‘... DAS NORMALE WEIB GEHÖRT DER ZUKUNFT’. EVOLUTIONISM AND THE NEW WOMAN IN LEOPOLD VON SACHER-MASOCH, FRIEDA VON BÜLOW AND LOU ANDREAS-SALOMÉ

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ABSTRACT

Whilst the treatment of Darwinian and other concepts of evolution in literary theory and writing by men around 1900 has recently received attention, little has been written on their influence over women writers and their theorisation of gender at this epoch. This paper addresses the impact of ‘Darwinism’, in particular sexual selection, on concepts of gender and writing practice in the representative women writers Bülow and Andreas-Salomé. These are contrasted with works by Sacher-Masoch and with Böltsche’s construction of the feminine in Das Liebesleben in der Natur. It is argued that radical feminism emerged even in prominent feminist writers around 1900 in an inhibited-attenuated form, and that the authority attributed to Darwinistic constructions of sexual selection was a factor in that phenominalisation.


Comment [NDBS1]: I don't mind at all changing this, but I am unsure attenuated is better. A-S's feminism is not an attenuated form of constructivist feminism, it's radically different. I suppose my point was that it's contaminated by a residual adherence to masculinist stories of gender roles. Hence inhibited qua a kind of received deference to the norm. Some other alternative, by all means, otherwise can I plead for inhibited?
Darwinian evolutionism changed everything in German nineteenth-century cultural history. If we think of the Bible at the end of the eighteenth century as still, despite Enlightenment secularist critique, the foundational narrative of occidental culture, then Darwin’s alternative, post-metaphysical story of the origin and evolution of life definitively usurped that position. If we think of the public sphere as composed of discourses competing in the consensual pursuit of truth, then Darwinism in the age of science was the dominant discourse, owner of the highest epistemological authority. But just as anti-semitic discourse pre- and postdates the rise of Darwinism and is changed by it (notably in the scientistic pseudo-legitimation of racism), so too the discourse of women’s emancipation. What, then, was the impact of the newly authoritative discourse of evolutionism on the received patriarchal discourse on women? Did it modify the familiar terms of the campaign against received anthropological stereotypes: woman as close to nature, emotional, receptive, passive, sensual, tendentially sickly, static, [homely etc]; man as the opposite of all that; marriage as the harmonious merging of those complementary opposites, recovery of the lost holistic androgynous ideal lauded in the first book of Genesis and Plato’s Symposium? Certainly Darwinism was thematised and problematised everywhere in German nineteenth-century literature, which in this context (as ever) performed its Foucauldian function as the meta-discourse in which the epistemes of apparently factual and foundational scientific discourses are embedded, and so can be reflected upon. Now the philosophical deep structure of argument on the woman question, if we follow authorities like de Beauvoir, Ortner, Butler and Frevert, seems always to have been constituted by a fundamental tension between essentialism and constructivism. To what extent were the limits and potential of women and
men essential (innate, naturalised and closed beyond change) or constructed (contingently defined in words by societies as traditional roles and in the same degree open to modification)? More historically, around 1900 these underlying terms of the woman question, if we follow Ursula Renner, manifest themselves as the conflict of abstract equality and concrete difference of the sexes. In what sense is a woman the equal of a man without being a man, and in what sense is a woman definitively a woman and so free to be irreducibly her own authentic self? In what follows I am going to address these issues by analysing the exposition of gender difference in late nineteenth-century literary works by three writers close to Darwinism: Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s ‘Don Juan von Kolomea’ (1864) and Venus im Pelz (1870), Frieda von Bülow’s ‘Sie und Er’ (1898), ‘So laß mich nun vergessen!’ (1898) and ‘Zwei Menschen’ (1899), and Lou Andreas-Salomé’s ‘Eine Ausschweifung’ (1898) and ‘Mädchenreigen’ (1899). All these tales focus on the decisive theme of love and power in gender relations; in the case of Bülow and Andreas-Salomé on the emergence of the New Woman. The orientation around Darwinian evolution, I shall argue, offers these authors in terms of gender politics arguments which tend to anchor gender roles in essentialist and naturalistic accounts of what male and female are. They all derive, then, an ethical gender ought from an ontological is. Yet paradoxically that discursive filiation so characteristic of a scientistic culture releases both a repressive and an emancipatory potential, and this, even more paradoxically, cuts across the obvious a priori gender divide. From this I derive a moral about the two cultures (science and the humanities), and the value of science as an authority for telling us how ethically to live our lives.

