had spent 37-years in the police. He took over when his predecessor was shunted sideways into the army (the vice-admiral was moved to second in command in the army at the same time). The HQ staff is currently headquartered in a small rented compound comprising a handful of dark offices in a single-story house though the new headquarters under construction will have an impressive conference centre, lecture theatre, very large offices, kitchens, lavatories and a parade ground. For
now, the clock in the admiral's office does not work while the cooks (the only females present) spend their day in a corner of the open compound.

In this way, the coast guard illustrates the nuanced relationship existing between politics and practice, and the limited role that ICT plays in brokering communications between the various elements. It suggests that the activities of low-ranking sailors in coastal areas are influenced by the culture at the Hargeisa headquarters, which is in turn tolerated or shaped by Silanyo's government ministers.

**Immigration Police**

The quality of the immigration police working alongside coast guards in remote and coastal areas is difficult to judge. Their technical skills are unlikely to be high, yet their role is relatively high profile and the quality of the institution they represent is different. Based on developments in Hargeisa and at major crossing points in the west of the country, two things are clear: first, with the exception of the secret police and, perhaps, the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the immigration police are one of the more proficient elements in Somaliland's law enforcement system. This seemingly owes much to the determination of recent chief officers to develop a force aligned to international standards and 'global security', but it must also reflect the government's prioritisation of controlling migration as an aspect of counter-terrorism and internal security. Politics and practice appear to be more positively linked than in the coast guard, while immigration officers make greater use of ICT.

The immigration police's functional priority is 'combating illegal migrants' entering Somaliland and it does this via operations from 10 immigration centres and posts scattered along the 1,200 km of border (officers refer to five as 'big' and five 'small'). News reports often focus on migrants from Ethiopia walking to Bosasso, but the conflict in Yemen drives thousands across the Gulf of Aden. Also, many migrants are deported after their stay permits expire, with the deportation of 300 illegal immigrants, mostly Ethiopians, in mid January 2016 being a case in point. But it is uncontrolled migration through the porous border that links politics and practice most closely because internationals associate it with trans-national crimes such as smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism while Hargeisa probably assesses it in relation to political insecurity and terrorism. No doubt Hargeisa also wishes to use its response as a bargaining chip in its quest for resources and recognition. And it does this successfully. Hence the UK, which wishes to target terrorism at source, gave security equipment and vehicles to the Somaliland Ministry of Civil Aviation and Air Transport to use at Berbera and Hargeisa airports, and to the Department of Immigration to use at land/sea/air border crossings. The equipment and vehicles provided were accompanied by a training and mentoring package worth £457, 263, which aimed to ensure that airport security staff could operate X-ray, explosive trace detection (ETD) and CCTV equipment. Additionally, senior and operational staff received the mentoring and professional development necessary for 'a sustainable and compliant civil aviation sector.' The total cost of £699,465 was met by the UK's counter-terrorism programme.
ICT is seen as playing a significant role within this response. Indeed, the acceptance of a link between immigration control and ICT is evident in the immigration police's working environment, from the computer room in the headquarters building to visa booths at Hargeisa's airport. Even in 2012, the outgoing (and now current) commander, Dayib Osman Alin, had specifically promoted technology as a tool for enhancing border control.54 And the immigration police has undoubtedly been fortunate in the resources it receives. It may lack ICT at, e.g. Wajale on the border with Ethiopia, Somaliland's busiest crossing, but its US$ 250,000 head quarters (funded by Japan) houses a central database for a passport registration and data collection system. The system, known as the Personal Identification and Registration System (PIRS), was installed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a contribution to improving Somaliland's migration management capacity. The IOM provided training for 'hundreds' of immigration, security and civil aviation officers, the rehabilitation of ports-of-entry at Hargeisa, Wajale, Borama and Berbera, and, significantly, equipment and IT systems for passenger inspection. Walk-through and hand-held metal detectors and new uniforms for 100 immigration staff were also provided.55 Five base stations and repeaters and 48 VHF radio handsets were installed as the means for securing communication between immigration's HQ in Hargeisa and major ports-of-entry such as Wajale and Berbera.

