BUILDING LIBERAL RESILIENCE?
A CRITICAL REVIEW FROM DEVELOPING RURAL ASIA

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Abstract
‘Resilience’ is the catchword of the moment. For many of the mainstream institutions of international development, building resilience is embedded in a wider commitment to market liberalism. Taking three entry points, the sectoral, spatial and socio-governmental, this paper critically explores the connections, interdependencies and tensions between social resilience and the market imperative. The paper argues that ‘liberal resilience’ plays into a growth-development-resilience ‘trap’ wherein economic growth has become a de facto synonym for development and, often, development a synonym for resilience. Drawing on empirical cases from across rural Asia we highlight the incongruities and inconsistencies in this line of logic. The paper suggests that there is a need to critically judge the market mechanism and the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in which the processes that have been set in train by market integration impinge on resilience.

Keywords: Liberal resilience; development; the market imperative; vulnerability; rural Asia

1.0 Introduction: resilience and market integration

‘Resilience’ has become the mantra of the moment. From confronting the challenge of climate change to addressing financial crises, security threats and livelihood vulnerability in poor countries, it seems that building resilience will, somehow, do the trick. It has become a guiding vision and a new orthodoxy for donors. Just as governments used to have social exclusion units, now many have groups of policy makers thinking about how to create, sustain and manage resilience and, by implication, reduce vulnerability.

There is an enormous body of work on resilience, stemming largely from the field of ecology in the 1960s, but now applied to a variety of contexts and challenges. It has come to be used as a concept that enables scholars to work across disciplinary boundaries; as a framework for understanding complex issues; as an ‘approach’ that can inform and guide policy and practice; and as something to be built, sustained or encouraged in and of itself. In this way, and notwithstanding the fact that its multiple meanings remain disputed (Manyena, 2006, Manyena et al., 2011, Levine et al., 2012), resilience has taken on archetypal and exemplary status: “The term has assumed such political and financial clout, whether you’re working in family planning or disaster management, it seems as if every funding proposal, every programme, every result has to be seen to be contributing to resilience” (Hussain, 2013). Resilience is seen as the ‘policy gap’, “with millions of dollars in public funding currently spent on resilience building” even while we are “without the means to adequately evaluate or monitor what resilience means in practice” (Sudmeier et al., 2013, p. 367; see also Hussain, 2013, Cretney, 2014).

This paper focuses on the sub-field of social resilience, defined by Adger (2000a, p. 347) as the “ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses or disturbances as a result of social, political or environmental change”. More particularly, the concern is on the connections between social resilience and market integration, drawing on the experience of developing rural Asia. The point of entry is international development policy and practice, particularly as these are justified and purveyed by bilateral and multilateral donors. As some others have done, the paper explores the intersection between neo-liberal approaches to development and resilience debates and practices.
We take the discussion further, however, by ‘grounding’ these critiques in an effort to understand how resilience is deployed, through what mechanisms, and with what effects on people, places and livelihoods.

The building of social resilience has become a normative goal of the development sector, whereby resilience is often seen as a self-evident ‘good’ and vulnerability as necessarily ‘bad’ (Miller et al., 2010). The achievement of social resilience is, moreover, typically embedded in a broader – and longer standing – commitment to market integration and, more broadly still, to neo-liberalism. We refer to this here as the ‘market imperative’. Just as it was assumed in the 1990s that sustainable development could be achieved through growth-oriented strategies of market integration, so in the new Millennium the building of social resilience is also predicated on the philosophy that the market is the best avenue for achieving the desirable twin ends of growth with social resilience, akin to the growth with equity argument of the 1990s. This paper critically explores the connections, interdependencies and tensions between social resilience, on the one hand, and the market imperative, on the other. This market-based approach to resilience purveyed by the key institutions of global development is termed here, ‘liberal resilience’.

We focus on resilience at the community and household scales, while recognising the need to understand local resilience in wider national and global contexts. As Wilson (2012) writes, global processes (in this case market integration) are “ultimately mediated by the individual/household within a community and turned into action with tangible effects in a given locality” (p. 36). It is this “direct expression of [social] resilience” which is of particular interest.

There exists a rich and often critical academic debate concerning the relationship between resilience and marketization, but this debate is rarely adequately reflected in policy and practice (see Welsh, 2014, p. 19, Brown, 2011). This paradigmatic short-sightedness encompasses both national governments and bilateral and multilateral agencies, and is linked to the agenda-setting power of the market orthodoxy (see below). The paper will argue that while there are evident ways in which market integration can assist in resilience-building (e.g. through access to capital and the opportunity for livelihood diversification), there is also a potent contradiction at the heart of the liberal resilience orthodoxy. There are many ways in which marketization undermines resilience, exposing households, individuals and communities to new risks and vulnerabilities. Some of these have been overlooked because they lie outside the usual line of sight of policy-makers; others have been ignored or underplayed because they represent a challenge to the prevailing market-based paradigm.

To date, the burden of critical debate over the links between resilience and neoliberalism has focused on the ways in which governments and multilateral organisations have used resilience-thinking to promote and justify the building of adaptable (and resilient) neoliberal subjects embodying such qualities as self-reliance, self-help, self-sufficiency and personal responsibility (see Felli and Castree, 2012, Cretney, 2014, p. 632-634, Cretney and Bond, 2014, Welsh, 2014). This is seen as a way in which states have off-loaded their responsibilities to the market on the one hand, and society, from community groups to families and individuals, on the other. The contribution we seek to make is rather different. Here, we highlight the way in which the evolving point of contact between marketization and resilience creates a field of livelihood indeterminacy. We ask, in other words, two thoroughly empirical questions: What is the impact of the market imperative on livelihoods in the global South? And: what does this mean for resilience? The answers to these questions are then used to reflect on a third question: What are the implications for the promotion of liberal resilience, including the mechanisms deployed, by the key agencies of international development?
2.0 Resilience in practice and in theory

Since the turn of the Millennium, ‘resilience’ has come to occupy a critical and nodal position in both scholarship (see Berkes, 2007, Gaillard 2010) and practice. It has been applied in the context of climate change (Bahadur et al., 2010, Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010 and Gaillard, 2010), disasters (Cutter et al., 2008 and Sudmeier et al., 2013), vulnerability reduction (Bene et al., 2012), risk management (Mitchell and Harris, 2012), terror threats (Coaffee, 2006 and Coaffee and Rogers, 2008), economic/financial crises (Azevedo and Terra 2009), and with regard to policy more generally (Levine et al., 2012, Levine and Mosel 2014, and Levine 2014).