But let us start with a foil to what follows, the gender scene before the ‘Ära Darwin’. Clemens Brentano’s novella ‘Die mehreren Wehmüller’ (1817) is a classic statement. Promisingly, it is about the limits imposed by arbitrary borders, both gender roles and those of nations composing the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the function of poesy in overcoming them. Mimicking Boccaccio, Brentano has characters telling tales in a safe place, the locus of
poesy, a tavern, beyond the plague across the border. The central figure Wehmüller has been Romantically punished. He is a bad, commercialising painter who mass-produces in advance standardised typical portraits which falsely purport to capture the individuality of his subjects, and so is aptly cursed by poetic nemesis with identity theft: an uncontrollable duplicate of himself, a ‘Doppelgänger’. Separated from his handsome wife Tonerl by the plague cordon for the foreseeable future, he is dismayed to discover that his ‘Doppelgänger’ has passed through the border shortly before the cordon was imposed. Thus the original Wehmüller is tortured by what may happen if Tonerl fails to spot the difference. Fortunately for him, there are Gypsies about. Gypsies by definition transcend borders. The violinist Michaly is an Orphic figure, whose music-making marvellously quells the particularist-nationalistic resentments which erupt in the tavern. His sister Mitidika across the border is another, still more powerful mythic symbol of the irenic, harmonistic function of Romantic poesy. She is both possessed of irresistible feminine erotic charisma and majesty and unites in her androgyne person traditionally conceived female and male qualities. As a poetic figuration of poesy, gifted in the recognition of intrinsic identity, she can instantly tell the difference between the true and the false Wehmüller, and fights for the reunion of the separated lovers. Dressed in men’s clothes, she mounts a horse Amazon-like and leads a charge with Tonerl through the plague cordon, where the real Wehmüller awaits. Out of fragmentation and division, then, come harmony and order. The lost biblical or Platonic paradise of androgynous sexual union, the (re)union in love of complementary gender opposites, is restored by the messianic agency of poesy. Androgyny so understood is the anthropological ideal of Romantic humanism, sacralised fulfilment of gender history.

If, crudely speaking for the purposes of this argument, the latter half of the nineteenth century is characterised philosophically by the dismissal of this harmonistic style of thought in dialectical idealism (Hegel, Romanticism) in post-metaphysical conflict-orientated systems (Schopenhauer, Darwin, Nietzsche), then Sacher-Masoch’s tales can stand for the initial
impact of that paradigm shift on gender relations. It is a moot point how deeply Sacher-Masoch studied Darwin, although the triumph of Darwinism was trumpeted by Ludwig Büchner in the popular and supposedly authoritative Gartenlaube as early as 1861 and Ernst Haeckel’s huge Darwinian standard work Generelle Morphologie appeared in the first of its numerous editions in 1866. Nonetheless, Sacher-Masoch formally acknowledges the ‘‘Kampf um das Dasein’’ as one of the key formative energies of his planned cycle, the Vermächtniß Kains, of which both of the works to be discussed form a part, and both of which discuss ‘die Liebe, das Verhältniß der Geschlechter’ (Werth der Kritik, p. 45) in terms of the struggle for life and enmity of all against all, which ends not in harmonistic marriage (or any form of harmonious union) but only either in domination or enslavement.

Thus ‘Don Juan von Kolomea’, another narrative set in a tavern on a border, discloses the inner history of a how a modern man becomes a thoroughly Darwinian Don Juan. This physically brave man, emblematically named Dmitri, is timid in the presence of the female of the species (Don Juan, p. 29). He is too shy to dance with his chosen Nikolaya in the traditional sexual marketplace, even though she is clearly interested. Only when he grasps that he can achieve selection by performing remarkable feats of male bravery which demonstrate his qualities – single combat with a bear, restraining runaway horses – is the inhibition dissolved, and he can lead her off in triumph, a trophy – ‘mein Weib’ (p. 37), not ‘meine Frau’ or ‘meine Gemahlin’ – posed on the symbolic bearskin (p. 36). This is evidently Darwinian sexual selection in poetic refraction. But the prize won at such cost turns out to be anything but a harmonious union, since Nikolaya, despite his feats, unexpectedly fails to acknowledge his mastery in the new relationship. The struggle for sexual domination, figured by the bearskin and other furs (pp. 46, 58), symbol of her animal nature, and her attribute of the riding crop, symbol of the agonistic, not harmonistic, means to control animal nature, informs the relationship. She turns out to be sexually as much a huntress of men as he is a hunter of women. At last Dmitri’s sexual confusion is resolved by a philosopher friend, Leon
Bodoschkan. Life, he learns, is, as with Schopenhauer, a punishment under the slavery of the Will *qua* nature, which compels us to procreate in its own interest and dupes us to this end with the notion of love. Love is in truth nothing but subordination to the loved one. Symbolic androgyne union with the beloved, the Romantic ideal, is in fact a form of spiritual self-murder (p. 43). The underlying truth of love, guaranteed by the authority of nature, is the relation of he- and she-wolf, a bloody and pitiless fight for superiority. Hence – this an enormity in the nineteenth century, which defined women’s honour exclusively in sexual terms\(^\text{16}\) – Dmitri can even accept Nikolaya’s unfaithfulness without bothering to win the inevitable duel. It is merely her, and woman’s, nature; not a matter of honour. Their relation is reduced to a ‘Josephsehe’ (p. 50), each a sexual predator outside it. Thus Dimitri becomes Don Juan, released from the slavery of love if not from that of the sexual drive, a compulsive serial hunter of women.

