Rhythms of the City: Temporalised Space and Motion

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This essay is concerned with the intersection of lived time, time as represented and urban space - especially around everyday practice. As such it follows in a long pedigree of works addressing time and space in the city. However, what I want to try and rethink some approaches to offer a less stable version of the everyday, and through this a sense of practice as an activity creating time-space not time space as some matrix within which activity occurs. The essay thus addresses the paradox that Stewart identifies where the ‘temporality of everyday life is marked by an irony which is its own creation, for this temporality is held to be ongoing and non-reversible and, at the same time characterized by repetition and predictability’ (1984, p14). I want to thus look both at stability but also the emergence of new possibilities through everyday temporality. To do this I want to proceed through four circuits, each picking up and expanding upon the previous, developing and transforming it. The first circuit serves to locate the everyday through the study of temporality. The study of the chronopolitics and regulation of daily life serves as an entree into why ‘the everyday’ matters. The multiple rhythms and temporalities of urban life this form the back-cloth for this essay – what Lefebvre evoked, but hardly explained, as a rhythmanalysis. The second circuit picks up on this but to adds the insights of time-geography in the paths and trajectories that individuals and groups make through the city. Introducing a sense of human action and motility into the experience of time offers a new step while the combination of time-space routines serves to link the everyday to the reproduction of social regularities (Pred 1982). However, the sense of time-space created through time geography is rather rarefied, so the third circuit seeks to develop a critique and step sidewise through a concern with the differences between lived and represented times - a focus on experiential time-space that will lead to considering phenomenological accounts. Time and space cease to be simply containers of action. These it will be suggested begin to offer a sense of space-time as Becoming, a sense of temporality as action, as performance and practice – indeed the difference as well as repetition. The possibility as Grosz (1999) argues for not merely the novel, but the unforeseen. However, the fourth circuit suggests that these still share an idea of the self-presence of everyday experience, and will open up ideas of events as problematising the everyday. This attempts to both keep a sense of fecundity in the everyday without it becoming a recourse to ground thinking in an ‘ultimate non-negotiable reality’ (Felski 2000:15). The essay then argues for a sense of greater instability - or perhaps better, fragility - within the everyday. This essay thus focuses on the flow of experience for the social subject. It is also important to think through the topology and texture of temporality in the urban fabric, the city as well as its people, but that is a task for a different occasion (see Crang & Travlou, 2000).
**Chronotopes of the City**

Mikhail Bakhtin introduced the idea of a chronotope as a unifying or typifying relationship of time and space in novels (Holquist 1984, Holloway & Kneale 2000). The creation of distinctive urban time-space registers has indeed been one of the ways urban life has been characterised. In accounts of urbanisation, time has played a long and important - if often implicit - part. Indeed one story of the city told in terms of space and time could be the conquest of time through space, and the creation of conditions of co-presence. This is a story then of density, proximity, planned and unplanned contact that create a civil society. And yet the moment we think of these terms they surely lead us to others - proximity and density to hustle and bustle. The popular account of metropolitan life is of one of increasing pace. It is a recurrent motif that we can read repeatedly in modernisation theories; there were cold societies of slow change, now there are hot ones; oral culture of recurrent time moves to print capitalism’s open linear expansive time; horse gives way to steam, steam to internal combustion, to jet or telephony. A teleological story leads us to current urban nightmares of simultaneity, of real-time connections and interactions overwhelming the city and individuals (e.g. Virilio 1997). Sociological work offers some support with analyses of the ‘time bind’ as increasing demands of work, commuting, domestic tasks and social expectations stress people’s, and especially women’s, time (e.g. Jurcyk 1998). To suggest how much of a trope this has become, we need only look to the science fiction city, or indeed the heralded information technology ‘datascape’ written through and through with fantasies of fast straight lines and hurtling people or information (Robins 1999). The clichéd picture of the city, perhaps its chronotope par excellence, has become the long exposure shot of headlights forming blurred streaking lights (see Thrift 1997). But we can also trace the trope back to key modernisation theorists like Simmel and Tonnies, whose accounts of dense urban life, were written in terms of overload, speed up and the bombardment of increasingly isolated individuals by signs and information (Bouchet 1998; Friedberg 1993).