Resilience has taken on a normative gloss in policy debates as both a necessary means of managing change and as a desirable end point. This extends, it should be added, across both the poor(er) and rich(er) worlds. Resilience has been embraced by the Asian Development Bank, AusAID (Australia), the Department for International Development (DFID, UK), the OECD, SIDA (Sweden), the UNDP, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and many other national and multilateral agencies as a key organising principle and integrative approach, not infrequently replacing, in the process, sustainable development (see Davidson, 2010).

This is not to suggest that these agencies lack expertise in the area or are unaware of the interdependencies and trade-offs between prevailing policies of market-led growth and social resilience. Indeed, at times the delicate balancing act that is necessary to make both the resilience and the market-led growth cases comes unstuck. The World Bank, in its report *Building resilience: integrating climate and disaster risk into development*, for example, states that “poor and marginalized households tend to be less resilient and face greater difficulties in absorbing and recovering from disaster impacts” (2013, p. 7), and then two pages later informs the reader that “the poor are already resilient, both by nature as well as by necessity” but “they need further funding, information and support to escape poverty traps and to better cope with weather-related disasters” (2013, p. 9).

For practitioners, resilience is seen as a linking concept that enables connections to be made between different areas of work and intervention. As the DFID explains:

“Adopting resilience as our core approach to tackling disasters means identifying where different areas of our work can complement and enhance one another. This includes disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, social protection, working in fragile contexts and humanitarian preparedness and response” (DFID, 2011, p. 4).

In every instance, the reports produced by the key institutions of international development policy noted above take for granted that resilience is best achieved within a wider framework that emphasises the primacy of the market (see Table 1). To summarise, the mainstream view purveyed by these institutions is that market integration, pursued through the application of broadly neo-liberal policies, is the best means to achieve economic growth; and that economic growth is the best route to raising incomes and reducing poverty. As Brown says of climate change adaptation, which can be similarly applied to resilience debates, “much of the existing literature – and policy – is based on the assumption that alleviating poverty will enable people to adapt to climate change; in other words, that there is an almost complete overlap between those who are poor and those who are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change” (Brown, 2011, p. 26).

However, the directionality of the link to resilience is often less clearly specified. In some instances, it is assumed that development-as-growth will lead to greater resilience (OECD, 2013, p. 7) while in other cases, greater resilience, it seems will help to promote growth (ADB, 2013a, p. xii, AusAID, 2007, p. 2). But whatever the directionality of the relationship, rather than providing an opportunity
to re-think the growth agenda, resilience is embedded within – or tacked on to – the prevailing market-based growth agenda. It is largely, it seems, business as usual for bilateral and multilateral agencies of development (see Grist, 2008, Brown, 2011, p. 28).

Putting the market liberalism / economic growth / poverty reduction / development / resilience relationship in such black-and-white terms does invite the charge of reductionism and there are, certainly, papers and reports from all these agencies and institutions that are more questioning and nuanced. For it to be otherwise given the sheer quantity of publications and number of field-based studies would be a surprise. At a high level, however, the suggestion is that these links and associations can be seen reflected, and consistently so, in the flagship and other publications of the institutions concerned, and also in the tenor of their work (Table 1). That, in other words, and notwithstanding the cautionary caveats, the resilience turn has not led to any substantive and fundamental change in the market orthodoxy which shapes international development policy (see Brooks et al 2009, p. 742-4). Hence the coining of the term ‘liberal resilience’ to encapsulate this tendency. As Cretney says in her review paper “resilience, as a concept, needs to be understood not only as a metaphor but also as a framework shaped by dominant societal values and hegemonic discourses” (2014, p. 628).

Table 1: Policy orthodoxies: connecting markets, growth, poverty and resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions in the mainstream policy literature</th>
<th>Exemplifying extracts</th>
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<tr>
<td>Market integration pursued through the application of broadly neo-liberal policies is the best means to achieve economic growth</td>
<td>Commission on Growth and Development: “Governments committed to growth must...liberalize product markets, allowing new, more productive firms to enter and obsolete firms to exit. ... The 20th century saw many experiments with alternatives to markets. They were all conclusive failures. It therefore seems safe to say that markets are a necessary part of the economic structure in order to achieve and sustain growth” (CGD, 2008, p. 6 and 25).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF: “There is a significant and large effect of trade liberalization, consistent with the notion that mechanisms such as increased market size, promotion of competition, and transmission of know-how may link trade openness and growth and make growth more durable” (Berg and Ostry, 2011, p. 11)</td>
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<td>World Bank: “Globalization generally reduces poverty because more integrated economies tend to grow faster and this growth is usually widely diffused. ... In sum, global economic integration has supported poverty reduction and should not be reversed.” (World Bank, 2002, p. 1 and xi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic growth is the best route to raising incomes, reducing poverty and building resilience</td>
<td>ADB: “Rapid economic growth in Asia and the Pacific has led to a dramatic reduction in extreme poverty at the conventional $1.25/person/day poverty line. By that measure, Asia’s extreme poverty could be eradicated before 2030. ... Looking ahead, poverty will decline further if recent economic growth trends continue.” (ADB, 2014, p. xxxi and xxxiii).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission on Growth and Development: “Growth is, above all, the surest way to free a society from poverty” (CGD, 2008, p. 14).</td>
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<td>Dollar et al. for the World Bank: “Incomes of the bottom 20 percent and bottom 40 percent of the income distribution</td>
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countries] generally rise equiproportionally with mean incomes as economic growth proceeds. ...hence the conclusion that ‘growth still is good for the poor’” (Dollar et al., 2013)

**IMF:** “Over the long run, sustained growth is central to poverty reduction. ... All the more reason, then, to place sustainability of growth at the center of any poverty reduction strategy” (Berg and Ostry, 2011, p. 4).