But if the shift from Romantic androgyne to the battle of the sexes is clear enough, where precisely does Darwinism fit in? Darwinism adds not only the notion of the struggle for life by natural selection to the discourse of women’s emancipation, it also adds the notion of sexual selection, an idea elaborated for the first time in *The Descent of Man* (1871)\(^\text{17}\) but anticipated by Haeckel in Germany already in the *Generelle Morphologie* (1866). Sexual selection adds as it were a layer of efficiency to the process of struggle. In this, significantly for our cognitive interest, female sexuality – sexual agency – is to an extent recognised and empowered. For in the lower species, says Darwin, mates are selected either by physical competition (ants, bees, stags, lions) or display (peacocks, bower birds, birds of paradise). Both of these behaviours signal adaptedness or fittedness, strength, stamina, boldness, aggression, leadership, the power to overcome handicaps,\(^\text{18}\) and so forth, and thus promise the best chances for the survival of individual inheritance and, indirectly, the species. Sexual selection is hugely important in Darwinian evolution. Quite apart from serving as a rudimentary sense of aesthetic taste in evolutionary adaptation and so initiating the origin of
art (Abstammung des Menschen, pp. 770-71, 864), sexual selection determines in the form of secondary sexual characteristics to a material extent the shape we are in: not only the male display characteristics just mentioned, but also, in humans, for example, the relative hairlessness of females (and, in some cultures, males; Abstammung, pp. 1142-5) – and indeed all conceivable emphases of body morphology and colouring. Darwin even argues (Abstammung, pp. 1145-7) that in humanity selection by sexual taste is probably responsible for the differentiation of races across the globe. But important for our purpose is the common feature that it is generally the female which selects (Abstammung, pp. 863-4), so that the female can in this sense be said to be proactive sexually and insofar to dominate. Yes, Darwin points out that in humans it is the male who generally selects (Abstammung, p. 1140), at least in that it is the female who displays, who is selected for physical beauty, that the female is also selected for physical and intellectual subordination (and Carus’s German does formulate this as the ‘Stand der Knechtschaft’; Abstammung, p. 1140). But Darwin also notes that there are lower species in which both females and males select reciprocally (Abstammung, pp. 866-7), and, moreover, that in humans there is evidence – the beard – of modification of the male body for sexual selection by the female (Abstammung, pp. 1140, 1142). In any case in civilised nations, mental attributes are by now, he argues, more significant factors of sexual selection than physical attributes (Abstammung, p. 1131). In the German tradition too, Haeckel, even if he still preaches the ideal of complementarity, nonetheless also explicitly reinforces the reciprocity of selection in humans and of the priority of intellectual development as criterion of sexual selection in the civilised nations (Generelle Morphologie, pp. 245, 247). In short: Darwinian discourse recognises female sexual agency, is to this extent emancipatory, and in Sacher-Masoch, we can claim, if not positivistic influence at least a Darwinian genealogy. Both sexes, Nikolaya as much as Dmitri, follow de-Romanticised strategies of evolutionary selection and domination, and female sexual agency is to this extent legitimised.
Under this new régime of biologised sexual politics, *Venus im Pelz* is however the programmatic statement of patriarchy’s survival strategy – what Krafft-Ebing later feminised, pathologised and christened masochism and Freud moulded into his own, still more influential version of the theory of the constitutional masochism of women. But whereas Dmitri escaped the tough love of Nikolaya in furs yet remained subject to the will of nature in his endless pursuit of women to conquer, here masochism seems to be male. It seems to be Severin who willingly submits to Wanda in furs. And one could indeed superficially read this tale as Don Juan’s postultimate capitulation to love as he construes it after all. Except that this would be quite wrong. In truth Severin is in charge. Even when he loses control of proceedings it is on the basis of a scenario which he has anticipated and to which he has already assented: Wanda’s betrayal of him with the dominant Count Alexis, modern reincarnation of Apolline masculine power, beauty and cruelty. For unlike Nikolaya, Wanda is from the outset expressly groomed into the domina role by Severin. She is identified not only with Venus, but more accurately with the statue of Venus, his fantasy figure, sprung into life, a manipulative aesthetic process he himself identifies with Pygmalion’s creation of Galatea (*Venus im Pelz*, pp. 15-17, 19), and which for him brings classical poetry alive in this post-Christian world. Wanda herself is allegedly like all women: characterless (*Venus im Pelz*, p. 56). She is nature, savage, an amoral, unprincipled creature of impulse (*Venus im Pelz*, p. 57). She even has to be taught the task of whipping him (*Venus im Pelz*, pp. 48, 50-51), becomes a she-bear only in his dream (*Venus im Pelz*, pp. 80-81), has to be educated (as it were) to the point of signing the contract which he has drafted. In truth, then, the male here is still the traditional master, despite appearances hammer rather than anvil (*Venus im Pelz*, pp. 12, 35-6). When she abandons Severin, now the servant Gregor, for Alexis, Wanda is only following the terms of his contract and fulfilling his greatest fantasy. But even here she is only following the wider, and much less mediated law of nature we know from one construction of Darwin: “‘Das Weib braucht einen Herrn und betet ihn an’” (*Venus im Pelz*, p. 20).
128). As Alexis expains, it is as with the lioness and the lion. If her selected mate is beaten in struggle by another male, she will indifferently follow the winner, “‘das ist die Natur des Weibes’” (Venus im Pelz, p. 120). And she lives happily with Alexis until he of course dies in a duel. Allegedly there is an emancipatory moral to this tale, which the narrator Severin lives out. In her current state of development woman must remain the enemy of man, either mistress or slave, and he who allows himself to be whipped deserves that fate (Venus im Pelz, p. 141). This is why we see Severin beat his maidservant in the opening scenes of the story. In future, if only he educate her, woman may be man’s equal.

