INTRODUCTION: POLYMORPHIC BORDERS

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Abstract: Conceptualizing the respatialization, rescaling, and mobilization of borderwork is a central problem in current borders research. Traditional and ubiquitous border concepts imply a coherent state power belied by much contemporary research. In this introduction to the special issue on “Polyphormic Borders,” we suggest that not only do empirical studies of border work reveal a much more fragmented and chaotic world of bordering, that is more guided by site- and agent-specific contingencies than by grand schemes, but that representing
borders as ubiquitous calls forth the state as coherent, monstrous, omnipotent and omniscient. Rather than being either strictly tied to the territorial margins of the states or ubiquitous throughout the entire territory of states, bordering takes on a variety of forms, agents, sites, practices, and targets. We propose reconceptualising borders as polymorphic, or taking on a multiplicity of mutually non-exclusive forms at the same time (Jones, 2016). In this introduction, we propose the metaphor of polymorphic borders in order to account for the respatialization of border work beyond and within traditional borders in a way that avoids viewing borders as either lines, or everywhere. The articles that follow elaborate polymorphic borders through ethnographic investigations of border work at various sites and scales.

**KEYWORDS:** Borders, externalization, migration, care, refugees, enforcement, immobility, control.

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**INTRODUCTION**

Over the past several years, scholars have noted the dramatic proliferation of border controls both at and beyond national territorial borders, often in unexpected and egregious ways. This work has provoked a critical rethinking of state power at its margins, and this special issue expands the corpus of concepts, sites, and practices that count as border control. The articles in this special issue analyze “border work” in diverse sites: in churches (Ehrkamp & Nagel, 2017), through refugee communities (Pascucci, 2017), in advertising campaigns (Watkins, 2017), by petty bureaucrats (Carte, 2017), through de facto outsourcing to aid organizations (Williams, 2017) and in detention centers (Hiemstra & Conlon, 2017).
Individually, the articles demonstrate the different forms that enforcement can take and we bring them together to show how mobility control regimes use difference to constitute different spatial practices. In this introduction, we pave the way for these interventions in four respects. First, we sketch out what we see as the main geographic and legal transformations in border control work in recent years. Second, we caution that theorisations of borders as ubiquitous and generalized could help to produce the effect they critique: a diffuse, totalizing, “everywhere” border. Third, we set out in general terms our view of what metaphors of contemporary border controls need to offer in the current political climate. Fourth, we advocate for a polymorphous approach to the spaces of bordering and migration control, that refuses a homogenizing border logic but that illuminates the fractured, partial ways that difference and territoriality are practiced.

**TRANSFORMING SPACES OF ENFORCEMENT**

Researchers from a variety of disciplines are charting the geographic and legal transformation of immigration controls across a range of geographic contexts, especially the merging of criminal justice and immigration policing; the securitization of migration; and the respatialization of state sovereignty, legal jurisdiction, and the territoriality of rights. In the United States, scholars have analyzed the intermingling of criminal justice and immigration policing (Coleman, 2008; Martin, 2015); interior immigration enforcement resulting in detention and deportation (Coleman, 2009; Mountz et al., 2012; Hiemstra, 2013); devolution of immigration inspections to local agencies (Varsanyi et al., 2012); and risk-based profiling and financial surveillance (De Goede, 2012; Amoore, 2013). In the European Union, migration and border policies have produced complex spatial dynamics: the bounding of Europe’s Schengen Area (Prokkola 2013; Van Houtum 2010); simultaneous freeing of internal mobility for EU citizens and “hardening” of external boundaries (Huysmans, 2000;
Vaughan-Williams, 2008); the harmonization of border and immigration controls as a condition of EU admission; Good Neighbor Agreements with non-EU members tying aid to immigration and border policing requirements (Casas-Cortes et al., 2012); and the expansion of long-term detention as a mobility control practice (Schuster, 2005; Gill, 2009). In Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia, critical inquiry has included well-documented transit zones (Collyer, 2012; Ferrer-Gallardo and and, 2013); externalized detention centers (Mountz, 2011a; Bialasiewicz, 2012); and the criminalization of detainees (Crush, 1999; Mainwaring, 2012) and deported people (Zilberg, 2011). In and between major receiving countries, scholars point to strange couplings of law and space: waiting zones, long tunnels, excised territories, present-but-not-admitted legal categories of persons; refugee and immigration processing by non-state actors; and third country detention centers (Bigo, 2007; Mountz, 2010). Across the developed world, visa systems differentiate between elite and unskilled workers to produce varied conditions for border-crossings, maintaining authorized presence, and living without documents (Ong, 2006; Mezzadra And Neilson, 2013).