**World Bank:** “These win-win examples illustrate the potential to simultaneously manage risk and enhance development: there need not necessarily be a trade-off between resilience and growth” (World Bank, 2014a, p. 59)

**World Bank:** “Resilience varies greatly from household to household even in one locality. It is determined by two measures of peoples’ livelihoods: (a) the assets they possess and (b) the services provided by external infrastructure and institutions. Strategies to strengthen the resilience of communities, and especially poor communities, should be based on the most effective combination of these two measures determined by local needs and capabilities” (World Bank, 2009, p. 32)

The scholarly literature, unsurprisingly, is rather more diverse, questioning and circumspect in its treatment of the relationships between economic growth, poverty, development and resilience and, furthermore, entertains other routes to resilience, beyond market integration. We consider this literature falling into three broad categories, which we label ‘neo-liberal’, ‘neo-Marxist’ and ‘neo-populist’ (Table 2). Each situates resilience in a different spatial as well as ideological frame.

The neo-liberal approach to resilience situates the generation of resilience at the regional and global levels, taking the view that greater global economic integration and openness to trade and investment will fuel growth, drive prosperity and thus build more resilient lives and livelihoods. This is exemplified best in the World Development Report 2014, *Risk and opportunity – managing risk for development* (World Bank, 2014a) although it is also evident in the Bank’s 2009 World Development Report, *Reshaping economic geography* (World Bank, 2009). The neo-Marxist approach tends to view resilience-building operating at the national level, where it is the task of governments to build national economies that ensure a broadly equitable distribution of resources and where the state can protect populations from the more egregious effects of globalisation. Here the national state is the key actor and the nation the main spatial reference point. Finally, the neo-populist approach embraces a vision where the community is the linchpin for resilience-building and only local people and grass-roots organisations are seen to have the knowledge and governance structures suited (or appropriate) for achieving resilience. In this approach, the state is often viewed as problematically disruptive to community interests, as is global integration (Parnwell, 2005 and 2007, and see Wilson 2013, p. 304). We appreciate the limitations of this categorisation of a diverse literature, but feel that it does serve to highlight the varying underpinning logics of scholars and institutions working from very different ideological starting points.

Globalisation and market integration are not necessarily destructive or corrosive of community resilience (Wilson, 2012). It is possible to entertain both the view on the one hand that “...even successful capitalist growth has always done damage to a significant portion of the population” (Glassman, 2004, p. 203), while also accepting that “economic reforms in developing countries can create opportunities for poor people” (Ravallion, 2001, p. 1812). Essentialising the traditional community as inherently resilient is necessarily problematic; nonetheless, it is possible to accept
that traditional structures, norms and accepted practices may play a very important role in building and sustaining resilience. It is therefore necessary to be cautious and critical of the sometimes assumed connections — not infrequently, as noted, tied to entrenched ideological positions — in the triangular relationship that connects market-led development, traditional norms and structures, and social and community resilience. To be sure, there are important associations, feedbacks, trade-offs and dependencies that need to be illuminated and understood; it is in assuming the form and direction they take where caution has to be exercised.

Table 2: Positioning resilience: the neo-liberal, neo-Marxist and neo-populist spaces of resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Exemplar Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neo-liberal</td>
<td>That resilience is best built through a growth-oriented, market-based strategy that integrates marginal communities and regions into the mainstream</td>
<td>That market integration drives income diversification, draws people into the mainstream, widens opportunities, and assists people to meet their potential</td>
<td>Potter and Tilzey 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neo-Marxist</td>
<td>That resilience is best built through de-linking from the global economy and the avoidance of the dependencies that come from (especially global) market integration</td>
<td>That market integration deepens dependency, accentuates vulnerability, and draws people into unequal and often immiserising relations</td>
<td>Castree 2008a and 2008b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-populist</td>
<td>That resilience is best built through relying on local knowledge, intermediate technologies, indigenous wisdom and local resources</td>
<td>That resilience lies in developing and supporting local knowledge and intermediate technologies, and that traditional societies are inherently resilient and have considerable adaptive capacity</td>
<td>Gaillard 2007, Parnwell 2005 and 2007</td>
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A critical lens, then, can be brought to all the modes of resilience thinking summarised in Table 2. In this paper the focus is on interrogating the market integration take promulgated by the agencies of international development (see Table 1), for the simple reason that it is this approach which dominates development policy and practice. While the neo-Marxist and neo-populist viewpoints do find their echoes in the work and publications of NGOs (as well as in scholarly publications), this is at the margins and the concern here is to question some of the assumptions that underpin the mainstream orthodoxy which is so important and influential in informing and guiding the resilience debate and, more importantly, the policies and mechanisms that result.

At the same time as mainstreaming resilience, development organisations — as well as national governments — have continued to pursue market integration in a broadly neo-liberal manner. What is significant is that few of the policy documents that set out the case for resilience explicitly connect this with the wider market-based context within which resilience is achieved (or otherwise). At most there is mention of the need for (economic) growth, but how that growth is realised, what form it takes, and what effects it has on modes of living and livelihoods is generally left for consideration in other policy documents. There is, therefore, something of a disconnect between the stated desirable end of resilience, and the context and means by which this is achieved. Thus we see paired, in
practice, on the one hand a desire to support and engender social and community resilience, and on the other a doctrinal belief in the efficacy of market-based growth strategies for growth and poverty reduction (see Table 1). The structural violence that, to critical development scholars, is part-and-parcel of market-led approaches to development (see below) and what this might mean for vulnerability/resilience are rarely addressed. As Levine et al. (2012, p. 2) write, “the [resilience] paradigm encourages value-free analysis by focusing on outcomes and symptoms of resilience, avoiding looking at the power relations that are at the root of much vulnerability”. Like the debates over ‘liberal environmentalism’ (Bernstein, 2001, p. 3), ‘liberal resilience’ takes as read that there is a compatibility between resilience building, economic growth and the prevailing neo-liberal order. Here we seek to bring to light the gaps, tensions and imperfections between these elements in the growth/resilience agenda, while also recognising the scope for broadly positive intersections.

3.0 Market-led development and resilience: three transformational threads

Figure 1 provides a simple framework that structures the rest of the paper and the argument it pursues. This framework consists of three transformational ‘threads’ that link to market-integration and which impact upon resilience. These threads are sectoral, spatial and socio-governmental. The primary objects of interest and investigation are the individual, the family/household, and the settlement/community. In each instance it is the local and everyday manifestations of social and community resilience and the ways that these link to market integration which are of interest.