But ICT's contribution should not be over-played. In interviews during December 2015, then director Mohamed Ali Yusuf said that his budget, resources, equipment, vehicles and logistics were inadequate, and that while officers in Hargeisa and Berbera have IT support, they lack connectivity. In fact, many HQ systems remain paper-based, some records are little more than procedural exercises, it takes a week for photo IDs taken at Hargeisa airport to be uploaded into the system, and the office in Berbera has only two laptops. The new system cannot catch the groups of 10-20 people walking from Ethiopia or Djibouti to Puntland, and officers rely on their experience when it comes to recognising false documents or identifying ex-fighters from the marks on their hands and shoulders. And experience counts for more than ICT in everyday business, as when 200 illegals were identified in one day in early 2016. Also, as Brigadier Yusuf astutely noted, the receipt of too much technical equipment can be counter-productive, leading to internecine rivalries and a structurally unbalanced security sector. ICT, equipment and training alone cannot facilitate capacity building or meaningful immigration management, least of all along Somaliland's coastal borders where six immigration officers share police posts at Maydh (50 km north of Erigavo), Shalaaw (28 km west of the port of Hees, which is also shared), Eil Daraad in Sahil region (its main city is Berbera), Lughaya (a small coastal town 20 km west of Berbera), Bulahaar (Berbera) and Zeila (towards the Djibouti border). Selected on the basis of clan-based calculations, the officers concerned are reliant on informants (the phrase 'they tell us' was used during interviews at the immigration police's HQ), but ICT means little when even radios are a scarce resource.56 There is no sign of new or innovative modes of governance emerging.
Although the significance of individuals in shaping institutional development is less than it would be in the West, not least because appointments and tenure depend on presidential wishes and clan-based calculations, improvements in the immigration police’s HQ during 2015 can be explained by Yusuf’s determination to improve officers’ technical capacity and access to ICT while fulfilling the immigration police’s remit effectively and efficiently. Like many Somaliland officers, he has over the years received training from the Soviet Union as well as Israel and EU-member states, but, unlike the admiral, he had worked in his department since 1972 and, unlike most of his peers, in interviews in December 2015 he was sufficiently assured and comfortable in his authority to delegate questions and tasks to his staff. However, the government's support for his tough approach to immigration control lasted only until mid-February when he was replaced by his immediate predecessor a week after the president made sweeping changes to the cabinet following ‘a trip east’ in preparation for 2017's elections.57 But this is not unusual: Yusuf had taken over from Alin in 2012 when the latter was sacked after nine years as commander.58 Like all security organisations in the former Somalia, Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police are subject to political or factional pressure, which leads to dismissals and clashes, as in September 2015 when the deputy head of the immigration service was jailed for defying orders from the Ministry of Interior.

One further feature deserves note. Despite youth unemployment, both coast guard and immigration police find it challenging to recruit and retain good ICT-literate officers. But the approaches adopted by the two forces are notably different, and those introduced in the immigration police represent a regional first. The coast guard is aware of its need to improve recruitment and retention but has yet to make a significant difference whereas Yusuf deliberately recruited computer-literate, ambitious and focused male graduates between the ages of 20 and 35-years who do not smoke, chew qat or drink alcohol. In 2015 he recruited five graduates in IT and administration from two of Hargeisa's universities, four from the Somaliland civil service, five with local training and 35 graduates from local police academies. He introduced a smart uniform of navy trousers and white shirts (in conversation he described it as 'the international uniform for immigration officers') which was intended explicitly to help facilitate professional pride, and at the time of his dismissal he was developing a career structure that builds on regular training, 'mentoring' and 'little incentives'; the projector in the training room is in regular use and every year two officers receive an 'officer of the year' certificate. He also created a basic welfare system to support his plans; $1 is deducted from the US $300 officers are paid regularly each month (this is more than regular police are paid), and the resultant fund is used to cover sick leave, marriages and the like. The degree of skimming appeared to be minimal. Equally unusual is the large and detailed organogram of the police and ministry displayed in the conference room. These gestures are cosmetic and do not fundamentally affect centre-periphery relations yet they indicate an awareness of international approaches to the technicalities of security governance that is rare in Somaliland's institutions. Overall, this picture
suggests that while ICT is at best a minor variable in Somaliland's law enforcement system, it can be used as a catalyst.

**Conclusions**

Prompted by the trend amongst international organisations to see ICT as a tool for development, this paper asks whether the use of ICT has — or can — recast centre-periphery relations and capacity-building in a hybrid country such as Somaliland. With access to remote and coastal areas restricted, and the details of everyday security unknown, it uses the record and resources of the coast guard and immigration police to illustrate significant aspects of Somaliland's law enforcement framework, the relationship between its politics and practice, the practical application of its coercive resources, and the Silanyo government's priorities and preference for governance based on consensus and co-existence whenever security imperatives allow. Based on this, it suggests that ICT can be a desirable technical or operational tool, or a functional variable in existing power networks, but that its introduction does not represent a new mode of security governance, transfer or brokerage. For now, ICT's impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of security-related knowledge and practice is minimal. Its availability has not resulted in the integration of state-based and informal security provision into a new, flexible or coherent system of governance for Somaliland's mode of governance is weighted towards the centre. This suggests that while spatial metaphors such as centre-periphery help to clarify the situation, the significance invested in them reflects Western rationalities, rather than Somali realities.

Contrary to Herbst’s observation that a fundamental problem confronting African leaders concerns how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely settled lands, the Silanyo government has not sought to overtly or systematically extend, consolidate or exert its authority in remote and coastal areas. Instead, it relies on clan-based consent or acquiescence to ensure politically acceptable levels of security in the issues that concern it, reproducing and, perhaps, representing the centre-periphery divide through security practices. Managing uncontrolled migration may be of more pressing concern than illegal fishing or piracy but, as the commander of the immigration police discovered in February 2016, ensuring effective migration control does not guarantee presidential support.