Like many overarching modernisation theses, these accounts work by suppressing other urban temporalities. Typically the dismissing of cyclical time, as outside history or a residue to the main story. Equally typically this risks mobilising gendered assumptions about time that have linked women’s experience with cyclical time (be that biorhythmical determinism or a critique of the gendering of household tasks, see for
example Leccardi 1994, Kristeva 1982) or pitting western, modern urban time against ‘traditional’, rural time. The tendency of these narratives of acceleration is then to replicate the association of feminised, cyclical time with immanence, place and the everyday while constructing a heroic, western masculine narrative of time’s transcendence over place. Taking inspiration from Lefebvre (1995) we might instead listen to the rhythms of the city. Lefebvre offered a means of discriminating between different sorts of cities - in his analysis Mediterranean and Northern European - in terms not of a singular tempo or its quickening, but as an assemblage of different beats. Indeed it may be we need to refigure the idea of the urban not as a singular abstract temporality but as the site where multiple temporalities collide, as in Bombay where there is an ‘intertwining of times, of attitudes, of the coming together and moving apart of past and present, [which] has historically created Bombay’s urban kaleidoscope. It is an urban phenomenon that does not lend itself to simplistic readings of its form, which is pluralistic in nature and does not make explicit its origins, intention or rationale.’ (Mehrotra 199:65-6). The ordered temporalities of glass, concrete and steel and the bazaar as coexist in the same space. Like Lefebvre’s evocative view from his Parisian apartment it demands that we think through everyday rhythms as a multiplicity, forming distinctive concordances. Following his lead we might think not just of the one-way story of speed up, but also the circadian beat of commuting, of the changing shifts punctuating the industrial city - the sort of beat that so struck Engels in the tramp of the massed feet of masses of workers heading to factories in Manchester before dawn – but also the school run and annual cycle. Beyond these striking moments Lefebvre draws our attention the overlain multiplicity of rhythms; dominant and quieter, cycles on daily, weekly, annual rhythms that continue to structure the everyday as much as ‘linear time’. Indeed Felski (2000:18) suggests ‘Everyday life is above all a temporal term. As such it conveys the fact of repetition; it refers not to the singular or unique but to that which happens “day after day”’. The everyday cycle must include the metronomic beat of official time, the rituals of the life course and rites of passage. A multiplicity of temporalities, some long run, some short term, some frequent, some rare, some collective some personal, some large-scale, some hardly noticed – the urban place or site is composed and characterised through patterns of these multiple beats. It is the urban space offered by Rutman’s film ‘Berlin: symphony of the city’ which traces the ebb and flow of a day in the city, the pulsing movement and flows of people and things that make up the daily round (Natter 1993). Instead of a being a solid thing, the city is a becoming, through circulation, combination and recombination of people and things. This is a seductive vision where the urban field becomes an object in motion, or rather an object with time (Lefebvre
Lefebvre’s influence spread thus to Derrida’s vision of temporised places (see Quick 1998), to de Certeau’s (1984) vision of spatialisation as practised place - by which he means the inscription of time onto place, the appropriation of urban places through temporary use - to Harvey’s (1985) programmatic move from a study of urban form to the urbanisation of time. Or as Lefebvre suggested:

‘Space is nothing but the inscription of time in the world, spaces are the realizations, inscriptions in the simultaneity of the external world of a series of times, the rhythms of the city, the rhythms of urban population ... the city will only be rethought and reconstructed on its current ruins when we have properly understood that the city is the deployment of time’ (in Kofman & Lebas 1995:16)

The city is then, as Bachelard noted, the poetics of multiple durées coming together (Kofman & Lebas 1995:29), not necessarily as unified wholes but as sometimes fragmentary and ragged patterns (Réda 1997). Sassen (1999) argues that cities are just this place where different temporalities of action come into friction. It is in this sense that we might take Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of the chronotope as a unity of time and place, and perhaps adapt it as the sense of temporalised place. A place not necessarily of singular time but a particular constellation of temporalities, coming together in a concrete place (cf. Rämös 1999). While Virilio (1997) argues for a pre-modern unity of time and place - suggesting that ‘place’ as a category becomes shattered by the multiple temporalities that modern life brings more discriminating analyses undercut the starting point of ‘fragmentation’ stories, by suggesting the lived city has for a long time been a polyrhythmic ensemble. Thrift (1988) traced examples of this in terms of the public chronology and time experience of the mediaeval period. While many stories talk of capitalism as an encroaching clock time, or as Le Goff (1980) put it the transition from church time to merchant time, or what Castoriadis (1991) called ‘public time’, Thrift (1988:66-9) points to the multiple roles of church bells as devices of time between 1100 and 1300. Far from a modern phenomenon, here there were already multiple bells, with the Foucauldian disciplines of the monastic rules of St.Benedict dividing the day into eight canonical offices (though not of uniform hours), compounded through a plurality of churches operating on different hours ringing in different services, with public ringing in of curfews and policing the streets, and civic functions marked by church bells, or their own calls; the secular and sacred times of the city were neither distinct nor opposed. Meanwhile careful accounts of the Ottoman empires adoption and use of the clock tell a
different story from the clash of modern and Byzantine times – where clocks were status symbols which were regularly reset to accurately reflect the passing of the solar day. Epochal accounts with bold narratives of a singular commodified time need to be inflected then by a sense of complex starting points. But equally, they produce a time-space that is far from monolithic but produces uneven and varied rhythms in urban space. Contrary to Virilio and other theorists, we have not lost a unity of place with a unity of time, rather places have always had different temporalities orchestrated through them.

In this version of a city with plural rhythms long extant, we can follow other trends than acceleration. We might, for instance, follow Melbin (1987) and look at the colonisation of the night - the steady movement of social life into the dark. There are, inevitably, more stories to tell - with the regulation of nightlife being accompanied by public street-lighting and technologies of policing and surveillance (Alvarez 1995; Schlör 1996). Night time revellers and night workers - and the public demons of the criminal classes - follow a different rhythm, often seen as disordering the regular times of regular folk. This story we can extend with current concerns not just of acceleration but the non-stop city as breaking down family time. Every now and again the media return to the demise of ‘meal times’ as collective times with increasing numbers of people eating ready meals at disparate times - without a collective rhythm holding families together. Shift work and night work increasing in the service sector undermine the solidarities and rhythms of nine to five lives. There is a sense that the rhythms structuring urban life have shifted and with them the structuration of wider patterns in society (Shapcott & Steadman 1978).

Meanwhile at the same time, new rhythmic groupings may be emerging, not mapping on to the image of stable, permanent (residential) communities, but transient, episodic affinities and comings together - what Maffesoli (1996) termed neo-tribes. This reworking of Durkheim’s collective temporalities thus allows us to include a refashioned notion of the sacred and shared without locking it in the solidarities of tradition (Watts-Miller 2000). The rhythms of the city thus include the pulsing formation of these intensities and affinities as collective groups - and their dissolution, fragmentation and reformation. Amid this appealing version of the city as rhythms and urban living as rhythmic composition, though there is the critique of the polychronic city as a realm of shattered and fragmented times where we see less rhythms than disjointed tempos - as principally women, juggle work rhythms, biological rhythms, school rhythms and domestic expectations (Paolucci 1998). The fragmentation of household time budgets perhaps brings a different, less harmonic, sense to Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis. When we consider the tangles of people’s lives with their different points of intersection with
different times and other people, marching to different beats, it seems that we might perhaps take the time-soaked place of Lefebvre rather more as the constrained time-space interaction locale derived from the work of time geography.