But surely these are less Darwinian sexual politics than Nietzschean inflections thereof, the will to survive transformed into the ‘Wille zur Macht’? It is perhaps no coincidence that one of the two women writers here discussed, Lou Andreas-Salomé, is still best known in German cultural history for the remarkable photograph, taken in 1882 in Zürich, of her with two of her lovers, Paul Rée and Friedrich Nietzsche. They all look rather sheepish, but nevertheless also as if they are knowingly enjoying themselves:
This picture can surely be argued to be the prudently censored reverse ekphrasis of that notorious scene in *Venus im Pelz*, where Severin-Gregor is harnessed to the plough by Wanda and whipped through the fields by her black servant girls (*Venus im Pelz*, pp. 99-100). In this the photograph epitomises both the extraordinary relationships of Andreas-Salomé, Réé and Nietzsche, and the governance of the Will to Power in the nineteenth-century battle of the sexes. It mirrors not only the Sacher-Masoch, but also (inversely) the primal scene of Nietzsche’s most famous Zarathustran imperative on the female,\(^1\) and so suggests that Sacher-Masoch, of whose work Nietzsche can hardly have been ignorant, at least subliminally informed Nietzsche’s own view of gender relations – and, therefore, his view of his mentor Darwin. For Darwin, as Nietzsche argues in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882),\(^2\) is rightly interested in the Will and in struggle, but misses the point. The Will struggles not for survival
but *power* (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, p. 215, No. 349), indeed *is* the Will to Power. Darwin’s claim, so Nietzsche argues, is really conditioned and limited by the imagination of a people who live on an overpopulated small island and are constitutionally worried about scarce resources. The true character of nature is however not scarcity but opulence and excess. The Will to life thus struggles in this environment not against lack but for power. As the attribute of the whip suggests, what we discerned pre-emptively in Sacher-Masoch is the precursor of this Nietzscheanised Darwin, of the *sexual* will to power and its concomitant sadomasochistic construction of gender anthropology. Remarkably, as we shall see, this complex also pervades the feminist writings of Lou Andreas-Salomé and her ally Frieda von Bülow.

Bülow is a representative of moderate or conservative women’s emancipation, and her writings are filled with critical, sometimes sympathetic portraits of her peers from this perspective. Now Bülow is capable of radical, well-wrought and amusing utopian designs of gender equality. ‘Sie und Er’ (1899) calls into question the gender of the possessors of the pronouns in its title to propose an androgyne with the poles reversed. Maria Margarethe, a successful woman photographer (and half-portrait of Sophia Goudstikker) in Dresden, exercises her profession and is independent, but at the price of a half-empty home, finds it hard to run the place, and has lost her libido. Fortunately her old flame Jano, a once successful and important poet, who is finding it hard to make his way in life and has writer’s block, turns up and asks for a loan. Which he gets, together with something else quite unexpected: a proposal of marriage, to fill the empty half of the house and complement her masculinised identity. He indeed succeeds in redefining his received concept of masculinity (male strength can be made manifest in acceptance of limitation), and becomes a house-husband. Both flourish in the redefined roles. She rediscovers her sexuality, his poetry its muse. It is precisely because of her strongly differentiated self-consciousness as ‘ganz Weib’ (‘Sie und Er’, p. 225) – Bülow, Andreas-Salomé, Laura Marholm and Hedwig Dohm tend to use the
biologistic term – that she can accept her need for the male in this re-constructed version of gender anthropology. This, then, is the Romantic androgynous ideal reborn after Darwin, Nietzsche and Sacher-Masoch: recuperated and feministically repolarised, with love relegitimated.

