G. E. M. Anscombe

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Introduction

G. E. M. Anscombe is widely recognised as one of the most brilliant philosophers of the twentieth century. Donald Davidson described her 1957 monograph *Intention* as the most important work on action since Aristotle’s *Ethics*, and her much anthologised paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) is the genesis of contemporary virtue ethics. Anscombe’s claim that ‘I’ is not a referring expression (in her 1975), remains as a provocative counterpoint to the consensus position among philosophers of mind. Alongside her own writing, she edited and translated much of Wittgenstein’s work. Her translation of the *Philosophical Investigations*—a task which also involved substantial editorial work—is viewed by many as authoritative. Given these credentials, one might expect to find Anscombe’s work well represented in the secondary literature. But in fact, only a tiny proportion of her published writings has attracted critical engagement. As this bibliography highlights, some areas of Anscombe’s thought—for example, her writings on memory, mental events and sensation—have received almost no attention in the literature, despite their insight and relevance; and even where her work has made a significant impact—for example, in ethics and
causation—it has not been subject to scholarly study. It is really only in the area of philosophy of action that substantial and high quality discussion of her thought has taken place. To date, the literature contains no detailed discussion of Anscombe’s philosophical method. Her main interlocutors are Hume and Descartes, and her contemporaries at Oxford—R. M. Hare, J. L. Austin and Stuart Hampshire. Her aim is to recover pre-modern thinking—in particular the thinking of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—about core topics in mind, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (for example, human nature, mind-body relation, causation, substance, sensation, perception, human action, practical reason). However, her methods are those of philosophy post the linguistic-turn. In particular, she follows Frege and, more explicitly, Wittgenstein in thinking that the way to study these topics is not as a scientist but as a logician or grammarian. Her concern is not the properties of material (or immaterial) objects but the formal order that belongs to our concepts and to human life in which they have their home. This explains the deep interconnectedness that is a feature of her work.

General Overviews
Teichmann 2008 is currently the only overview of Anscombe’s work taken as a whole. Teichmann is a reliable guide, covers the core areas of Anscombe’s thought, and usefully puts her in conversation with Aristotle, Hume and Wittgenstein. Discussion often lacks the depth to satisfy a reader looking to understand the more difficult and puzzling aspects of her view and there is no substantial engagement with Anscombe’s Thomism. The introduction and first two chapters of Wiseman 2016 contain the only general discussion of Anscombe’s method and its relation to Wittgenstein’s. The online **Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy** article on Anscombe (Driver 2011) is thin and the bibliography out of date; the discussion of Anscombe’s philosophy of action is very much out-of-step with the current interpretative orthodoxy (such as it is). Some useful background to Anscombe’s life, as well as impressionistic discussion her key ideas, can be found Teichman 2002 and Gormally 2012. Kenny 2016 and Gibson 2016 provide background to Anscombe’s time at Oxford and Cambridge.


Idiosyncratic but revealing reflections on Anscombe’s relation with Wittgenstein and his male acolytes.
A clear overview of Anscombe’s life and thought; focusses on the ethical and religious character of her work. Helpful for context and introduction but no deep philosophical discussion.

Recollections of Anscombe’s time at Oxford, including her opposition to Truman’s degree and the publication and reception of *Intention*.

Clear and helpful short introductory survey of the most important works in Collected Papers II and III (see *Collections*); some bibliographical information.

A reliable and readable introduction though lacking interpretative depth. Would be good background reading for undergraduates but would need to be supplemented.

Guidebook to Intention, with early chapters on Anscombe’s life, philosophical method, and the influence of her Catholicism. Suitable reading for undergraduates and postgraduates.