**Routes, routines and paths.**

Lefebvre’s rhythmsanalysis focuses on the music made by diverse beats forming the experience of place. It offers some purchase on the sense of localities as marked by both their own temporalities or better the conjunction of tempos within them. It certainly seems a more fruitful sense of city life than say Tuan’s definition of places as ‘pauses’. Rhythms of time suggest activity rather than rumination as defining place. The attempt to dynamise representations of the city and open them to the itinerant and tactile knowledges of immersed participants has indeed been a theme in twentieth century urban art (Hollevoet 1992). This sense of rhythm is perhaps more usually evoked in geography through the legacy of Torsten Hägerstrand. The pulsing of the city, the flows of people through its networks, the constraints of time and motion have long been the subject of time-geographic studies. As Hägerstrand put it in a reflective piece ‘We need to rise up from the flat map with its static patterns and think in terms of a world on the move, a world of incessant permutations’ (1982:323). Yet the result is rather different than Lefebvre’s vision. Where Lefebvre sought to change our understanding of the city by unpacking the phenomenology of the place as object, time geography too often ended up dealing with the measurable and evident - indeed, the mappable. The map, it is true, is expanded though through the inclusion of time - typically as a vertical dimension. In this way waves of motion and activity can be traced as an overlay on space. The institutions and temporal parameters they create form specific time-space locales for types of activities. These then are the envelopes of space-time, through which people must pass in order to accomplish their daily business. This constraints synchronise (and synchronise, bring together in space) actions by diverse people, forming the time-space anchors, or stations, of behavioural patterns. Thus regular envelopes of time-space would be the 9-5 work place, the school, the nursery, the shops, clubs and of course the domestic arena. Around these anchors are Hägerstrand’s prisms of time-space opportunity showing a constrained range of possible activities given the limits of time and mobility - lots of time could be spent on activities near at hand, the further one wishes to travel the less time will remain for any activity. The time-scale might vary to chart daily, weekly rhythms and shifts, seasonal ones, through to life-course changes.
Out of this mapping of the banal, comes something of ballet of lines of motion. The sense of rhythm and repetition connects provocatively with ideas of routinisation - and the suggestion then of the relationship between societal pressures and individual life. Indeed Lefebvre suggests that ‘everyday life’ only became visible as urbanisation allowed the observation of uniform and repetitive aspects of social existence (Felski 2000:16). This is the sense Hägerstrand labelled as the ‘diorama’, alluding not to the visual perception but the ‘thereness’ of rules and regulations. Cullen (1978:31) suggests the imperatives of routines mean that in quantitative terms, deliberative choices:

‘are swamped by a dominant pattern of repetition and routine. We spend very little time each day either deliberating some future action or executing a previously deliberated one. Most of our time is devoted to living out a fairly sophisticated pattern of well ordered and nearly integrated routine.’

If these routinised constraints are one dimension, the opposite of this is Hägerstrand’s provocative term of ‘project’. The sense of trajectory also means we have a space-time – or a ‘ForceSpaceTime’ of kinaesthetics (Stewart 1998) - that seeks to include physical and social vectors and velocities (de Certeau 1984). And with this we seem to add a rather different dimension than Lefebvre offers. Clearly one sense of project, is the intentional and planned courses of action people can undertake. Pred (1981) shows the idea of a project can encompass a dialectic of life course and daily life with different scales of projects intersecting, and thus meshing longer term power relations and positions in society with small scale events. This structuration brings institutional projects into contact with lived experience through routine structures. Pred develops this to suggest that we do not then need see a possibilist world of constrained action, but also look at which projects are rendered thinkable, and how the intersection of institutional and individual projects makes available (or not) means to accomplish various goals. This link of habituation and project also joins the two supposed antinomies of cyclical and linear time though we might again need more empirical specification of how these rhythms and structure linear projects for different people, and the shifting importance of each to people. For instance, Strathern (1992) argued for instance it is the middle class who tend to make a project out of life, and we might then see a range of projects designed to accumulate forms of capital marking out a middle class group through a specific temporality in their habitus (cf. Bourdieu 1990). In this sense trajectory begins to appeal not only to physical motion but the inherited dispositions and capabilities and the varying abilities to colonise the future. We need to include trajectories that are not just ‘the thrust into the future that imposes a dominance on social life’, but also non-
directional, aleatory trajectories that may be cyclical or echo recurring times but allow a coping with the world through ‘the serenity of the Greek kairos: what we might call the temporal opportunities of everyday life’ (Maffesoli 1998: 108, 110).

This aspect of time-space imposes limits, some addressed within the ‘school’ of time geography but also leading us in to different realms. First, despite the primacy given to corporeal lived experience, the practice of mapping activities tends to produce a cadaverous geography. A geography of traces of actions, rather than the beat of living footfalls. So we need ‘not only phenomenology’s notion of consciousness as, by definition, an intentional corporeal consciousness, but also supports dance phenomenology’s concern with describing consciousness in terms of the structure of the sensation of the moving body. Such a body opposes mere “flesh, the body not infused with life but dragged around”’ (Stewart 1998:44). In other words not bodies moving through space-time but making it. One response is the concept of ‘action space’ that sees not just a time-space grid, as an accounting medium, but temporality as structuring medium (Cullen 1978:37). Or going further, seeing the time-spaces as ‘a co-ordinated complex of spatio-temporal rhythms with its own internal organisation and structure’ (Shapcott & Steadman 1978:55). This to begin to think through space-time as the fluid not just the container; to think temporality not just tempo. This entails forms a spatiality that is ‘atopical’, as Miller (1995:7) suggests, that ‘Space is less the already existing setting for such stories, than the production of space through that taking place, through the act of narration’ (see also Donald 1997:183). Space is an eventful and unique happening. Space is more to do with doing than knowing, practice than representation, less a matter of ‘how accurate is this?’ than of ‘what happens if I do it?’. As de Certeau (1984) would argue then the project and story creates a theatre of actions, creates frontiers and interactions; a space that is topological and about deformation of places rather than topical and about defining places.