Figure 1: Framing resilience with market integration

The sectoral discussion focuses on the ways that livelihoods have been unsettled and re-worked by market integration, sometimes in a positive manner but also negatively. The spatial discussion pays attention to the ways that the spatial footprint of people’s lives has altered, often in quite profound ways. This has resituated – spatially – resilience and vulnerability. Finally, the socio-governmental
delves on the way that households and communities are governed and the structures that underpin knowledge generation and communication, and decision making.

The question that underpins much of the rest of the discussion is this: what do these changes wrought to households and communities by the forces of market integration mean for resilience building at the local level? Where is resilience-building located, for whom, and how and through what mechanisms is it being achieved – or denuded/reworke? As will be clear, existing academic studies have highlighted the sometimes problematic ways in which market engagements and livelihood change become grounded in places and for people. Indeed, this work has a long pedigree and can be dated back to O’Keefe et al.’s (1976) bench mark paper ‘Taking the naturalness out of natural disaster’, Blaikie’s The political economy of soil erosion (1985) and the first and second editions of At risk (Blaikie et al., 1994), all highly influential texts. Such work highlighted the links between market liberalism and vulnerability, reflected in the attention paid to the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004). It also, however, predates the resilience ‘turn’ in policy and practice and, therefore, does not directly engage with it, or with the ways in which the mainstream institutions of development have embraced resilience. We use our three lenses, therefore, to bring these critical studies into conversation with resilience and, in this way, with the policies and practices of resilience building.

3.1 Thread 1: Sectoral and livelihood change and community resilience

Livelihoods are changing across the global South, and are often doing so in a manner that shows distinct resonance between quite different geographical contexts (Ellis, 2000). Furthermore, attempts have been made to set out community resilience transitions paths which partly map onto livelihood transition paths (see Wilson, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). These commonalities can be reduced to three key processes: marketisation, diversification and delocalisation. The third of these will be addressed in the next sub-section of this paper. Here the focus is on marketisation and diversification.

For many organisations working in the field of community resilience, diversification is “clearly a strategy to enhance resilience” at the household level (SIDA, 2012, p. 47). Ellis (1998, p. 1) likewise views livelihood diversification as a ‘desirable policy objective’ giving “individuals and households more capabilities to improve livelihood security and to raise living standards”. More generally, it is commonly thought that multi-functional human systems are generally more resilient than mono-functional (or narrower) systems (Béné et al., 2012). Furthermore, diversification is tied to marketization and commercialisation. Having stated that diversification assists in supporting resilience, a SIDA report notes that, “at a national level, efforts to diversify agriculture...imply the need to support smallholders to specialise in more high value crops in order to produce in sufficient quantities to access commercial markets” (2012, p. 47). Paradoxically, diversification into high value crops may lead to specialisation, and therefore a narrowing of the agricultural system. Diversification is often used as shorthand for commercialisation even when that might lead, de facto, to the narrowing of the production base in terms of cultivars, production systems and cropping methods.

What such market-based ‘diversification’ does is to create a potential ‘double risk exposure’ (SIDA, 2012, p. 66), wherein the risks associated with natural hazards are overlain by market risks (see Rigg and Salamanca, 2009). Settlements (‘communities’) in some mythic past were not self-sufficient collections of peasants living in an egalitarian moral economy, insulated from wider shocks with finely tuned mechanism to redistribute production during times of shortage. But there is certainly a case that settlements across the global South have become relatively less self-sufficient and more dependent on non-local markets and distant trade relations (Ellis, 2000). This changes the nature of
risk and risk exposure, both positively and negatively. Fortier and Tran (2013) provide a case of how this has worked in practice in Vietnam.

While the modernisation of the agricultural sector in Vietnam through the policies of doi moi (renovation, reform) has undoubtedly led to truly impressive aggregate increases in output, the combination of marketization, chemicalisation and mechanisation, fuelled by debt, has “led to a vicious cycle of induced systemic fragility through engineered landscapes, reduced agro-biodiversity, and weakened social networks, knowledge and skills” (2013, p. 82). Fortier and Tran (2013) focus on climate change (Vietnam is one of the world’s most climate change-vulnerable countries) and they argue that the country’s market-based mode of agricultural modernisation has left it more exposed – and less resilient – to climate change. The key argument here is that vulnerability has been induced by the policies adopted. As they write, the “dominant response fails to recognize how modernization itself has rendered agriculture more vulnerable to the problem [of climate change] by weakening resilience and the ability of farmers to adapt” (Fortier and Tran, 2013, p. 88, and see Beckman 2011). Similar processes have been noted in other country contexts. The liberalisation of the economy of Mozambique, for example, is said to have made small holders more vulnerable to climate stressors such as drought (Eriksen and Silva 2009, Silva et al 2010).

To understand more fully the effects of market-led development it is necessary, however, to look beyond induced vulnerability in the agricultural sector, critically important though it may be for people, households and communities who are reliant on agriculture for their living. It is the non-farm sector which, it has been argued, is critical in raising incomes, reducing poverty, and building resilience, reflected in the term deagrarianisation (see Rigg, 2006). Just as there is little doubt that market reforms have led to rising aggregate agricultural output, so it is also evident that in countries that have experienced rapid export-oriented, foreign investment-driven economic growth, the non-farm sector has played an important and growing role in providing employment, boosting incomes, reducing poverty and sustaining livelihoods. What, however, can be read off from this: growing community and household resilience or, alternatively, induced vulnerability? Or, more likely given the diversity of contexts and conditions, a combination of the two?

With development, the informal ‘sector’ in many parts of the global South has been replaced by an informal ‘economy’. Chang (2011) calls this the informalisation of the formal sector. “Contrary to many expectations”, Chang writes, “that growing national wealth or poverty reduction could resolve the problem of the growing informal sector in developing countries, the bigger the economy grew, the bigger became the population that came to work informally” (Chang, 2009, p. 165). In some cases, the hazards and health risks of work as well as its insecurity have also increased (Hewison and Kalleberg, 2013). This process of informalisation occurs in different ways and countries have their own distinctive informalisation pathways. In summary, however, while in the past informality was associated with informal enterprises – and classically those associated with an underdeveloped economy – it is now best understood as linked to informal working arrangements within the formal economy (Chen, 2007). This is linked to a growing interest in ‘precarity’.