**Anthologies**
There are two series of collected papers. Three volumes of **Collected Philosophical Papers** were selected and edited by Anscombe herself, and published in 1981 by Blackwell with introductions by Anscombe. These bring together largely previously published material in history of philosophy (*Parmenides to Wittgenstein*), metaphysics (*Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind*) and ethics (*Ethics, Religion and Politics*). Following Anscombe’s death, her executors have undertaken to publish four volumes of essays, in the St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs series. Many of the essays in the first two volumes of this second set of anthologies (*Human Life, Action and Ethics*, *Faith in a Hard Ground*) were written by Anscombe as talks for Catholic—rather than philosophical—audiences. This means that in these papers Anscombe often takes for granted a shared moral and religious outlook and philosophical discussion arises out of, or in the service of, doctrinal issues or questions that arise within Catholic moral theology. They contain some of Anscombe’s more provocative—and widely criticised—writing on sex, contraception, and marriage. The papers collected in
*From Plato to Wittgenstein* and *Logic, Truth and Meaning* display the marriage of ancient and medieval metaphysics to twentieth-century linguistic philosophy that is characteristic of Anscombe’s approach. Many of the papers in the *St Andrew’s* volumes were unpublished in her lifetime and they are in general not of the same quality as those contained in the Blackwell volumes. Nevertheless, they contain many excellent pieces, as well as helpful introductions by the philosopher Mary Geach, Anscombe’s daughter.

Historically-focussed discussions of topics in philosophical logic and metaphysics, half from Ancient sources and half from Medieval and Modern (post-Cartesian, including 20th Century) philosophy. Topics include Plato’s theory of forms, practical truth in Aristotle, Hume on causation and linguistic idealism and Wittgenstein’s later work.

Contains several important and well-known papers (including ‘The First Person’ (1975), ‘On Sensations of Position’ (1962) and ‘Causality and Determination’ (1971)) as well as many excellent papers on perception, time and philosophy of mind that deserve to be better known.

Includes the much anthologised ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958), along with nine other papers on ethics, two on philosophy of religion and two on political philosophy; these papers usefully contextualise and expand the themes of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.

*Human Life, Action and Ethics*, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005) [d]

*Faith in a Hard Ground*, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008) [e]
M. Geach’s introduction describes the place of Anscombe’s faith in her life and work. Many of Anscombe’s most controversial and reviled pieces are collected here, including several on abortion and contraception.
From Plato to Wittgenstein, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew's Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011) [f]
M. Geach’s introduction provides some illumination of Anscombe’s relationship with Wittgenstein and his thought, and discusses her distinctive approach to texts in the history of philosophy. It contains also essays on Plato, Anselm, Spinoza, and Hume, and seven papers on Wittgenstein’s work and method, which together present Anscombe’s understanding of the notion of ‘grammar’ and ‘grammatical investigation’.

Logic, Truth, and Meaning, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2016) [g]
Reprints her Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959) along with thirteen further essays on the Tractatus, including discussions of the picture theory, the ‘general form of proposition’, solipsism, and generality. The remaining thirteen essays tackle problems in philosophical logic—thought, belief, truth, meaning and existence.

Collections
The most important collection of exegetical essays is undoubtedly Ford, Hornsby and Stoutland (2011). The quality and depth of this collection represents a revival of interest in Anscombe’s *Intention* (1957), and renewed scholarly efforts to recover her philosophy of action and to demonstrate the depth of its challenge to the contemporary Davidsonian orthodoxy in that field. The exegetical literature is currently exploding, and many more collections are soon to be forthcoming. Haldane 2016, which contains quality contributions from some excellent scholars, takes as its subject ‘Elizabeth Anscombe’, and as such ranges over many topics. Gormally, Jones and Teichmann 2016 focusses on Anscombe’s moral philosophy and is the first collection to tackle papers published in *Human Life, Action and Ethics* and *Faith in a Hard Ground*. Earlier *Festschriften*—Diamond and Teichman (1979) and Gormally (1994), —have been far less influential, and are patchy in quality, though Diamond and Teichman (1979) contains a number of good essays on ‘I’ and Cora Diamond’s important essay “Frege and Nonsense”. Two *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements*, Teichmann 2000 (*Logic Cause and Action*) and O’Hear 2004 (*Modern Moral Philosophy*) contains some excellent pieces inspired by, or in dialogue with, Anscombe work.

Four groups of essays discussing (i) The First Person, (ii) Action and Intention, (iii) Sense and nonsense and (iv) Time, truth and necessity. Varied in subject and quality. Kenny’s ‘The First Person’ and Diamond’s ‘Frege and Nonsense’ are excellent papers.