This sense of producing space-time returns us to Lefebvre. The form of space-time created being characteristic of modes of production and social organisation. Lefebvre (1991a, 1991b) argued that the current city was marked by the increasing dominance of a abstract space as a realm of equivalent points. This then is a sense of space as a replicable realm of homogeneous instants that differ only through their location. If we are not careful applying time to geography simply subjects time to just this sort of space. Thus to an East-West, North-South grid we add hours or days; \( t_1, t_2, t_3 \ldots t_n \) and so forth. Activities are then located, and emplaced in the same representational logic. Or as Grosz
put it:

‘Even today the equation of temporal relations with the continuum of numbers assume that time is isomorphic with space, and that space and time exist as a continuum, a unified totality. Time is capable of representation only through its subordination to space and spatial models.’

This I would suggest is to actually apply a particular form of spatial categorisation. Or as Grosz (1999:22) recently put it, if time has numericized duration then mathematization has rendered space itself as a kind of abstraction of place. It is, after Aristotle’s framework, to create a \textit{chrono-chora} framework of abstract models of space and time, a sequence of ‘anywhere-whenever’ in Deleuze’s terms (1989), fashioned after each other, rather than a \textit{kairo-topos} model of this event through and in this place (Rämö 1999). The critique of this spatialised model of time can be taken back to Henri Bergson in the first quarter of the twentieth century criticising models of time as comprising individual instants succeeding one another. He argued time works like motion and that this ‘spatialised time’ attributes to the moving body the immobility of the point through which it passes. As de Certeau (1984) has it, in an almost exact critique of time-geographic maps, we mistake the map for the path, the act of going by for its trace. Bergson suggests space based versions of time are impure compounds that fail to see that movement (time) is different from distance covered which as a line may be infinitely divided (space) (Deleuze 1991). This spatial model of time is thus a ‘cinematographic illusion’ (Douglass 1998:26):

\begin{quote}
“which accompanies and masks the perception of real movement ... your succession of points are at bottom, only so many imaginary halts. You substitute the path for the journey, and because the journey is subtended by the path, you think the two should coincide. But how should \textit{progress} coincide with a \textit{thing}, a movement with an immobility?”
\end{quote}

Bergson (1991:189-90)

Time is qualitatively different from space, and spatial metaphors for time only obscure this (Boundas 1996:94) - although it is perhaps better to say that the spatial metaphors generally used are problematic, that concepts of abstract space tend to be applied to make an abstract time. Later I want to include different notions of space but for now let us confine ourselves to homogenous, empty space rather than say folded or haunted (see also Crang & Travlou, 2000). In the next section I want to look at how temporality is seen as
creating heterogeneity.

**Experienced Time.**

The idea of time existing ‘like beads on a string’ in a brute sequence of isolated and self-contained events can be undermined from several directions. Lefebvre’s account of the different experiences of different tempos offered a sense of different p(l)aces for different events. However, here I want to expand the notion of event by drawing upon the phenomenology of time. Tracing its roots back to Augustine’s writings is a view of the ‘expanded present’, that has been reworked phenomenologically through the writings of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Alliez 1996:129, Ricoeur 1988:19). Following these authors, I want to make a very selective reading that seeks to emphasise how the relationship of space to time changes when we open up a sense of motion and ‘apprehension’ - both in the sense of uncertainty and how we grasp the world. I want to do this through a sense of the individual as motion and flow - not in time, but flow as constituting time. For the sake of simplicity the flow here is fairly linear, but thinking back to the polyvalent rhythms mentioned earlier would in reality include loops, turbulence and so forth. This is rather more fundamental than the concept of ‘reach’ or projects deployed in time-geography, to suggest the level and range of ability to command the future (but see Parkes & Thrift 1978). Hägerstrand’s ‘prisms’ of mobility might be translated into a phenomenal reach of the subject in time.

Augustine’s meditations introduced a ‘big now’ of the ‘distentio animi’. This is the human consciousness, or soul in his work, composed through successive graspings of a future and past. The present is always a threefold structure where a person’s present disposition can only be made sense of in terms of a future and past, so the present becomes an expanded field (Ricoeur 1984:9). It is thus a trajectory or project in that intentional sense - where Augustine says of the mind it expects, it is attentive and it remembers (Alliez 1996:131). But the situation is more complicated that this - since we have both the phenomenology of time, the phenomenology of the subject and of the world, and as Ricoeur ruefully adds a mimetic spiral of ways the subject attempts to represent this both to themselves and others (for a critical note on the tautology possibly here see Currie 1998). We need to unpack this, first, to clarify the grasping of the world in this temporally distended manner, and second to ask whether events and space-time itself, as opposed to its experience or representation, is shaped as a distended present. Husserl’s phenomenology provides a starting clarification, suggesting the structure of any event.
comprises this sense of the distended present. Thus Husserl suggested a distended present based on the past and future that are bound into the very instant itself - so every instant also contains a just-pastness, and nearly-nowness, say as a sense of continuing action. For example, a ball in flight has the just-pastness and the towards the future nearly nowness of its trajectory embedded within every moment of the arc. The moments are implicated one in the other. If this is taken as a more general pattern it suggests that events themselves are not discrete objects or happenings but have a temporal structure. It is not then a case that humans are super-imposing or configuring an inchoate world of events into a representational forms - but that there is a temporality to experience. As Carr (1986:25) argues ‘[t]he reality of our temporal experience is that it is organised and structured; it is the “mere sequence” that has turned out to be fictional’. Extending this into thinking about projects we also need to consider the effect of envisaged trajectories, by which I mean we have to distinguish the actual path from the shifting and provisional, and temporally embedded, perspective of an actor at a given moment. There is a sense of ‘future perfect vision’, the will have been or perhaps conditional ‘would have been’, registers, as we think of any conscious actor thinking through the possible outcomes of any given project. The threefold temporal structure is thus replicated in mimetic, representational thought.