These changing configurations of law, enforcement and territory have provoked geographers to track the de- and re-territorialisation of nation-state borders. For Amilhat-Szary and Giraut (2015), there is a ‘growing dissociation between border functions and border locations’ (p. 6) that makes it necessary to understand borders through a mobile epistemology that challenges the traditional associations of the border with ‘fixity in time and space’ (p. 6). In particular, the past 25 years have witnessed the extra-territorialisation of certain practices related to migration management and policing. In their discussion of emerging trends in migration and borders for example, Casas-Cortes et al. identify externalisation as a central contemporary concept, defining it as:

…the process of territorial and administrative expansion of a given state’s migration and border policy to third countries […] externalization is an explicit effort to “stretch
the border” in ways that multiply the institutions involved in border management and extend and rework sovereignties in new ways. In this way the definition of the border increasingly refers not to the territorial limit of the state but to the management practices directed ‘at where the migrant is’. (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015, p. 73)

The EU has been a particular proponent of such practices, creating incentives or directly pressuring neighbouring states to detain migrants pre-emptively en-route to the EU, creating what has been referred to as ‘Fortress EU’ (Van Houtum, 2010). Bialasewicz (2012) and Andrijasevic (2010) have explored the use of third-country agreements and detention policies, alongside the growing role of the International Organization for Migration and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly FRONTEX) in interdictions and detention (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Such operations, and the subsequent development of spaces of detention and incarceration, are often located in countries that are not signatories of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, where there is little oversight or access to international monitoring, and where the ability to apply for asylum is typically not possible (Dikeç, 2009). This work therefore traces the territorial re-organisation of policing practices and detention spaces located at a distance – and designed to keep certain populations at a distance – from destination countries, most particularly within the EU. As Andrijasevic (2010) notes, given the inability to apply for asylum at these locations, international responsibilities are not merely externalised, but rather retracted all together.

In addition to this territorial disjuncture between policing and rights, border and migration control regimes use confinement as a spatial strategy of containing, coralling, and redirecting unauthorized mobility. In their review of geographies of detention and imprisonment, Martin And Mitchelson (2009) point towards the often ad-hoc nature of detention practices and spaces where:
Provisional ports-of-entry, temporary courts in rural areas, and extra-territorial detention indicate not a coherent, centralised state strategy, but nation-states’ willingness to combine multiple detention strategies. There is no single geography of detention, therefore, but an emerging and continually changing assemblage of spatial tactics. (Martin & Mitchelson, 2009, p. 466-7)

Martin and Mitchelson discuss the often “uneven topography” of detention sites, where “people are held in former jails, with prisoners in existing prisons, in tent cities, on ships, and in makeshift cells in courthouses, airports, and ports-of-entry the world over,” alongside the typically uneven geographies of legal practices and boundaries (p. 469). In a similar vein, Alison Mountz and the wider research of the Island Detention Project have investigated the remote sites and the dispersal of detention often deployed by receiving countries including the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the European Union (Loyd and Mountz, 2014; Coddington, et al., 2012). Migrants are detained in increasingly remote locations, such as Christmas Island or Guam, where access to legal representation, the media, or support networks are severely limited, rendering them essentially invisible to the citizens of the state responsible for their detention (Mountz, 2010). Mountz notes however that these islands, located within the peripheral zones of sovereign territory maintain a connection with the mainland, often used as test sites for onshore detention practices. Mountz (2010; 2011a; 2011b) has also investigated the use of ports-of-entry, often thought of as relatively static spaces, as increasingly mobile, and often deployed in an ad-hoc manner to allow the detention of persons not arriving through officially designated sites of entry.