Currently the most important collection on Anscombe’s *Intention*, stand-out contributions are Moran and Stone (2011), Hornsby (2011), McDowell (2011), Haddock (2011). The contributors are mostly philosophers of action working in the analytic tradition, so their focus is on the distinctiveness of Anscombe’s philosophy of action from Davidson’s. Difficult but rewarding.


Catholic *Festschrift*, celebrating Geach and Anscombe’s golden wedding anniversary; essays strongly focussed on questions of Catholic moral theology including contraception, chastity, parental authority.


Many of these essays are the first discussions of papers published in *Human Life, Action and Ethics* and *Faith in a Hard Ground*. Includes *Muller 2016* on the spirituality of man, *Volger 2016* on promising and *O’Brien 2016* on obligation in Anscombe’s moral philosophy.


Collection of 13 essays from prominent Anscombe scholars most of whom focus on topics in the philosophy of action and philosophical logic. Also includes two biographical pieces by Kenny (Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford’) and Gibson (‘Anscombe, Cambridge and the Challenges of Wittgenstein’).


Very good collection of ten high-quality papers, the most significant of which are Harcourt (2000), Hursthouse (2000), and Foot (2000).


This collection takes its title from Anscombe’s essay but is not commentary; rather her essay forms the backdrop to many of its papers, which cover topics including good action, practical inference, absolutism and authority.

*Action*
Anscombe's major work is "Intention" (1957). This area of Anscombe's thought has attracted the most interest in the secondary literature. Of particular interest is Anscombe's concepts of 'knowledge without observation' and 'practical knowledge', which contemporary philosophers of mind have sought to make use of to solve the so-called mind-body problem (McDowell 2011, Martin 1971, Thompson 2011, Setiya 2008). Work published after Davidson 1963 and before Ford, Hornsby, and Stoutland 2011 tended to underplay the distinction between Davidson's causalist account of action and Anscombe's position while focussing on the so-called 'Davidson-Anscombe thesis' of action identity (Driver 2011). This reading of Anscombe's project (as preparatory notes to Davidson) has now been widely rejected; criticisms by Hornsby (2011), Moran and Stone (2011), and Haddock (2011) have been particularly influential, as has increased recognition of the Thomist roots of "Intention" (Schwenkler 2015, Vogler 2002). "Intention" should be read alongside other important papers which elucidate its central concepts: under a description, non-observational knowledge, practical reason, causation of action ("On Brute Facts" 1958, "Under a Description" 1979, "The Causation of Action" 1983, "Practical Inference" 1989). The book must also be seen in light of Anscombe's reading of Aristotle on practical truth ('Practical Truth' 1992) and of Aquinas's account of good and bad human action (2005). A series of polemical papers written at the same time as "Intention" ('Mr Truman's Degree' 1956, 'Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?' 1957, 'Modern Moral Philosophy' 1958) illuminate the book's relation to Anscombe's broader ethical, religious and political aims, and its relevance to topics in Catholic moral theology.

**Intention**

Anscombe (1957) is Anscombe's earliest and major work on action, with later work elucidating and contextualising its major claims. Early reviews are on the whole unhelpful, with the exception of Baier 1960 and Jarvis 1959. Wiseman 2016 is the first guidebook to this difficult monograph. Stoutland 2011 is a short but comprehensive overview of the book’s structure and Teichmann 2008 contains useful discussion in chs 1-2. Davidson 1963 is important as the genesis of the so-called 'Anscombe-Davidson thesis' described in Driver 2011. The interpretative school arising from this misnomer is compellingly challenged in Moran and Stone 2011. (See *Introduction* for further details.) Thompson 2012 and Vogler 2002 are important monographs showing how an Anscombian account of intention can generate a moral philosophy


Difficult, deep and short, this monograph was described by Davidson as the most important work on action since Aristotle.


