Cartwright, N. (1997) 'Models : the blueprints for laws.', Philosophy of science (supplement)., 64 . S292-S303.
In this paper the claim that laws of nature are to be understood as claims about what necessarily or reliably happens is disputed. Laws can characterize what happens in a reliable way, but they do not do this easily. We do not have laws for everything occurring in the world, but only for those situations where what happens in nature is represented by a model: models are blueprints for nomological machines, which in turn give rise to laws. An example from economics shows, in particular, how we use--and how we need to use--models to get probabilistic laws.
|Additional Information:||Published by University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association|
|Full text:||(VoR) Version of Record|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392608|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||27 July 2016|
|Date of first online publication:||December 1997|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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