Taking these emerging spatialities of mobility control seriously has a number of implications for theorizing state power, territoriality, and politics. First, it implies that immigration and border control efforts may be found in unexpected places. Second, beyond the proliferation of locations, the character of mobility controls has diversified, as policing
for citizenship status has become tied to an increasing range of social services. Third, this means that the spatiality of borders and the territoriality of immigration law do not correspond, as states externalize, outsource, and internalize controls. Rather, control of human mobility is undergoing what Vaughan-Williams (2009) calls a generalisation. States do not confine mobility controls to the borders of territorial sovereignty, but use mobility as both a method of capture (e.g. through traffic stops of undocumented migrants, Stuesse & Coleman, 2014) and as a site of data production (e.g. through credit card transactions, Amoore and De Goede, 2008).

THE UBIQUITOUS BORDER

In light of these developments, borders are often experienced as ubiquitous modes of governance. Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009) urge us to capture this sense through a focus on the phenomenology of the experience of border settings, asking ‘what does it feel like to exist as a border’ (p. 584, italics in the original). De Genova’s (2002) theorisation of the condition of migrant ‘illegality’ and deportability, for example, conveys the suffocating sense in which immigration and border policing becomes internalised, felt and constantly lived by those vulnerable to the socio-political processes of illegalisation.

Migrant ‘illegality’ is lived through a palpable sense of deportability, which is to say, the possibility of deportation, the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state [...] the spatialized condition of ‘illegality’ reproduces the borders of nation-states in the everyday life of innumerable places throughout the interiors of migrant-receiving states. (De Genova, 2002, p. 439)

In the face of these intrusions of border processes into everyday life, De Genova echoes Balibar’s (2002) conclusion that ‘the border is effectively everywhere’ (De Genova, 2013, p. 1183, see also Lyon, 2005). ‘[T]he entirety of the interior of the space of the state becomes a
regulatory zone of immigration enforcement’ he asserts, ‘as borders appear to be increasingly ungrounded—both internalized and externalized’ (De Genova, 2013, p. 1183). Under these circumstances control ceases to be an event that occurs at a specific place, somehow additional and extraordinary to the normal state of affairs. Rather, bordering becomes evermore incorporated into Western developed ways of life. Instead of associating borders with particular sites, generalizing bordering in this way depicts them as evermore mobile, complex, differentiated, dispersed and sophisticated (Vaughan-Williams, 2009).

While De Genova (2013) and Lyon (2005) are careful to emphasize that they are referring to experiences of border control from the bottom up, a more top down interpretation of ubiquity risks producing a totalizing conception of the state as a monstre froid, one that is inattentive to the uneven geographies of bordering and forecloses alternative futures. We are not alone in expressing reservations about these sorts of metaphors for border controls (see for example Johnson et al., 2011). In their discussion of geographical studies of migrants’ use of transnational space Collyer and King (2015) recapitulate the ‘established critique in geography of the use of spatial metaphors’ because they ‘may disguise more complex or contested spatial realities’ (p.4 citing Harvey, 1989 and Mitchell, 1997). And in a recent edited book, Jones and Johnson (2014) take exception to the “everywhere” hypothesis on the grounds that while ‘there is no doubt that border control is now done at many new sites and by many new people … these new borders are not designed to ensnare everyone, everywhere’ (Jones and Johnson, 2014, p. 3). Rather, borders are highly selective and are only “everywhere” for certain excluded sections of the population. Borders are powerful tools of segmentation and differentiation.

A top down view of the “everywhere” border bestows the state with more organizational competence, stability and capacity than it deserves, Western governments for example have struggled to control their borders for decades (see Castles, 2004). Despite
recent increases in investment technology, the scale of the current European refugee crisis has illustrated once again that people on the move can and do overwhelm border controls (see Papadopoulos, et al, 2008). We detect, then, a degree of chaos in border management that is not captured by discourses of the ubiquitous border.

This is not to imply an inadequacy of state control. Scholars have noted that the language of ‘border crisis’ can prompt an expansion of state power (Mountz and Heimstra, 2014). It is nevertheless clear that a large proportion of the work of border personnel is dedicated to reconciling the deep contradictions and inconsistencies in the border control systems that they are responsible for (Mountz, 2010; Heyman, 1995; Gill, 2016). In this sense the border is constantly prosaically performed, staged and improvised in everyday contexts (Jeffrey, 2012; Salter, 2011). The imagined ubiquitous border, on the other hand, obscures the ‘contradictory processes that go into constituting “it”’ (Gupta, 2006, p. 231).