Illuminating paper aiming to correct some misunderstandings about the meaning of 'under a description'; essential reading for anyone seeking to understanding Anscombe 1957.
Practical Knowledge

This topic—familiar to readers of Thomas Aquinas—is introduced into modern philosophy of action by Anscombe 1957. Anscombe says that the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions is *practical knowledge* and also that the descriptions of a man’s actions belong to the class of things he *knows without observation*. To this second class belong also descriptions of bodily posture. The exegetical literature on both these concepts is muddled by the fact that there is no agreement about the relation between practical, non-observational and self-knowledge in Anscombe’s thought, and so no consensus on whether the capacity to know the position of one’s limbs, the capacity to know what one is doing and the capacity to say what one intends are of the same species. Many of the best essays on these topics attend to this question (Haddock 2011, McDowell 2011). Moran 2004 is an important discussion of why practical knowledge must be non-observational. Thompson 2011 influentially seeks to make ‘the progressive’ a central notion in understanding practical knowledge. Schwenkler 2015 is an extremely
helpful reminder that ‘practical knowledge’ has its roots in Aquinas—a fact that seems to have gone largely unnoticed by earlier interpreters. Setiya 2008 is a stand-out example from a more critical interpretative tradition.

Discussion of Aristotle’s notion of ‘truth in agreement with right desire’; important for opening up the sense in which ‘practical knowledge’ might meet the truth condition on knowledge.

Careful exegetical piece highlighting many of the interpretative difficulties in this area.

For many years the most significant and widely cited discussion of Anscombe on practical knowledge; remains relevant and influential.

An influential and widely cited paper connecting practical knowledge with non-propositional ‘knowledge-how’.

A helpful study of the Aristotelian and Thomistic roots of Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge.

Rather chaotic paper, but influential in arguing that Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge can be understood only if we recognise that the object of knowledge must be specified in the imperfection rather than perfective form. This underlines the contrast between Davidson’s and Anscombe’s action-theory.

Bodily Knowledge
Anscombe 1957 says that we know the position of our limbs without observation and offers as a criterion for non-observational knowledge the absence of ‘separately describable sensations’. Anscombe 1962 seeks to clarify this claim, though many readers (e.g. Vesey 1963 and Martin 1971) continue to find the notion incoherent. Vesey 1963, Martin 1971, McDowell 2011 all focus on the significance of Anscombe’s claim for the so-called mind-body problem. Harcourt 2008 uses Anscombe’s remarks to explore the role of introspectibilia in perception.


**Practical Reason**

Anscombe 1957 made practical reason a central topic in philosophy of action. It includes a substantial discussion of Aristotle’s account of practical reason (§§33-42); this account plays a crucial role in the book’s thesis. Anscombe 1989 (written in 1974, but published later) is a reply to Von Wright 1972, and is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand §§33-42. For further discussion of the contrast between practical and theoretical reason, see also Alvarez 2010 and Müller 1979. The significance of
practical reason in Anscombe’s account of intention, and in particular her account of practical knowledge, has been seriously neglected in a secondary literature (though see Vogler 2001). More attention has been given to the relation between practical knowledge and non-observational knowledge, than on that between practical knowledge and practical reasoning.

Clear and helpful interpretation and defence of Anscombe’s claim that ‘I want to φ’ is not ordinarily a premise in practical reasoning.


Causation in Action
Anscombe follows Aquinas to say that practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’ (1957, §48), but she certainly does not mean the efficient cause. Just what she does mean is a locus of philosophical debate (see also “Practical Knowledge”). Her 1983 provides useful clues as to what she does not mean—Anscombe says that explanation of action by intention is not causal explanation, in the sense in which ‘moderns’ understand ‘causal’. This position is connected with another of Anscombe’s claims about intention: that to give the mental cause of an action is not to give a reason for the action
(see Teichman 1961). As discussed in Hursthouse 2000, this claim puts her at odds with the Davidsonian orthodoxy in philosophy of action, according to which reason explanation is causal explanation. It is important to recognise that Anscombe’s pre-modern perspective leads her to recognise species of causation that are alien to post-Humean philosophy—this is a point developed in Hornsby 2011.


**Metaphysics**

Anscombe’s works on causality and time are difficult and idiosyncratic but full of deep insight and replete with claims that cut against contemporary orthodoxy. Her “Causality and Determination” (1971) is well anthologised, and is the source of her reputation as champion of the singularist theory of causation. She is radically anti-Humean in her rejection of the nomological and necessitating character of causation but also in the modern reduction of causation to a single kind: efficient. These strands of her thought have their roots in a radical view about the meaning of causative verbs (see Hornsby 2011 in *Action*). Her singularist pluralism is an essential part of her account of the causation of human action (1983) and relatedly of her view that intention and motive are not mental causes (*Intention* 1957; see *Action*). It
is also part of a novel response to the problem of free will (1976). Her work on memory and the past is closely connected with her rejection of the Humean **Weltanschauung** (as she puts it in her 1971), and showcases both her ability in philosophical logic and her Wittgensteinian roots, the latter of which is the subject of Diamond 1979.