Other tales of Bülow are more ambiguous. ‘Zwei Menschen’ (1897) features another of Bülow’s favourite types, the divine, nordic, thoroughly uncorsetted, Brünhilde-like Valkyrie (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 27). Brought up amongst men, Helga thinks and talks like a man, but is nonetheless like Maria Margarethe ‘ganz Weib’ (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 23), another sexual huntress, who collects and disposes of males as she likes. But with Siegfried Helga stumbles into tragedy. For Siegfried is misnamed. He ought to resemble his Wagnerian namesake. But he is in fact shrivelled, weak, dark, Jewish, feels inferior. He does not live life in that transitive, turn-of-the-century sense, even though he yearns to. Instead he cowers in the world of letters, a mere literary man, not even a poet. His low self-esteem is evident in the transparently Darwinian language of a metonymy: “‘Druckfehler’”, he says, clearly referring to himself, “’soll man ausmerzen [...] Sie haben keine Existenzberechtigung”’ (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 24). He lusts for Helga. But when she, like Maria Margarethe in ‘Sie und Er’, drawn to his complementary opposite nature (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 27), proposes to, or, better, propositions, him (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 42), he evades what amounts to a challenge to his innate sense of masculine superiority. For he, unlike Jano in ‘Sie und Er’, but like Krafft-Ebing (Psychopathologia sexualis, pp. 136-7) sees love as inherently involving the domination by the male, and could not tolerate domination by Helga. Thus, having apparently decided to attempt the experiment, he takes flight. Later, Helga hears that he has tragically lived up to his name, allowing himself to drown having rescued a child from drowning, serving life by dying – surely a deliberate parallel to the fate of the degenerate and quietistic Schopenhauerian hero Eynhardt of Max Nordau’s Krankheit des Jahrhunderts.24 So far so feminist. But even Helga’s feminist world-view is informed by a contrary notion of love as
domination. Were she a man, she reflects at one point, she would resist the empowerment of women (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 26). Worse, even though she desires Siegfried as her complementary opposite, she wants him to beat (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 53) and coerce her (‘Zwei Menschen’, pp. 27, 39, 57). There are other dark counter-indicators in this tale. The men for their part – long before the protagonists of A.S. Byatt’s Angels and Insects (1992) – are fascinated in Darwinian style by ant colonies (‘Zwei Menschen’, p. 34), which, as Ludwig Büchner had famously elucidated, are matriarchies full of male slaves; and Siegfried is persuaded that according to the ‘Naturgesetz der Weiterentwicklung’ (p. 66) the age of woman is dawning.

In this light the ambiguous treatment of androgynous sexual power in ‘Laß mich nun vergessen!’ (1897) is perhaps Bülow’s most characteristic work. Here are two complementary opposite women who need to learn how to live. Gunhild, another goddess-Valkyrie, is experiencing at thirty years of age the female version of the Nietzschean midlife crisis, excluded from life by obsessive memories of the lover who had abandoned her ten years since. (This is a figuration of Bülow’s own relationship with the ‘Afrikareisender’ Carl Peters.) Senta by contrast, a compilation of the outed lesbians Sophia Goudstikker and the women’s rights campaigner Anita Augspurg, and despite her winsome Wagnerian name, doesn’t want a man at all. She has a law doctorate, a practice in Berlin dedicated to the defence of proletarian women’s rights, wears short hair, breeches and a ‘Wagnermütze’, rides a bicycle, smokes, carries a riding crop, has as her companion a large hairy black dog called Nero, dislikes men, flirts mannishly with all the women in sight and is generally a bundle of sthenic activist energy. The one woman is clearly presented as ripe for conversion to feminism by the other. But in fact both of these women are argued by Bülow to be on the wrong path. Senta makes the first therapeutic move, with classic constructivist arguments designed to wean Gunhild off her obsession with this man and dependence on any man. Provoked by Gunhild’s assertion that she wishes only to be a normal women, Senta declaims:
“Ja, wenn es normale Frauen gäbe! […] Was wir heute sind, das sind vom Manne abgerichtete Last- und Luxus-Sklavinnen, die fast jede Ahnung von dem verloren haben, was sie hätten sein können” (p. 84). “Das normale Weib”, she insists, “gehört der Zukunft” (p. 84). Freed from this construction, woman needs to be centred on herself: “Nur wenn wir lernen, den Schwerpunkt unseres Daseins in uns selbst zu suchen und zu finden, können wir von dem Fluch unserer heutigen Existenz erlöst werden” (p. 84). Love is a patriarchal fiction with which women have been force-fed like a Strasburg goose. So far so feminist again. But matters take quite a different course. The key factor here is the availability of Gunhild’s step-brother Edmund on the marriage market. He is a ‘Frauenarzt’, no less, an expert in female psychology, and an opponent of women’s emancipation who considers Senta (naturally) to be hysterical. Gunhild’s diagnosis is more telling, for it raises the issue of domination: “Senta gehört zu denen, die bezwungen werden müssen” (p. 93), that is, she suffers from strategic blindness in her self-understanding. If there were any doubt of this, the authorial narrator’s criticism of Senta confirms the point. Senta’s problem, she comments, is that she thinks she wants to be a man (p. 104), and in this delusion merely turns herself into an imitation of the male, not a free authentic woman. Her flirting with women merely reproduces male behaviour exploitative of women’s (socially inculcated) weakness (p. 104). The turning point comes, then, when Senta can experience Edmund’s strength and authority at first hand, when he (with her assistance) treats a sickly woman friend (p. 114) and when he finally, at her insistence, heals her after her tomboyish heroism has caused her to be injured in a traffic accident: “Eine solche herrliche Gelegenheit, die Wildkatze zu zähmen” (p. 130), comments Gunhild in an authorially legitimated strategic intervention. So it is that Senta learns to be “sehr vernünftig […] Herr Doktor” (p. 140), to accept Edmund’s control (if not relinquish her profession). We last see her wearing a dress, with long hair, the dog behind the oven, the whip nowhere to be seen (p. 139). And Gunhild? After meeting her lost lover again – ‘der Meister, der alles wachrief, was in ihrer Seele schlafend lag’ (p. 135) –, she learns ‘Entsagung’ as a way both to
retain her love and permit life to go on. In each case, then, we have a remarkable phenomenon: an insistence on constructivist arguments for emancipation, followed by recuperation of the essentialist emphasis on the true womenliness of woman in her own differential identity, and the conclusion that true womanliness entails acceptance of male tutelage.