A top-down imagination of the generalized, ubiquitous border, then, overlooks its ever-attendant opposite: the generalized up-swell of migrant activism, protest, resistance, lobbying and struggle that has pervaded popular Western culture. One need only consider the huge popular support for online social media campaign ‘#RefugeesWelcome’, migrant-led demonstrations in Budapest, hunger strikes by women at the family detention center in Texas, and DREAM Activist youth (organized undocumented youth in the U.S., see Nicholls, 2013) to get a sense of this. At worst, in its top-down, state-centred variants, we detect in the “everywhere” hypothesis a post-political logic, that is, an apocalyptic predisposition that paradoxically factors out spaces of dissent and disagreement (see Swyngedouw, 2007).

Feminist geographers Gibson-Graham (2008) urge us to be skeptical of heroic, masculinist views of ‘neoliberalism, or globalization, or capitalism, or empire’ (Ibid, p. 618) as omnipotent drivers of social processes that yield what they call a ‘reductive field of
meaning’ (Ibid, p. 618). This reductive diagnosis of an inescapable grid of subjugating practices and discourses produces paranoia, they argue, which ‘marshals every site and event into the same fearful order’ (Ibid, p. 618). Academics themselves are complicit in this sort of social theorizing, since the very phenomena we describe are ‘strengthened, [their] dominance performed, as an effect of [their] representations’ (Ibid, p. 615). This ‘paranoid motive in social theorizing’ (Ibid, p. 618) also obfuscates the performative potential of academic scholar-activism to change the phenomena under study. In short, academic discourse does not just represent the world: it constitutes the world. To posit the inescapability or omnipotence of state controls is to cede their dominance, and to overlook the ever-present possibility for tactical responses to profound structural injustices (De Certeau, 1984; Gill, et al., 2014). To theorize counter-tactics on the other hand ‘is to change the world, in small and sometimes major ways’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008, p. 615).

Thus, border theorizing and spatial metaphors are not merely approximations of worldly phenomena: they help to create the world they seek to describe. The “everywhere” border feeds the ‘state-phobia’ that Foucault has identified (2008, p. 76), which has the potential to disseminate a misleading image of an unassailable, monstrous, calculating and coherent state behemoth, possessing ‘a sort of generic continuity’ (Ibid, p. 187), that is difficult, if not impossible, to resist. ‘Even in the most inhospitable of contexts’, Schipstal and Nicholls write (2014, p. 175), ‘discursive and institutional cracks open up’ (Ibid, p. 175) that allow the subjects of exclusionary practices to find ‘openings’ (Ibid, p. 177), precisely because politically hostile environments are the product of ongoing site-specific practices.

Just as the phenomenon of globalization is the subject of myth-making (Agnew, 2009), so too can state border controls appear so stable and general, especially during epochs of re-territorialisation (such as that currently being witnessed in the context of the European refugee crisis) that it becomes impossible to see past them and imagine alternative futures.
Granted, we recognize that there is a disturbing sense in which the border control industry has undergone certain technical refinements in recent years. We also accept that borders may very well feel inescapable to those subject to them, especially in the current climate of protectionism and isolationism ushered in by events such as Brexit and the Trump presidency. We should not, though, be cowed by the ‘amazing sophistication’ (Bialasiewicz, 2012, p. 843) of border controls into losing sight of their patchy, makeshift, inconsistent and failure-prone character.

POLYMORPHIC BORDERS

For this reason we see value in a polymorphic approach to conceptualising border control that recognises the complexity of borders and the inter-connections between borders, territory, spatial politics and governance (Jones, 2016; Jessop, 2016). Such an approach is catholic and eclectic in its use of spatial metaphors, and therefore borrows from territorial, place-based, scalar and networked conceptualisations depending upon the specific aspect of borders that are under study (Jones, 2016; see also Jessop, et al., 2008). What all of these spatial metaphors of political space promote, however, is avoidance of blunt, blanket pronouncements that overlook the nuanced landscape of border controls (‘borderscapes’ as they have been referred to – see Rajaram and Gundy-Warr, 2007; Brambilla, 2015). In other words, the selective combination of these concepts offers a way to avert ‘exaggerated claims’ (Jones, 2016, p. 3), ‘chaotic concepts’ (Ibid, p. 3) and intellectual ‘overextension’ (Ibid, p. 3) that results in ‘one-dimensional thinking’ (Ibid, p. 3).