Early paper offering a (Wittgensteinian) solution to puzzles about how past-tense statements have meaning. Anscombe’s proposed solution lies in the ways in which the past tense is taught and learnt. Read with her 1974.

Brilliant and radical rejection of the then prevailing (Humean) conception of causation, according to which causality involves necessary connection and causation implies a general law. Genesis of singularism about causation.

Attacks the definition of personal memory as *experience plus truth plus causal connection*. Claims we do not discover a causal connection between memory, experience and the past but rather call memory an effect of being a witness to a past event. Read with her 1950.

A subtle discussion of Lehrer’s argument (and Goldman’s and Davidson’s rebuttals) against subjunctive analyses of dispositions.

Provocative discussion of the kinds of causation that are relevant to human action; argues that causal explanation at the level of the whole human agent is formally prior to explanation at the level of human physiology.

Takes Anscombe’s discussion of nonsense in ‘The Reality of the Past’ as starting point for understanding Frege’s conception of nonsense. Significant in making Anscombe central to the development of the ‘New Wittgenstein’ interpretative school.

Philosophy of Mind
Anscombe’s work on core topics in the philosophy of mind is strangely neglected. Her best known piece is her 1975, in which she argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression. The claim, though almost universally rejected, has motivated some important discussion on the logic of the first-person pronoun and Cartesian philosophy of mind. It is notable in defending the view Anscombe makes significant use of the notion of non-observational knowledge of action and posture; for her there is a deep connection between the no-reference view and an account of action (see “Action”). She repeats the claim that ‘I’ is not a referring expression again in her 1976 where she connects it explicitly which her reading of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Anscombe’s work on sensation and perception has not been brought into dialogue with contemporary theories of perception though such dialogue is richly suggested in her writing.

Anscombe offers conceptual clarification of core terms, including subjective, intentional, object (as in ‘object of sight’), mental event, observation, colour. In each case she looks to articulate the ‘grammar’ (or form) of the concepts these words represent and to dissolve or resolve philosophical problems through this descriptive work. What emerges is a distinctive position that rejects sense-data-, naïve-, representational-, and adverbial-theories. The view is clearly rooted in Wittgenstein’s private language argument, but goes far beyond the former’s destructive conclusions. For memory see “Metaphysics”.

Self-consciousness and ‘I’
Anscombe 1975 argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, a thesis also associated with Wittgenstein. Kenny 1979 and Malcolm 1979 accept the no-reference view, stressing its Wittgensteinian roots. However, almost all contemporary analytic philosophers reject this view; Evans 1982 has been an especially influential work and contains many criticisms of Anscombe. It is clear from her 1975 and 1976 that Anscombe sees her views on ‘I’ as intimately connected to her accounts of action and bodily awareness. Work to connect these parts of her thought is starkly absent. All the post-1982 commentary pieces listed (Evans 1982, Harcourt 2000, McDowell 1998, O’Brien 1994) accuse her of a residual form of Cartesianism, in the form of a failure to appreciate fully that the referent need not be an ego, but may be a human being, a person or a body.


Classic paper arguing by reductio that ‘I’ is not a referring expression (nor ‘I am EA’ an identity proposition), and offering a novel account of self-consciousness in terms of the capacity to employ the first-person pronoun.

Account of what is meant in calling sensation 'subjective'; argues that the account requires that we reject the thesis that 'I' is a referring expression.


Ch. 7 is Evans’ account of self-reference through 'I' and includes an influential dismissal of Anscombe’s 1975.


Critical commentary on Anscombe 1975, arguing that Anscombe’s reductio fails to support its conclusion; it shows only that 'I’ is not associated with a sense, and not that it is not associated with a reference.


Rare in agreeing with the no-reference thesis. Contains a critical discussion of status of the Cartesian proposition: ‘I am the thinker of these thoughts’.


Defence of Anscombe, illuminating connections with Wittgenstein’s *Blue Book* remarks.