Bülow’s feminism, then, is a curiously fractured thing. Eloquent constructivist emancipatory arguments are matched by a recuperation of biologistic essentialism, the conviction that love is both intrinsically heterosexual and involves domination (usually by the male partner), and a revival of the Romantic androgyne complementarity to accommodate this essentialist master-servant model.

Something similar, if intellectually more complex, is the case with Andreas-Salomé. Her deliberations on the New Woman clearly derive from Darwinian scientism, specifically in the aestheticised version popularised by her friend Wilhelm Bölsche, leading light of the Friedrichshagen circle of writers. Andreas-Salomé wrote reviews for the Freie Bühne, then edited by Bölsche. In particular, she reviewed volume one of his major work, the bestseller Das Liebesleben in der Natur (1898-1902), and used Bölsche’s arguments in this work as the foundation of her own major contribution to gender theory, ‘Der Mensch als Weib’ (1899). This in turn is the basis of ‘Eine Ausschweifung’ and ‘Mädchenreigen’.

Now in Das Liebesleben in der Natur Bölsche, whilst maintaining his loyalty to Darwinian evolutionism, responds to a deficiency in the new master narrative: its lack of human meaning, devotional or other meaning to compensate for the loss of this functionality of the displaced Biblical narrative. His answer is to eroticise, teleologise and aestheticise the evolutionary story. All life is one, from the bacillus to the human, the one in principle latent and present in the other. This hierarchy, contrary to Darwin’s view, represents however a qualitative progression immanent in the development of life from the simple to the complex, the elementary to the sophisticated. Above all, life is the emergence or self-realisation of the
monistic erotic principle, made manifest in reproduction from primitive cell division to sexual
dimorphism and ultimately human spirituality. Bölsche, then, deploys aesthetic language to
make of the (often graphically described) facts of Darwinian biology that characteristic fin de
siècle imaginative experience of oceanic totality, to be experienced ever more intensely as we
evolve. His book was indeed widely used as a post-Darwinian devotional work.

Bölsche’s strategic coupling – acceptance of the new science, engagement with the
erotic, engagement with devotional need – was bound to appeal both to the feminist and the
seeker after God in Andreas-Salomé. Leaving aside her very favourable review, in which she
concludes that human consciousness lags behind, and so is alienated from, the evolution of
the body, Andreas-Salomé develops in ‘Der Mensch als Weib’ as her answer to the Woman
Question a fully-fledged feminist yet biologistic philosophy of female (and male) identity. 30
Characteristically, and controversially, it leans to the differentialist pole of feminist argument.
At the bottom of this is the story of the origin of sex. Bölsche had noted (Liebesleben in der
Natur, I, pp. 130-40) that when, in the earliest mode of reproduction, primitive single-celled
life forms divide in order to reproduce, they do so unequally, into larger and smaller, also
qualitatively different halves (and sometimes into more than two). At a higher stage of
reproduction these unequal halves then learn to re-merge in order to generate further such
offspring with new genetic material. This is the genesis of female and male, the larger,
tendentially less active, yet factually more whole cells female, the smaller, more dynamic yet
fragmented cells male. By this Andreas-Salomé is fascinated. For this, of course, is
potentially the mirror, or, better, generator of all sexual behaviour, the master narrative
underlying and, by extrapolation, regulating all gender identity (‘Mensch als Weib’, p. 96).
But does this image not merely reinscribe the ancient and oppressive Rousseauistic
constructions? The passive female, the active male, the female less developed and closer to
nature, the male more developed and remote from origin, and so forth? Indeed, she answers,
anticipating the horror of her fellow feminists around 1900, it does. But instead of
acquiescing in this received construction of the narrative, Andreas-Salomé revalorises Böl sche’s masculinist complementary opposition. In her closeness to origin the female is admittedly less developed. But she is also more perfectly representative of the whole. In her reproductive primacy the female is in truth more active, in a sense also more creative than the male, which is but an accessory to the process (‘Mensch als Weib’, pp. 97-9). Thus Andreas-Salomé accepts the lesser evolutionary differentiation and specialisation of the female by comparison with the constitutionally more fragmented and eternally striving male. (She does not mention Gretchen and Faust, but the analogy is clear.) The female is content creatively to transmit the undivided harmonious wholeness of the plural forces in her being to her child, so that being and action are in this sense one. The price of this holistic self-focus is however inferiority in all spheres of life where masculine one-sidedness promotes development, thus lesser intellectual productivity, which in her (pre-Freudian) terminology is the one-sided sublimation of sexuality in the constitutionally divided male (‘Mensch als Weib’, p. 103). Concomitantly woman, whose creativity is preconscious, is not suited to making art, which she tends to produce for non-aesthetic purposes, such as feminist protest. In fact art is the province where the male is most creative and female, and indeed has most to teach the female about herself (‘Mensch als Weib’, p. 109). The practical consequences of this? Any attempt to compete intellectually or productively with the male is a perversion of female nature, ‘ein wahres Teufelswerk’ (‘Mensch als Weib’, p. 110). A woman’s vocation is to be (in a positivised sense) narcissistically true to her intrinsically harmonious nature. Participation in the struggle for existence (for example by exercising a profession) is absurd (‘Mensch als Weib’, p. 115), as, conversely, is acquiescing in the search for a man on whom to be dependent. Women really are closer to the divine (‘Mensch als Weib’, pp. 124-5). What, then, does this unsettling mixture of scientistic foundationalism and differentialist feminism, emancipatory yet traditional, activist yet quietist, mean for the cause?
Only Andreas-Salomé’s stories can make that clear. Or clearer. ‘Mädchenreigen’ is another tale portraying the boyish Augspurg in her usual masculine-coded uniform, whip and all, and mannerisms. It contains none of Bülow’s patronising heterosexism, but confronts her nonetheless somewhat cruelly with the power of heterosexuality, and leaves her in tragic disorientation. But ‘Eine Ausschweifung’ (1898)\textsuperscript{31} seems, despite its status as art made by a female, to give the answer. This, clearly an intertextual response to Bülow’s ‘Laß mich nun vergessen!’, is the fictive self-scrutiny of a modern woman caught between self-determination and received forms of love.

