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Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret

Damjanovic, V.

Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret Thumbnail


Authors

V. Damjanovic



Abstract

For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.

Citation

Damjanovic, V. (2017). Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret. Economics Letters, 150, 99-103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 4, 2016
Online Publication Date Nov 16, 2016
Publication Date Jan 1, 2017
Deposit Date Nov 11, 2016
Publicly Available Date May 16, 2018
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 150
Pages 99-103
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1371959

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