Critical comparison with Strawson’s description of use of “I” without criteria of subject identity.


Rejects the no-reference thesis, but suggests that Anscombe’s argument identifies a special epistemological capacity relating to 'I'-use.

**Sensation and Perception**

Anscombe’s papers on sensation and perception remain almost unread. This is an enormous loss to the philosophy of mind and perception. These three papers (Anscombe 1965, Anscombe 1976, Anscombe 1981), when read together, constitute a thoroughgoing and distinctive attack on traditional accounts of
mental phenomena. Anscombe 1965—discussed in Crane 2001—presents a unique account of the intentionality of perception, one which attacks the root of the dilemma between representational and object-based accounts of perceptual experience. In her 1976, Anscombe shows how ambiguity about the meaning of ‘subjectivity’ has led philosophers to characterise sensory judgment as involving a distinctive kind of infallibility.


Ethics and Religion
Anscombe is usually credited, along with her friend and colleague Philippa Foot, with the modern revival of virtue ethics. Her much anthologised “**Modern Moral Philosophy**” (1958) is a highly polemical piece which argues for the use of Aristotelian virtue terms in ethics and rejects consequentialist and deontological ethical theories (the latter, she argues, are incoherent when removed from a theistic framework). This paper is part of a cluster written between 1956-8, in which Anscombe attacks both the moral philosophy of her contemporaries and the prevailing ethical outlook of the country at large, both of which she claims to be consequentialist in spirit (see “**Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?**” (1957) and **“Mr Truman’s Degree**” (1956)). It was also during this time that Anscombe wrote “**Intention**” (1956). It is important to see Anscombe’s work in this period as a whole: the writings on *action* provide the philosophy of psychology required to sustain talk of virtuous acts and actors. Though
Anscombe suggested the use of virtue terms in ethics, a use which she indicates could be sustained within a secular naturalism, she herself was a devout Catholic. Her view was that a developed virtue ethics would characterise as vicious just those acts which Catholicism prohibited. So for her, virtue ethics was a means of securing a secular ethics of prohibition. When we come to those acts that fall within the prohibition, Anscombe’s views have attracted outrage and condemnation (e.g. Williams and Tanner 1972). In particular, her fierce condemnation of homosexuality, contraception, sex outside heterosexual marriage, euthanasia and abortion coupled with her insistence on justice over the prevention of suffering, have made her a target of rebuke from philosophers working in the liberal, secular and humanistic traditions of post-enlightenment thought. The deep connections between Anscombe’s virtue ethics, her philosophy of action and mind and her conservative religious beliefs, renders Anscombe a problematic figure for contemporary ethicists.

**Anti-Consequentialism**

In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe coined the term ‘consequentialist’ to describe any moral philosopher who rejected a fundamental tenet of Hebrew-Christian morality: that there are some act-kinds that are prohibited in virtue of their nature alone, whatever the consequences. Anscombe finds consequentialism prevalent among her contemporaries at Oxford (see her 1958) and in the British public at large (see her 1957) and connect this attitude with support for Truman’s use of atomic weapons during WWII (see her 1956, listed under *Politics*). Anscombe argues that consequentialism is inevitable without a philosophy of psychology which can sustain an account of human action which enables the characterisation of the nature and quality of an act independently of consideration of its causal consequences. This is one of the tasks of her 1957 monograph **Intention** (see Wiseman 2016). The question of whether an anti-consequentialist ethics can be sustained outside a theistic framework is discussed in Lovibond 1973. It is worth noting that Anscombe’s use of the word ‘consequentialism’ as a contrast term with ‘absolutism’ does not align with philosophical usage today, according to which ‘consequentialism’ may be consistent with prohibition and is inconsistent with virtue ethics. These differences are explored in Diamond 1997.


Extremely provocative paper—written for a BBC radio broadcast; usefully read alongside Anscombe 1958; see also letters and replies in *The Listener* February-April 1957.


By far the most well-known and influential of Anscombe’s moral philosophy papers in which she introduces the term ‘consequentialism’ into the literature.
Important clarification of Anscombe’s definition of ‘consequentialism’—from which contemporary philosophical use has somewhat departed. Suggests that Anscombe’s definition leaves space for characterising Mill as an anti-consequentialist.

