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British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Hilda Oakeley Against McTaggart, Leibniz, and Others

Thomas, Emily

British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Hilda Oakeley Against McTaggart, Leibniz, and Others Thumbnail


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Abstract

In the early twentieth century, a rare strain of British idealism emerged which took Leibniz's Monadology as its starting point. This paper discusses a variant of that strain, offered by Hilda Oakeley (1867–1950). I set Oakeley's monadology in its philosophical context and discuss a key point of conflict between Oakeley and her fellow monadologists: the unreality of time. Oakeley argues that time is fundamentally real, a thesis arguably denied by Leibniz and subsequent monadologists, and by all other British idealists. This paper discusses Oakeley's argument for the reality of time, and Oakeley's attack on the most famous account of the unreality of time offered in her day: that of J. M. E. McTaggart. I show that Oakeley's critique of McTaggart can be extended to challenge all monadologists, including that of the great monad, Leibniz himself.

Citation

Thomas, E. (2015). British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Hilda Oakeley Against McTaggart, Leibniz, and Others. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 23(6), 1150-1168. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1059314

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 3, 2015
Online Publication Date Jul 6, 2015
Publication Date Nov 1, 2015
Deposit Date Oct 21, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Print ISSN 0960-8788
Electronic ISSN 1469-3526
Publisher Routledge
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 23
Issue 6
Pages 1150-1168
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1059314

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