Take networks (see for example Axford, 2006). A host of intermediaries have taken on the daily work of identifying, detaining, processing, and deporting migrants. They include those formally employed by border control agencies and contracted partners such as airport liaison officers, passport controllers, air and sea port personnel, backroom government
employees, interviewers, security officers of various hues, elite immigration system designers and immigration judges. What is more, networks of immigration controllers extend well beyond these groups, as more individuals who have no formal connection with immigration control have been required to check and verify immigration status including social workers, hospital staff, real estate agents, university lecturers (Jenkins, 2014) and schoolteachers. Thinking in terms of networks brings into focus the set of new nodes, including schools, churches, hospitals and businesses that have been made to do border work in recent years. In this sense they convey the differing intensities of control across space in a way that is not captured by the “everywhere” border. Additionally, although “webs” and “nets” convey reach and extensive coverage, they also have gaps, holes and loops through which certain practices “slip through”. Networks are also fallible whilst “nets” and “webs” tear and break. A ‘fibrous, thread-like, wiry, [and] ropy’ (Latour, 1997, p. 3) social ontology promises to throw into relief the sinewy and cross cutting texture of both borders on the one hand and migrant routes on the other. Our point here is that the apparent diffusion of bordering practices should not be mistaken for an effective, global border enforcement complex. As the articles in this special issue show, borders come into force through disparate, disconnected practices, through failures and gaps in services as well as through humanitarian protection and religious outreach.

THE ARTICLES

The special issue begins in migrant detention centers, seemingly a paradigmatic example of closed territorial borders, expulsion, and the production of illegality. Taking a closer look at detention’s outsourcing to private sector firms, however, Hiemstra & Conlon (2017) show how nominally “public” and “private” actors have become entwined in ways that trouble those very categories. Departing from macro-economic analyses of the
migration-industrial complex, they examine the internal circulation of money within detention centers, particularly the ways in which commissary and migrant labor have become additional sources of money for both contractors and the county administrating the detention center. Their analysis of contracting practices suggest that personal connections and cronyism influence procurement processes and that local governments have come to rely on detention as a source of revenue in the context of diminishing state resources. Hiemstra & Conlon show, then, that the privatization of banal services like food provision involve diverse actors and organizations in detention, and that neoliberalisation reconfigures familiar forms of border and migration control and problematize who and what enacts state power.

Williams (2017) provides a critical interrogation of the 2014 re-expansion of family detention in the United States, concerned with how the mobilization of discourses of ‘crisis’ serve to justify the expansion of restrictive border enforcement practices. Their article focuses upon the polymorphous character of immigrant detention as seen through these transformations in family detention. More specifically, Williams shows how practical and legal barriers to detaining particular types of migrants (e.g., minors, families) shape the very mechanisms of detention that are used. Their paper therefore challenges us to look past brick and mortar detention centers to recognize alternative forms of detention and their relationship to the regulation of different types of political and social subjects. Methods including the use of electronic monitoring bracelets, requirements to provide the names and contact information of family members, and threats of immigration raids, function as less geographically fixed forms of detention and regulation that reconcile the practical and legal barriers to traditional forms of immigrant detention. Like Ehrkamp and Nagel (2017), and Pascucci (2017) later in the collection, Williams (2017) also shows how care and humanitarian aid may inadvertently perform bordering, as discourses of chaos and crisis on the border expand geographies of enforcement and regulate subjectivities in new ways.
Watkins (2017) analyses Australia’s migration and smuggling deterrence campaigns, or Overseas Public Information Campaigns (OPICs). He argues that by seeking to change the decision-making of potential migrants, OPICs extraterritorially subjugate non-citizens. Providing the *trompe l’oeil* to Ehrkamp & Nagel’s differential inclusion, Watkins argues that “Potential Irregular Migrants” are included as extraterritorial subjects. Australia subcontracts these campaigns to local advertising agencies, however, so that the composition and deployment of these campaigns produces transnational and non-state networks of organisations that contribute to Australia’s bordering projects. OPICs attempt to deter potential migrants by normalising imaginative geographies of safe, financially predictable homes and unpredictable, expensive stays in detention. Exemplifying polymorphic borders, he shows how a range of actors become involved in enforcement practices, but more importantly that Australia actively seeks to externalize migration control to individuals and households abroad.