I want to make two moves to develop this idea of the threefold structure. The first is to try and reinsert a sense of lived space-time through the work of Merleau-Ponty. The second is to introduce the autonomous subject through the work of Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty offers an important moment though in this study, since like Hägerstrand, he focuses on the corporeal experience of time, but uses this to open up a sense of phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty (1962:268) uses Bergson’s insight that movement is not successive occupation of a discontinuous series of instants, to distinguish a public, objective time from lived, subjective temporality. ‘It is objective time that is made up of successive moments. The lived present holds a past and a future within its thickness’ (1962:275). However, his formulation takes this rather further asking us to think through how objects and subjects come to shape each other not just in space and time but through defining space and time. Thus in his discussion of protention and retention he suggests that we should not so much see time as the subject as being stretched. Thus he reworks the example of the thrown ball so that:

‘the impending position is also covered by the present and through it all those that will occur throughout the movement. Each instant of the movement embraces its whole span, and particularly the first, which being
the active initiative, institutes the link between a here and a yonder, a now and a future which the remainder of the instants will merely develop. In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesised by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them’ (1962:140)

The effect is to project the embodied self temporally and spatially anticipating and haunting, so that future and past, memory and anticipation form the field through which objects themselves are discernible - they form a structure of foreground and horizon against which objects appear. This is not being in space and time but inhabiting space-time. Objects are not just ‘in-themselves’ but are directional being ‘for-us’. The protention and retention, as well as conscious planning and projects, mean that let us say our grasping of a house is such that

‘the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, but the house seen from everywhere. The completed object is translucent, being shot through from all sides by an infinite number of present scrutinies which intersect in its depths leaving nothing hidden. ... Each moment in time calls the others to witness ... each present permanently underpins a point of time which calls for recognition from all the others, so that the object is seen at all times as it is seen from all directions and by the same means, the structure imposed by a horizon’ (1962:69)

Or if we think of the house as a cube, this depends on our understanding that there are hidden sides that could/will unfold in space and time as we move around the object. Importantly this opens up a sense of virtual presence, of a field which is not ‘present’ in the conventional sense, but which shapes our current understanding of space and time. Like Hollywood streets that are actually made of flat facades, this sense of virtual presence, drawing upon expectation and willing credulity, shapes the perception of an object. The structure of experience Merleau-Ponty then offers is one of a continuous unfolding of objects to a moving observer in space-time. Or, as de Certeau (1983:25) described it, a combination of wave and landscape that produces a mobile texture of folding relations of seer and seen - where seeing is already travelling. It is this engagement that moves us from Husserl’s transcendent and essential subjectivity.

This shift to existence before essence leads us to the commitment to engaged experience or in Heidegger’s terms a structure of Care. This practical engagement with the world is a
sense of ‘pre-ontological’ (Heidegger), ‘pre-objective’ (Merleau-Ponty) and pre-representational (Bergson) shaping. This move shifts the concern from epistemological concerns in classical phenomenology to ontological concerns about the shaping of experience. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have a sense of the human subject as being necessarily part of space and time, or the ‘worldliness’ of existence, what Heidegger called the ‘thrownness’ of Being; that is finding oneself amongst the world as it unfolds, and having to start coping from there. This is of course one of the basic points of Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-world’ or ‘dasein’. But in this context it means:

‘The projective character manifested in particular projects ... outlines a future which in turn organises the present world into interlocking complexes of significance, all accomplished on the background of Dasein’s thrownness or facticity, that is, its finding itself in a particular situation. This projective structure which accomplishes, projects and organises the world, is actually the self-projection of dasein onto time ... dasein’s activity is ultimately its structuring of itself’

Carr (1986:111).

In other words this is not travelling through space-time, but the organisation of space time. Dasein is a temporal event or to put in another way, we possess ourselves only as a journey (de Concini 1988:171). This performative production of space-time means being-in-the-world is an activity; in Heidegger’s example of the clearing in the woods formed through its context, ‘clearing’ is an action. It also moves us round again to Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, since Heidegger offers a difficult - less charitably we might say confused - inflection of shared practice. That is we might see the activity of clearing as being the individual practice, but the clearing as a collective creation (Dreyfus 1991:167). Space-time has become the present participle; it is not prexistent, it is not present but presencing, a threshold of disclos-ing, and appear-ing; it is how things become apprehensible. This public structuring shapes a relationship of dis-stance, that is objects becoming discernible. Thus instead of Merleau-Ponty’s structure of field-horizon framing objects, we can ‘distinguish the general opening up of space as the field of presence (dis-stance) that is the condition for things being near and far, from dasein’s pragmatic bringing things near by taking up and using them’ (Dreyfus 1991:132). In other words, particular forms of life that make certain objects appear.

