Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.


Durham Research Online
You are in:

Models : the blueprints for laws.

Cartwright, N. (1997) 'Models : the blueprints for laws.', Philosophy of science (supplement)., 64 . S292-S303.

Abstract

In this paper the claim that laws of nature are to be understood as claims about what necessarily or reliably happens is disputed. Laws can characterize what happens in a reliable way, but they do not do this easily. We do not have laws for everything occurring in the world, but only for those situations where what happens in nature is represented by a model: models are blueprints for nomological machines, which in turn give rise to laws. An example from economics shows, in particular, how we use--and how we need to use--models to get probabilistic laws.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Published by University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
Full text:(VoR) Version of Record
Download PDF
(262Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392608
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:27 July 2016
Date of first online publication:December 1997
Date first made open access:No date available

Save or Share this output

Export:
Export
Look up in GoogleScholar