Sensitive and thought-provoking defence of secular absolutism; brings Anscombe’s 1958 into dialogue with Bernard Williams’ influential “Consequentialism and Integrity.”

Currently the only book to give an overview of Anscombe’s moral philosophy; introductory.

Places Intention in the context of Anscombe’s objections to Truman’s degree, Oxford moral philosophy and ‘the spirit of the age’ and argues for a reading of Intention based on that context.

**Virtue Ethics**

Anscombe’s call for a return to talk of virtue in ethics was premised on the view that without a divine legislator, the notion of ‘moral obligation’ is empty of ethical content. An ethics grounded in an adequate philosophy of psychology which made use of the Aristotelian and Thomist account of good and bad action would have no need such a notion (but see O’Brien 2016). Anscombe thought that the class of vicious actions would be the same as those actions which Hebrew-Christian ethics says are illicit (**Modern Moral Philosophy** 1958). Her work in virtue ethics is largely concerned with what she saw as necessary preparatory conceptual work in the philosophy of psychology (see, for example, ‘On Brute Facts’ 1958).
That work seeks to provide an account of human action which enables the identification of the ‘nature and quality of an act’ (see her 1982). This requires an account of acts in which an agent’s intentions can be seen as constituting her actions’ nature. In tandem to Anscombe’s work, Philippa Foot sought to develop an account of human nature which would frame a secular understanding of the proper purpose of a human life (2001). The standard work in Anscombian virtue ethics is Hursthouse 1999. Vogler (2002 and 2006) has taken this project forward, while pointing out some of the deep difficulties involved in detaching Anscombe’s ethics from its Thomist underpinnings.
Usefully read alongside Anscombe 1958 and 1957; shows why Anscombe thought ethics impossible without a sound philosophy of psychology and indicates the way in which her 1957 is conceived to provide such foundation.

Casts light on Anscombe’s controversial rejection of the prefix ‘moral’ (e.g. ‘morally bad action’) in her 1958 by putting it in the context of Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

Usefully read alongside 1958 and 1957. This paper relates Anscombe’s account of action to her ethical absolutism and her reading of the Thomist doctrine that all human action is moral action.

An important book in the revival of virtue ethics, contributing to the project set out in Anscombe 1958. Argues for a naturalist, secular virtue ethics.

Classic statement and defence of virtue ethics, heavily indebted to Anscombe who is discussed throughout.

Argues that Anscombe is a moral pluralist—rather than a straightforward virtue theorist—and constructs from her later writings on authority an account of obligation.

Brilliant monograph, demonstrating the productiveness of Anscombian / Thomist accounts of good (and bad) action, and their relevance to contemporary ethics.

Friendly to virtue ethics, but arguing that there is a deep problem for naturalist virtue ethics, parallel to that highlighted by Anscombe 1958 for atheist deontological theorists.
Religion and Applied Ethics
Anscombe wrote on applied ethics mainly for Catholic audiences. Her discussions of war, nuclear weapons, murder and judicial injustice (in her 1939 and 1961), though against the ‘spirit of the age’ (as she put it in her 1957), are palatable to contemporary secular ethical thought, and have attracted some careful and sympathetic discussion. However, on the topics of sex, contraception, and abortion (e.g. 1972), Anscombe’s views remain beyond the pale for liberal secular readers; within philosophical circles these writings have been on the whole either ignored, mocked or violently attacked (for example, Williams and Tanner 1972 is a vicious attack on her 1972). Winch (1972) and Teichman (1979) are rare examples in which Anscombe’s arguments have been rigorously discussed, and their conclusions rejected on their own terms. Richter 2011 arranges his discussion of Anscombe’s ethics around these topics. See also *Politics and Law*. A different, and potentially more rewarding, way into Anscombe’s religious outlook is to focus on her understanding of the ‘spiritual nature of man’ (Muller 2016).

Skilful application of just war theory to the case of World War II; prescient in its description of the direction in which the war would unfold.

Attack on pacifism and on the view of Christianity as predominantly a religion of love rather than—as Anscombe thinks—one of justice. Anscombe (1981c) describes this paper as written in a ‘tone of righteous fury’.