Like Bülow’s Gunhild, Adine has reached maturity in crisis, unable to free herself from a past attachment and transitively live. The aberration of the title, mirroring the Bülow, is the renewed and decisive encounter with him. The writing process is central, for Adine is an artist, but can no longer paint, since her unconscious has been destabilised by the encounter with the ex-lover. Writing is thus both compensation, process and self-therapy, and skilfully shown to be informed throughout by compulsive associations. All connote female subordination in love, which she ultimately, and tragically, affirms. The primal scene is Adine’s obsessive memory of her Slav nurse. This nurse is rarely visited in the home by her husband, but is always beaten by him when he appears. Yet she positively relishes this treatment in ‘Sklavenseligkeit’ (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 70) as a kind of atavistic celebration of the enslavement and masochism of countless generations of women. Adine’s beloved is Benno, like Bülow’s Edmund a male psychotherapist, handsome, in charge of the local clinic. Their relationship seems to be defined by the scientistic-patriarchal gaze filtered through his glittering lenses, always seeming to ask whether she belongs in his institution (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 71). When her father dies and Benno assumes his role in Adine’s family, they follow him to his new post in Brieg on the German-Polish border. It seems natural for her to want what he wants (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 73). Like her friend Gabriele Adine earnestly wants to follow an independent profession. But like her Slav nurse she
prefers the pleasurable pain of subordinating herself to him, fully aware of her position as a willed martyr to love (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 76). Thus, in trauma, concludes the first phase of development, when Benno, who seems to want something else altogether, abruptly breaks the engagement.

In the second phase she follows the path of art, studies, establishes an atelier in Paris, feels after six years that if not attached she in some degree is living. Until there arrives a letter from Benno. There is gossip at home about her free-living lifestyle. Benno seems to be adopting the role of her cavalier, defending in patriarchal fashion the sexually-defined honour of the woman.

The aberrant visit to Brieg to deal with this patriarchal diffamation of her identity encapsulates the third phase of her ontogeny. Of course Benno still loves her. Artist that she is, Adine symbolises this through Maximilian Klinger’s strident engraving Zeit und Ruhm, featuring a robust male (Time) ruthlessly crushing a defenceless female (Fame/Art) beneath his feet, reinscribing into her psyche, then, the ambiguous martyrdom of female enslavement which had been erased in Paris.32
Her response is however decidedly more complex. For Benno now, surprisingly, discloses a weakness in his male armour. No longer the warrior, he admits that he has changed: He himself feels enslaved to his arduous and one-sided employment – slavery, he calls it – as psychotherapist. He longs to round out his personality, perhaps to move to the metropolis, begins to read Schiller, wants a female soulmate: Adine, in short. Adine, however, now caught like Gundhild between the power of memory and the power of life, chooses life, refuses his will (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 90). Whereupon a more complex development unfolds in her psyche. Bereft of his armour, bereft of his emblematic glasses (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 116), Adine discovers that in sheer human terms she likes Benno in this
form (something clearly not the case before). But precisely this dissolves the up until that point still powerful erotic bond between them (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 105), which evidently presupposed that crudely defined dominant maleness. Towards the humanised and feminised Benno she now entertains only feelings of motherliness (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 115). The ‘Weib’ (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 119) in her is left cold. For this ‘Weib’, she now understands, is aware in her deepest consciousnes that she is the willing inheritor of that contradictory role of generations of women, like the Slav nurse, feeling bliss in the suffering of their enslavement (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 119). Thus she abandons poor Benno. Before returning to Paris, and the present of writing through her disorientation in this confession, she agrees with her mother: ‘‘(wir) lieben [...] keinen Mann so recht, wie den, der uns befiehlt’ (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 120). All earnest has now been erased from her (Bölschean?) ‘Liebesleben’ (‘Eine Ausschweifung’, p. 121), and art will take over again. If this tale, then, is the elaboration of ‘Der Mensch als Weib’, it is surely a statement of the tragedy of modern woman from Andreas-Salomé’s standpoint. She is caught between the assertion of her freedom in a profession and the demand for love. One precludes the other. And love, even for an emancipated woman, even for a fully self-conscious ‘Weib’ as ‘Mensch’ in her sense, seems to connote, as in Bülow, that atavistic domination by the male.