Carte (2017) offers a richly textured glimpse into the bureaucratic work of providing care to migrants in Mexico’s southernmost province. In contrast to the two articles above, Tapachula, Mexico, has committed itself to migrants’ rights, but without providing frontline service providers with the resources to provide those services. For migrants, the constant refusals, frustrations, and deferrals feel like exclusion and discrimination. For the bureaucrats Carte interviewed, the lack of basic supplies—pens, paper, printers, toner—prevented them from completing the paperwork necessary to complete migrants’ requests. While some of those bureaucrats chaffed at the mayor’s demand to provide certain services to migrants, those that sought to fairly meet those obligations found it impossible to do so. Both bureaucrats and doctors retained a high degree of discretion to provide or withdraw services, and conditions of scarcity exacerbated the experience of waiting and exclusion for migrants. Like Pascucci (2017) and Ehrkamp and Nagel (2017), Carte’s article shows how efforts to
include and incorporate migrants can still exacerbate differences. The appearance of borders and discrimination can come from both intentional and accidental events simultaneously. This insight problematizes the appearance of “everywhere” borders, as exclusion can in some cases be the result of poorly resourced, but well-intentioned local government.

In a very different context, Ehrkamp and Nagel (2017) argue that love and care can perform “border work,” inscribing the very boundaries those acts of care seek to overcome through “differential inclusion.” They describe how white churches in the US South have tried to reach out to Latina/o and other immigrant people, but have done so in ways that consolidate their difference. Meeting in separate rooms, holding church services in other languages, and framing work with immigrants as charity, congregation and clergy members maintain those groups as different from the rest of the congregation. In addition, those involved in outreach tended to understand migrants’ distrust and reticence as “cultural” and “because of where they come from,” rather than due to exclusionary practices within and beyond the church or direct experience with white Southerners. Latina/o residents resisted their roles as receivers of charity, reporting feelings of being looked down upon and unwanted. Ehrkamp and Nagel show, crucially, that border work is emotional labor, produced through the repetition of affective, care relationships. Sometimes it is an invitation, other times, “small gestures, looks, silences, and avoidance or non-engagement” (Cisneros 2012). For Latino participants in their research, “being ministered to” marked them as outside, different, and therefore unequal, as noncitizens. Not only does their study question who and where the border is performed, but also the presumption that bordering takes the form of overt exclusion.

Pascucci’s (2017) study of urban refugee governance in Cairo, Egypt, similarly shows how humanitarian aid relies upon normalized ethnic identities and how the turn towards community governance has consolidated and institutionalized those ethnicities. Like Carte
Pascucci’s participants faced a chronic lack of basic infrastructure: housing, furnishings, communication technologies and assistance to obtain those items. Moreover, responsibility for those that do not obtain protected status falls to the communities tasked with serving them, but come with no resources for support. Pascucci argues that refugee governance has come to rely on “community infrastructures” and that this has, in turn, institutionalized particular forms of community. While ethnically defined communities do not provide camp-like infrastructure, exploitation still occurs in these “networked infrastructures” so that communities of support also serve as gatekeepers and rent-takers. Like Ehrkamp and Nagel (2017), Pascucci shows how difference is institutionalized according to place of origin, working to reinscribe that difference as a condition of receiving aid, comfort and basic needs. Here as above, bordering refracts through the legal recognition of refugee status and the related provision—and withdrawal—of aid. This kind of bordering is not only embodied and performed but diffused across the urban landscape, as refugee assistance shifts away from camp-style infrastructure towards social infrastructure. These changes in refugee administration respatialize and reterritorialize those political identities and borders.

Across the articles, the authors describe the banal ways that a range of actors materialize and enact difference, understood in terms of citizenship and migration, across territorial borders to produce multiple bordered spaces. They show that these borders come into force through the cooperation of a range of actors, but through different institutions, by multiple logics of inclusion and exclusion, often unintentionally. The authors describe a range of spatial practices and strategies, that demonstrate there is not a single border logic nor a ubiquitous border. Rather, inclusion and exclusion work through polymorphic spaces, produced by the specific coming-together of people, institutions, resources, law, territory, and mobility.
REFERENCES


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