The most widely read of Anscombe’s many papers on sex and chastity. Argues that sexual acts which involve contraception are deviant and against the natural law. She relies on the claim that the intentional act that is performed when contraception is used is different from that performed without contraception during infertile periods, and in this way puts to work the account developed in her 1957 monograph *Intention*.

Solid if introductory study of Anscombe’s moral philosophy, important as it is the only one. Richter sketches connections between Anscombe’s work on intention and her moral philosophy, with case studies on war and sex.
Anselm Winfred Muller, "The Spiritual Nature of Man" in Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and Roger Teichmann (eds), *The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe*, Imprint Academia (2016), 10-32. Sympathetic and illuminating exploration of Anscombe's understanding of man’s 'spirituality', the centre of which is our 'orientation toward truth and goodness'.

Williams, Bernard and Michael Tanner, "Comment on 'Contraception and Chastity'." *The Human World* 9 (1972), 41—51. Angry and polemical attack on Anscombe's views on sexuality, representative of the reaction of many secular liberal readers.

Winch, Peter, “A Letter to the Editor.” *The Human World* 9 (1972). Winch applies pressure to Anscombe's distinction between intrinsically generative and intrinsically non-generative acts in order to undermine her claim that contraceptive sex is disordered while sex timed to be during the infertile period is not.

**Politics and Law**

Anscombe’s *Intention* is a work in the philosophy of psychology, but her interest in that topic stemmed, at least in part, from practical concern with matters of politics and law. In particular, she sought to understand—in order to undermine—the source a cluster of ideas that she saw as representative of the 'spirit of the age': that murder was sometimes permissible but that the death penalty was not; that concerns of justice should give way to the prevention of suffering; that pacifism was admirable, but that total war acceptable (see Anscombe “**Mr Truman’s Degree***” (1956), “**Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth**” (1957), “**War and Murder**” (1961), “**On Justice in a Trial***” (1972)). In each case, she diagnoses a lack of clarity about core concepts, in particular, the concepts of intention, responsibility and action. (See *Action*). Her uncompromising commitment to justice over the prevention of suffering, her rejection of leniency when it comes to illicit acts and her adherence to the Socratic idea of a citizen's duty of ultimate submission to the state (1978), make her thought a provocative counterpoint to the prevailing liberal ideology. Her novel analysis of the concepts of rights and promises locates their source in Aristotelian necessities and, as discussed in Vogler 2016, poses a challenge to recent Rawlsian accounts of the institution of promising.

Anscombe, G. E. M. “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?” *The Listener* 57 (14 Feb. 1957):1455. Written as a radio broadcast for the BBC; an attack on the consequentialist 'spirit of the age', as it manifests in policy, jurisdiction, institutions and public sympathy. Read alongside her 1958 ('Modern
Moral Philosophy'). Attracted venomous letters from her contemporaries, published with her non-
conciliatory replies in subsequent editions of *The Listener*.

Anscombe’s intervention to prevent Oxford University awarding an honorary degree to USA President
Corrupt the Youth?’ (1957), and ‘Modern Moral Philosophy (1958).

Polemical piece, defending the right of a country to go to war and the right of a state to coerce its citizens
by violence; sheds light on Anscombe’s opposition to ‘moral principles’ (in her ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’,
1958).

Anscombe, G. E. M. “On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected in Foro Interno”,
*Critica*, 3/7-8 (1969), 61-83. Reprinted in [c].
Brilliant discussion of Hume’s puzzle about the ‘naturally unintelligibility’ of promising and the distinction
between rights arising out of in Aristotelian necessity and those arising out of convention. Read with
Anscombe 1978.

Anscombe argues that states have the right to be obeyed in the exercise of institutional violent coercive
power. She introduces the idea of ‘authority stemming from a task’ to account for this right. Contains an
excellent discussion of the notion of a ‘right’ and related modals, in this case Aristotelian necessities.
Read with Anscombe 1969.

Written in the style of Swift’s modest proposal, a scathing attack on the Home Office Report proposing to
end the privilege of Catholic priests to withhold information learned in confessional; clear expression of
Anscombe’s view that Justice must never be sacrificed in the name of expediencia.

Vogler, Candace, “Anscombe on Promising” in Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and Roger Teichmann
Puts Anscombe into dialogue with Scanlon and Rawls.