This sense of publicness and sharedness suggests Heidegger’s reshaping of the threefold division of Augustine, here as three ‘ekstases’ of Dasein thrown into the future and bringing along the past (Ricoeur 1988). There is also a sense of fore-having, that is things
made available or dis-closed in particular ways through a pre-ontological disposition (Dreyfus 1991:199). Yet also there is the less often stressed ekstase of being-alongside, or collectivity. Certainly the sense of routinisation and the imposition of rhythms is still weaker here than in Lefebvre or empirical time-geographic studies. Perhaps inevitably given the politico-ontological leanings of Heidegger, where he labels inauthentic life as following the crowd (das Man) (Bourdieu 1991) - the stress is on a self realisation or a collective realisation that is profoundly anti-urban. But the sense of creating space-time through a tactile apprehension, seems important to develop. Not least since the sense of performatively creating time here seems rather different than Lefebvre - performance as orchestration - and raises issues of seeing time-space as practice rather than a way of representing a given time.

The relationship of events to representation has also been rather differently portrayed. For instance Ricoeur (1984, 1988) leans towards the idea that mimesis does not need to be underpinned by a temporal structure of protention and retention Ricoeur argues there is a necessary gap or uncertainty between representational structures and the flow of events and experience. Or as Lyotard would argue one of the roots of the foundational crisis is the questioning the conditions of time and space, in part due to temporality being ‘figural’ and resistant to representation (Quick 1998:65-6). This gap leads him to suggest the relationship of time and narrative is an aporia, that drives poetic rather than metaphysical solutions - that is the gap impels us to spin stories, to account for it. Yet these can never fill the gap but only circle about it.

**Spatialised time to temporalised space.**

What this essay has developed so far is a sense of time-space not as a framework in which events occur, but as itself as an event. Instead of adding time to models of space it has tried to suggest adding time to our notions of space. So far this essay has leant towards Heidegger’s view that the idea of unifying consciousness remaining inviolate as a series of images move before it is an intellectualised reflection not an accurate description of temporal experience (Dreyfus 1991:133). Lefebvre offered a rather more ambivalent position in regards to this. Firstly he clearly suggested the need to experience particular tempos was not in itself adequate as an account:

‘There is a certain externality which allows the analytical intellect to function. Yet, to capture a rhythm one needs to have been captured by it. One has to let go, give and abandon oneself to its duration. Just as in music
or when learning a language, one only really understands meanings and sequences by producing them... Therefore in order to hold this fleeting object, which is not exactly an object, one must be at the same time both inside and out.’ (1995:219)

Except he also quite clearly had a suspicion of the process of abstraction. This can be developed in two ways. First, much of his work was an account or variations on a theme of the colonisation of the lifeworld, in which his driving narrative was the appropriation of lived experience (by no means uncontested or universally successful) by progressively more abstract conceptualisations. Famously this is his (1991) triplet of lived experience, imaginative engagement and conceptualisation or spatial practices, representational space and representations of space respectively. Part of his story of capitalism is the movement from absolute to abstract space as a representation, from sacred to geometric, where spatial dimensions form an axis of equivalence allowing any space to be measured and compared against another. This homogeneous, exchangeable form of space is the one generally used as the public representation of time. This, it has to be said an appealing but arguable, comment on capitalist time, which is after all inflected by many temporalities from grand historical narrative to the daily routines for workers (even those in the most 24/7 occupations). 1 Connecting these times are an expanding range of technologies (from diaries to calendars) that seek to mediate different times and reflexively allow us to monitor and create time-space. The differential connections we can find in what Frank Kermode called the traditionalist modernism of Joyce’s Ulysses that represents ‘an attempt to eternalize a pedestrian dimension of events in a single, randomly chosen day by superimposing a a mythological dimension.’ (Isozaki & Asada 1999:78). Indeed the empty, homogenous time needs these other times for it to make sense, to be distinct and to function. We must acknowledge that: ‘As a whole, time is braided, intertwined, a unity of strands layered over each other; unique, singular, individual, it nevertheless partakes of a more generic and overarching time, which makes possible the relations of earlier or later, relations locating times and durations relative to each other.’ (Grosz 1999:23). Anytime whatevers and abstract time do not have things simply their own way. If this notion of time is powerful, it is not analytically tenable to end up with a dichotomous idea of time as, on the one hand, representations or ‘images in consciousness’ and, on the other, movements of bodies in space (Deleuze 1986:56). Instead we need a sense of time as motion and transformation. It is the idea of motion and transformation that often seems obscured by representing time through a spatial idiom.

1 For instance, along side modernity goes the rise of the textualised, autobiographical, storied self, as well as many grand narratives of nation, class and even stories of capital itself – be they liberalism of globalisation.
Bergson distinguished a temporal pluralism from a spatial pluralism, suggesting two types of multiplicity - one in terms of space, which is a quantitative change (augmentation or diminution), creating multiple and discontinuous actual objects, the second that of time and ‘duration’ which is a qualitative heterogeneity (about changing type and kind), a multiplicity of fused and continual states which are virtually co-present (Deleuze 1988:31). Deleuze thus distinguishes given diversity and becoming difference:

‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given’ (in de Landa 1999:31). Deleuze argues that theory has been too preoccupied with extended magnitudes in space instead of intensities in time (Boundas 1996:85, de Landa 1999) - or by making time an independent variable we end up with a succession of instants rather than a dialectical order, missing the production of singularities through watching the accumulation of banalities (Deleuze 1986:6). This picks up the sense of ‘virtual presence’ mentioned previously in the work of Merleau-Ponty but takes it a step further. Here I want to foreground this problematic axis rather more. Instead of seeing the everyday as an unproblematic grounding for experience, I want to suggest that this sort of analysis also suggests a subject who is not self-present. That is not so much distended or stretched through space-time as seeing the subject as ‘abyssally fractured’ into future and past, always an unstable becoming, always concerned with events rather than things (see Massumi 1992, Rajchman 1997). Going the opposite way from the ‘big now’, using many of the same arguments, Bergson rather hollowed out the present. He pointed out that is better defined by what is not than what it is:

“You define the present in an arbitrary manner as that which is, whereas the present is simply what is being made. Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit that divides the past from the future. When we think this present is going to be, it exists not yet, and when we think of it as existing, it is already past.” (1991:149-50)

In this sense the present ceases to be self-present, and is haunted by the virtual realm (Grosz 1999). The emphasis is on the flow of time. Bergson thus criticised spatial concepts of time as impure compounds that fail to see that movement (time) is different from distance covered which as a line may be infinitely divided (space) (Deleuze 1988). Deleuze (1986:1) suggests three consequences of this approach:

- ‘movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past,
movement is the present the act of covering. The space covered is
divisible, indeed infinitely divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or
cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided.
This already presupposes a more complex idea: the spaces covered all
belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space while the movements are
heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.’