Precarity links the adjective ‘precarious’ with the proletariat and, in Standing’s (2011, 2013) view, the precariat is a class ‘in the making’. While the idea of a precariat has its critics (see Munch, 2013), for the purposes of this paper it does highlight the way in which labour incorporation processes in the global South may be eroding resilience and forging new forms of vulnerability. “A feature of the precariat”, Standing (2013, p. 5) writes, “is not the level of money wages or income earned at any particular moment but the lack of community support in times of need, lack of assured enterprise or state benefits, and lack of private benefits to supplement money earnings”. Table 3 shows how changing livelihoods in the global South, at a general level, is leading to profound changes to the composition of social income. It is this, not income or prosperity per se, which is important when it
comes to understanding the puzzle of how people who are richer in income terms can, at the same time, also be less resilient.

Table 3: Precarity, vulnerability, resilience and the changing composition of social income in the global South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>PRE-MODERN ERA</th>
<th>PRE-GLOBALISATION ERA</th>
<th>GLOBALISATION ERA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBAL SOUTH</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsistence or Self-production</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family support and transfers</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community support and transfers</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money wage</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise benefits</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State benefits and public transfers (welfare)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private, asset-based benefits (savings, investments)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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Notes: *, ** and *** = relative increasing importance for sustaining livelihoods; X = generally absent as a livelihood-sustaining feature.

Source: composition of social income adapted from Standing, 2013p. 5

Precarity and insecurity are differentiated according to age, gender, family responsibilities, ethnicity, education level and country context (Arnold and Bongiovi, 2013). Across the globe, women are more likely to be in informal employment than men and, when men are so employed, it is also often on better terms. It is evident that increasingly the “informal nature of work is neither a problem of certain groups of workers in specific sectors, nor that of developing countries alone” (Chang, 2009, p. 176). It is becoming a general feature of working conditions and is intimately associated with late capitalism.

Nothing is more emblematic of the incorporation of hundreds of millions of people into non-farm work than migration. The UNDP (2009, p. 21) has put the global figure for internal population movements at 740 million. In addition there is a transnational flow of another 214 million migrants. These movements, both domestic and international, are usually developmental in their motivation and sometimes also in their outcomes: people move because this, they hope, will bring higher incomes, better prospects, more robust livelihoods, and greater freedoms (World Bank, 2009, Ravenstein, 1889). As noted by Adger et al. (2002), the remittance dependence that sometimes arises from migration elicits very different views. For some, it is seen as a negative process resulting in a loss of labour, capital and production, and a hollowing out of the village (UNDP, 2007, p. 2). As Connell writes, “migration tends to produce stagnation in the sending society and contributes to its [further] impoverishment by dissolution of the productive unit…” (1981, p. 254). Migration can,
however, also be part of a family strategy that raises incomes, spreads risk and provides capital for investment (Jalilian and Reyes, 2012).

In countries like Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the growth of non-farm work has a transnational dimension because so much involves international labour migration and remittance income generated abroad. The remittance economy in Nepal accounts for over 25 per cent of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 2014b). This has played an important role in raising incomes and, therefore, reducing money-metric poverty. Whether, however, it has also led to greater resilience is less clear. Just as Sen (1999) argues that economic growth is not constitutive of development, nor is it constitutive of resilience; indeed, the disconnection is even greater (see also Wisner et al., 2004; Dow et al., 2006). As Shakya (2013) summarises, “remittances continue to provide the money that is keeping the rural households running and the [Nepal] national economy afloat” (p. 274) but this is “doing little to support economic growth and job creation within the country...” (p. 174). Instead, the remittance economy in Nepal is disguising rather than addressing the roots causes of poverty and vulnerability. A significant proportion of the income generated by overseas work in Nepal is being invested in housing, leading to a haphazard and unregulated construction boom where building codes are barely enforced (Practical Action and the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium, 2014). As one of the world’s most earthquake-exposed countries, scholars and practitioners fear that this is creating a growing ‘at risk’ population, even while incomes rise. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium has estimated that a repeat of the 1934 Bihar-Nepal earthquake (which is thought to have caused around 10,000 fatalities in Nepal) will have a death toll of more than 100,000 people in the Kathmandu Valley alone, ten times that of the earthquake 80 years ago (NRRC Secretariat, 2012).

Processes of marketization and diversification, then, have created a context where populations may, in aggregate terms, be richer but are not infrequently also more and/or differently vulnerable. They experience greater precarity both day-to-day and over their life course and, importantly, in the degree to which they are prepared for, and resilient in the face of, a major hazard event such as an earthquake or flood.

3.2 Thread 2: spatial change and community disaster resilience

One of the key changes associated with the livelihood transformations outlined in the last section is a re-spatialisation of living and, in particular, its delocalisation. Like marketization, this is relative rather than absolute; the sedentary peasant paradigm (that in the past rural people were safely cocooned in self-reliant and inward-looking communities) overlooks the degree to which mobility and trade have long been features of rural living. Nonetheless, rural living and livelihood footprints are very different today from the recent past, and becoming progressively more so. Households are becoming multi-sited, livelihoods delocalised, flows of knowledge and capital are national and global, and household members are moving across an ever more vital and variegated landscape of social and economic interaction (Rigg, forthcoming). The household, in most countries of the global South, formerly came quite close to the ideal of the co-residential dwelling unit, defined by the propinquity (geographical rootedness) of its members. Likewise, communities had a clear spatial designation made up as they were by such co-residential households. In addition, livelihoods were also quite closely aligned spatially to the household as a social unit.

Drawing on field research in Northeast Thailand in 2008, Figure 2 illustrates the sort of multi-sited household form that is becoming increasingly common in developing Asia (see Rigg and Salamanca, 2011 for further details). In this instance, Mrs Kesanee, an ageing widowed grandmother (aged 59 at the time of interview) lives alone with her two grandchildren, aged 7 and 15 years, who she raises. Her daughter and son-in-law, the parents of these two children, live in Bangkok some 450 km to the
south-west and they return only periodically. They do, however, regularly remit money to meet childcare and other costs and on paper she is not poor. Mrs Kesanee’s other living child, a son, is married and lives in Phetchabun, 300 km to the west. He also returns only occasionally and, like his older sister in Bangkok, remits money to his mother in Mahasarakham.