Interestingly, Bölsche does seem to have responded to Andreas-Salomé’s extrapolations of his theory. The third volume of Das Liebesleben in der Natur (1902), which defends the legitimacy of marriage as the culmination of the universal natural law of love, specifically includes a chapter ‘Der moderne Befreiungskampf der Frau’ (Liebesleben, III, pp. 284-90). In it Bölsche acknowledges frankly the traditional dominance of the male in social culture as grounded in evolutionary selection. In general woman, despite the existence of exceptional women geniuses (Andreas-Salomé?), must be accepted to be less intellectually powerful today than the male. This asymmetry, however, is not an unchangeable fact of the Darwinian narrative of life. There is an inner connection between the physical and intellectual
sides of human nature. Today’s woman, he claims, in intention concessively, is thanks to the
 evolutionary division of labour between the sexes ‘körperlich in einer leichten Weise
degeneriert’ (Liebesleben in der Natur, III, p. 285). Originally, however, and fundamentally,
the female was the stronger sex, thanks to the dual demands of survival and child-bearing
(Liebesleben in der Natur, III, p. 286). Sexual selection alone, the captivity of the female in
the home like an animal in a zoo, has resulted in this physiological and its concomitant
intellectual enfeebling (Liebesleben in der Natur, III, pp. 287-8). But if the body has made the
mind weak, it can also make it strong again. The answer to woman’s intellectual weakness:
‘Turnen und alle Sorten gesunder Leibesübung’ (Liebesleben in der Natur, III, p. 288) for
288): ‘es ist der Geist, den wir stählen und gesund erhalten mit diesem Körper’ (Liebesleben
in der Natur, III, p. 289). Woman’s path to full participation in modern intellectual cultures
thus passes through the cultivation of the body. This will condition a new spring of the female
intellect: ‘In der Frau wird nichts Größeres, aber auch nichts Geringeres erscheinen, als – der
Mensch’ (Liebesleben in der Natur, III, 289). Bölsche’s surely intended echo of Andreas-
Salomé’s title indicates the strategy of this argument as a supportive response. Here, then, the
recourse to scientistic and biologistic foundationalism (of all things) offers an alternative
emancipatory pathway to the unstable differentialism of Andreas-Salomé.

The moral of the tale? Of course Darwinism per se is not an -ism at all. It is, if we
think in terms of Dilthey’s still valid division of labour between the natural and human
sciences,33 in Darwin’s intention at least a value-free and falsifiable hypothesis, designed to
explain data by grouping them as evidence into facts which claim a provisional plausibility.
That is why Darwin himself refrained almost neurotically from entering theological or moral
debates (except slavery). Darwinisms are by contrast what philosophers and writers make of
the scientific hypothesis, releasing a semantic and hermeneutic potential which may or may
not be latent in the theory (as Elizabeth Grosz and Winfried Menninghaus well showed). Thus
the discourse on gender appropriates the scientific theory, not vice versa, and inflects its hermeneutic slant this way or that, according to its prior cognitive interest. Darwinism, in short, can be deployed either to legitimate the status quo of the enslaved woman in a patriarchal order, or to undermine it; by a man, or a woman.


(conservative) German comment on the New Woman see Ernst von Wolzogen, *Das dritte Geschlecht*, Berlin 1899.


Compare Ludwig Büchner, Aus dem Geistesleben der Thiere. Staaten und Thaten der Kleinen, Berlin 1876, esp. pp. 53-54, 139-162; also Erich Wasmann, Vergleichende Studien über das Seelenleben der Ameisen und der höheren Thiere, Freiburg 1900 (first edn 1897), esp. p. 48, who maintains the identification of the ant state as a matriarchy, and suggests that
it is the highest form of social organisation outside human society, yet attacks Büchner’s anthropocentricity.


30 Compare the reading which follows with Brinker-Gabler, *Image in Outline*, pp. 24-7. She, developing Grosz’s engaging *relecture* of Darwin, sees a subversive potential in the mere act of re-writing the Darwinian tale. Whilst sympathetic, this argument is however not anchored in the Darwinian specifics of Andreas-Salomé’s own re-writing, nor in the history of the appropriations of Darwinist discourse in literature. Nor indeed, does the the emancipatory potential claimed for this re-writing seem to be supported in readings of Andreas-Salomé’s tales – which, as is argued *infra*, tend rather to a highly conservative *reinscription* of the received discourse formation; compare Davies (note 29).