In Bergson’s work space preserves indefinitely things which are juxtaposed while time
devours the states which flow into each other within it, where the pure present is the
progress of the past gnawing into the future (Bergson 1991:150). Thus memory should
not be seen as a field in which instances and items (or images of the past) accumulate. It
is not a representational field of images or instants to be configured - this is a spatial
representation of temporal process. Thus the flow of durée may produce ‘images’ but this
is rather like a ray of light (1991:37) that may produce a virtual and static image - an
after-image\(^2\) - but is actually based around motion.

Bergson’s idea of time emphasises ‘the virtual’, which appeals to the continued presence
of the past. Although we may reflect back on the past and see it as discrete events and
epochs this is to spatialise time. Instead we might see within any ‘present’ a virtual
multiplicity of possible futures, and pasts, existing. Thus, the past and present are not
‘additive’ like spatially bounded entities stacked end on end, what Deleuze called
‘extensive boundaries but are marked by ‘internal thresholds of intensity’ - offering not
just diversity, but the difference that causes different outcomes (de Landa 1998). This is a
very different sense of the real and virtual than we had in time geography. Here the virtual
extends like a prism of associations and possibilities brought to bear on a point in the
present. But this is not the realization of possible outcomes. The virtual however, unifies
a range of mutually impossible and differing paths. So Grosz puts it ‘The movement from
a virtual unity to an actual multiplicity requires a certain leap of innovation or creativity,
the surprise that the virtual leaves within the actual. The movement of realization seems
like the concretization of a preexistent plan or program; by contrast, the movement of
actualization is the opening up of the virtual to what befalls it’ (1999:27). That is
Bergson sees in temporality a dynamic becoming that is different than the rearrangement
of what already exists (Adam 1990:24). The effect is twofold in that first, it is not human

\(^2\) This analogy was indeed from where Benjamin took his notion of the after-image as the appearance of
history. We might also notice that the study of optical effects like this at the end of the nineteenth century
had radically destabilised notions of time and the subject.
representation of time-space that is fractured into virtual and actual but these are properties of the objective world itself, and second the distinction between the two becomes indiscernible in practice, even if the poles remain distinct (Rodowick 1997:92). Past states are drawn into contact with the present, and made virtually present by action (op.cit. 143). Memories are organised and called up by the focus of attention to the present and future - what Bergson called ‘attention to life’ that prefigures Heidegger’s notion of Care.

The present virtually includes the past through a process of attention contracting into the future and dilating into the past (Deleuze 1988:49). The present and past coexist in a virtual order:

“We have great difficulty in understanding a survival of the past in itself because we believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus confused Being with being-present. Nevertheless the present is not; rather it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless, inactive, impassive it is, in the full sense of the word: It is identical with being in itself.”

Deleuze (1988:55, emphasis in original)

In a reverse of how we often think of time, the past does not recede but “literally moves towards the present” and exerts a pressure to be admitted (Deleuze 1988:70). Bergson illustrates these points by drawing a crossing temporal and spatial axes. The subject he locates at the crossing point. He notes how readily we accept that those positions and things spatially not present are still existing, Merleau-Ponty’s virtual spatial unfolding, but that we do not accord the same ontological reality to those temporally not present. This is then the virtual dimension whose continued reality Deleuze insists upon - ontologically different - but there.

The upshot of this is a concern with not spatialising time but temporalising places. As Lefebvre had it in his ‘rights to the city’ what was required was an assemblage of difference through multiple temporalities:

‘opportunity for rhythms and use of time that would permit full usage of moments and places... the ludic in its fullest sense of theatre, sport and
games of all sorts, fairs, more than any other activity restores the sense of
oeuvre conferred by art and philosophy and prioritizes time over space,
appropriation over domination.’ [which would oppose] ‘the New Masters
[who] possess this privileged space [of urban planning through the], axis of
a strict spatial policy. What they especially have is the privilege to possess
time ... There is only for the masses carefully measured space. Times eludes
them.’ (in Kofman & Lebas 1995:19-20)

It is clear there are echoes here of de Certeau’s (1984, 1997) call for a practice that turns
the places of command into spaces through their temporal use - appropriation without
possession. It is a sense of time as plurality and difference from the time of the rulers that
is crucial in these terms. Seeing time in terms of space is to submit it to the uniformity of
a ruling view, to allow its administration. We can thus combine the idea of plural kinds of
time and time as plurality with a sense of social vibrancy. But not just through how
people arrange themselves in time-space but through their creation of different sorts of
time-space. That is there is an ‘ontological heterogenesis’ (Boyne 1997:56) where groups
are constituted and defined through inhabiting different corporeal and incorporeal time-
spaces. So Felix Guattari suggests we need to see heterogeneity as a ‘refrain’ explicitly
linking uniform time with social domination:

‘The polyphony of modes of subjectivation actually corresponds to a
multiplicity of ways of keeping time ... In archaic societies, it is through
rhythms, chants, dances, masks, marks on the body... on ritual occasions
and with mythical references, that other kinds of collective existential
territories are circumscribed. What we are aiming at with this concept of
refrain [is] hyper-complex refrains, catalyzing the emergence of incorporeal
universes such as those of music or mathematics... This type of refrain
evades strict spatio-temporal delimitation. With it time ceases to be exterior
.. From this perspective, universal time appears to be no more than a
hypothetical projection, a time of generalized equivalence, a ‘flattened’
capitalistic time; what is important are these partial modules of
temporalization, operating in diverse domains (biological, ethological,

These dynamic accounts of time often come at the expense of using one model of
spatiality as their foil (Massey 1998:30-2). A space that is as simple and bleak as the
modellers of spatial science could have wished. We need care not to imply that space is
indeed necessarily the opposite of time, and thus all forms of spatiality are conservative
(Massey 1992). Running the analysis backwards, suggests we need senses of space that are not about stasis, that are not the homogenous ordered realm set up as the villain in these theories. We might well see time-spaces as not closed systems where pregiven variables are related to everything else, but as fields of emergent potentialities, with connections and happenings that may or may not come to fruition but are spheres offering the possibility of multiplicity (Massey 1998:26). See spatiality as thus a becoming seems better able to grasp the rhythmic city, and offer an important pointer beyond the ways geographers have too often ended up inscribing time onto place through a spatial idiom. The sense of dynamism of temporality, written in to the inspiration and ‘projects’ of time-geography should offer us not a way of adding ‘time’ but rethinking space. Following this side of the argument, not just looking to the time of the subject moving through the world but following that encoded in the world would mean thinking beyond time flowing like simple ‘lines’ and trajectories to look at loops and recursivity, and fractures and folds in the space-time fabric of the city (Serres 1995:57, Crang & Travlou, 2000). Thus instead of a simple direction flows and projects we might take Bergson’s idea of expanding cycles and circuits of memory and reality, where each recollection deforms and deepens the memory with the memory of its own remembering (Rodowick 1997:90).

Conclusion

The time-space that I have been trying to outline here then is one of temporalised space. That is it is not simply a matter of mapping time on to space - particularly not when time becomes visible as though it were space. Thinking of the rhythms of particular locales begins to offer a better grasp on linking of space and time. But this seems a stationary account of motion in places, not actually following the motion itself. In this sense the ‘projects’ of the Lund school time-geography offer an anchor that can be refashioned so that the paths retain the sense of expectation and memory suggested by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. A sense of space-time that brings in the virtual into the experience of space, that thinks of space as connected to time seems a fuller account. It is an account of the connectedness of future and past, binding them into the present instant. Rather then offering everyday life and places as self-contained self-present activities, the inclusion of the virtual suggests they always contain other possibilities, that different

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3 Specifically, structuralism rejected the dominance of temporal narratives in favour of internally coherent self-standing structures which were a-temporal, which were then labelled ‘spatial’ (See Massey 1998:32; Crang & Thrift 2000)
4 To think this through we could follow Latour’s observation that Serres has ‘a topologically bizarre space as [his] reference for understanding time’ (in Serres with Latour 1995:59)
forms can emerge. The temporalisation of place removes a sense of self contained moments and acts linked by external logics to open possibilities of immanent and emergent orders. In this sense I have tried to suggest a time space practice that is neither, a stitching together of pregiven points - it constitutes places. Nor is it a weaving of a fixed and closed urban fabric, rather it is a becoming of velocities, directions, turnings, detours, exits and entries (cf. Grosz 1995:126-8). The balance of the city in motion between repetitive rhythmical activity making place and passage through place is a matter that will vary empirically. Attention to cycles, to flux and repetition in and though places serves as a useful counter to the rather simple ‘flows’ I have used here to illustrate ideas of time-space as an event. But in both cases the events created suggest the generative properties of time-space while suggesting everyday acts are inevitably distantiated. Instead of assuming ‘a bounded or framed space in which discrete elements may be associated, more or less ambiguously’ which subordinates diversity to unity (Rajchman 1997:17), it is to see unity as a contingent operation holding together the fractured and virtual diversity of time-space.

Time-space that is not a container for images of the past, nor a storehouse of prior experiences in that sense. We should be wary of attempts to suggest time offers a set of representations of future and past. This is an intellectualisation and abstraction from the phenomenological orchestration of time-space. Time is an experience of flow rather than being a series of static images enchained in a sequence. The criticism about models of space and time thus works not only at the level of experience but also that of representation. We need a sense of the event and process of time, rather than letting thinking be dominated by static representations. It may be that we can develop representations that within them encode the forces and movement of time (Deleuze 1988), not an image added to movement but a sense of dynamic space-time. Crucially time is not an external measure but intrinsic. To create a useful idea of the combination time-space perhaps what we need is to apply the dynamism theory gives to time into space, rather than allow the stasis theory ascribes to space to frame time. Crucially then this uses time to deny the ‘self-presence’ of the everyday, indeed inserting virtual times to move it from brute actuality. The present is decentered into a set of fractured virtualities. This haunting and opening offers the possibility of difference rather than just repetition. Within space-time there is more than simultaneity, space is more than the synchronic foil to various diachronic models. As Grosz suggests (1999:25) ‘what duration, memory and consciousness bring to the world is the possibility of unfolding, hesitation, uncertainty. Not everything is presented in simultaneity.’ Out of the virtual can come the new, that is
new forms that do not correspond or fit within dominant logics and expectations. It offers an anarchization of time away from predictable and projected actions – and projects. Inserting the virtual offers the possibility, and only the possibility, of emergent non-determined forms. Then, perhaps, we can think through a pluralised and eventful sense of lived time-space.

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