Figure 2: A multi-sited household in Northeast Thailand

The changes to the spatial footprint of the household and therefore, collectively, the community do have elements to them – or may have – which are resilience-building. The ability to access wider resources, to earn income in new ways, to garner new knowledge, and to reach local government agencies may all reduce vulnerability and build resilience. This is the assumption in much of the literature on roads and spatial integration, for example. For policy-makers, the benefits of spatial integration – and the drawbacks of isolation – are self-evident. For the Asian Development Bank (ADB), “investment in physical infrastructure will significantly contribute to the pursuit of socially inclusive development. … Roads appear to have strong indirect and direct effects on poverty reduction” (Ali and Pernia, 2003, p. 2 and 10), while the World Bank argues that “remoteness is an important cause of rural poverty” (World Bank, 1999, p. 7). The development-enhancing effects of spatial integration constituted the underpinning argument of the 2009 World Development Report, 

*Reshaping economic geography* (World Bank, 2009).

Roads, to be sure, can be life-changing and are often income-raising. Moreover, good roads are the one investment that local people, poor and rich alike, clamour for. Through their engagement with *ex situ* work, made possible by spatial (and market) integration, households are generally wealthier. In Thailand, for example, such changes have played a large role in bringing those living in absolute poverty (earning less than $1.25 per day) down to just 0.4 per cent of the total population, effectively eradicating extreme poverty (ADB, 2013b). But while these changes, and the other
elements of re-spatialisation noted above, are often income generating, they may not, at the same
time, always enhance resilience. It is at this juncture when it is necessary to go beyond the
generalities of roads as income and wealth generators, and ask questions such as, ‘for whom’, ‘in
what ways’, and ‘with what effects’. As Leinbach says with regard to roads, “We still know all too
little about the ways in which rural transport should be improved and how to deliver benefits to
more needy populations” (Leinbach, 2000, p. 2 and see Chareunsy, 2012). This extends from their
effects on individual mobility to their distributional implications and their direct and indirect impacts
on agricultural and non-agricultural productivity. Li’s ethnographic study of Central Sulawesi
(Indonesia), for example, shows how the extension of all-weather roads into the uplands afforded
wealthy coastal dwellers access to the hills, thus intensifying the process of land dispossession of
highlanders (2014, p. 161). Even the poorest porters, however, who found that their work
 evaporated as roads were improved, saw them as necessary if their children were to access schools
and stand a chance of escaping the poverty of their parents.

A rather different perspective of the associations between the spatial unsettling of communities and
households and vulnerability/resilience can be seen in the way in which roads act as settlement
magnets, as well as commercial arteries. Evidence from Nepal, for example, shows that people move
to settle along roads because they not only provide improved access to markets and employment
but also to health care, schools and water (Oven et al., 2008, Oven, 2009 and Davies et al., 2012).
With few off-road households in the valley managing to meet their subsistence needs from farming
alone, a reflection of the growing prevalence of sub-livelihood landholdings, the economic
advantages associated with a roadside location are a significant draw. Much like Nepal’s building
boom noted above, this tendency also, however, sees migrants exposed to new risks such as
landslides and debris flows which present an acute hazard in the valley bottoms where roads and
associated settlements are situated. The attractions of roads cause traditional settlement patterns
and their logics to be usurped, leading to increased risk in once sense (from landslides and other
secondary hazards), but growing opportunities (for work, education) and reduced risks (in health
terms) in other regards.

There are two core issues of importance when it comes to understanding the community resilience
effects of such spatial turbulence. First of all, the re-spatialisation of living as a general issue alters
the resilience fabric or texture of societies and traditional economies (i.e. livelihoods). When
livelihoods are no-longer based on diverse, semi-subsistence, in-situ production but on specialised,
market-based and ex-situ activities, this alters the resilience signature of living. New forms of
inequality are also brought into play, between rich and poor, women and men, and young and old.
The second effect of spatial integration is to widen inequalities. Market integration is inequality
widening in itself, and spatial integration which is part of this wider process bestows cumulative
benefits on some social and ethnic groups (see Wisner, 2001 on El Salvador and Chareunsy, 2012 on
Laos). Four-fifths of developing Asia’s population live in countries where income inequality
xii). It has been argued that spatial integration can, in some instances, actually harm some social
groups. An ADB report, for example, claims in the context of Lao PDR that the “penetration of the
market may be aggravating…social differentiation with the emergence of an entrepreneurial
(capitalist) group of farm households, on the one hand, and a disposessed labor-selling group of
households, on the other” (ADB, 1999, p. 6, and see Rigg and Wittayapak, 2009).

Re-spatialisation and delocalisation are important means by which rural populations can access
‘opportunities’ in other spaces and sectors, as the Nepal case shows. In this way, such processes
importantly help to counteract the effect of declining rural incomes which have been squeezed by
shrinking land holdings and declining terms of trade, set against rising needs. This is one of the core
contentions of the 2009 World development report (World Bank 2009) which, it has been argued,
embodies a mechanical and apolitical depiction of the links between space, economic activity and social welfare (see Smith, 1977, Rigg et al., 2009). When, however, the spatial changes associated with marketization are driven by dispossession then the development outcomes are not so innocent. Accumulation in many parts of the global South has been driven by dispossession. Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington (2011) argue that resource extraction in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru has led to extraction of value from one place and its distribution to other areas – bypassing the indigenous groups who suffer the negative effects of such extraction and who receive few of the benefits. Even more seriously, studies in countries like the Lao PDR reveal upland dispossession on a massive scale: “...the system of issuing large-scale economic land concessions [in the Lao PDR] to foreign investors from other Asian countries such as Vietnam, China, Thailand and others... not only involves the expropriation and enclosure of land and resources...but also [leads to] driving semi-subsistence farmers into labour markets” (Baird, 2011, p. 12, see also Hall et al., 2011 and Hall 2012 and 2013). These dispossessed and displaced rural populations then become assimilated into precarious non-farm work as discussed above. In such circumstances, market integration and diversification are far from being resilience-building even though, at an aggregate level, they are wealth generating.