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2 Interview, director general, Ministry of Interior (MOI), Hargeisa, 7 Sept. 2011; interview, deputy minister, MOI, Hargeisa, 10 Dec. 2015.

3 Interview, deputy minister, 10 Dec. 2015.


5 In 2011, DDG introduced district and community safety committees involving government institutions and civil society into a number of villages though this has since shifted to 'planning groups' comprising locally representative groups such as religious leaders, traders, women and youths. Compare Laura Hammond, 'Safety, security and socio-economic well-being in Somaliland' (Nairobi, Geneva, London: SOAS, DDG, GICHD: 2013), p. 6.


http://www.budde.com.au/Research/Somalia-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Broadband-Statistics-and-Analyses.html, accessed 9 Nov. 2015; Interviews, Somaliland government officials and NGOs, Hargeisa, 7, 10, 14 Dec. 2015. Somaliland's telecommunications market is unregulated and its providers operate independently. This means that Telesom users cannot contact SomTel users unless they keep a second SIM card for their SomTel mobile or a separate phone with a SomTel card.


10 Unlike security, it is not significant primarily because it is absent. Compare Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London: Verso, 1996), p. 44.


12 The Isaaq is Somaliland's largest clan family though police recruitment and deployment reflects or is aligned to local clan composition. Compare International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Somaliland: The strains of success' (Nairobi/ Brussels: ICG, 2015), pp. 3-5.


14 Herbst, States and Power.


25 OCVP, 'Erigavo'.

26 OCVP, 'Baligubadle'; 'Buroa'.

27 OCVP, 'Salahley', pp. 5-9.


Data from the World Bank and Gallup cite cell phone ownership in Somalia at 70%, i.e. on a par with Kenya and well above the regional median (Gallup, 'Disparities in Cellphone Ownership Pose Challenges in Africa', 17 February 2016. http://www.gallup.com/poll/189269/disparities-cellphone-ownership-pose-challenges-africa.aspx (accessed 9 March 2016). But there are problems with figures based on ownership, rather than access or subscription, because mobiles are often shared and it is possible to subscribe to mobile services without buying a phone, with many people buying a pre-paid SIM card which they use in other people’s mobiles.

The project is analysed in a forthcoming paper and brief, 'A modest proposal: Mobiles and police-community engagement in Hargeisa'. Its key message is that local norms and preferences can negate the availability of globalised technology.

Focus groups conducted with 180 respondents in Hargeisa in March 2016 show that people with access to mobiles or SIM cards are comfortable ringing the police, especially when they have been the victim of robbers or wish to 'tell the government' (the commonly used phrase is telling) about a potential incident, but they do not use text messaging. Asked how they normally communicate with the police, 24 respondents said that they use mobiles but 158 said that they visit their local station, which is clearly the recognised site for engagement. This may reflect literacy levels or Somaliland’s oral culture, or it may be no more than an acknowledgement of the police’s inability to respond quickly.

A number of districts and villages in the Hargeisa area collaborate with the police to establish night-time community policing or neighbourhood watches who cascade alerts verbally. Each pays its community police a small monthly sum of money to safeguard its area at night though the groups cannot afford to pay for mobiles or transport. There are problems associated with this form of policing in that people fear that the groups are managed by the state for its own purpose or infiltrated by al-Shabaab or ex-criminals, but for most it is an acceptable solution; police stations may be open 24 hours a day but no one expects their officers to respond quickly, least of all at night.

Personal observation, Mandeera, Sept. 2011.

In interviews at the MOI in Dec. 2015, the Ethiopian border region received more attention than coastal areas in the north-east or the disputed territories of Sool and Sana Sanaag in the eastern borderlands with Puntland. This may be attributable to Somaliland's often uncomfortable relationship


41 International security contractors escorting survey teams speak about, for example, women in settlements alongside roads leading towards the coast throwing stones at outsiders (Discussion, private contractor, Djibouti, 2 Feb. 2016), but most commentators extrapolate from the roles played by elders, women or youths in urban areas. Contrast the former SomaliaReport news service at, e.g. SomaliaReport, 'Eyl residents concerned about pirate actions', 20 March 2011. http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/324/Eyl_Residents_Concerned_About_Pirate_Actions, accessed 23 March 2016.


45 The immigration police appear to be better at translating fees into functional resources such as uniforms and equipment.

46 Dua, 'Piracy'.

47 This section is based on interviews with international advisers, Hargeisa, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18 Dec. 2015, and chief and senior coast guard officers, Hargeisa, 15 Dec. 2015.


49 This section is based on interviews with immigration police ranging in rank from the commander to recent recruits, Hargeisa, 11, 12 Dec. 2015.


56 Interviews, chief and senior officers, Coast Guard, Hargeisa, 15 Dec. 2015.