3.3 Thread 3: Socio-governmental change and disaster resilience

Less directly than the two sets of changes outlined above, market-led growth also contributes to important changes in the socio-governmental architectures of living. Included here are both formal systems of government, in so far as they touch upon rural people and their lives, and community governance structures and norms. In a report on human development in Thailand, the UNDP states the following about the effects of marketization on rural lives and living:

“The basic building blocks of local society have taken a terrible beating. Old customs of shared labour and other forms of local exchange disappeared within a couple of decades of the intensifying of market agriculture. As the income from agriculture declined and the demand for urban labour increased, more and more rural families survived by sending their youth to the city (or overseas) from where they could remit some supplementary income. Families are scattered by migration. Village populations are hollowed out, with mainly young and old, and few of working age. Many children are brought up seeing their parents only for occasional visits” (UNDP, 2007, p. 2).

This UNDP quote echoes the sentiments of the neo-populist take on resilience set out in schematic terms in Table 2. The position adopted in such work, implicitly if not explicitly, is that globalised communities have reduced social capital compared with less globalised ones. The present, in effect, becomes that which the past is not.

The question of what ‘traditional’ communities were like – how they were structured and operated in social, cultural and governance terms – continues to be vigorously debated. The neo-populist vision is of communities characterised by high levels of social capital and self-reliance, low levels of inequality, relatively egalitarian structures, and featuring what Scott (1976) famously called a ‘moral’ economy. Parnwell outlines just such a vision of ‘primordial social capital’ or PSC in his account of a village in Northeast Thailand. This PSC sustains community resilience and is shaped by a:

“...traditional culture that maps out social norms, values, institutions, moral codes, regulatory regimes, and so forth, which in turn influence the adhesiveness of the ‘glue’ that holds the community together. PSC functions, most importantly, as a redistributive social safety net in times of economic, environmental, and social stress or shock in the absence of support mechanisms emanating from outside the community” (Parnwell, 2007, p. 993).
The dissociation of rural living outlined above impacts on community governance. Social capital, and resilience based on shared risks and a moral economy, becomes fractured. Governance becomes increasingly separated from the local level as community leaders find their influence and status undermined or compromised by higher level actors or by those whose authority arises from their economic or political power. Mutual support is replaced by competition, and cohesive communities with shared challenges by settlements which are more differentiated and whose interests are dissimilar and sometimes at odds. Inequality tends to be measured, for reasons of ease if nothing else, in terms of income. But these changes have resilience effects beyond widening economic cleavages; inequality in terms of values, needs and priorities, and the community covenant which emerges from a shared experience, may also be compromised.

Social and community resilience are linked to social equality (and inequality). Even in the context of widening inequality, if this inequality remains social – in the sense of the common membership of a social group – then formal and informal systems of social support may continue to operate and function even while some individuals benefit over others in economic terms. But what if, as Ferguson (2013) has suggested, inequality becomes asocial and where there is no common bond, no shared interests and no sense that 'we are in this together'? With reference to southern Africa, Ferguson (2013, p. 237) writes: “Today, with work decentred and underemployment a durable and widespread reality, we must rethink both the grounds for social membership and the meaning of work”. The last point Ferguson raises has been partially addressed above with reference to precariousness, but we can see the wider issue of growing asocialisation at work in the context of Thailand’s 2011 flooding.

Thailand’s floods of October–November 2011 were the most serious in recent memory. They led to 730 deaths, affected 1.6 million hectares of land with a loss of a quarter of the main season rice crop, led to 10,000 factories employing 660,000 workers being temporarily closed, and cost in terms of damage and lost production some US$46 billion, equivalent to 13 per cent of GDP (Promburom and Sakdapolrak, 2012, p. 18). The 2011 floods illustrated that, as far as the Thai government and bureaucracy were concerned, some people, some occupations and some areas were more important or valuable than others. Lebel et al. (2011) have termed this ‘elite capture’ by which “flood and disaster management are organized in such a way that it makes it easy for elites to deploy experts and technical tools in ways that serve their interests and not those of less politically empowered and socially vulnerable groups” (Lebel et al., 2011, p. 52). In the case of the 2011 floods, these privileged areas, occupations and people comprised the Central Plains generally and central Bangkok in particular, industrial and service sector activities, and the Bangkok elite respectively. Such elites became protected and/or compensated classes, while the non-elites had the expectation of adaptation thrust upon them. The institutions that governed responses to climate change (and much else besides) in Thailand reflect power relations and asymmetries, and therefore class interests (Lebel et al., 2010). Resilience, in the context of the 2011 floods, therefore has to be viewed against power geometries. It is not just that the rural poor were being channelled into precarious factory work but when the flooding disaster struck, growing asocial inequality meant that they were counted as of lesser value.

Deepening globalisation and engagement with the market lies at the heart of the shift from covenant to competition (Wilson, 2013, p. 304). This dissociation can also challenge – in a positive sense – deep-seated participatory exclusions. It may empower women and ethnic minorities, for example. It may also raise awareness and develop the knowledge that communities need to build resilience. But there are several ways in which governance – both in terms of structure and quality/effectiveness – has deteriorated and been degraded, with negative implications for resilience. The work of Adger and colleagues (Adger, 2000a, 2000b, 2003 and Adger et al., 2002) in
Vietnam provides an insight into the effects of market reform (*doi moi*) on vulnerability, resilience and the local institutions of governance.

Adaptive practice in Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s was based on collective systems and action, and common property. Close to two-thirds of the population were absolutely poor (living on less than $1-a-day), and yet there was a good deal of adaptive practice and resilience in the face of environmental threats. In the Vietnam case therefore, it is not possible to read-off from past poverty, an equal level of vulnerability. The reverse is also the case. Today, absolute poverty has been close to eradicated in Vietnam but, in the process, resilience has sometimes been eroded and vulnerability accentuated. In part this is for the reasons outlined above. Also important, however, are changes to the institutions of governance. This is because state and commune safety nets have been partially dismantled; market individualisation has replaced community cooperation, assistance and mutual support; and inequalities at multiple levels (regional, inter-personal, gender) have widened. While this is not quite the asocial inequality to which Ferguson (2013) alludes, the directionality of change is towards such an outcome. As Adger concludes (1999, p. 266) in his study of Xuan Thuy District in north Vietnam’s Nam Dinh Province the “reduction in power and autonomy of state institutions associated with collective measures for protection from the impacts of coastal storms is one major accentuation of vulnerability”. He highlights the declining role of agricultural cooperatives in managing collective action along with ‘atomisation’ of agricultural decision-making. He notes the rising incomes that this has engendered but notes that this has been “at some cost to collective security” (p. 266).

4.0 Conclusion: a growth-development-resilience ‘trap’?

This paper has brought together evidence and debates regarding the intersection between market integration and community resilience in the global South, focusing particularly on cases drawn from rural areas of developing Asia. The focus has been on highlighting the contradictions of pursuing liberal resilience, while recognising that the traffic is not all one way: market-led growth can be resilience-enhancing. The paper argues that the policies promulgated by the international development agencies aimed at building, sustaining or preserving resilience need to be vigilant of the ways in which market integration can compromise such efforts. While there is no necessary, automatic relationship between market integration and vulnerability, the discussion illustrates how, across a range of fields, there are tensions, incongruities and, sometimes, conflicts between these two central pillars of international development policy-making.

We further suggest that what has emerged in mainstream resilience debates, particularly in the international development community, is a growth-development-resilience ‘trap’. This trap consists of the way in which economic growth (and associated reductions in income poverty) has become a de facto synonym for development (see table 1); with development, so achieved, not infrequently being closely tied to resilience. All of this is, in turn, underpinned by a policy logic that prioritises and privileges market-based economic growth. The scrutiny of ‘resilience’ – like so many other key terms in the lexicon of social and economic development, such as empowerment, sustainability and participation – has to pay attention to the context in which it is deployed.

The paper highlights, then, the point that high levels of GDP growth, rising incomes and falling income poverty should not be seen as indicative of – or a path to – greater resilience. Indeed, not infrequently the reverse may be the case. Poverty cannot be neatly equated with vulnerability, nor non-poverty with resilience, particularly at the household level. There are multiple pathways to and manifestations of resilience (‘multiple resilient/fragile communities, etc.), even within a single community (see, for example, Wilson, 2014a). Given that the growth agenda, and the justification of the growth agenda, is resolutely focused on raising incomes it is necessary to be wary of reading off

Mainstream institutions of international development rarely seem to recognise that their approach to development may have accentuated vulnerability and undermined resilience; when policies fail or have untoward outcomes this is usually put down to such factors as inadequate implementation, lack of capacity, or poor governance. But just occasionally it is accepted that the problem may go beyond failures of implementation:

“In practice, development decisions have brought about a considerable rise in disaster risk in Asia and the Pacific, rather than strengthened resilience. Many development decisions by governments, the private sector, the international community, and society at large have been made with little regard to their consequences for the vulnerability of either populations or infrastructure” (ADB, 2013a, pp. 19-20).

The same report then goes one step further to suggest that “mounting disaster risk directly threatens development’s two key goals: poverty reduction and inclusive sustainable economic growth” (ADB, 2013a, p. 20). Like so many studies, however, this report, while it notes that development decisions have social resilience implications, does not make the more fundamental link between the market imperative and community vulnerability/resilience. This is because the implication of such recognition would be to challenge the logic of the liberal resilience paradigm.

The key question to be asked is not ‘more’ or ‘less’ growth, even ‘more’ or ‘less’ development; rather, it is what kind of growth and development. This is a point that Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010 and see Wisner, 2011, p. 261) note in their paper, when they pose the question: “can ‘development’ help to reduce risks, including the ones created by climate change, or is it itself – at least to some extent – responsible for the manufacturing of risks?” They suggest that much development has exposed people to hazards; it has, in short, accentuated vulnerability. We would not wish to go so far as to suggest that the link is one-directional; as we have noted, the past was not a Panglossian resilient world and there is no question that economic growth has the potential significantly to contribute to resilience building.

To ground Cannon and Müller-Mahn’s (2010) question and get beyond generalities as to whether ‘development’ (by which they actually mean, market-based economic development) can manufacture risks, the discussion here has isolated three key ways in which the market imperative may compromise resilience at the community and household levels. These are in terms of the structure and constitution of livelihoods, the spatial footprint of households, and the socio-governmental structures of society. In each instance it is evident that market-based growth has contradictory resilience effects.

It is also clear, however, that development-as-modernisation is broadly welcomed by the great bulk of the populations of the global South. Even so, this does not negate or discount the crucial importance of judging the market mechanism (Sen, 1999, p. 7). As Li says in her study of upland populations in Central Sulawesi:

“Their poverty isn’t a residual problem to be solved by the march of progress, the extension of markets, or the promotion of economic growth. Too often, it is the product of the capitalist form taken by this ‘progress’ that entrenched inequalities and fails to provide jobs. Poverty in these places isn’t being reduced, as optimistic development narratives propose. It is expanding and
intensifying, exacerbated by development policies that place their faith in markets to generate economic growth from which all are expected to benefit...” (2014, p. 180).

Given, not least, the challenges of climate change and the volatility of the global economy, appreciating (i) that resilience is not an automatic outcome of the achievement of economic growth and (ii) that the very processes and policies that are seen to create the conditions for economic growth may undermine resilience and accentuate vulnerability, is essential. The year 2015 has been described as “the Bretton Woods moment for our generation” (Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees and President of Ireland), with the conclusion of three international processes which will set the agenda for disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and climate change (United Nations, 2015). These processes present a rare opportunity to rethink and reshape the international development agenda in the context of the greater social and economic impacts of disasters. What is clear from the evidence presented in this paper is a need to recognize and interrogate the sometimes problematic intersections between economic growth, poverty reduction and resilience, and the mechanisms and policies deployed to achieve these ends.

The United Nations’s recently (2015) released Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction provides a challenge to existing approaches to disaster risk reduction and, by implication, much else in the realms of resilience. Rather than “mainstreaming disaster risk reduction to protect against external threats” there is a need to “[manage] the risks inherent in social and economic activity” (page 5, [emphases in original]). This, the report continues “has to become inherent to the art of development; not an add-on to development, but a set of practices embedded in its very DNA”. Whether the concerns expressed in the Global assessment report or GAR will be taken seriously at a policy as well as at a rhetorical level is to be seen. The 28-page ‘pocket’ GAR report, perhaps strategically, does not use the words ‘liberal(ism)’ or ‘neoliberal(ism)’. The worry is that notwithstanding mounting evidence of the need to rethink the ‘DNA’ of development policies and practices by the institutions of international development, the post-2015 development agenda will continue to place its faith in liberal resilience.

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